Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[Bruno Marchal]

On 06 Aug 2016, at 22:13, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 8/6/2016 10:12 AM, smitra wrote:

On 05-08-2016 01:08, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2016-08-04 19:20 GMT+02:00 smitra :


On 04-08-2016 03:05, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/3/2016 4:30 PM, smitra wrote:
On 04-08-2016 01:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote:

On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a
mistake,
which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one
of
the many copies who didn't win is not one of the options - those
copies are not continuations of the you who won the lottery.

I'm imagining waking up after a night of heavy drinking with
memories gradually returning. Now, you can, of course, condition
everything on the person who will find that he won the lottery. But
making that a hard part of my identity doesn't make sense to me,
otherwise you could not be the same person and forget about it, or
consider being the same person who participated in the lottery who
then went on to win it.

Now,while this boils down to an arbitrary definition of personal
identity, we should be consistent about this; you can be the same
person as the won who had not yet won it, and you could imagine
being a person who did not win it, then you'll likely end up waking
up as a copy in another branch who did not win it.


 That seems to invoke a dualism, such that there's only one real
"you"
who may be in different branches at different times.  I'd say that  
if

"you" wake up as a copy in another branch where "you" didn't win,
it's
because "you" didn't win.  It's the same as saying the man who sees
Moscow didn't "wake up" as the man who sees Washington.

 Brent

We can turn this into a reverse Bruno-like problem. If your memory  
is

temporarily cleared then copies of different branches merge.

You mean there are branches of the world in which your memory of
yesterday, when the lottery was drawn, is erased (and we're  
supposing
there is no physics, so there is no physical evidence of  
yesterday?).

Then the threads of consciousness constituting Saibal before
yesterday
AND suffering amnesia about yesterday will merge with each other,  
but

NOT with the threads of Saibal that do remember yesterday.


The branches will of course be different, but you without a memory
of having won in the branch where you did win is the same you as  
the

you in another branch were you did not win where you also have
forgotten about not winning.

The question is then if it is advisable to go through this
procedure if you have won.


You're supposing there's a "procedure" for erasing memory of
yesterday?  How could there be, there's no physics?  So there are
some
Saibals that forgot yesterday, and whether or not "they" won, but  
the

forgetting wasn't a "procedure" because that would imply a physical
world context in which whether on not Saibal won would be evident in
the physical world and beyond mere "forgetting".  The forgetting
would
just have to be a result of the computation.

I've written in the past about an elaborate procedure involving an  
AI

that resets its memory, but I now think that this is not necessary.
It seems to me that every moment we experience is a new  
measurement of

our state that is equivalent to forgetting everything and then just
reloading all the information. Predictions of outcomes of  
experiments

should not depend on making this assumption. Put differently, at any
one time you could imagine yourself as being sampled randomly from  
the

set of all observer moments.

This is basically ASSA... and it has all the problems ASSA has



I think in the old debate about RSSA/ASSA things were  
oversimplified. The main thing that was overlooked was that an  
observer moment (OM) cannot be specified as a classical state,  
because an algorithm needs to be specified requiring counterfactual  
inputs and outputs to be specified. So OMs should be identified  
with operators specifying the time evolution over one computational  
step.


?? An algorithm doesn't have have any input or output.



An algorithm is just an informal descriptionj of a procedure. With  
Church thesis, each algorithm has infintely many implementation.





The algorithms executed by the UD don't have either.



Well, all versions of the UD that I made precise actually dovetail on  
the program with one input. The one in lisp do dovetail on all one- 
input programs, and all inputs for each of them.b


You are right, computerland is 0-dimensional, by the SMN theorem, and  
the dovetaling of programs without inputs generates the dovetailing on  
all inputs, including infinite non computable streams of inputs. That  
play some role at some points. The FPI might works thanks to some  
Oracle, the random oracle plays some role, like in the iterated self- 
duplication.



Bruno






Now, if we jump ahead to QM, then it should be clear that you  
should end up with a complete set of 

Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[Bruno Marchal]

On 06 Aug 2016, at 19:12, smitra wrote:


On 05-08-2016 01:08, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2016-08-04 19:20 GMT+02:00 smitra :

On 04-08-2016 03:05, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/3/2016 4:30 PM, smitra wrote:
On 04-08-2016 01:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote:
On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a
mistake,
which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one
of
the many copies who didn't win is not one of the options - those
copies are not continuations of the you who won the lottery.
I'm imagining waking up after a night of heavy drinking with
memories gradually returning. Now, you can, of course, condition
everything on the person who will find that he won the lottery. But
making that a hard part of my identity doesn't make sense to me,
otherwise you could not be the same person and forget about it, or
consider being the same person who participated in the lottery who
then went on to win it.
Now,while this boils down to an arbitrary definition of personal
identity, we should be consistent about this; you can be the same
person as the won who had not yet won it, and you could imagine
being a person who did not win it, then you'll likely end up waking
up as a copy in another branch who did not win it.

 That seems to invoke a dualism, such that there's only one real
"you"
who may be in different branches at different times.  I'd say that if
"you" wake up as a copy in another branch where "you" didn't win,
it's
because "you" didn't win.  It's the same as saying the man who sees
Moscow didn't "wake up" as the man who sees Washington.
 Brent
We can turn this into a reverse Bruno-like problem. If your memory is
temporarily cleared then copies of different branches merge.
You mean there are branches of the world in which your memory of
yesterday, when the lottery was drawn, is erased (and we're supposing
there is no physics, so there is no physical evidence of yesterday?).
Then the threads of consciousness constituting Saibal before
yesterday
AND suffering amnesia about yesterday will merge with each other, but
NOT with the threads of Saibal that do remember yesterday.

The branches will of course be different, but you without a memory
of having won in the branch where you did win is the same you as the
you in another branch were you did not win where you also have
forgotten about not winning.
The question is then if it is advisable to go through this
procedure if you have won.

You're supposing there's a "procedure" for erasing memory of
yesterday?  How could there be, there's no physics?  So there are
some
Saibals that forgot yesterday, and whether or not "they" won, but the
forgetting wasn't a "procedure" because that would imply a physical
world context in which whether on not Saibal won would be evident in
the physical world and beyond mere "forgetting".  The forgetting
would
just have to be a result of the computation.
I've written in the past about an elaborate procedure involving an AI
that resets its memory, but I now think that this is not necessary.
It seems to me that every moment we experience is a new measurement  
of

our state that is equivalent to forgetting everything and then just
reloading all the information. Predictions of outcomes of experiments
should not depend on making this assumption. Put differently, at any
one time you could imagine yourself as being sampled randomly from  
the

set of all observer moments.
This is basically ASSA... and it has all the problems ASSA has


I think in the old debate about RSSA/ASSA things were  
oversimplified. The main thing that was overlooked was that an  
observer moment (OM) cannot be specified as a classical state,  
because an algorithm needs to be specified requiring  counterfactual  
inputs and outputs to be specified. So OMs should be identified with  
operators specifying the time evolution over one computational step.


That would only define another universal number.

We must just agree on one sigma_1 complete theory (Turing universal)  
to have the counterfactuals.
Here your use of "operators" is ambiguous, as we don't know if it is  
referred to math or physics.


Computation is not just a mathematical notion, it is an arithmetical  
notion. Physical time should emerge from the FPI (hopefully plural) on  
an infinities of "digital time", which are just the computation  
themselves (determined either by two numbers (the program and the  
inputs) at the base level (arithmetic) or by three numbers (a  
universal number and its program, and its data), + streams, and oracle  
(like non computable set of numbers).





Now, if we jump ahead to QM, then it should be clear that you should  
end up with a complete set of commuting observables not for some  
system in the lab, but for whatever the observer is aware of, which  
is in principle also a quantum mechanical measurement.


So, specifying an OM involves a lot more 

Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[Russell Standish]

On Fri, Aug 05, 2016 at 01:08:15AM +0200, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2016-08-04 19:20 GMT+02:00 smitra :
> >
> > I've written in the past about an elaborate procedure involving an AI that
> > resets its memory, but I now think that this is not necessary.  It seems to
> > me that every moment we experience is a new measurement of our state that
> > is equivalent to forgetting everything and then just reloading all the
> > information. Predictions of outcomes of experiments should not depend on
> > making this assumption. Put differently, at any one time you could imagine
> > yourself as being sampled randomly from the set of all observer moments.
> >
> >
> This is basically ASSA... and it has all the problems ASSA has
> 

At least he'd consistent. On page 147 of Theory of Nothing, I have
Saibal pegged as an ASSAist!

Cheers

-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[Brent Meeker]

On 8/6/2016 10:12 AM, smitra wrote:

On 05-08-2016 01:08, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2016-08-04 19:20 GMT+02:00 smitra :


On 04-08-2016 03:05, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/3/2016 4:30 PM, smitra wrote:
On 04-08-2016 01:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote:

On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a
mistake,
which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one
of
the many copies who didn't win is not one of the options - those
copies are not continuations of the you who won the lottery.

I'm imagining waking up after a night of heavy drinking with
memories gradually returning. Now, you can, of course, condition
everything on the person who will find that he won the lottery. But
making that a hard part of my identity doesn't make sense to me,
otherwise you could not be the same person and forget about it, or
consider being the same person who participated in the lottery who
then went on to win it.

Now,while this boils down to an arbitrary definition of personal
identity, we should be consistent about this; you can be the same
person as the won who had not yet won it, and you could imagine
being a person who did not win it, then you'll likely end up waking
up as a copy in another branch who did not win it.


  That seems to invoke a dualism, such that there's only one real
"you"
 who may be in different branches at different times.  I'd say that if
 "you" wake up as a copy in another branch where "you" didn't win,
it's
 because "you" didn't win.  It's the same as saying the man who sees
 Moscow didn't "wake up" as the man who sees Washington.

  Brent

 We can turn this into a reverse Bruno-like problem. If your memory is
temporarily cleared then copies of different branches merge.

 You mean there are branches of the world in which your memory of
 yesterday, when the lottery was drawn, is erased (and we're supposing
 there is no physics, so there is no physical evidence of yesterday?).
 Then the threads of consciousness constituting Saibal before
yesterday
 AND suffering amnesia about yesterday will merge with each other, but
 NOT with the threads of Saibal that do remember yesterday.


The branches will of course be different, but you without a memory
of having won in the branch where you did win is the same you as the
you in another branch were you did not win where you also have
forgotten about not winning.

The question is then if it is advisable to go through this
procedure if you have won.


 You're supposing there's a "procedure" for erasing memory of
 yesterday?  How could there be, there's no physics?  So there are
some
 Saibals that forgot yesterday, and whether or not "they" won, but the
 forgetting wasn't a "procedure" because that would imply a physical
 world context in which whether on not Saibal won would be evident in
 the physical world and beyond mere "forgetting".  The forgetting
would
 just have to be a result of the computation.

 I've written in the past about an elaborate procedure involving an AI
that resets its memory, but I now think that this is not necessary.
It seems to me that every moment we experience is a new measurement of
our state that is equivalent to forgetting everything and then just
reloading all the information. Predictions of outcomes of experiments
should not depend on making this assumption. Put differently, at any
one time you could imagine yourself as being sampled randomly from the
set of all observer moments.

This is basically ASSA... and it has all the problems ASSA has



I think in the old debate about RSSA/ASSA things were oversimplified. 
The main thing that was overlooked was that an observer moment (OM) 
cannot be specified as a classical state, because an algorithm needs 
to be specified requiring counterfactual inputs and outputs to be 
specified. So OMs should be identified with operators specifying the 
time evolution over one computational step.


?? An algorithm doesn't have have any input or output.  The algorithms 
executed by the UD don't have either.




Now, if we jump ahead to QM, then it should be clear that you should 
end up with a complete set of commuting observables not for some 
system in the lab, but for whatever the observer is aware of, which is 
in principle also a quantum mechanical measurement.


A quantum measurement implicitly assumes decoherence into classical 
results. It's not all clear to me what process is "ending up" there?




So, specifying an OM involves a lot more than was assumed, you can 
build an entire universe around it. This should be possible because 
that's what we do in physics all the time. All we know at any given 
moment is never more than  information contained in a single OM, but 
that doesn't stop us from knowing a lot about the universe, the laws 
of physics etc. etc.


What does it mean to know something at a given moment?  Does it mean to 
have an affirmative thought about a 

Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[smitra]

On 05-08-2016 01:08, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2016-08-04 19:20 GMT+02:00 smitra :


On 04-08-2016 03:05, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/3/2016 4:30 PM, smitra wrote:
On 04-08-2016 01:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote:

On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a
mistake,
which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one
of
the many copies who didn't win is not one of the options - those
copies are not continuations of the you who won the lottery.

I'm imagining waking up after a night of heavy drinking with
memories gradually returning. Now, you can, of course, condition
everything on the person who will find that he won the lottery. But
making that a hard part of my identity doesn't make sense to me,
otherwise you could not be the same person and forget about it, or
consider being the same person who participated in the lottery who
then went on to win it.

Now,while this boils down to an arbitrary definition of personal
identity, we should be consistent about this; you can be the same
person as the won who had not yet won it, and you could imagine
being a person who did not win it, then you'll likely end up waking
up as a copy in another branch who did not win it.


  That seems to invoke a dualism, such that there's only one real
"you"
 who may be in different branches at different times.  I'd say that if
 "you" wake up as a copy in another branch where "you" didn't win,
it's
 because "you" didn't win.  It's the same as saying the man who sees
 Moscow didn't "wake up" as the man who sees Washington.

  Brent

 We can turn this into a reverse Bruno-like problem. If your memory is
temporarily cleared then copies of different branches merge.

 You mean there are branches of the world in which your memory of
 yesterday, when the lottery was drawn, is erased (and we're supposing
 there is no physics, so there is no physical evidence of yesterday?).
 Then the threads of consciousness constituting Saibal before
yesterday
 AND suffering amnesia about yesterday will merge with each other, but
 NOT with the threads of Saibal that do remember yesterday.


The branches will of course be different, but you without a memory
of having won in the branch where you did win is the same you as the
you in another branch were you did not win where you also have
forgotten about not winning.

The question is then if it is advisable to go through this
procedure if you have won.


 You're supposing there's a "procedure" for erasing memory of
 yesterday?  How could there be, there's no physics?  So there are
some
 Saibals that forgot yesterday, and whether or not "they" won, but the
 forgetting wasn't a "procedure" because that would imply a physical
 world context in which whether on not Saibal won would be evident in
 the physical world and beyond mere "forgetting".  The forgetting
would
 just have to be a result of the computation.

 I've written in the past about an elaborate procedure involving an AI
that resets its memory, but I now think that this is not necessary.
It seems to me that every moment we experience is a new measurement of
our state that is equivalent to forgetting everything and then just
reloading all the information. Predictions of outcomes of experiments
should not depend on making this assumption. Put differently, at any
one time you could imagine yourself as being sampled randomly from the
set of all observer moments.

This is basically ASSA... and it has all the problems ASSA has



I think in the old debate about RSSA/ASSA things were oversimplified. 
The main thing that was overlooked was that an observer moment (OM) 
cannot be specified as a classical state, because an algorithm needs to 
be specified requiring  counterfactual inputs and outputs to be 
specified. So OMs should be identified with operators specifying the 
time evolution over one computational step.


Now, if we jump ahead to QM, then it should be clear that you should end 
up with a complete set of commuting observables not for some system in 
the lab, but for whatever the observer is aware of, which is in 
principle also a quantum mechanical measurement.


So, specifying an OM involves a lot more than was assumed, you can build 
an entire universe around it. This should be possible because that's 
what we do in physics all the time. All we know at any given moment is 
never more than  information contained in a single OM, but that doesn't 
stop us from knowing a lot about the universe, the laws of physics etc. 
etc.


Saibal


Saibal

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Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

This bet is akin to believing that there are super civilizations in the galaxy, 
but we don't know they exist. Could be, but, meh!



-Original Message-
From: John Clark 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Thu, Aug 4, 2016 2:02 pm
Subject: Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life 
as a millionaire



A few years ago on this list I made a modest proposal, it's a low tech way to 
test the Many World's interpretation of Quantum Mechanics and as a bonus it'll 
make you rich too. First you buy one Powerball lottery ticket, the drawing of 
the winning number is on Saturday at 11pm, now make a simple machine that will 
pull the trigger on a 44 magnum revolver aimed at your head at exactly 
11:00:01pm UNLESS yours is the winning ticket. Your subjective experience can 
only be that at 11:00:01pm despite 80 million to one odds stacked against you a 
miracle occurs and the gun does not go off and you're rich beyond the dreams of 
avarice. Of course for every universe you're rich in there are 80 million in 
which your friends watch your head explode, but that's a minor point, your 
consciousness no longer exists in any of those worlds so you never have to see 
the mess, it's their problem not yours.

Actually I like Many Worlds and think it may very well be right, but I wouldn't 
bet my life on it.

  John K Clark







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Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[Quentin Anciaux]

2016-08-04 19:20 GMT+02:00 smitra :

> On 04-08-2016 03:05, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> On 8/3/2016 4:30 PM, smitra wrote:
>>
>>> On 04-08-2016 01:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>>
 On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote:

 On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a
>> mistake,
>> which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one
>> of
>> the many copies who didn't win is not one of the options - those
>> copies are not continuations of the you who won the lottery.
>>
>
> I'm imagining waking up after a night of heavy drinking with
> memories gradually returning. Now, you can, of course, condition
> everything on the person who will find that he won the lottery. But
> making that a hard part of my identity doesn't make sense to me,
> otherwise you could not be the same person and forget about it, or
> consider being the same person who participated in the lottery who
> then went on to win it.
>
> Now,while this boils down to an arbitrary definition of personal
> identity, we should be consistent about this; you can be the same
> person as the won who had not yet won it, and you could imagine
> being a person who did not win it, then you'll likely end up waking
> up as a copy in another branch who did not win it.
>

  That seems to invoke a dualism, such that there's only one real "you"
 who may be in different branches at different times.  I'd say that if
 "you" wake up as a copy in another branch where "you" didn't win, it's
 because "you" didn't win.  It's the same as saying the man who sees
 Moscow didn't "wake up" as the man who sees Washington.

  Brent

>>>
>>> We can turn this into a reverse Bruno-like problem. If your memory is
>>> temporarily cleared then copies of different branches merge.
>>>
>>
>> You mean there are branches of the world in which your memory of
>> yesterday, when the lottery was drawn, is erased (and we're supposing
>> there is no physics, so there is no physical evidence of yesterday?).
>> Then the threads of consciousness constituting Saibal before yesterday
>> AND suffering amnesia about yesterday will merge with each other, but
>> NOT with the threads of Saibal that do remember yesterday.
>>
>> The branches will of course be different, but you without a memory of
>>> having won in the branch where you did win is the same you as the you in
>>> another branch were you did not win where you also have forgotten about not
>>> winning.
>>>
>>> The question is then if it is advisable to go through this procedure if
>>> you have won.
>>>
>>
>> You're supposing there's a "procedure" for erasing memory of
>> yesterday?  How could there be, there's no physics?  So there are some
>> Saibals that forgot yesterday, and whether or not "they" won, but the
>> forgetting wasn't a "procedure" because that would imply a physical
>> world context in which whether on not Saibal won would be evident in
>> the physical world and beyond mere "forgetting".  The forgetting would
>> just have to be a result of the computation.
>>
>
>
> I've written in the past about an elaborate procedure involving an AI that
> resets its memory, but I now think that this is not necessary.  It seems to
> me that every moment we experience is a new measurement of our state that
> is equivalent to forgetting everything and then just reloading all the
> information. Predictions of outcomes of experiments should not depend on
> making this assumption. Put differently, at any one time you could imagine
> yourself as being sampled randomly from the set of all observer moments.
>
>
This is basically ASSA... and it has all the problems ASSA has


> Saibal
>
>
> --
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>



-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[Brent Meeker]

On 8/4/2016 12:45 PM, smitra wrote:

On 04-08-2016 21:35, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 8/4/2016 10:15 AM, smitra wrote:

On 04-08-2016 05:48, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 8/3/2016 6:59 PM, smitra wrote:


Actually, there will objective evidence as to whether or not you
have
won the lottery. There will be a winning number and you will have
a
ticket that will have this number on it or not, regardless of
whether
you forget anything or not. The idea that branches in the MWI can

recombine after the relevant quantum measurement has been
irreversibly
recorded is nonsense.


There is no recombination of branches here, it's just that you
become identical to another version of you located in another
branch. Then, upon a new measurement, you'll spit over the different
branches again. If somehow you would not be identical to another
copy of you located on a branch where the outcome of the lottery is
different, then that means that you actually did not forget the
outcome as the information about the outcome is still present in
your memory (the algorithm that defines you).


 And then you'll become Bruno, and then you'll become John Clark, and
then you'll become Sherlock Holmes and then you'll become a unicorn
and each of them infinitely many times...  That's the trouble with
"everything thing happens" .



Yes, but this is not a problem, this is just an artifact of 
introducing an unphysical "you". All that really exists are 
algorithms and they can be identified by the particular 
computational state that refers to them uniquely. So, your statement 
reduces to the fact that I, Bruno, and many other persons exist, 
which is not all that shocking.


Right.  But it destroys the indicial meaning of "you" so your so your
statement that, "... it's just that you become identical to another
version of you located in another branch."  becomes meaningless.



Yes, we need to be careful with precisely defining what we mean. In 
principle, we can only access information stored in our present 
moment. Anything that we experience that refers to the past is 
actually stored inside our present computational state.


How can past and future even be defined in that model.   To "access" 
information already implicitly assumes time and a duration of the 
"present moment".


Brent



It should therefore always be possible to reformulate all arguments in 
terms of only present moments, then that leads to convoluted argument. 
But I think this is a good way to go about things, also in the other 
thread about Bruno's duplication experiment to eliminate assumptions 
that are not physical.


Saibal



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Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[smitra]

On 04-08-2016 21:35, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 8/4/2016 10:15 AM, smitra wrote:

On 04-08-2016 05:48, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 8/3/2016 6:59 PM, smitra wrote:


Actually, there will objective evidence as to whether or not you
have
won the lottery. There will be a winning number and you will have
a
ticket that will have this number on it or not, regardless of
whether
you forget anything or not. The idea that branches in the MWI can

recombine after the relevant quantum measurement has been
irreversibly
recorded is nonsense.


There is no recombination of branches here, it's just that you
become identical to another version of you located in another
branch. Then, upon a new measurement, you'll spit over the different
branches again. If somehow you would not be identical to another
copy of you located on a branch where the outcome of the lottery is
different, then that means that you actually did not forget the
outcome as the information about the outcome is still present in
your memory (the algorithm that defines you).


 And then you'll become Bruno, and then you'll become John Clark, and
then you'll become Sherlock Holmes and then you'll become a unicorn
and each of them infinitely many times...  That's the trouble with
"everything thing happens" .



Yes, but this is not a problem, this is just an artifact of 
introducing an unphysical "you". All that really exists are algorithms 
and they can be identified by the particular computational state that 
refers to them uniquely. So, your statement reduces to the fact that 
I, Bruno, and many other persons exist, which is not all that 
shocking.


Right.  But it destroys the indicial meaning of "you" so your so your
statement that, "... it's just that you become identical to another
version of you located in another branch."  becomes meaningless.



Yes, we need to be careful with precisely defining what we mean. In 
principle, we can only access information stored in our present moment. 
Anything that we experience that refers to the past is actually stored 
inside our present computational state.


It should therefore always be possible to reformulate all arguments in 
terms of only present moments, then that leads to convoluted argument. 
But I think this is a good way to go about things, also in the other 
thread about Bruno's duplication experiment to eliminate assumptions 
that are not physical.


Saibal

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Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[Brent Meeker]

On 8/4/2016 10:20 AM, smitra wrote:

On 04-08-2016 03:05, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 8/3/2016 4:30 PM, smitra wrote:

On 04-08-2016 01:16, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote:


On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a
mistake,
which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one
of
the many copies who didn't win is not one of the options - those
copies are not continuations of the you who won the lottery.


I'm imagining waking up after a night of heavy drinking with
memories gradually returning. Now, you can, of course, condition
everything on the person who will find that he won the lottery. But
making that a hard part of my identity doesn't make sense to me,
otherwise you could not be the same person and forget about it, or
consider being the same person who participated in the lottery who
then went on to win it.

Now,while this boils down to an arbitrary definition of personal
identity, we should be consistent about this; you can be the same
person as the won who had not yet won it, and you could imagine
being a person who did not win it, then you'll likely end up waking
up as a copy in another branch who did not win it.


 That seems to invoke a dualism, such that there's only one real "you"
who may be in different branches at different times.  I'd say that if
"you" wake up as a copy in another branch where "you" didn't win, it's
because "you" didn't win.  It's the same as saying the man who sees
Moscow didn't "wake up" as the man who sees Washington.

 Brent


We can turn this into a reverse Bruno-like problem. If your memory 
is temporarily cleared then copies of different branches merge.


You mean there are branches of the world in which your memory of
yesterday, when the lottery was drawn, is erased (and we're supposing
there is no physics, so there is no physical evidence of yesterday?).
Then the threads of consciousness constituting Saibal before yesterday
AND suffering amnesia about yesterday will merge with each other, but
NOT with the threads of Saibal that do remember yesterday.

The branches will of course be different, but you without a memory 
of having won in the branch where you did win is the same you as the 
you in another branch were you did not win where you also have 
forgotten about not winning.


The question is then if it is advisable to go through this procedure 
if you have won.


You're supposing there's a "procedure" for erasing memory of
yesterday?  How could there be, there's no physics?  So there are some
Saibals that forgot yesterday, and whether or not "they" won, but the
forgetting wasn't a "procedure" because that would imply a physical
world context in which whether on not Saibal won would be evident in
the physical world and beyond mere "forgetting".  The forgetting would
just have to be a result of the computation.



I've written in the past about an elaborate procedure involving an AI 
that resets its memory, but I now think that this is not necessary.  
It seems to me that every moment we experience is a new measurement of 
our state that is equivalent to forgetting everything and then just 
reloading all the information. Predictions of outcomes of experiments 
should not depend on making this assumption. Put differently, at any 
one time you could imagine yourself as being sampled randomly from the 
set of all observer moments.


Sure.  And you can imagine that God created the world last Thursday.  
But I see any predictive or explanatory power in such an "imagining".


Brent




Saibal



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Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[Brent Meeker]

On 8/4/2016 10:15 AM, smitra wrote:

On 04-08-2016 05:48, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 8/3/2016 6:59 PM, smitra wrote:


Actually, there will objective evidence as to whether or not you
have
won the lottery. There will be a winning number and you will have
a
ticket that will have this number on it or not, regardless of
whether
you forget anything or not. The idea that branches in the MWI can

recombine after the relevant quantum measurement has been
irreversibly
recorded is nonsense.


There is no recombination of branches here, it's just that you
become identical to another version of you located in another
branch. Then, upon a new measurement, you'll spit over the different
branches again. If somehow you would not be identical to another
copy of you located on a branch where the outcome of the lottery is
different, then that means that you actually did not forget the
outcome as the information about the outcome is still present in
your memory (the algorithm that defines you).


 And then you'll become Bruno, and then you'll become John Clark, and
then you'll become Sherlock Holmes and then you'll become a unicorn
and each of them infinitely many times...  That's the trouble with
"everything thing happens" .



Yes, but this is not a problem, this is just an artifact of 
introducing an unphysical "you". All that really exists are algorithms 
and they can be identified by the particular computational state that 
refers to them uniquely. So, your statement reduces to the fact that 
I, Bruno, and many other persons exist, which is not all that shocking.


Right.  But it destroys the indicial meaning of "you" so your so your 
statement that, "... it's just that you become identical to another 
version of you located in another branch."  becomes meaningless.


Brent



Saibal



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Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[John Clark]

A few years ago on this list I made a modest proposal, it's a low tech way
to test the Many World's interpretation of Quantum Mechanics and as a bonus
it'll make you rich too. First you buy one Powerball lottery ticket, the
drawing of the winning number is on Saturday at 11pm, now make a simple
machine that will pull the trigger on a 44 magnum revolver aimed at your
head at exactly 11:00:01pm UNLESS yours is the winning ticket. Your
subjective experience can only be that at 11:00:01pm despite 80 million to
one odds stacked against you a miracle occurs and the gun does not go off
and you're rich beyond the dreams of avarice. Of course for every universe
you're rich in there are 80 million in which your friends watch your head
explode, but that's a minor point, your consciousness no longer exists in
any of those worlds so you never have to see the mess, it's their problem
not yours.

Actually I like Many Worlds and think it may very well be right, but I
wouldn't bet my life on it.

  John K Clark

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Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[Bruno Marchal]

On 04 Aug 2016, at 05:48, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 8/3/2016 6:59 PM, smitra wrote:


Actually, there will objective evidence as to whether or not you  
have

won the lottery. There will be a winning number and you will have a
ticket that will have this number on it or not, regardless of  
whether

you forget anything or not. The idea that branches in the MWI can
recombine after the relevant quantum measurement has been  
irreversibly

recorded is nonsense.


There is no recombination of branches here, it's just that you  
become identical to another version of you located in another  
branch. Then, upon a new measurement, you'll spit over the  
different branches again. If somehow you would not be identical to  
another copy of you located on a branch where the outcome of the  
lottery is different, then that means that you actually did not  
forget the outcome as the information about the outcome is still  
present in your memory (the algorithm that defines you).


And then you'll become Bruno, and then you'll become John Clark, and  
then you'll become Sherlock Holmes and then you'll become a unicorn  
and each of them infinitely many times...  That's the trouble with  
"everything thing happens" .



Fortunately for mechanism, some diophantine equation have no  
solutions, some programs never stop, and nothing impossible happens at  
the base level, or we are all gravely inconsistent.


But what is interesting is that for any machine, the truth is bigger  
than its believable/justifiable part, and the exploration is infinite,  
and can only lead to more surprises and more surprises, and more  
doubts ...


"everything" has no meaning out of the theory of thing that we  
postulate.


Bruno





Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[smitra]

On 04-08-2016 03:05, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 8/3/2016 4:30 PM, smitra wrote:

On 04-08-2016 01:16, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote:


On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a
mistake,
which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one
of
the many copies who didn't win is not one of the options - those
copies are not continuations of the you who won the lottery.


I'm imagining waking up after a night of heavy drinking with
memories gradually returning. Now, you can, of course, condition
everything on the person who will find that he won the lottery. But
making that a hard part of my identity doesn't make sense to me,
otherwise you could not be the same person and forget about it, or
consider being the same person who participated in the lottery who
then went on to win it.

Now,while this boils down to an arbitrary definition of personal
identity, we should be consistent about this; you can be the same
person as the won who had not yet won it, and you could imagine
being a person who did not win it, then you'll likely end up waking
up as a copy in another branch who did not win it.


 That seems to invoke a dualism, such that there's only one real 
"you"

who may be in different branches at different times.  I'd say that if
"you" wake up as a copy in another branch where "you" didn't win, 
it's

because "you" didn't win.  It's the same as saying the man who sees
Moscow didn't "wake up" as the man who sees Washington.

 Brent


We can turn this into a reverse Bruno-like problem. If your memory is 
temporarily cleared then copies of different branches merge.


You mean there are branches of the world in which your memory of
yesterday, when the lottery was drawn, is erased (and we're supposing
there is no physics, so there is no physical evidence of yesterday?).
Then the threads of consciousness constituting Saibal before yesterday
AND suffering amnesia about yesterday will merge with each other, but
NOT with the threads of Saibal that do remember yesterday.

The branches will of course be different, but you without a memory of 
having won in the branch where you did win is the same you as the you 
in another branch were you did not win where you also have forgotten 
about not winning.


The question is then if it is advisable to go through this procedure 
if you have won.


You're supposing there's a "procedure" for erasing memory of
yesterday?  How could there be, there's no physics?  So there are some
Saibals that forgot yesterday, and whether or not "they" won, but the
forgetting wasn't a "procedure" because that would imply a physical
world context in which whether on not Saibal won would be evident in
the physical world and beyond mere "forgetting".  The forgetting would
just have to be a result of the computation.



I've written in the past about an elaborate procedure involving an AI 
that resets its memory, but I now think that this is not necessary.  It 
seems to me that every moment we experience is a new measurement of our 
state that is equivalent to forgetting everything and then just 
reloading all the information. Predictions of outcomes of experiments 
should not depend on making this assumption. Put differently, at any one 
time you could imagine yourself as being sampled randomly from the set 
of all observer moments.


Saibal

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Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[smitra]

On 04-08-2016 05:48, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 8/3/2016 6:59 PM, smitra wrote:


Actually, there will objective evidence as to whether or not you
have
won the lottery. There will be a winning number and you will have
a
ticket that will have this number on it or not, regardless of
whether
you forget anything or not. The idea that branches in the MWI can

recombine after the relevant quantum measurement has been
irreversibly
recorded is nonsense.


There is no recombination of branches here, it's just that you
become identical to another version of you located in another
branch. Then, upon a new measurement, you'll spit over the different
branches again. If somehow you would not be identical to another
copy of you located on a branch where the outcome of the lottery is
different, then that means that you actually did not forget the
outcome as the information about the outcome is still present in
your memory (the algorithm that defines you).


 And then you'll become Bruno, and then you'll become John Clark, and
then you'll become Sherlock Holmes and then you'll become a unicorn
and each of them infinitely many times...  That's the trouble with
"everything thing happens" .



Yes, but this is not a problem, this is just an artifact of introducing 
an unphysical "you". All that really exists are algorithms and they can 
be identified by the particular computational state that refers to them 
uniquely. So, your statement reduces to the fact that I, Bruno, and many 
other persons exist, which is not all that shocking.


Saibal

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Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[smitra]

On 04-08-2016 04:13, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 4/08/2016 11:59 am, smitra wrote:

On 04-08-2016 01:51, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 4/08/2016 9:30 am, smitra wrote:

On 04-08-2016 01:16, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote:


On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a
mistake,
which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one
of
the many copies who didn't win is not one of the options - those
copies are not continuations of the you who won the lottery.


I'm imagining waking up after a night of heavy drinking with
memories gradually returning. Now, you can, of course, condition
everything on the person who will find that he won the lottery. 
But

making that a hard part of my identity doesn't make sense to me,
otherwise you could not be the same person and forget about it, or
consider being the same person who participated in the lottery who
then went on to win it.

Now,while this boils down to an arbitrary definition of personal
identity, we should be consistent about this; you can be the same
person as the won who had not yet won it, and you could imagine
being a person who did not win it, then you'll likely end up 
waking

up as a copy in another branch who did not win it.


 That seems to invoke a dualism, such that there's only one real 
"you"
who may be in different branches at different times.  I'd say that 
if
"you" wake up as a copy in another branch where "you" didn't win, 
it's

because "you" didn't win.  It's the same as saying the man who sees
Moscow didn't "wake up" as the man who sees Washington.

 Brent


We can turn this into a reverse Bruno-like problem. If your memory 
is temporarily cleared then copies of different branches merge. The 
branches will of course be different, but you without a memory of 
having won in the branch where you did win is the same you as the 
you in another branch were you did not win where you also have 
forgotten about not winning.


Actually, there will objective evidence as to whether or not you have
won the lottery. There will be a winning number and you will have a
ticket that will have this number on it or not, regardless of whether
you forget anything or not. The idea that branches in the MWI can
recombine after the relevant quantum measurement has been 
irreversibly

recorded is nonsense.


There is no recombination of branches here, it's just that you become 
identical to another version of you located in another branch. Then, 
upon a new measurement, you'll spit over the different branches again. 
If somehow you would not be identical to another copy of you located 
on a branch where the outcome of the lottery is different, then that 
means that you actually did not forget the outcome as the information 
about the outcome is still present in your memory (the algorithm that 
defines you).


Forgetting does not involve  complete reversal of a particular brain
state, so there will always be traces of the facts that you once knew,
but have recently forgotten -- the memories might come flooding back.
I don't think the subconscious mind is as simple as you seem to
presume. While you were forgetting, the other branches of the wave
funtion have evolved away in different diretions, so it is extremely
unlikey that there will be another copy identical to you
post-forgetting state. If you do another measurement, there is another
branching -- you never go back to an earlier state. Decoherence is
irreversible.

It doesn't matter, because the moment you have forgotten it,  the parts 
of your brain that do contain the information about the lottery are 
external to you. Otherwise, you would not have forgotten it.  That 
decoherence is irreversible in practice is irrelevant here.


Saibal

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R: Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

['scerir' via Everything List]

>Messaggio originale
>Da: "Bruce Kellett" 
>Data: 04/08/2016 4.13
>A: 
>Ogg: Re: If you win the lottery, dont expect to live the rest of your 
life as a millionaire
>
>On 4/08/2016 11:59 am, smitra wrote:
>> On 04-08-2016 01:51, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>> On 4/08/2016 9:30 am, smitra wrote:
 On 04-08-2016 01:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
> On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote:
>
>> On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>> Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a
>>> mistake,
>>> which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one
>>> of
>>> the many copies who didn't win is not one of the options - those
>>> copies are not continuations of the you who won the lottery.
>>
>> I'm imagining waking up after a night of heavy drinking with
>> memories gradually returning. Now, you can, of course, condition
>> everything on the person who will find that he won the lottery. But
>> making that a hard part of my identity doesn't make sense to me,
>> otherwise you could not be the same person and forget about it, or
>> consider being the same person who participated in the lottery who
>> then went on to win it.
>>
>> Now,while this boils down to an arbitrary definition of personal
>> identity, we should be consistent about this; you can be the same
>> person as the won who had not yet won it, and you could imagine
>> being a person who did not win it, then you'll likely end up waking
>> up as a copy in another branch who did not win it.
>
>  That seems to invoke a dualism, such that there's only one real "you"
> who may be in different branches at different times.  I'd say that if
> "you" wake up as a copy in another branch where "you" didn't win, it's
> because "you" didn't win.  It's the same as saying the man who sees
> Moscow didn't "wake up" as the man who sees Washington.
>
>  Brent

 We can turn this into a reverse Bruno-like problem. If your memory 
 is temporarily cleared then copies of different branches merge. The 
 branches will of course be different, but you without a memory of 
 having won in the branch where you did win is the same you as the 
 you in another branch were you did not win where you also have 
 forgotten about not winning.
>>>
>>> Actually, there will objective evidence as to whether or not you have
>>> won the lottery. There will be a winning number and you will have a
>>> ticket that will have this number on it or not, regardless of whether
>>> you forget anything or not. The idea that branches in the MWI can
>>> recombine after the relevant quantum measurement has been irreversibly
>>> recorded is nonsense.
>>
>> There is no recombination of branches here, it's just that you become 
>> identical to another version of you located in another branch. Then, 
>> upon a new measurement, you'll spit over the different branches again. 
>> If somehow you would not be identical to another copy of you located 
>> on a branch where the outcome of the lottery is different, then that 
>> means that you actually did not forget the outcome as the information 
>> about the outcome is still present in your memory (the algorithm that 
>> defines you).
>
>Forgetting does not involve  complete reversal of a particular brain 
>state, so there will always be traces of the facts that you once knew, 
>but have recently forgotten -- the memories might come flooding back. I 
>don't think the subconscious mind is as simple as you seem to presume. 
>While you were forgetting, the other branches of the wave funtion have 
>evolved away in different diretions, so it is extremely unlikey that 
>there will be another copy identical to you post-forgetting state. If 
>you do another measurement, there is another branching -- you never go 
>back to an earlier state. Decoherence is irreversible.
>
>Bruce

But, are there differences between "Many Minds I." and "Many Worlds I."?
It seems so.
http://www.ibiblio.org/weidai/Many_Minds.pdf
http://www.ibiblio.org/weidai/Many_Minds_Replies.pdf

Each interpretation has problems (preferred basis, decoherence, recoherence,
Born rule, etc.). I think here we are somehow mixing the two interpretation 


s.

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Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[Brent Meeker]

On 8/3/2016 6:59 PM, smitra wrote:


Actually, there will objective evidence as to whether or not you have
won the lottery. There will be a winning number and you will have a
ticket that will have this number on it or not, regardless of whether
you forget anything or not. The idea that branches in the MWI can
recombine after the relevant quantum measurement has been irreversibly
recorded is nonsense.


There is no recombination of branches here, it's just that you become 
identical to another version of you located in another branch. Then, 
upon a new measurement, you'll spit over the different branches again. 
If somehow you would not be identical to another copy of you located 
on a branch where the outcome of the lottery is different, then that 
means that you actually did not forget the outcome as the information 
about the outcome is still present in your memory (the algorithm that 
defines you). 


And then you'll become Bruno, and then you'll become John Clark, and 
then you'll become Sherlock Holmes and then you'll become a unicorn and 
each of them infinitely many times...  That's the trouble with 
"everything thing happens" .


Brent

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Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[Bruce Kellett]

On 4/08/2016 11:59 am, smitra wrote:

On 04-08-2016 01:51, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 4/08/2016 9:30 am, smitra wrote:

On 04-08-2016 01:16, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote:


On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a
mistake,
which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one
of
the many copies who didn't win is not one of the options - those
copies are not continuations of the you who won the lottery.


I'm imagining waking up after a night of heavy drinking with
memories gradually returning. Now, you can, of course, condition
everything on the person who will find that he won the lottery. But
making that a hard part of my identity doesn't make sense to me,
otherwise you could not be the same person and forget about it, or
consider being the same person who participated in the lottery who
then went on to win it.

Now,while this boils down to an arbitrary definition of personal
identity, we should be consistent about this; you can be the same
person as the won who had not yet won it, and you could imagine
being a person who did not win it, then you'll likely end up waking
up as a copy in another branch who did not win it.


 That seems to invoke a dualism, such that there's only one real "you"
who may be in different branches at different times.  I'd say that if
"you" wake up as a copy in another branch where "you" didn't win, it's
because "you" didn't win.  It's the same as saying the man who sees
Moscow didn't "wake up" as the man who sees Washington.

 Brent


We can turn this into a reverse Bruno-like problem. If your memory 
is temporarily cleared then copies of different branches merge. The 
branches will of course be different, but you without a memory of 
having won in the branch where you did win is the same you as the 
you in another branch were you did not win where you also have 
forgotten about not winning.


Actually, there will objective evidence as to whether or not you have
won the lottery. There will be a winning number and you will have a
ticket that will have this number on it or not, regardless of whether
you forget anything or not. The idea that branches in the MWI can
recombine after the relevant quantum measurement has been irreversibly
recorded is nonsense.


There is no recombination of branches here, it's just that you become 
identical to another version of you located in another branch. Then, 
upon a new measurement, you'll spit over the different branches again. 
If somehow you would not be identical to another copy of you located 
on a branch where the outcome of the lottery is different, then that 
means that you actually did not forget the outcome as the information 
about the outcome is still present in your memory (the algorithm that 
defines you).


Forgetting does not involve  complete reversal of a particular brain 
state, so there will always be traces of the facts that you once knew, 
but have recently forgotten -- the memories might come flooding back. I 
don't think the subconscious mind is as simple as you seem to presume. 
While you were forgetting, the other branches of the wave funtion have 
evolved away in different diretions, so it is extremely unlikey that 
there will be another copy identical to you post-forgetting state. If 
you do another measurement, there is another branching -- you never go 
back to an earlier state. Decoherence is irreversible.


Bruce

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Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[smitra]

On 04-08-2016 01:51, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 4/08/2016 9:30 am, smitra wrote:

On 04-08-2016 01:16, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote:


On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a
mistake,
which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one
of
the many copies who didn't win is not one of the options - those
copies are not continuations of the you who won the lottery.


I'm imagining waking up after a night of heavy drinking with
memories gradually returning. Now, you can, of course, condition
everything on the person who will find that he won the lottery. But
making that a hard part of my identity doesn't make sense to me,
otherwise you could not be the same person and forget about it, or
consider being the same person who participated in the lottery who
then went on to win it.

Now,while this boils down to an arbitrary definition of personal
identity, we should be consistent about this; you can be the same
person as the won who had not yet won it, and you could imagine
being a person who did not win it, then you'll likely end up waking
up as a copy in another branch who did not win it.


 That seems to invoke a dualism, such that there's only one real 
"you"

who may be in different branches at different times.  I'd say that if
"you" wake up as a copy in another branch where "you" didn't win, 
it's

because "you" didn't win.  It's the same as saying the man who sees
Moscow didn't "wake up" as the man who sees Washington.

 Brent


We can turn this into a reverse Bruno-like problem. If your memory is 
temporarily cleared then copies of different branches merge. The 
branches will of course be different, but you without a memory of 
having won in the branch where you did win is the same you as the you 
in another branch were you did not win where you also have forgotten 
about not winning.


Actually, there will objective evidence as to whether or not you have
won the lottery. There will be a winning number and you will have a
ticket that will have this number on it or not, regardless of whether
you forget anything or not. The idea that branches in the MWI can
recombine after the relevant quantum measurement has been irreversibly
recorded is nonsense.


There is no recombination of branches here, it's just that you become 
identical to another version of you located in another branch. Then, 
upon a new measurement, you'll spit over the different branches again. 
If somehow you would not be identical to another copy of you located on 
a branch where the outcome of the lottery is different, then that means 
that you actually did not forget the outcome as the information about 
the outcome is still present in your memory (the algorithm that defines 
you).


Saibal


Bruce


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Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[Brent Meeker]

On 8/3/2016 4:30 PM, smitra wrote:

On 04-08-2016 01:16, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote:


On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a
mistake,
which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one
of
the many copies who didn't win is not one of the options - those
copies are not continuations of the you who won the lottery.


I'm imagining waking up after a night of heavy drinking with
memories gradually returning. Now, you can, of course, condition
everything on the person who will find that he won the lottery. But
making that a hard part of my identity doesn't make sense to me,
otherwise you could not be the same person and forget about it, or
consider being the same person who participated in the lottery who
then went on to win it.

Now,while this boils down to an arbitrary definition of personal
identity, we should be consistent about this; you can be the same
person as the won who had not yet won it, and you could imagine
being a person who did not win it, then you'll likely end up waking
up as a copy in another branch who did not win it.


 That seems to invoke a dualism, such that there's only one real "you"
who may be in different branches at different times.  I'd say that if
"you" wake up as a copy in another branch where "you" didn't win, it's
because "you" didn't win.  It's the same as saying the man who sees
Moscow didn't "wake up" as the man who sees Washington.

 Brent


We can turn this into a reverse Bruno-like problem. If your memory is 
temporarily cleared then copies of different branches merge. 


You mean there are branches of the world in which your memory of 
yesterday, when the lottery was drawn, is erased (and we're supposing 
there is no physics, so there is no physical evidence of yesterday?).  
Then the threads of consciousness constituting Saibal before yesterday 
AND suffering amnesia about yesterday will merge with each other, but 
NOT with the threads of Saibal that do remember yesterday.


The branches will of course be different, but you without a memory of 
having won in the branch where you did win is the same you as the you 
in another branch were you did not win where you also have forgotten 
about not winning.


The question is then if it is advisable to go through this procedure 
if you have won.


You're supposing there's a "procedure" for erasing memory of yesterday?  
How could there be, there's no physics?  So there are some Saibals that 
forgot yesterday, and whether or not "they" won, but the forgetting 
wasn't a "procedure" because that would imply a physical world context 
in which whether on not Saibal won would be evident in the physical 
world and beyond mere "forgetting".  The forgetting would just have to 
be a result of the computation.


Brent

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Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 4 August 2016 at 09:51, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On 4/08/2016 9:30 am, smitra wrote:
>
>> On 04-08-2016 01:16, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>>> On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote:
>>>
>>> On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a
> mistake,
> which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one
> of
> the many copies who didn't win is not one of the options - those
> copies are not continuations of the you who won the lottery.
>

 I'm imagining waking up after a night of heavy drinking with
 memories gradually returning. Now, you can, of course, condition
 everything on the person who will find that he won the lottery. But
 making that a hard part of my identity doesn't make sense to me,
 otherwise you could not be the same person and forget about it, or
 consider being the same person who participated in the lottery who
 then went on to win it.

 Now,while this boils down to an arbitrary definition of personal
 identity, we should be consistent about this; you can be the same
 person as the won who had not yet won it, and you could imagine
 being a person who did not win it, then you'll likely end up waking
 up as a copy in another branch who did not win it.

>>>
>>>  That seems to invoke a dualism, such that there's only one real "you"
>>> who may be in different branches at different times.  I'd say that if
>>> "you" wake up as a copy in another branch where "you" didn't win, it's
>>> because "you" didn't win.  It's the same as saying the man who sees
>>> Moscow didn't "wake up" as the man who sees Washington.
>>>
>>>  Brent
>>>
>>
>> We can turn this into a reverse Bruno-like problem. If your memory is
>> temporarily cleared then copies of different branches merge. The branches
>> will of course be different, but you without a memory of having won in the
>> branch where you did win is the same you as the you in another branch were
>> you did not win where you also have forgotten about not winning.
>>
>
> Actually, there will objective evidence as to whether or not you have won
> the lottery. There will be a winning number and you will have a ticket that
> will have this number on it or not, regardless of whether you forget
> anything or not. The idea that branches in the MWI can recombine after the
> relevant quantum measurement has been irreversibly recorded is nonsense.


If you win the lottery today there are some branches of the multiverse
where you forget you won and all evidence of winning is erased, or you
discover you were dreaming or deluded. But I think these possibilities are
less likely (smaller in measure) than the ones where you actually have won,
which although unlikely is not completely incredible, like realising that
you are God or that you have been turned into a frog.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[Bruce Kellett]

On 4/08/2016 9:30 am, smitra wrote:

On 04-08-2016 01:16, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote:


On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a
mistake,
which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one
of
the many copies who didn't win is not one of the options - those
copies are not continuations of the you who won the lottery.


I'm imagining waking up after a night of heavy drinking with
memories gradually returning. Now, you can, of course, condition
everything on the person who will find that he won the lottery. But
making that a hard part of my identity doesn't make sense to me,
otherwise you could not be the same person and forget about it, or
consider being the same person who participated in the lottery who
then went on to win it.

Now,while this boils down to an arbitrary definition of personal
identity, we should be consistent about this; you can be the same
person as the won who had not yet won it, and you could imagine
being a person who did not win it, then you'll likely end up waking
up as a copy in another branch who did not win it.


 That seems to invoke a dualism, such that there's only one real "you"
who may be in different branches at different times.  I'd say that if
"you" wake up as a copy in another branch where "you" didn't win, it's
because "you" didn't win.  It's the same as saying the man who sees
Moscow didn't "wake up" as the man who sees Washington.

 Brent


We can turn this into a reverse Bruno-like problem. If your memory is 
temporarily cleared then copies of different branches merge. The 
branches will of course be different, but you without a memory of 
having won in the branch where you did win is the same you as the you 
in another branch were you did not win where you also have forgotten 
about not winning.


Actually, there will objective evidence as to whether or not you have 
won the lottery. There will be a winning number and you will have a 
ticket that will have this number on it or not, regardless of whether 
you forget anything or not. The idea that branches in the MWI can 
recombine after the relevant quantum measurement has been irreversibly 
recorded is nonsense.


Bruce

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Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 4 August 2016 at 09:09, smitra  wrote:

> On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a mistake,
>> which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one of
>> the many copies who didn't win is not one of the options - those
>> copies are not continuations of the you who won the lottery.
>>
>
> I'm imagining waking up after a night of heavy drinking with memories
> gradually returning. Now, you can, of course, condition everything on the
> person who will find that he won the lottery. But making that a hard part
> of my identity doesn't make sense to me, otherwise you could not be the
> same person and forget about it, or consider being the same person who
> participated in the lottery who then went on to win it.
>

You did start your post, "suppose that you won the lottery...". That
constitutes a strong condition. A lot more people dream that they win the
lottery than actually win the lottery, but usually if you are not dreaming
then you can be sure that you are not dreaming, and I assume this is the
sort of experience of winning the lottery that you mean. To have such an
experience then wake up and realise that you were wrong seems unlikely. If
you picked another example, such as realising that you are God, I would
agree that you will more likely wake up at some point and realise that it
is a dream or delusion.


> Now,while this boils down to an arbitrary definition of personal identity,
> we should be consistent about this; you can be the same person as the won
> who had not yet won it, and you could imagine being a person who did not
> win it, then you'll likely end up waking up as a copy in another branch who
> did not win it.
>

For this thought experiment to be meaningful you would have to wake up as
someone with a clear recollection of winning and yet not have won. If you
wake up as someone who never won and never thought he had won then that is
just a statement of what normally happens - people rarely win the lottery.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[smitra]

On 04-08-2016 01:16, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote:


On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a
mistake,
which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one
of
the many copies who didn't win is not one of the options - those
copies are not continuations of the you who won the lottery.


I'm imagining waking up after a night of heavy drinking with
memories gradually returning. Now, you can, of course, condition
everything on the person who will find that he won the lottery. But
making that a hard part of my identity doesn't make sense to me,
otherwise you could not be the same person and forget about it, or
consider being the same person who participated in the lottery who
then went on to win it.

Now,while this boils down to an arbitrary definition of personal
identity, we should be consistent about this; you can be the same
person as the won who had not yet won it, and you could imagine
being a person who did not win it, then you'll likely end up waking
up as a copy in another branch who did not win it.


 That seems to invoke a dualism, such that there's only one real "you"
who may be in different branches at different times.  I'd say that if
"you" wake up as a copy in another branch where "you" didn't win, it's
because "you" didn't win.  It's the same as saying the man who sees
Moscow didn't "wake up" as the man who sees Washington.

 Brent


We can turn this into a reverse Bruno-like problem. If your memory is 
temporarily cleared then copies of different branches merge. The 
branches will of course be different, but you without a memory of having 
won in the branch where you did win is the same you as the you in 
another branch were you did not win where you also have forgotten about 
not winning.


The question is then if it is advisable to go through this procedure if 
you have won.


Saibal




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Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[Brent Meeker]

On 8/3/2016 4:09 PM, smitra wrote:

On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a mistake,
which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one of
the many copies who didn't win is not one of the options - those
copies are not continuations of the you who won the lottery.


I'm imagining waking up after a night of heavy drinking with memories 
gradually returning. Now, you can, of course, condition everything on 
the person who will find that he won the lottery. But making that a 
hard part of my identity doesn't make sense to me, otherwise you could 
not be the same person and forget about it, or consider being the same 
person who participated in the lottery who then went on to win it.


Now,while this boils down to an arbitrary definition of personal 
identity, we should be consistent about this; you can be the same 
person as the won who had not yet won it, and you could imagine being 
a person who did not win it, then you'll likely end up waking up as a 
copy in another branch who did not win it. 


That seems to invoke a dualism, such that there's only one real "you" 
who may be in different branches at different times.  I'd say that if 
"you" wake up as a copy in another branch where "you" didn't win, it's 
because "you" didn't win.  It's the same as saying the man who sees 
Moscow didn't "wake up" as the man who sees Washington.


Brent

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Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[smitra]

On 04-08-2016 00:12, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a mistake,
which seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one of
the many copies who didn't win is not one of the options - those
copies are not continuations of the you who won the lottery.


I'm imagining waking up after a night of heavy drinking with memories 
gradually returning. Now, you can, of course, condition everything on 
the person who will find that he won the lottery. But making that a hard 
part of my identity doesn't make sense to me, otherwise you could not be 
the same person and forget about it, or consider being the same person 
who participated in the lottery who then went on to win it.


Now,while this boils down to an arbitrary definition of personal 
identity, we should be consistent about this; you can be the same person 
as the won who had not yet won it, and you could imagine being a person 
who did not win it, then you'll likely end up waking up as a copy in 
another branch who did not win it.


Saibal




On Thursday, 4 August 2016, smitra  wrote:


Suppose that you won the lottery, you had a one in a hundred million
chance to win, so you got extremely lucky. You party, go to bed and
think about planning your trip around the World next morning.

In the MWI, things will actually not pan out this way. What will
happen is that the next morning you'll wake up as one of your copies
who did not win the lottery.

This is the flip side of the "anything that can happen will happen"
aspect of the MWI. While you have a copy who has won the lottery, in
fact there even exists an extremely freak copy who has won every
time, it's not true that if you find yourself as one of these
copies, you can expect to continue to be one of these copies.

If you think of something else and then return your thoughts about
your bank balance, then that is a new measurement, and in the MWI
the outcome is not fixed, there are only stable correlations. So, if
you already know that you have won the lottery, then you'll find a
consistent result upon a new measurement.

Saibal

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Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[Brent Meeker]

On 8/3/2016 3:03 PM, smitra wrote:
Suppose that you won the lottery, you had a one in a hundred million 
chance to win, so you got extremely lucky. You party, go to bed and 
think about planning your trip around the World next morning.


In the MWI, things will actually not pan out this way. What will 
happen is that the next morning you'll wake up as one of your copies 
who did not win the lottery.


This is the flip side of the "anything that can happen will happen" 
aspect of the MWI. While you have a copy who has won the lottery, in 
fact there even exists an extremely freak copy who has won every time, 
it's not true that if you find yourself as one of these copies, you 
can expect to continue to be one of these copies.


You can if "you" are defined by memories and memories are physically 
encoded classically in your brain.


Brent



If you think of something else and then return your thoughts about 
your bank balance, then that is a new measurement, and in the MWI the 
outcome is not fixed, there are only stable correlations. So, if you 
already know that you have won the lottery, then you'll find a 
consistent result upon a new measurement.


Saibal



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Re: If you win the lottery, don't expect to live the rest of your life as a millionaire

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Only if you wake up and find out winning the lottery was a mistake, which
seems less likely than waking up a winner. Waking up as one of the many
copies who didn't win is not one of the options - those copies are not
continuations of the you who won the lottery.

On Thursday, 4 August 2016, smitra  wrote:

> Suppose that you won the lottery, you had a one in a hundred million
> chance to win, so you got extremely lucky. You party, go to bed and think
> about planning your trip around the World next morning.
>
> In the MWI, things will actually not pan out this way. What will happen is
> that the next morning you'll wake up as one of your copies who did not win
> the lottery.
>
> This is the flip side of the "anything that can happen will happen" aspect
> of the MWI. While you have a copy who has won the lottery, in fact there
> even exists an extremely freak copy who has won every time, it's not true
> that if you find yourself as one of these copies, you can expect to
> continue to be one of these copies.
>
> If you think of something else and then return your thoughts about your
> bank balance, then that is a new measurement, and in the MWI the outcome is
> not fixed, there are only stable correlations. So, if you already know that
> you have won the lottery, then you'll find a consistent result upon a new
> measurement.
>
> Saibal
>
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-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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