Re: Improving The Hard Problem
On 20 Apr 2013, at 13:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Friday, April 19, 2013 11:46:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Apr 2013, at 13:56, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Qualia are generated,
With comp the qualia are not generated. They are arithmetical truth
seen from some point of view. They cannot even been defined, but it
can be shown that they obeys to some laws (including the maws of not
being definable).
but only by other qualia. By pointing out that qualia can have no
possible function, I am clarifying that in a universe defined
purely by function, that qualia cannot be possible.
This does not follow. Qualia might be epiphenomenal.
Whether qualia is epiphenomenal or not is up to the participant.
That is their role from 3p perspective, to select which sensory
affect they prefer or allow to influence their motive output, and
thus contribute to public realism. Free will is the active modality
of qualia, turning superpositioned epiphenomena into
thermodynamically committed phenomena.
But this does not follow for another reason: qualia have a function/
role, although in the intensional (program related) sense, and not
really in the usual extensional one (set of input-outputs). So it is
preferable to refer to computation instead of function, which is an
ambiguous term in computer science.
What role could qualia have to a program that would not be
accomplished by other quantitative means? Any number, for example,
can be used as a precise and absolutely unique identifier - why
would a colorful name be used instead of that? If we don't add in
high level names for our own benefit, by default strings like SIDs
and GUIDs are easier to use.
What this means is that the universe cannot be defined purely by
function. It cannot be a motor, machine, computer, zombie, or set
of all arithmetic truths.
This is vague. I can agree (in comp) and disagree (in comp).
If 'universe' denotes the big whole, by definition it has no input
nor output, and so is equivalent with the unique function from
nothing to nothing. The empty function = { }.
That's only if you assume a number system based on a null default. I
am using the totality as a default. The universe is the set of all
inputs and outputs; every significant function (not every function,
since the universe is not a nonsense generator of accidental sense
like UD, but an elitist aesthetic agenda which chooses which
functions to formally pay attention to/materialize and which to
leave as theoretical potentials).
So universe is already an intensional term, and should be handled
with intensional tools, like computer science, modal logic, etc.
Then assuming comp, we can explain how the physical universe
appearance is given by internal modalities, some locally sharable
(quanta), and some not locally sharable (qualia).
These tools are only useful to organize aesthetic phenomena which
already exist (insist). No logic or Doxastic framework can ever
account for qualia. Who cares if we know all of the things that
satisfy some relation to the experience of seeing red? That doesn't
let the blind see red.
We cannot know all the things that satisfy some relation of seeing
red, oeven of comuting x+y. Machines prove this or similar in their
own qualia theory, with some reasonable axiomatic of qualia.
You systematically talk about the machine we thought we knew before
the advent of the universal machine. You just confirms systematically
that you have not taken the time to study computer science.
Develop your theory, and then compare it to comp, if you want, but
then study it.
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: Improving The Hard Problem
On Sunday, April 21, 2013 8:45:39 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Apr 2013, at 13:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Friday, April 19, 2013 11:46:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Apr 2013, at 13:56, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Qualia are generated,
With comp the qualia are not generated. They are arithmetical truth seen
from some point of view. They cannot even been defined, but it can be shown
that they obeys to some laws (including the maws of not being definable).
but only by other qualia. By pointing out that qualia can have no
possible function, I am clarifying that in a universe defined purely by
function, that qualia cannot be possible.
This does not follow. Qualia might be epiphenomenal.
Whether qualia is epiphenomenal or not is up to the participant. That is
their role from 3p perspective, to select which sensory affect they prefer
or allow to influence their motive output, and thus contribute to public
realism. Free will is the active modality of qualia, turning
superpositioned epiphenomena into thermodynamically committed phenomena.
But this does not follow for another reason: qualia have a function/role,
although in the intensional (program related) sense, and not really in the
usual extensional one (set of input-outputs). So it is preferable to refer
to computation instead of function, which is an ambiguous term in computer
science.
What role could qualia have to a program that would not be accomplished by
other quantitative means? Any number, for example, can be used as a precise
and absolutely unique identifier - why would a colorful name be used
instead of that? If we don't add in high level names for our own benefit,
by default strings like SIDs and GUIDs are easier to use.
What this means is that the universe cannot be defined purely by
function. It cannot be a motor, machine, computer, zombie, or set of all
arithmetic truths.
This is vague. I can agree (in comp) and disagree (in comp).
If 'universe' denotes the big whole, by definition it has no input nor
output, and so is equivalent with the unique function from nothing to
nothing. The empty function = { }.
That's only if you assume a number system based on a null default. I am
using the totality as a default. The universe is the set of all inputs and
outputs; every significant function (not every function, since the universe
is not a nonsense generator of accidental sense like UD, but an elitist
aesthetic agenda which chooses which functions to formally pay attention
to/materialize and which to leave as theoretical potentials).
So universe is already an intensional term, and should be handled with
intensional tools, like computer science, modal logic, etc. Then assuming
comp, we can explain how the physical universe appearance is given by
internal modalities, some locally sharable (quanta), and some not locally
sharable (qualia).
These tools are only useful to organize aesthetic phenomena which already
exist (insist). No logic or Doxastic framework can ever account for qualia.
Who cares if we know all of the things that satisfy some relation to the
experience of seeing red? That doesn't let the blind see red.
We cannot know all the things that satisfy some relation of seeing red,
oeven of comuting x+y. Machines prove this or similar in their own qualia
theory, with some reasonable axiomatic of qualia.
You systematically talk about the machine we thought we knew before the
advent of the universal machine. You just confirms systematically that you
have not taken the time to study computer science.
Develop your theory, and then compare it to comp, if you want, but then
study it.
What are you saying in particular is different about my understanding of a
machine and the post Turing understanding regarding the presentation of
qualia though?
I think you're dodging the question and making it about the knowability of
qualia, when qualia has nothing to do with knowledge. Knowledge can tell
you about experiences that you have not have, but nothing can tell you
about experience itself. I don't care if there is a family of equations
that add up to be a picture of Plato with a thought balloon saying qualia
goes here - unless it turns numbers and functions into feelings and
flavors and electromotive power then it's still ultimately a way to talk
about reality rather than a way of replacing it.
Craig
Bruno
Craig
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: Improving The Hard Problem
On Friday, April 19, 2013 11:46:25 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Apr 2013, at 13:56, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Qualia are generated,
With comp the qualia are not generated. They are arithmetical truth seen
from some point of view. They cannot even been defined, but it can be shown
that they obeys to some laws (including the maws of not being definable).
but only by other qualia. By pointing out that qualia can have no possible
function, I am clarifying that in a universe defined purely by function,
that qualia cannot be possible.
This does not follow. Qualia might be epiphenomenal.
Whether qualia is epiphenomenal or not is up to the participant. That is
their role from 3p perspective, to select which sensory affect they prefer
or allow to influence their motive output, and thus contribute to public
realism. Free will is the active modality of qualia, turning
superpositioned epiphenomena into thermodynamically committed phenomena.
But this does not follow for another reason: qualia have a function/role,
although in the intensional (program related) sense, and not really in the
usual extensional one (set of input-outputs). So it is preferable to refer
to computation instead of function, which is an ambiguous term in computer
science.
What role could qualia have to a program that would not be accomplished by
other quantitative means? Any number, for example, can be used as a precise
and absolutely unique identifier - why would a colorful name be used
instead of that? If we don't add in high level names for our own benefit,
by default strings like SIDs and GUIDs are easier to use.
What this means is that the universe cannot be defined purely by function.
It cannot be a motor, machine, computer, zombie, or set of all arithmetic
truths.
This is vague. I can agree (in comp) and disagree (in comp).
If 'universe' denotes the big whole, by definition it has no input nor
output, and so is equivalent with the unique function from nothing to
nothing. The empty function = { }.
That's only if you assume a number system based on a null default. I am
using the totality as a default. The universe is the set of all inputs and
outputs; every significant function (not every function, since the universe
is not a nonsense generator of accidental sense like UD, but an elitist
aesthetic agenda which chooses which functions to formally pay attention
to/materialize and which to leave as theoretical potentials).
So universe is already an intensional term, and should be handled with
intensional tools, like computer science, modal logic, etc. Then assuming
comp, we can explain how the physical universe appearance is given by
internal modalities, some locally sharable (quanta), and some not locally
sharable (qualia).
These tools are only useful to organize aesthetic phenomena which already
exist (insist). No logic or Doxastic framework can ever account for qualia.
Who cares if we know all of the things that satisfy some relation to the
experience of seeing red? That doesn't let the blind see red.
Craig
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: Improving The Hard Problem
On Saturday, April 20, 2013 4:34:15 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Apr 2013, at 22:39, Terren Suydam wrote: On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 3:46 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Friday, April 19, 2013 11:49:17 AM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote: On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 11:37 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Friday, April 19, 2013 11:05:28 AM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote: On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 9:30 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stat...@gmail.com wrote: But you claim that it is impossible to conceive of consciousness supervening on function. A religious person would claim that it impossible to conceive of consciousness as residing anywhere other than in the spiritual realm. Both your positions seem to essentially be based on the argument from incredulity: see, this lump of coal is inert and dead, how could anything derived from it possibly have feelings? Craig's theory is essentially equivalent with explaining consciousness in terms of the religious 'soul'. Nope. Soul is anthropmorphic. Sense is generic and universal. I am talking physics, not religion. It's a distinction without a difference. Making it generic and universal as opposed to anthropomorphic doesn't change anything... it is still the uncomputable generator of qualia. That's like saying that there is no difference between saying that ions are electrically charged and saying that atoms have little invisible men pushing them around. Soul is a concept which lends itself to supernatural inhabitants of natural bodies - I am not talking about that at all. I am talking about perception and participation being the absolute fundamental meta-noumena. Except that you don't articulate any demonstrable difference between a universe in which experience is fundamental, and the deterministic physics of mainstream science (as your exchange with Stathis shows, e.g. you repeatedly deny that you need to show how ion channels would do anything differently than what physics would expect them to do), except for one thing - that intention flows downward and affects the lowest levels, and it does this in a way that is not computable (i.e. not in obeyance of any kind of law). That viewpoint is indistinguishable from soul, which is also not computable. But Craig is right on this, with respect to comp. If you define the soul by the knower, like Plotinus, and if you define the knower by the Theaetetus' method (to know p = to believe p + p is true), you get something (the soul) which appears to be non definable by the machine, and not computable, from that machine-soul perspective. Arithmetic is full of non computable entities, and they pay some role when the machine looks inward. The problem with Craig is that he want experience to be primitive, and for this it needs a primitive matter (despite what he says), and a primitive and magical link between. Why would numbers which produce experience be independent of matter but experience which produces numbers not be? He argues that sense is primary, and that the top-down causality of intention translates to the bottom-up causality of physics, Not always, not. There is bottom up, top down, inside out, outside in...all kinds of causality. Makes no difference. How do you figure? If you accuse me of stealing bread because you are the only baker in the world, and I insist that I also can bake bread, and so can many others, how does that make no difference to the presumptuousness of your accusation? The only charge you need to answer for is an uncomputable causality that somehow affects the world in a way that is undetectable by physics - People like John Clark seems to believe also in non computable causality, when he says that indeterminacy can be something physical. Single worlder have to believe in that kind of magic. this is indistinguishable from soul. The other kinds of causality you mention (whatever those mean) are either from computable sources (in agreement with physics) or uncomputable sources (and thus also indistinguishable with soul). and, crucially, that top-down intention is not computable, i.e. that it is not possible for such top-down intention to emerge in any kind of simulation, at any level. This is almost exactly the same thing as saying that what animates us is our god-given soul. Nope. I am saying that top-down intentions emerge from proprietary diffractions of the eternal experience. It's more Vedic or Taoist than Christian, but where I differ from Vedic or Taoist conceptions is that I do not see matter as illusion or Maya, but as the concrete public presentations which orthomodularly re-present private experiences. In what conceivable way does proprietary diffractions of the eternal experience differ from something equally as ambiguous as divine spark? Spark of
Re: Improving The Hard Problem
On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 2:57 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I have been using the term 'aesthetic' a lot lately in specifying the qualitative aspects of consciousness, and I feel like it clarifies one of the core issues. The Hard Problem of Consciousness is confusing to people whose mindset is innately compelled to define consciousness as a collection of functions in the first place. It therefore comes out nonsensical when philosophers like David Chalmers talk about questioning why there is such a thing as 'what it is like' to have an experience, since for the functionalist, 'what it is like' to perform a function is simply the self-same set of events which comprise the function. Not really, since Chalmers himself has provided the best argument in support of functionalism. Maybe it helps to define 'what it is like' in more specific terms, which I think would be scientifically described as private sensory-motive participation but informally can be understood as aesthetic phenomena. The key is to notice the asymmetric relation between aesthetics and function in that function can improve aesthetics, but aesthetics can *never* improve function. The Hard Problem then becomes a problem of how to explain aesthetics (aka qualia) in a universe of functions which can neither benefit by them nor physically generate them as far as we can tell (unless there is a miniature kitchen near our olfactory bulbs baking microscopic apple pies whenever we remember the smell of apple pie). The Hard problem does not pertain to whether qualia are useful or can be generated. It is taken as a given that they can be generated, since they are in fact generated, and their usefulness or otherwise is irrelevant. The Hard Problem pertains to why qualia should exist at all given that it is possible to conceive of a universe just the same, except lacking qualia. The fact that aesthetics are not possible to explain in terms of a function, but that functions can be conceived of aesthetically is unfamiliar and those who have that innately functional mindset will balk at the notion of aesthetic supremacy, but this is the future of science - letting go of the familiar, or in this case, rediscovering the literally familiar (ordinary consciousness) in an unfamiliar way (as the fabric of existence). When we talk about consciousness then, what we really mean is the aesthetic experience of being and doing, of perceiving and participating. This experience is extended publicly as spatio-temporal form-functions (STFF), but those phenomena are not capable of appreciating themselves. Just as a puppet can be made to seem to walk and talk like a person, forms can be made to interact by hijacking their natural low-level aesthetics to represent our high-level expectations. The letters on this screen are just such an example. I am using a lot of technology to generate contrasting pixels on your video screen, which you will experience as letters, words, and sentences. Each level of description - as typeface, spellings, grammars, evoke aesthetic micro-experiences. The closer these descriptions get to your native scale - the personal scale, the more that your personal experience, feelings, and understanding influences the aesthetics of all of the sub-personal experiences within reading the language. What you see of the letters is because of your experience of learning to read English, not because of any special power that these words have to project meaning. By themselves, these words and letters do nothing to each other. They are figures for use in human communication - they have no functional aspect, i.e. they are *only* aesthetic. This is why a computer has no use for human languages, or even programming languages. Computation requires no figures or forms of any kind, nor can it produce any forms or figures without borrowing some kind of STFF (with u in the middle, heh) from the 'real world'. Otherwise there is a only the anesthetic concept of pure function - which is the exact opposite of representation by form, image, or quality, but is non-presentation through quantity. Computation, or 'Information Processing' is the unconscious number crunching of automated, logical functionality. Information lacks aesthetic presence by definition - it is a purely conceptual understanding of instructed variables in motion. If there is a capacity for aesthetic appreciation to begin with, then computation can extend it and improve it. If there is no such capacity, then there is certainly no justification for adding it into computation, as automatic function cannot benefit in any way by appreciation of its own activity. Information lacks aesthetic presence by definition. So you say. I could also say that matter lacks aesthetic presence by definition, or anything in the universe lacks aesthetic presence by definition, and consciousness must therefore come from the spiritual realm. -- Stathis
Re: Improving The Hard Problem
On Friday, April 19, 2013 6:01:21 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 2:57 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: I have been using the term 'aesthetic' a lot lately in specifying the qualitative aspects of consciousness, and I feel like it clarifies one of the core issues. The Hard Problem of Consciousness is confusing to people whose mindset is innately compelled to define consciousness as a collection of functions in the first place. It therefore comes out nonsensical when philosophers like David Chalmers talk about questioning why there is such a thing as 'what it is like' to have an experience, since for the functionalist, 'what it is like' to perform a function is simply the self-same set of events which comprise the function. Not really, since Chalmers himself has provided the best argument in support of functionalism. Maybe it helps to define 'what it is like' in more specific terms, which I think would be scientifically described as private sensory-motive participation but informally can be understood as aesthetic phenomena. The key is to notice the asymmetric relation between aesthetics and function in that function can improve aesthetics, but aesthetics can *never* improve function. The Hard Problem then becomes a problem of how to explain aesthetics (aka qualia) in a universe of functions which can neither benefit by them nor physically generate them as far as we can tell (unless there is a miniature kitchen near our olfactory bulbs baking microscopic apple pies whenever we remember the smell of apple pie). The Hard problem does not pertain to whether qualia are useful or can be generated. It is taken as a given that they can be generated, since they are in fact generated, and their usefulness or otherwise is irrelevant. I am suggesting that the Hard problem be improved by clarifying the current form: Why is there anything that it is like for X to occur to Why do aesthetic phenomena exist? Qualia are generated, but only by other qualia. By pointing out that qualia can have no possible function, I am clarifying that in a universe defined purely by function, that qualia cannot be possible. What this means is that the universe cannot be defined purely by function. It cannot be a motor, machine, computer, zombie, or set of all arithmetic truths. This answers the Hard problem. The answer is that aesthetic qualia exist because existence itself is synonymous with qualia. Functions are explained by qualia, but qualia are not explainable by functions. The Hard Problem pertains to why qualia should exist at all given that it is possible to conceive of a universe just the same, except lacking qualia. It's not that it is possible to conceive of a universe lacking qualia, it is that it is impossible to conceive of a function for qualia, and it is impossible to conceive of a non-circular justification for the possibility of qualia in a universe driven purely by function. If we define pain as that which motivates a certain set of behaviors, we must ask why that set of behaviors needs some magical aesthetic decoration to be initiated, rather than the way that every other function in the universe would work - by simple Laws of Physics. The fact that aesthetics are not possible to explain in terms of a function, but that functions can be conceived of aesthetically is unfamiliar and those who have that innately functional mindset will balk at the notion of aesthetic supremacy, but this is the future of science - letting go of the familiar, or in this case, rediscovering the literally familiar (ordinary consciousness) in an unfamiliar way (as the fabric of existence). When we talk about consciousness then, what we really mean is the aesthetic experience of being and doing, of perceiving and participating. This experience is extended publicly as spatio-temporal form-functions (STFF), but those phenomena are not capable of appreciating themselves. Just as a puppet can be made to seem to walk and talk like a person, forms can be made to interact by hijacking their natural low-level aesthetics to represent our high-level expectations. The letters on this screen are just such an example. I am using a lot of technology to generate contrasting pixels on your video screen, which you will experience as letters, words, and sentences. Each level of description - as typeface, spellings, grammars, evoke aesthetic micro-experiences. The closer these descriptions get to your native scale - the personal scale, the more that your personal experience, feelings, and understanding influences the aesthetics of all of the sub-personal experiences within reading the language. What you see of the letters is because of your experience of learning to read English, not because of
Re: Improving The Hard Problem
On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 9:56 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Qualia are generated, but only by other qualia. By pointing out that qualia can have no possible function, I am clarifying that in a universe defined purely by function, that qualia cannot be possible. What this means is that the universe cannot be defined purely by function. It cannot be a motor, machine, computer, zombie, or set of all arithmetic truths. Qualia are not possible in a world defined purely by function unless qualia supervene on function. A motor, machine or computer could have qualia, since humans qualia and humans are made of the same stuff as motors, machines and computers. If humans are not defined purely by function (whatever that means) then motors, machines and computers may also not be defined purely by function. If humans contain an undetectable ingredient that confers on them the possibility of qualia then motors, machines and computers may also have this undetectable ingredient. This answers the Hard problem. The answer is that aesthetic qualia exist because existence itself is synonymous with qualia. Functions are explained by qualia, but qualia are not explainable by functions. It doesn't seem to me to answer anything. I could equally well say that aesthetic qualia exist because they necessarily occur when certain functions are implemented, and assert that this is just a brute a brute fact as you assert ad hoc that existence is synonymous with qualia. The Hard Problem pertains to why qualia should exist at all given that it is possible to conceive of a universe just the same, except lacking qualia. It's not that it is possible to conceive of a universe lacking qualia, it is that it is impossible to conceive of a function for qualia, and it is impossible to conceive of a non-circular justification for the possibility of qualia in a universe driven purely by function. If we define pain as that which motivates a certain set of behaviors, we must ask why that set of behaviors needs some magical aesthetic decoration to be initiated, rather than the way that every other function in the universe would work - by simple Laws of Physics. It is possible to conceive that qualia necessarily supervene on certain functions. It is even possible that qualia supervene on every function, or panpsychism. Why this should be so is the Hard Problem. Information lacks aesthetic presence by definition. So you say. I could also say that matter lacks aesthetic presence by definition, or anything in the universe lacks aesthetic presence by definition, and consciousness must therefore come from the spiritual realm. Matter does not lack aesthetic presence. Matter always has a physical form - solid, liquid, gas, or plasma. Information has no physical form as it is conceived. Whatever acts as a sign that can be controlled and read is information. So? Information is more like mind in that it is intangible, supervenient on the physical but not identical to the physical. The 'spiritual realm' jab has nothing to do with anything except the need to make my points seem associated with irrationality. I am talking about physics and ontology, not spirituality. But you claim that it is impossible to conceive of consciousness supervening on function. A religious person would claim that it impossible to conceive of consciousness as residing anywhere other than in the spiritual realm. Both your positions seem to essentially be based on the argument from incredulity: see, this lump of coal is inert and dead, how could anything derived from it possibly have feelings? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Improving The Hard Problem
On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 9:30 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.comwrote: But you claim that it is impossible to conceive of consciousness supervening on function. A religious person would claim that it impossible to conceive of consciousness as residing anywhere other than in the spiritual realm. Both your positions seem to essentially be based on the argument from incredulity: see, this lump of coal is inert and dead, how could anything derived from it possibly have feelings? Craig's theory is essentially equivalent with explaining consciousness in terms of the religious 'soul'. He argues that sense is primary, and that the top-down causality of intention translates to the bottom-up causality of physics, and, crucially, that top-down intention is not computable, i.e. that it is not possible for such top-down intention to emerge in any kind of simulation, at any level. This is almost exactly the same thing as saying that what animates us is our god-given soul. Such stories exist in part to assuage the discomfort of uncertainty or existential angst, and stop any further inquiry by defining the fundamental mystery of existence in absolute terms. It is no different from saying that the way things are is God's will. Terren -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Improving The Hard Problem
On Friday, April 19, 2013 9:30:16 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 9:56 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: Qualia are generated, but only by other qualia. By pointing out that qualia can have no possible function, I am clarifying that in a universe defined purely by function, that qualia cannot be possible. What this means is that the universe cannot be defined purely by function. It cannot be a motor, machine, computer, zombie, or set of all arithmetic truths. Qualia are not possible in a world defined purely by function unless qualia supervene on function. It can only seem plausible for qualia to supervene on function because you are smuggling in qualia from your own experience and attaching it to function-without-qualia which is a hypothesis within your experience. If you try to justify qualia in a universe which already functions without qualia, then you can only get circular arguments since there is no possible function for qualia which does not take functional properties qualia itself for granted. A motor, machine or computer could have qualia, I disagree. Motors, machines, or computers are anesthetic executors of sense, but they have no sense themselves. This is part of their ontological definition. since humans qualia and humans are made of the same stuff as motors, machines and computers. That's your mistake. We are made of both cells and feelings, both of which express motives. Cells express motives publicly, which means spatially, which means 'motor'. Feelings inspire motives privately, which means experience. What a machine does is to impose the public motor non-sense conditions on private sense, reversing the natural direction where outer behaviors reflect inner nature. What a computer does is to multiply and miniaturize the machine to attain a higher resolution imposition of public non-sense on private sense. What we are looks like a machine only if we are using the machine-like extremities of our awareness to see it. When we look for consciousness from its own extremity, we can only find the minimal residue of it - which is public forms and functions. If humans are not defined purely by function (whatever that means) then motors, machines and computers may also not be defined purely by function. REAL machines, REAL motors, and REAL computers are not defined that way, no. They are actual devices made of matter and all matter is a representation of some experience. I have no problem with inanimate (to us) matter having experience. My problem is getting you to see that not all experiences are created equal. No amount of silicon crystal experiences can contain the *aesthetic* bandwidth of an animal's experience. Why? Because there I think there is a second, perpendicular axis to anesthetic-unintentional form-function in space-time, and that is aesthetic-intentional sensory-motive in significance-entropy. Silicon never levels up to living cells because biological experiences can't reach down to that sterile of a vehicle. It is an inappropriate container, just as four letter Anglo-Saxon curses are not an appropriate language with which to express theoretical physics. Maybe you could make a silicon biology, just as maybe you could make a physics theory out of only profanity, but it's by no means certain. Even in that case, since experience I am saying is based on time rather than space, it could take millions or billions of years of maturation to achieve anything like the aesthetic tones we get out of a primate brain. I'm saying that may not be condensable, because the qualia *is* the condensed experience. It cannot be imported into a lower inertial frame, or leapfrogged, only passed around among peers. If humans contain an undetectable ingredient that confers on them the possibility of qualia Never said they do. There is no ingredient, and undetectable by definition has nothing to do with qualia. What humans have that nothing else can ever have is the particular qualia which is specific to human lives. Animals share some of that qualia; plants, minerals share some too, and they presumably have qualia which we will never directly experience (unless we merge our nervous system with them). All that I say is that a stone shaped like a person's body is not a person, even if it is shaped like every fiber and molecule of a person's body. then motors, machines and computers may also have this undetectable ingredient. The real substrate of mmc's do indeed have qualia, it's just not human qualia, it is the qualia common to all matter only. The intellectual definition of motors, machines, and computers, however are abstract concepts - substrate independent designs which supervene on matter for execution, but not on any particular set of material objects. MMC's exploit the lowest common denominator Lingua Franca of public spatial
Re: Improving The Hard Problem
On Friday, April 19, 2013 11:05:28 AM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote: On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 9:30 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stat...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: But you claim that it is impossible to conceive of consciousness supervening on function. A religious person would claim that it impossible to conceive of consciousness as residing anywhere other than in the spiritual realm. Both your positions seem to essentially be based on the argument from incredulity: see, this lump of coal is inert and dead, how could anything derived from it possibly have feelings? Craig's theory is essentially equivalent with explaining consciousness in terms of the religious 'soul'. Nope. Soul is anthropmorphic. Sense is generic and universal. I am talking physics, not religion. He argues that sense is primary, and that the top-down causality of intention translates to the bottom-up causality of physics, Not always, not. There is bottom up, top down, inside out, outside in...all kinds of causality. and, crucially, that top-down intention is not computable, i.e. that it is not possible for such top-down intention to emerge in any kind of simulation, at any level. This is almost exactly the same thing as saying that what animates us is our god-given soul. Nope. I am saying that top-down intentions emerge from proprietary diffractions of the eternal experience. It's more Vedic or Taoist than Christian, but where I differ from Vedic or Taoist conceptions is that I do not see matter as illusion or Maya, but as the concrete public presentations which orthomodularly re-present private experiences. Such stories exist in part to assuage the discomfort of uncertainty or existential angst, and stop any further inquiry by defining the fundamental mystery of existence in absolute terms. It is no different from saying that the way things are is God's will. Haha, if you see my last response to Stathis, you will see that my story offers no comfort nor discomfort - it is pure science which merely accounts for the actual universe as it is rather than what our mechanistic or animistic compulsions tell us it cannot be. The only advantage that my view offers is that it reveals consciousness as it actually is. Craig Terren -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Improving The Hard Problem
On 19 Apr 2013, at 13:56, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Qualia are generated,
With comp the qualia are not generated. They are arithmetical truth
seen from some point of view. They cannot even been defined, but it
can be shown that they obeys to some laws (including the maws of not
being definable).
but only by other qualia. By pointing out that qualia can have no
possible function, I am clarifying that in a universe defined purely
by function, that qualia cannot be possible.
This does not follow. Qualia might be epiphenomenal.
But this does not follow for another reason: qualia have a function/
role, although in the intensional (program related) sense, and not
really in the usual extensional one (set of input-outputs). So it is
preferable to refer to computation instead of function, which is an
ambiguous term in computer science.
What this means is that the universe cannot be defined purely by
function. It cannot be a motor, machine, computer, zombie, or set of
all arithmetic truths.
This is vague. I can agree (in comp) and disagree (in comp).
If 'universe' denotes the big whole, by definition it has no input nor
output, and so is equivalent with the unique function from nothing to
nothing. The empty function = { }.
So universe is already an intensional term, and should be handled
with intensional tools, like computer science, modal logic, etc. Then
assuming comp, we can explain how the physical universe appearance is
given by internal modalities, some locally sharable (quanta), and some
not locally sharable (qualia).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: Improving The Hard Problem
On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 11:37 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Friday, April 19, 2013 11:05:28 AM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote: On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 9:30 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stat...@gmail.comwrote: But you claim that it is impossible to conceive of consciousness supervening on function. A religious person would claim that it impossible to conceive of consciousness as residing anywhere other than in the spiritual realm. Both your positions seem to essentially be based on the argument from incredulity: see, this lump of coal is inert and dead, how could anything derived from it possibly have feelings? Craig's theory is essentially equivalent with explaining consciousness in terms of the religious 'soul'. Nope. Soul is anthropmorphic. Sense is generic and universal. I am talking physics, not religion. It's a distinction without a difference. Making it generic and universal as opposed to anthropomorphic doesn't change anything... it is still the uncomputable generator of qualia. He argues that sense is primary, and that the top-down causality of intention translates to the bottom-up causality of physics, Not always, not. There is bottom up, top down, inside out, outside in...all kinds of causality. Makes no difference. and, crucially, that top-down intention is not computable, i.e. that it is not possible for such top-down intention to emerge in any kind of simulation, at any level. This is almost exactly the same thing as saying that what animates us is our god-given soul. Nope. I am saying that top-down intentions emerge from proprietary diffractions of the eternal experience. It's more Vedic or Taoist than Christian, but where I differ from Vedic or Taoist conceptions is that I do not see matter as illusion or Maya, but as the concrete public presentations which orthomodularly re-present private experiences. In what conceivable way does proprietary diffractions of the eternal experience differ from something equally as ambiguous as divine spark? Such stories exist in part to assuage the discomfort of uncertainty or existential angst, and stop any further inquiry by defining the fundamental mystery of existence in absolute terms. It is no different from saying that the way things are is God's will. Haha, if you see my last response to Stathis, you will see that my story offers no comfort nor discomfort - it is pure science which merely accounts for the actual universe as it is rather than what our mechanistic or animistic compulsions tell us it cannot be. The only advantage that my view offers is that it reveals consciousness as it actually is. Pure science would give you a means to test your ideas. You are simply philosophizing about metaphysics. Your view reveals nothing. It tells a story. It is up to the listener to decide whether they want to place their faith in the story you tell, because you provide no arguments that can be tested in any empirical way. Terren Craig Terren -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@**googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.**com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** group/everything-list?hl=enhttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_outhttps://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Improving The Hard Problem
On Friday, April 19, 2013 11:49:17 AM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote: On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 11:37 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Friday, April 19, 2013 11:05:28 AM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote: On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 9:30 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stat...@gmail.comwrote: But you claim that it is impossible to conceive of consciousness supervening on function. A religious person would claim that it impossible to conceive of consciousness as residing anywhere other than in the spiritual realm. Both your positions seem to essentially be based on the argument from incredulity: see, this lump of coal is inert and dead, how could anything derived from it possibly have feelings? Craig's theory is essentially equivalent with explaining consciousness in terms of the religious 'soul'. Nope. Soul is anthropmorphic. Sense is generic and universal. I am talking physics, not religion. It's a distinction without a difference. Making it generic and universal as opposed to anthropomorphic doesn't change anything... it is still the uncomputable generator of qualia. That's like saying that there is no difference between saying that ions are electrically charged and saying that atoms have little invisible men pushing them around. Soul is a concept which lends itself to supernatural inhabitants of natural bodies - I am not talking about that at all. I am talking about perception and participation being the absolute fundamental meta-noumena. He argues that sense is primary, and that the top-down causality of intention translates to the bottom-up causality of physics, Not always, not. There is bottom up, top down, inside out, outside in...all kinds of causality. Makes no difference. How do you figure? If you accuse me of stealing bread because you are the only baker in the world, and I insist that I also can bake bread, and so can many others, how does that make no difference to the presumptuousness of your accusation? and, crucially, that top-down intention is not computable, i.e. that it is not possible for such top-down intention to emerge in any kind of simulation, at any level. This is almost exactly the same thing as saying that what animates us is our god-given soul. Nope. I am saying that top-down intentions emerge from proprietary diffractions of the eternal experience. It's more Vedic or Taoist than Christian, but where I differ from Vedic or Taoist conceptions is that I do not see matter as illusion or Maya, but as the concrete public presentations which orthomodularly re-present private experiences. In what conceivable way does proprietary diffractions of the eternal experience differ from something equally as ambiguous as divine spark? Spark of what? Divine = what? My description is precise. The universe is an experience, our own experience is a nested set of sub-experiences within that. What is the big witchcraft here? Are you denying that experience is real? Are you offering an explanation for why experience would ever arise from non-experience? Such stories exist in part to assuage the discomfort of uncertainty or existential angst, and stop any further inquiry by defining the fundamental mystery of existence in absolute terms. It is no different from saying that the way things are is God's will. Haha, if you see my last response to Stathis, you will see that my story offers no comfort nor discomfort - it is pure science which merely accounts for the actual universe as it is rather than what our mechanistic or animistic compulsions tell us it cannot be. The only advantage that my view offers is that it reveals consciousness as it actually is. Pure science would give you a means to test your ideas. You are simply philosophizing about metaphysics. Your view reveals nothing. It tells a story. It is up to the listener to decide whether they want to place their faith in the story you tell, because you provide no arguments that can be tested in any empirical way. If that's true, it is only because experience is not empirical. I keep making this point but nobody seems to comprehend it at all. Science is about understanding whatever phenomena can be understood. Whether you denigrate it as 'simply' this or 'metaphysical' that doesn't make the alternative non-explanations of legacy science any more plausible. It's not a matter of having faith in a story, it is a matter of seeing for yourself whether it makes more sense than all other explanations - and I submit that thus far is seems to do that. Further, nothing that anyone on this list has said gives me any confidence that they really understand the basic premises that I propose, since the counterarguments offered are invariably old hat and obvious to me. Fortunately other people do have a better idea about what I am talking about.. Craig Terren Craig Terren --
Re: Improving The Hard Problem
On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 3:46 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: On Friday, April 19, 2013 11:49:17 AM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote: On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 11:37 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Friday, April 19, 2013 11:05:28 AM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote: On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 9:30 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stat...@gmail.com wrote: But you claim that it is impossible to conceive of consciousness supervening on function. A religious person would claim that it impossible to conceive of consciousness as residing anywhere other than in the spiritual realm. Both your positions seem to essentially be based on the argument from incredulity: see, this lump of coal is inert and dead, how could anything derived from it possibly have feelings? Craig's theory is essentially equivalent with explaining consciousness in terms of the religious 'soul'. Nope. Soul is anthropmorphic. Sense is generic and universal. I am talking physics, not religion. It's a distinction without a difference. Making it generic and universal as opposed to anthropomorphic doesn't change anything... it is still the uncomputable generator of qualia. That's like saying that there is no difference between saying that ions are electrically charged and saying that atoms have little invisible men pushing them around. Soul is a concept which lends itself to supernatural inhabitants of natural bodies - I am not talking about that at all. I am talking about perception and participation being the absolute fundamental meta-noumena. Except that you don't articulate any demonstrable difference between a universe in which experience is fundamental, and the deterministic physics of mainstream science (as your exchange with Stathis shows, e.g. you repeatedly deny that you need to show how ion channels would do anything differently than what physics would expect them to do), except for one thing - that intention flows downward and affects the lowest levels, and it does this in a way that is not computable (i.e. not in obeyance of any kind of law). That viewpoint is indistinguishable from soul, which is also not computable. He argues that sense is primary, and that the top-down causality of intention translates to the bottom-up causality of physics, Not always, not. There is bottom up, top down, inside out, outside in...all kinds of causality. Makes no difference. How do you figure? If you accuse me of stealing bread because you are the only baker in the world, and I insist that I also can bake bread, and so can many others, how does that make no difference to the presumptuousness of your accusation? The only charge you need to answer for is an uncomputable causality that somehow affects the world in a way that is undetectable by physics - this is indistinguishable from soul. The other kinds of causality you mention (whatever those mean) are either from computable sources (in agreement with physics) or uncomputable sources (and thus also indistinguishable with soul). and, crucially, that top-down intention is not computable, i.e. that it is not possible for such top-down intention to emerge in any kind of simulation, at any level. This is almost exactly the same thing as saying that what animates us is our god-given soul. Nope. I am saying that top-down intentions emerge from proprietary diffractions of the eternal experience. It's more Vedic or Taoist than Christian, but where I differ from Vedic or Taoist conceptions is that I do not see matter as illusion or Maya, but as the concrete public presentations which orthomodularly re-present private experiences. In what conceivable way does proprietary diffractions of the eternal experience differ from something equally as ambiguous as divine spark? Spark of what? Divine = what? My description is precise. The universe is an experience, our own experience is a nested set of sub-experiences within that. What is the big witchcraft here? Are you denying that experience is real? Are you offering an explanation for why experience would ever arise from non-experience? I have no idea what a divine spark is. I can invent a story about it though, or parrot other stories I've heard about it. But they are just stories. Your story lacks a lot of details that I have asked about before. For instance, if the universe is an experience, why don't I have that experience... why do I have my own personal, embodied experience? What sorts of entities larger than myself also have experiences, all the way up to the universe, and why? You've said before that the atoms in my body all have experiences. I assume the cells in my body do too. How do you characterize the kinds of systems that have particular kinds of bounded experiences, rather than everything just experiencing the one universal experience? Your story reminds me of astrology, because you use a lot of jargon and precision to convey an aura of
Re: Improving The Hard Problem
On Friday, April 19, 2013 4:39:11 PM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote: On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 3:46 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Friday, April 19, 2013 11:49:17 AM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote: On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 11:37 AM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote: On Friday, April 19, 2013 11:05:28 AM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote: On Fri, Apr 19, 2013 at 9:30 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stat...@gmail.com wrote: But you claim that it is impossible to conceive of consciousness supervening on function. A religious person would claim that it impossible to conceive of consciousness as residing anywhere other than in the spiritual realm. Both your positions seem to essentially be based on the argument from incredulity: see, this lump of coal is inert and dead, how could anything derived from it possibly have feelings? Craig's theory is essentially equivalent with explaining consciousness in terms of the religious 'soul'. Nope. Soul is anthropmorphic. Sense is generic and universal. I am talking physics, not religion. It's a distinction without a difference. Making it generic and universal as opposed to anthropomorphic doesn't change anything... it is still the uncomputable generator of qualia. That's like saying that there is no difference between saying that ions are electrically charged and saying that atoms have little invisible men pushing them around. Soul is a concept which lends itself to supernatural inhabitants of natural bodies - I am not talking about that at all. I am talking about perception and participation being the absolute fundamental meta-noumena. Except that you don't articulate any demonstrable difference between a universe in which experience is fundamental, and the deterministic physics of mainstream science (as your exchange with Stathis shows, e.g. you repeatedly deny that you need to show how ion channels would do anything differently than what physics would expect them to do), except for one thing - that intention flows downward and affects the lowest levels, and it does this in a way that is not computable (i.e. not in obeyance of any kind of law). That viewpoint is indistinguishable from soul, which is also not computable. The non-computability of sense comes from the supervenience of computation on sense. There is no agenda to elevate sense to a special place of reverence, it just so happens to be the boundary superlative. The difference between the universe which physics describes and the one in which we actually live is that the real universe is comprised exclusively of aesthetic qualities while the physics universe has no plausible explanation for even a single aesthetic quality. I don't see why that seems inarticulate to you. I am telling you that you have to take the blinders off to see what you are missing - there is no substitute. You cannot shut your eyes and then demand to be shown that the world can exist visually without opening them. Only you, through your own free will, can decide whether to validate your own participation in the universe. If you ask the universe to do it for you, it will show you that you cannot exist. That is the nature of the universe and of sense...juxtaposition and reflection. Don't take my word for it, but don't take science's word for it either. He argues that sense is primary, and that the top-down causality of intention translates to the bottom-up causality of physics, Not always, not. There is bottom up, top down, inside out, outside in...all kinds of causality. Makes no difference. How do you figure? If you accuse me of stealing bread because you are the only baker in the world, and I insist that I also can bake bread, and so can many others, how does that make no difference to the presumptuousness of your accusation? The only charge you need to answer for is an uncomputable causality that somehow affects the world in a way that is undetectable by physics - this is indistinguishable from soul. Uncomputable causality *is* the world. Causality and computation are expectations within sense, within sanity. They do not come free of charge as a gift from nothingness. Why are you setting up this binary sanction: 'If it is not countable on fingers and toes then it musst be witchcraffft.' Imagine how it was when electricity was discovered - you would be the voice saying 'this is not in the Bible, therefore it can only be sin...you must account for its absence in the bible.' I am not talking about soul, or spirit, or phlogiston or elan vital, I am talking about the front end of time. Space is the back end of time and space is the source of computation and local causation. Unintentional phenomena are not primitive or fundamental, they are derived from the more primitive and insuperable principles of presence and participation. It has nothing to with human personhood
