Re: Plurality

[Bruno Marchal]

On 07 Nov 2012, at 21:07, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/7/2012 10:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 07 Nov 2012, at 13:48, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/5/2012 1:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

[SPK] You are considering only one entity.


This is incorrect. For example the first person plural is defined  
in term of duplication of populations of machines sharing  
universal numbers/computations.

Dear Bruno,

I would like to restrict my discussions to just a few  
questions about the comp hypothesis. I do not understand how the  
AUDA explains the "duplication of populations of machines sharing  
universal numbers/computations". Could you elaborate on this? I  
asked previously if there exists an index set or some other way to  
identify differences between populations. You didn't seem to know  
what an index set is...


Then read the post more cautiously, please, and quote that part. My  
specialization is recursion theory, and I was pointing that your  
use of "index set" was irrelevant, and did not apply to the 1p.


 Dear Bruno,

Can you explain exactly what distinguishes one 1p from another  
in a way that does not refer to some Platonic Ideal?


?
One 1p has headache. Another one as toothache. For example.








My confusion is that I see only a single equivalence class of  
machines allowed by Tennenbaum's theorem.


When I ask you to explain what is the role of Tennenbaum here, you  
escape in even more 1004 fallacies.


Tennenbaum's theorem tells us that there is only one countable  
model of Peano Arithmetic that can be recursive. This makes, in my  
opinion, a Universal Machine to be a single entity


There is an infinity of different universal machines in the standard  
model, or any model, of arithmetic, for example a LISP interpreter, a  
prolog interpreter, the GOL, etc. All constitutes different universal  
numbers.





and any copy of it is identical to it. This prevents multiple copies  
of it having different identities unless the copies are all embedded  
in a space such that each copy has a different location.


They have different "locations" in the sequence 0, 1, 2, 3, ...







Explain it informally so that everyone can get the idea, if there  
is one. Avoid any links.


OK.


Take the time to explain what is a non standard model,


If we allow for non-standard models of PA to be countable and  
recursive models that individually 'imagine' themselves to be in  
compliance with Tennenbaum's theorem by hiding the constant that  
makes them non-standard from themselves, as if they are allowed to  
forget that they are actually non-standard (as seen from some 
hypothetical 3p) and thus fool themselves into believing that they  
are standard models.


Too much metaphorical. I don't think a model is a good metaphor for a  
thinking being (doubly so assuming comp). A model is a better metaphor  
for a reality than a thinking being.







and why "2+2=4" is universally true,


"2+2=4" is universally true because any collection of at least 3  
observers of tokens that represent {2, +, =, 4} can agree that it is  
true.


It is simpler to grasp that 2+2=4, than to grasp that 3 observers  
agree that "2+2=4" is true.







that is true in both standard and non standrad model.


What I am trying to explain covers both instances, no?

Then explains what role you see in those non standard model, and  
why they would change something in the comp results, which I have  
proved in arithmetic, and so are valid also for the non standard  
models.


All that comp needs to add is something like a Blum complexity  
measure, as you suggest, to act as the unique decoration of the  
instances of the model that are associated with a given observer.





Where am I going wrong?


You are already in the "not even wrong" territory. You make  
statements which are too much unclear, and this is worsened by your  
constant appeal to technical jargons.


You are trying to understand my words too literally.


If you use technical terms, I think that I have no choice.



You must treat what you read as signals whose code you do not  
entirely know. We each speak different languages and are trying to  
communicate with each other via crude analogies. I just ask that you  
truth that I have some coherent idea of what I am trying to say and  
I will do the same for you.


That is the root of your constant 1004. You make crude analogies with  
technical concepts. This can't work.










My problems center around your ideas about 3p-truth!



This, on the contrary is clear but weird, as you refer all the time  
to papers using that 3p truth notions. But then for comp, you seem  
to use philosophy to resist following a reasoning.


My argument is that all of those texts tacitly assume that the  
3p truth can be verified by some physical means, how ever remote it  
might be.


It is not an argument. It is a confession of aristotelianism. It begs  
the question address

Re: Plurality

[Stephen P. King]

On 11/7/2012 10:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 07 Nov 2012, at 13:48, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/5/2012 1:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

[SPK] You are considering only one entity.


This is incorrect. For example the first person plural is defined in 
term of duplication of populations of machines sharing universal 
numbers/computations.

Dear Bruno,

I would like to restrict my discussions to just a few questions 
about the comp hypothesis. I do not understand how the AUDA explains 
the "duplication of populations of machines sharing universal 
numbers/computations". Could you elaborate on this? I asked 
previously if there exists an index set or some other way to identify 
differences between populations. You didn't seem to know what an 
index set  is...


Then read the post more cautiously, please, and quote that part. My 
specialization is recursion theory, and I was pointing that your use 
of "index set" was irrelevant, and did not apply to the 1p.


 Dear Bruno,

Can you explain exactly what distinguishes one 1p from another in a 
way that does not refer to some Platonic Ideal?




My confusion is that I see only a single equivalence class of 
machines allowed by Tennenbaum's theorem 
.


When I ask you to explain what is the role of Tennenbaum here, you 
escape in even more 1004 fallacies.


Tennenbaum's theorem tells us that there is only one countable 
model of Peano Arithmetic that can be recursive. This makes, in my 
opinion, a Universal Machine to be a single entity and any copy of it is 
identical to it. This prevents multiple copies of it having different 
identities unless the copies are all embedded in a space such that each 
copy has a different location.




Explain it informally so that everyone can get the idea, if there is 
one. Avoid any links.


OK.


Take the time to explain what is a non standard model,


If we allow for non-standard models of PA to be countable and 
recursive models that individually 'imagine' themselves to be in 
compliance with Tennenbaum's theorem by hiding the constant that makes 
them non-standard from themselves, as if they are allowed to forget that 
they are actually non-standard (as seen from some hypothetical 3p) and 
thus fool themselves into believing that they are standard models.



and why "2+2=4" is universally true,


"2+2=4" is universally true because any collection of at least 3 
observers of tokens that represent {2, +, =, 4} can agree that it is true.



that is true in both standard and non standrad model.


What I am trying to explain covers both instances, no?

Then explains what role you see in those non standard model, and why 
they would change something in the comp results, which I have proved 
in arithmetic, and so are valid also for the non standard models.


All that comp needs to add is something like a Blum complexity 
measure, as you suggest, to act as the unique decoration of the 
instances of the model that are associated with a given observer.





Where am I going wrong?


You are already in the "not even wrong" territory. You make statements 
which are too much unclear, and this is worsened by your constant 
appeal to technical jargons.


You are trying to understand my words too literally. You must treat 
what you read as signals whose code you do not entirely know. We each 
speak different languages and are trying to communicate with each other 
via crude analogies. I just ask that you truth that I have some coherent 
idea of what I am trying to say and I will do the same for you.






My problems center around your ideas about 3p-truth!



This, on the contrary is clear but weird, as you refer all the time to 
papers using that 3p truth notions. But then for comp, you seem to use 
philosophy to resist following a reasoning.


My argument is that all of those texts tacitly assume that the 3p 
truth can be verified by some physical means, how ever remote it might 
be. There has to be at least one way to physically represent a theory 
for it to be communicated between two or more observers! My thesis is 
that the "physical means" is defined only by the computations that the 
observers have in common. There is not really a separate physical world 
in my thinking, only the illusion that there is one.




In the comp theory the 3p truth is the truth of the arithmetical 
sentences. You should have develop the intuition of it in high school. 
It is the simpler known 3p realm. In QM, an example of 3p would be 
Everett universal wave function.


I don't like the MWI model of QM. It assumes too much.

Most of science is based on 3p mathematical truth, simple like in 
economy and classical physics, and more sophisticated in quantum 
mechanics and theoretical physics.


I understand that is the case. My argument is that the 3p can be 
defined by the mutual agreements about s

Re: Plurality

[Bruno Marchal]

On 07 Nov 2012, at 13:48, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 11/5/2012 1:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

[SPK] You are considering only one entity.


This is incorrect. For example the first person plural is defined  
in term of duplication of populations of machinessharing  
universal numbers/computations.

Dear Bruno,

I would like to restrict my discussions to just a few questions  
about the comp hypothesis. I do not understand how the AUDA explains  
the "duplication of populations of machines sharing universal  
numbers/computations". Could you elaborate on this? I asked  
previously if there exists an index set or some other way to  
identify differences between populations. You didn't seem to know  
what an index set is...


Then read the post more cautiously, please, and quote that part. My  
specialization is recursion theory, and I was pointing that your use  
of "index set" was irrelevant, and did not apply to the 1p.




My confusion is that I see only a single equivalence class of  
machines allowed by Tennenbaum's theorem.


When I ask you to explain what is the role of Tennenbaum here, you  
escape in even more 1004 fallacies.


Explain it informally so that everyone can get the idea, if there is  
one. Avoid any links. Take the time to explain what is a non standard  
model, and why "2+2=4" is universally true, that is true in both  
standard and non standrad model. Then explains what role you see in  
those non standard model, and why they would change something in the  
comp results, which I have proved in arithmetic, and so are valid also  
for the non standard models.





Where am I going wrong?


You are already in the "not even wrong" territory. You make statements  
which are too much unclear, and this is worsened by your constant  
appeal to technical jargons.







My problems center around your ideas about 3p-truth!



This, on the contrary is clear but weird, as you refer all the time to  
papers using that 3p truth notions. But then for comp, you seem to use  
philosophy to resist following a reasoning.


In the comp theory the 3p truth is the truth of the arithmetical  
sentences. You should have develop the intuition of it in high school.  
It is the simpler known 3p realm. In QM, an example of 3p would be  
Everett universal wave function. Most of science is based on 3p  
mathematical truth, simple like in economy and classical physics, and  
more sophisticated in quantum mechanics and theoretical physics.


Of course I cannot explain comp, nor QM, nor GR, nor anything in  
science to someone who stops at "2+2=4", by doing what I feel to be  
only premature philosophical resistance.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Plurality

[Stephen P. King]

On 11/5/2012 1:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

[SPK] You are considering only one entity.


This is incorrect. For example the first person plural is defined in 
term of duplication of populations of machines sharing universal 
numbers/computations.

Dear Bruno,

I would like to restrict my discussions to just a few questions 
about the comp hypothesis. I do not understand how the AUDA explains the 
"duplication of populations of machines sharing universal 
numbers/computations". Could you elaborate on this? I asked previously 
if there exists an index set or some other way to identify differences 
between populations. You didn't seem to know what an index set 
 is... My confusion is that I 
see only a single equivalence class of machines allowed by Tennenbaum's 
theorem 
. Where 
am I going wrong?


My problems center around your ideas about 3p-truth!

--
Onward!

Stephen

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