On 07 Nov 2012, at 21:07, Stephen P. King wrote:

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On 11/7/2012 10:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 07 Nov 2012, at 13:48, Stephen P. King wrote:On 11/5/2012 1:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:[SPK] You are considering only one entity.This is incorrect. For example the first person plural is definedin term of duplication of populations of machines sharinguniversal numbers/computations.Dear Bruno,I would like to restrict my discussions to just a fewquestions about the comp hypothesis. I do not understand how theAUDA explains the "duplication of populations of machines sharinguniversal numbers/computations". Could you elaborate on this? Iasked previously if there exists an index set or some other way toidentify differences between populations. You didn't seem to knowwhat an index set is...Then read the post more cautiously, please, and quote that part. Myspecialization is recursion theory, and I was pointing that youruse of "index set" was irrelevant, and did not apply to the 1p.Dear Bruno,Can you explain exactly what distinguishes one 1p from anotherin a way that does not refer to some Platonic Ideal?

? One 1p has headache. Another one as toothache. For example.

My confusion is that I see only a single equivalence class ofmachines allowed by Tennenbaum's theorem.When I ask you to explain what is the role of Tennenbaum here, youescape in even more 1004 fallacies.Tennenbaum's theorem tells us that there is only one countablemodel of Peano Arithmetic that can be recursive. This makes, in myopinion, a Universal Machine to be a single entity

`There is an infinity of different universal machines in the standard`

`model, or any model, of arithmetic, for example a LISP interpreter, a`

`prolog interpreter, the GOL, etc. All constitutes different universal`

`numbers.`

and any copy of it is identical to it. This prevents multiple copiesof it having different identities unless the copies are all embeddedin a space such that each copy has a different location.

They have different "locations" in the sequence 0, 1, 2, 3, ...

Explain it informally so that everyone can get the idea, if thereis one. Avoid any links.OK.Take the time to explain what is a non standard model,If we allow for non-standard models of PA to be countable andrecursive models that individually 'imagine' themselves to be incompliance with Tennenbaum's theorem by hiding the constant thatmakes them non-standard from themselves, as if they are allowed toforget that they are actually non-standard (as seen from somehypothetical 3p) and thus fool themselves into believing that theyare standard models.

`Too much metaphorical. I don't think a model is a good metaphor for a`

`thinking being (doubly so assuming comp). A model is a better metaphor`

`for a reality than a thinking being.`

and why "2+2=4" is universally true,"2+2=4" is universally true because any collection of at least 3observers of tokens that represent {2, +, =, 4} can agree that it istrue.

`It is simpler to grasp that 2+2=4, than to grasp that 3 observers`

`agree that "2+2=4" is true.`

that is true in both standard and non standrad model.What I am trying to explain covers both instances, no?Then explains what role you see in those non standard model, andwhy they would change something in the comp results, which I haveproved in arithmetic, and so are valid also for the non standardmodels.All that comp needs to add is something like a Blum complexitymeasure, as you suggest, to act as the unique decoration of theinstances of the model that are associated with a given observer.Where am I going wrong?You are already in the "not even wrong" territory. You makestatements which are too much unclear, and this is worsened by yourconstant appeal to technical jargons.You are trying to understand my words too literally.

If you use technical terms, I think that I have no choice.

You must treat what you read as signals whose code you do notentirely know. We each speak different languages and are trying tocommunicate with each other via crude analogies. I just ask that youtruth that I have some coherent idea of what I am trying to say andI will do the same for you.

`That is the root of your constant 1004. You make crude analogies with`

`technical concepts. This can't work.`

My problems center around your ideas about 3p-truth!This, on the contrary is clear but weird, as you refer all the timeto papers using that 3p truth notions. But then for comp, you seemto use philosophy to resist following a reasoning.My argument is that all of those texts tacitly assume that the3p truth can be verified by some physical means, how ever remote itmight be.

`It is not an argument. It is a confession of aristotelianism. It begs`

`the question addressed by the comp theory.`

`The texts you refer too does not make that tacit assumption, even if`

`at another non relevant level, the authors of those paper assumes`

`there is some world in which they can publish the paper, but that is`

`not part of the theory they are studying.`

There has to be at least one way to physically represent a theoryfor it to be communicated between two or more observers! My thesisis that the "physical means" is defined only by the computationsthat the observers have in common.

OK.

There is not really a separate physical world in my thinking, onlythe illusion that there is one.

`OK, but then comp is handy to explain how and where the illusion come`

`from.`

In the comp theory the 3p truth is the truth of the arithmeticalsentences. You should have develop the intuition of it in highschool. It is the simpler known 3p realm. In QM, an example of 3pwould be Everett universal wave function.I don't like the MWI model of QM. It assumes too much.

`I disagree. It assumes less. In fact Everett did not invent a new`

`interpretation of QM. he proposed a new formulation, which is the old`

`QM minus the collapse of the wave. In that theory, using comp, he`

`explains where the belief in collapse can be explained by the SWE. MWI`

`assumes less. It is even the main motivation for everything type of`

`TOE. You need less assumption for getting an "all" than any sub-`

`particularization.`

Most of science is based on 3p mathematical truth, simple like ineconomy and classical physics, and more sophisticated in quantummechanics and theoretical physics.I understand that is the case. My argument is that the 3p can bedefined by the mutual agreements about statements between manyobservers, the 3p is just another way of talking about an illusoryphysical world..

`That is terribly confusing. Once you agree that the physical worlds is`

`dream sharing, it becomes 1p plural. It is simple to keep the 3p for`

`what we assume to be objective, like elementary arithmetic.`

Of course I cannot explain comp, nor QM, nor GR, nor anything inscience to someone who stops at "2+2=4", by doing what I feel to beonly premature philosophical resistance.You assume that Plato solved all problems of many minds

`I don't do that. Anything related to Plato is in the consequence, not`

`in the assumptions. That is why I use "arithmetical realism" in place`

`of "arithmetical platonism".`

and I am trying to explain to you that Plato's idea has an openproblem. You know this problem as the 'arithmetic body' problem.

`It is not in Plato. And the "body problem" is the result of reducing`

`the mind body problem in computer to science. It is a mathematical`

`problem, no more a philosophical one. But philosophically, it is a`

`logical refutation of aristotelian metaphysics.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.