Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> BG: You seem to be making points about the limitations
>> >of the folk-psychology notion of identity, rather than about the actual
>> >nature of the universe...
>>
>>
>> BM: Then you should disagree at some point of the reasoning, for the
>> reasoning is
> You seem to be making points about the limitations
> >of the folk-psychology notion of identity, rather than about the actual
> >nature of the universe...
>
>
> Then you should disagree at some point of the reasoning, for the
> reasoning is intended, at least, to show that it follows from
> the
Ben Goertzel writes:
>I read your argument for the UDA, and there's nothing there that
>particularly worries me.
Good. I don't like to worry people. (Only those attached
dogmatically to BOTH comp AND the existence of a stuffy
substancial universe should perhaps be worried).
You seem to be ma
> See my web page for links to papers, and archive addresses with
> more explanations, including the basic results of my thesis.
> (Mainly the Universal Dovetailer Argument UDA and its Arithmetical
> version AUDA).
I read your argument for the UDA, and there's nothing there that
particularly wor
Ben Goertzel wrote:
>Bruno wrote:
>***
> Let me insist because some people seem not yet grasping
>fully that idea.
>In fact that 1/3-distinction makes COMP incompatible with
>the thesis that the universe is a machine. If I am a machine then
>the universe cannot be a machine. No machine can simula
Hal Finney wrote:
>Bruno Marchal writes:
>> Methodologically your ON theory suffers (at first sight)the same
>> problem as Wolfram, or Schmidhuber's approaches. The problem consists in
>> failing to realise the fact that if we are turing-emulable, then
>> the association between mind-dynamics and
Bruno wrote:
***
Let me insist because some people seem not yet grasping
fully that idea.
In fact that 1/3-distinction makes COMP incompatible with
the thesis that the universe is a machine. If I am a machine then
the universe cannot be a machine. No machine can simulate the
comp first person in
Bruno Marchal writes:
> Methodologically your ON theory suffers (at first sight)the same
> problem as Wolfram, or Schmidhuber's approaches. The problem consists in
> failing to realise the fact that if we are turing-emulable, then
> the association between mind-dynamics and matter-dynamics cannot b
Ben Goertzel wrote:
>Regarding octonions, sedenions and physics
>Tony Smith has a huge amount of pertinent ideas on his website, e.g.
>
>http://www.innerx.net/personal/tsmith/QOphys.html
>http://www.innerx.net/personal/tsmith/d4d5e6hist.html
>
>His ideas are colorful and speculative, but also dee
Regarding octonions, sedenions and physics
Tony Smith has a huge amount of pertinent ideas on his website, e.g.
http://www.innerx.net/personal/tsmith/QOphys.html
http://www.innerx.net/personal/tsmith/d4d5e6hist.html
His ideas are colorful and speculative, but also deep and interesting.
One co
Tim May wrote:
>
> The articles, especially those by Marcus Chown, are wildly speculative
> hints at what may be aspects of reality...at least this is how I treat
> them. And what appears to be just idle speculation sometimes is linked
> with things I know to be important (a cover story on the
On Monday, November 18, 2002, at 07:12 AM, Marchal Bruno wrote:
Hi,
I hope you have not missed Ian Steward's paper on the number
8, considered as a TOE in the last new scientist.
It mentions a paper by John Baez on the octonions. The
octonions seems to be a key ingredient for the quantization
12 matches
Mail list logo
