Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>> BG: You seem to be making points about the limitations
>> >of the folk-psychology notion of identity, rather than about the actual
>> >nature of the universe...
>> BM: Then you should disagree at some point of the reasoning, for the
>> reasoning is intended, at least, to show that it follows from
>> the computationalist hypothesis, that physics is a subbranch of
>> (machine) psychology, and that the actual nature of the universe
>> can and must be recovered by machine psychology.
>BG; I tend to think that "physics" and "machine psychology" are limiting terms
>that will be thrown off within future science, in favor of a more unified

Sure, but before having that future science we must use some terms.
As I said in the first UDA posting, 
it is really the
proof that "physics is a branch of psychology" which provides the
explanation of such terms. Basically machine psychology is given by all
true propositions that machine or collection of machine can prove
or bet about themselves. 
Eventually it is given by the Godel Lob logic of provability with
their modal variants. I take the fact that a consistent machine
cannot prove its own consistency as a psychological theorem.
Consciousness can then be approximated by the unconscious (automated,
instinctive) anticipation of self-consistency. 

>Perhaps, from this more unified perspective, a better approximation will be
>to say that "physics" and "machine psychology" are subsets of each other
>(perhaps formally, in the sense of hypersets, non-foundational set theory,
>who knows...)

Perhaps. I guess a sort of adjunction, or a Chu transform? I don't know.

>> Physics is taken as what is invariant in all possible (consistent)
>> anticipation by (enough rich) machine, and this from the point of
>> view of the machines. If arithmetic was complete, we would get
>> just propositional calculus. But arithmetic is incomplete.
>> This introduces nuances between proof, truth, consistency, etc.
>> The technical part of the thesis shows that the invariant propositions
>> about their probable neighborhoods (for
>> possible anticipating machines) structure themtselves into a sort
>> of quantum logic accompagned by some renormalization problem (which
>> could be fatal for comp (making comp popperian-falsifiable)).
>> This follows from the nuances which are made necessary by the
>> Godel's incompleteness theorems, but also Lob and Solovay
>> fundamental generalization of it. But it's better grasping first
>> the UDA before tackling the AUDA, which is "just" the translation
>> of the UDA in the language of a "Lobian" machine.
>Could you point me to a formal presentation of AUDA, if one exists?
>I have a math PhD and can follow formal arguments better than verbal
>renditions of them sometimes...

You can click on "proof of LASE" in my web page, and on Modal Logic
if you need. The technical part of my thesis relies on the
work of Godel, Lob, Solovay, Goldblatt, Boolos, Visser. Precise
references are in my thesis (downloadable, but written in french).
You can also look at the paper "Computation, Consciousness and the Quantum".

When I will have more time I can provide more explanations.

Let me insist that that technics makes much more sense once you get
the more informal, but nevertheless rigorous, UDA argument.



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