> You seem to be making points about the limitations
> >of the folk-psychology notion of identity, rather than about the actual
> >nature of the universe...
> Then you should disagree at some point of the reasoning, for the
> reasoning is intended, at least, to show that it follows from
> the computationalist hypothesis, that physics is a subbranch of
> (machine) psychology, and that the actual nature of the universe
> can and must be recovered by machine psychology.

I tend to think that "physics" and "machine psychology" are limiting terms
that will be thrown off within future science, in favor of a more unified

Perhaps, from this more unified perspective, a better approximation will be
to say that "physics" and "machine psychology" are subsets of each other
(perhaps formally, in the sense of hypersets, non-foundational set theory,
who knows...)

> Physics is taken as what is invariant in all possible (consistent)
> anticipation by (enough rich) machine, and this from the point of
> view of the machines. If arithmetic was complete, we would get
> just propositional calculus. But arithmetic is incomplete.
> This introduces nuances between proof, truth, consistency, etc.
> The technical part of the thesis shows that the invariant propositions
> about their probable neighborhoods (for
> possible anticipating machines) structure themtselves into a sort
> of quantum logic accompagned by some renormalization problem (which
> could be fatal for comp (making comp popperian-falsifiable)).
> This follows from the nuances which are made necessary by the
> Godel's incompleteness theorems, but also Lob and Solovay
> fundamental generalization of it. But it's better grasping first
> the UDA before tackling the AUDA, which is "just" the translation
> of the UDA in the language of a "Lobian" machine.

Could you point me to a formal presentation of AUDA, if one exists?

I have a math PhD and can follow formal arguments better than verbal
renditions of them sometimes...

Ben G

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