> You seem to be making points about the limitations > >of the folk-psychology notion of identity, rather than about the actual > >nature of the universe... > > > Then you should disagree at some point of the reasoning, for the > reasoning is intended, at least, to show that it follows from > the computationalist hypothesis, that physics is a subbranch of > (machine) psychology, and that the actual nature of the universe > can and must be recovered by machine psychology.
I tend to think that "physics" and "machine psychology" are limiting terms that will be thrown off within future science, in favor of a more unified perspective. Perhaps, from this more unified perspective, a better approximation will be to say that "physics" and "machine psychology" are subsets of each other (perhaps formally, in the sense of hypersets, non-foundational set theory, who knows...) > Physics is taken as what is invariant in all possible (consistent) > anticipation by (enough rich) machine, and this from the point of > view of the machines. If arithmetic was complete, we would get > just propositional calculus. But arithmetic is incomplete. > This introduces nuances between proof, truth, consistency, etc. > The technical part of the thesis shows that the invariant propositions > about their probable neighborhoods (for > possible anticipating machines) structure themtselves into a sort > of quantum logic accompagned by some renormalization problem (which > could be fatal for comp (making comp popperian-falsifiable)). > This follows from the nuances which are made necessary by the > Godel's incompleteness theorems, but also Lob and Solovay > fundamental generalization of it. But it's better grasping first > the UDA before tackling the AUDA, which is "just" the translation > of the UDA in the language of a "Lobian" machine. Could you point me to a formal presentation of AUDA, if one exists? I have a math PhD and can follow formal arguments better than verbal renditions of them sometimes... thanks Ben G
