Re: children and measure
2009/2/11 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com --- On Mon, 2/9/09, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Also I still don't understand how I could be 30 years old and not 4, there are a lot more OM of 4 than 30... it is the argument you use for 1000 years old, I don't see why it can hold for 30 ? Quentin, why would the measure of 4 year olds be a lot more than the measure of 30 year olds? I have already explained that the effect of differentiation (eg by learning) is exactly balanced by the increased number of versions to sum over (the N/N explanation) and the effect of child mortality is small. I don't get it. Why should the measure suddenly decrease at 80 (or 100) years old ? Why not 30 ? Why not 4 ? Also this is still assuming ASSA and does not take in accound that my next momemt is not a random momemt (with high measure) against all momemts, but a random momemt again all momemts that have my current moment as memories/previous. Even if being Napoleon at the age of 30 would have a measure 10^30 higher than any individual measure of momemts that has composed me so far... I'm not Napoleon at age 30, my next moment will never be Napoleon at age 30 and never will and that changes everything. I know that in 1 minute, it will be 1 minute later from now whatever the measure of now and in one minute is. Also Stathis as a point, you said in the A1/A2 (A) vs B case that A as 2 times the measure of B... But B will be with probabilty 1... does B feel less real ? less conscious (that would contradict the assumption B was a conscious moment). If the measure doesn't change anything to these attributes... then however small this measure is as long as it is not striclty null, the experienced moment will be real... as real as the real here and now is. Is there some third factor that you think comes into play? Can you estimate quantitatively what you think the measure ratio would be? Also even if absolute measure had sense, do you mean that the measure of a 1000 years old OM is strictly zero (not infinitesimal, simply and strictly null)? No, it is not zero, but it is extremely small. I have never suggested that there is no long time tail in the measure distribution that extends to infinite time. Of course there is. Any MWIer knows that. But it is negligable. You will never experience it, or depending on definitions, at least not in any significant measure. The general argument against immortality proves that. It is no more significant then any other very-small-measure set of observations, such as the ones in which you are king of the demons. You might as well forget about it. So even if being 1000 years had a so small but not null measure, it will come into existence by MWI, then the person which will be living this OM having my currents life as past will feel as real as I am... so what's the difference ? Regards, Quentin -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: children and measure
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: I don't get it. Why should the measure suddenly decrease at 80 (or 100) years old ? Why not 30 ? Why not 4 ? Heart disease. Cancer. Stroke. Degradation of various organs leading to death. Such ailments are known to strike older people more than young people. Are such things unheard of in your country? I wouldn't call it sudden, but certainly by 100 the measure has dropped off a lot. By 200, survival is theoretically possible, so the measure isn't zero, but such cases are obviously quite rare. Also this is still assuming ASSA and does not take in accound that my next momemt is not a random momemt (with high measure) against all momemts, but a random momemt again all momemts that have my current moment as memories/previous. There is no randomness whatsoever involved. See my replies to Stathis. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: children and measure
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/11 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com mailto:jackmal...@yahoo.com --- On Mon, 2/9/09, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com mailto:allco...@gmail.com wrote: Also I still don't understand how I could be 30 years old and not 4, there are a lot more OM of 4 than 30... it is the argument you use for 1000 years old, I don't see why it can hold for 30 ? Quentin, why would the measure of 4 year olds be a lot more than the measure of 30 year olds? I have already explained that the effect of differentiation (eg by learning) is exactly balanced by the increased number of versions to sum over (the N/N explanation) and the effect of child mortality is small. I don't get it. Why should the measure suddenly decrease at 80 (or 100) years old ? Why not 30 ? Why not 4 ? Also this is still assuming ASSA and does not take in accound that my next momemt is not a random momemt (with high measure) against all momemts, but a random momemt again all momemts that have my current moment as memories/previous. Even if being Napoleon at the age of 30 would have a measure 10^30 higher than any individual measure of momemts that has composed me so far... I'm not Napoleon at age 30, my next moment will never be Napoleon at age 30 and never will and that changes everything. I know that in 1 minute, it will be 1 minute later from now whatever the measure of now and in one minute is. Also Stathis as a point, you said in the A1/A2 (A) vs B case that A as 2 times the measure of B... But B will be with probabilty 1... does B feel less real ? less conscious (that would contradict the assumption B was a conscious moment). If the measure doesn't change anything to these attributes... then however small this measure is as long as it is not striclty null, the experienced moment will be real... as real as the real here and now is. Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces the measure of each subspace. But there's no perceptible diminishment of consciousness. I think this is consistent with the idea that consciousness is a computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it doesn't. Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's vector in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: children and measure
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces the measure of each subspace. But there's no perceptible diminishment of consciousness. I think this is consistent with the idea that consciousness is a computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it doesn't. Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's vector in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it. If that is so then how do you explain the Born rule? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: children and measure
Brent Meeker wrote: Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces the measure of each subspace. But there's no perceptible diminishment of consciousness. I think this is consistent with the idea that consciousness is a computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it doesn't. Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's vector in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it. But why should less measure imply a diminishment of consciousness? Measure is not intended to have anything to do with how a given observer or observer-moment feels subjectively at a given instant, just how *likely* that experience is. If I win the lottery I don't feel my consciousness diminish, for example. Jesse --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: children and measure
2009/2/11 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com 2009/2/11 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com Brent Meeker wrote: Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces the measure of each subspace. But there's no perceptible diminishment of consciousness. I think this is consistent with the idea that consciousness is a computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it doesn't. Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's vector in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it. But why should less measure imply a diminishment of consciousness? Measure is not intended to have anything to do with how a given observer or observer-moment feels subjectively at a given instant, just how *likely* that experience is. If I win the lottery I don't feel my consciousness diminish, for example. Jesse Hence measure cannot be an argument againt QI... Because the point is to know from a 1st person perspective that it exists a next subjective moment... if there is, QI holds. Even if in the majority of universes I'm dead... from 1st perspective I cannot be dead hence the only moments that count is where I exists however small the measure of that moment is... and if at any momemts there exists a successor where I exists then QI holds. Regards, Quentin -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: children and measure
2009/2/11 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com Brent Meeker wrote: Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces the measure of each subspace. But there's no perceptible diminishment of consciousness. I think this is consistent with the idea that consciousness is a computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it doesn't. Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's vector in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it. But why should less measure imply a diminishment of consciousness? Measure is not intended to have anything to do with how a given observer or observer-moment feels subjectively at a given instant, just how *likely* that experience is. If I win the lottery I don't feel my consciousness diminish, for example. Jesse Hence measure cannot be an argument againt QI... -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: children and measure
2009/2/11 Quentin Anciaux Because the point is to know from a 1st person perspective that it exists a next subjective moment... if there is, QI holds. Even if in the majority of universes I'm dead... from 1st perspective I cannot be dead hence the only moments that count is where I exists however small the measure of that moment is... and if at any momemts there exists a successor where I exists then QI holds. But any notion of there being objective truths about what happens from the 1st person perspective, as opposed to just 3rd person truths about what various brains *report* experiencing, gets into philosophical assumptions that really need to made explicit or else people are talking at cross-purposes...this is what I was getting at with my post at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list/msg/26b0bf3e1e971381 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: children and measure
Jesse Mazer wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces the measure of each subspace. But there's no perceptible diminishment of consciousness. I think this is consistent with the idea that consciousness is a computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it doesn't. Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's vector in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it. But why should less measure imply a diminishment of consciousness? Measure is not intended to have anything to do with how a given observer or observer-moment feels subjectively at a given instant, just how *likely* that experience is. If I win the lottery I don't feel my consciousness diminish, for example. Jesse We seem to be in violent agreement. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: children and measure
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/2/11 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com mailto:laserma...@hotmail.com Brent Meeker wrote: Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces the measure of each subspace. But there's no perceptible diminishment of consciousness. I think this is consistent with the idea that consciousness is a computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it doesn't. Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's vector in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it. But why should less measure imply a diminishment of consciousness? Measure is not intended to have anything to do with how a given observer or observer-moment feels subjectively at a given instant, just how *likely* that experience is. If I win the lottery I don't feel my consciousness diminish, for example. Jesse Hence measure cannot be an argument againt QI... I guess that depends on what you care about. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
re: children and measure
--- On Mon, 2/9/09, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Also I still don't understand how I could be 30 years old and not 4, there are a lot more OM of 4 than 30... it is the argument you use for 1000 years old, I don't see why it can hold for 30 ? Quentin, why would the measure of 4 year olds be a lot more than the measure of 30 year olds? I have already explained that the effect of differentiation (eg by learning) is exactly balanced by the increased number of versions to sum over (the N/N explanation) and the effect of child mortality is small. Is there some third factor that you think comes into play? Can you estimate quantitatively what you think the measure ratio would be? Also even if absolute measure had sense, do you mean that the measure of a 1000 years old OM is strictly zero (not infinitesimal, simply and strictly null)? No, it is not zero, but it is extremely small. I have never suggested that there is no long time tail in the measure distribution that extends to infinite time. Of course there is. Any MWIer knows that. But it is negligable. You will never experience it, or depending on definitions, at least not in any significant measure. The general argument against immortality proves that. It is no more significant then any other very-small-measure set of observations, such as the ones in which you are king of the demons. You might as well forget about it. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: children and measure
On Tue, Feb 10, 2009 at 06:43:11PM -0800, Jack Mallah wrote: --- On Mon, 2/9/09, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Also I still don't understand how I could be 30 years old and not 4, there are a lot more OM of 4 than 30... it is the argument you use for 1000 years old, I don't see why it can hold for 30 ? Quentin, why would the measure of 4 year olds be a lot more than the measure of 30 year olds? I have already explained that the effect of differentiation (eg by learning) is exactly balanced by the increased number of versions to sum over (the N/N explanation) and the effect of child mortality is small. Is there some third factor that you think comes into play? Can you estimate quantitatively what you think the measure ratio would be? In my book (page 146) I make the comment: The Doomsday argument with selection of observer moments made according to a monotonically declining function of age would predict the youngest of observer moments to be selected. By this argument, it is actually mysterious why we should ever observe ourselves as adults, a reductio ad absurdum for the Mallah argument. Jacques has convinced me that the measure in question may be sufficiently slowly declining over (say) the first 80 years of human life that anthropic arguments becomes blunt. Particularly when the categories concerned are things like childhood, adolescence, youth, middle age and old age, rather than specific ages. Of course, infant mortality is still very high in many parts of the world, so the overall measure of babies is much higher than other age groups, but one could argue that infants are not conscious until after the brain reorganisation that occurs in the second year of life, so it is possible that high infant mortality doesn't count. Of course my major problem with the argument depending on the ASSA still stands, but I'm willing to grant that this particular objection may be overegged. -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
