Jesse Mazer wrote:
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>> Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of
>> consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which
>> implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces
>> measure of each subspace. But there's no perceptible diminishment of
>> consciousness. I think this is consistent with the idea that consciousness
>> is a
>> computation, since in that case the computation either exists or it doesn't.
>> Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's
>> in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it.
> But why should less measure imply a "diminishment of consciousness"? Measure
> is not intended to have anything to do with how a given observer or
> observer-moment feels subjectively at a given instant, just how *likely* that
> experience is. If I win the lottery I don't feel my consciousness diminish,
> for example.
We seem to be in violent agreement.
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