Re: This is not the roadmap
Thanks, Bruno, for your 1st par below.
My idea was based on (my) common sense using that tiny little I read (and
heard) about Gödel.
To the 2nd par: I disagree with any 'random' in the 'existence' (nature
etc.) - except for the mathematical use like:
"take ANY number". However: a 'random' string (unfettered by 'order') IMO
cannot provide reasonable computational results as seeable e.g. from a
'function' with unidentified and unlimited variables. It may lead to
anything at all. (says the layman - after a friend who teaches math at a NY
univ.).
Your 3rd par, however, ("For Tom and Georges:")
sounds to me like musical noise and I prefer Beethoven. I needed some 20-30
years of intensive study to get it right.
Thanks anyway.
John
- Original Message -
From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Tuesday, August 01, 2006 6:38 AM
Subject: Re: This is not the roadmap
Le 31-juil.-06, à 23:32, John M a écrit :
> 1Z:
> I liked your examples, would have liked better if you do not base the
> entire
> list on "matter to exist". It may not.
>
> I have a notion - cannot put my finger on an adequate formulation of
> it into
> words - that mathematics cannot be computed by mathamatics - I think
> Goedel
> would have some objections to that.
>
> Somebody tell me if this is a wrong idea. I will not fight it. (Not my
> table).
It is ok. Godel would have approved: the whole of formal mathematics
cannot be "computed" by any formal mathematics. It is a little vague
but this convey the main godelian point.
Concerning some of tyhe conversation between Brent, 1Z and Stathis, I
would say that I don't see the relationship between computations and
random string. Computations, or their description can be shown to be
necessarily redundant, (and deep in Bennett' sense).
For Tom and Georges:
Take the Fi corresponding to 0-argument (fortran) programs. Any such
program stops or does not stop. Consider the function which associates
to n either 1 or 0 according to the fact that the nth program stop or
does not stop. you get a deep complex and subtly redundant sequence of
0 and 1.
If you decide to compress it maximally you will get Chaitin OMEGA
number, which gives the probability that a Fi will stop or not, (but
this cannot be done algorithmically). There is no reason to related
consciousness to those random compression of computation. Look at
nature from genome to the number PI: you will always see many
redundancies. They are absent in the Putnam Chalmers rock. I don't
think it makes sense to attribute computations in there (but then I
don't care given that UDA makes us having to (re)define physics by
winning (in some relative probabilistic sense) sheaf of relative
computations existing in platonia.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: This is not the roadmap
Le 31-juil.-06, à 23:32, John M a écrit : > 1Z: > I liked your examples, would have liked better if you do not base the > entire > list on "matter to exist". It may not. > > I have a notion - cannot put my finger on an adequate formulation of > it into > words - that mathematics cannot be computed by mathamatics - I think > Goedel > would have some objections to that. > > Somebody tell me if this is a wrong idea. I will not fight it. (Not my > table). It is ok. Godel would have approved: the whole of formal mathematics cannot be "computed" by any formal mathematics. It is a little vague but this convey the main godelian point. Concerning some of tyhe conversation between Brent, 1Z and Stathis, I would say that I don't see the relationship between computations and random string. Computations, or their description can be shown to be necessarily redundant, (and deep in Bennett' sense). For Tom and Georges: Take the Fi corresponding to 0-argument (fortran) programs. Any such program stops or does not stop. Consider the function which associates to n either 1 or 0 according to the fact that the nth program stop or does not stop. you get a deep complex and subtly redundant sequence of 0 and 1. If you decide to compress it maximally you will get Chaitin OMEGA number, which gives the probability that a Fi will stop or not, (but this cannot be done algorithmically). There is no reason to related consciousness to those random compression of computation. Look at nature from genome to the number PI: you will always see many redundancies. They are absent in the Putnam Chalmers rock. I don't think it makes sense to attribute computations in there (but then I don't care given that UDA makes us having to (re)define physics by winning (in some relative probabilistic sense) sheaf of relative computations existing in platonia. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: This is not the roadmap
1Z: I liked your examples, would have liked better if you do not base the entire list on "matter to exist". It may not. I have a notion - cannot put my finger on an adequate formulation of it into words - that mathematics cannot be computed by mathamatics - I think Goedel would have some objections to that. Somebody tell me if this is a wrong idea. I will not fight it. (Not my table). John M - Original Message - From: "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Everything List" Sent: Monday, July 31, 2006 12:48 PM Subject: Re: This is not the roadmap Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 24-juil.-06, à 02:26, 1Z a écrit : > > OTOH, materialism explains how qualia can be unrelated to computation. > Could you say how (without invoking words like "real")? If nothing exists except mathematical structures, qualia can only be identical to mathematical structures. If qualia exist as non-mathematical properties, then something exists other than mathematical structures. If something exists other than mathematical structures, then qualia can supervene in on it, rather than on mathematical structures per se. if matter exists as a non-mathematical structure. then qualia can supervene on it, and not on only mathematical structures. If computationalism is true, qualia must supervene on computational processes. Computational processes are mathematical structures , so if computationalism is true, qualia must supervene on mathematical structures. Qualia must be related to mathematical structures to be related to computational processes. If there is a way in which qualia can be unrelated to mathematical structures it is also a way in which they can be unrelated to computational processes. If matter exists as a non-mathematical structure. then qualia can supervene on it, and not on only mathematical structures. Therefore , if matter exists, there is a way in which qualia can be unrelated to mathematical structures. Therefore, if matter exists, there is a way in which qualia can be unrelated to computational processes. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: This is not the roadmap
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 24-juil.-06, à 02:26, 1Z a écrit : > > OTOH, materialism explains how qualia can be unrelated to computation. > Could you say how (without invoking words like "real")? If nothing exists except mathematical structures, qualia can only be identical to mathematical structures. If qualia exist as non-mathematical properties, then something exists other than mathematical structures. If something exists other than mathematical structures, then qualia can supervene in on it, rather than on mathematical structures per se. if matter exists as a non-mathematical structure. then qualia can supervene on it, and not on only mathematical structures. If computationalism is true, qualia must supervene on computational processes. Computational processes are mathematical structures , so if computationalism is true, qualia must supervene on mathematical structures. Qualia must be related to mathematical structures to be related to computational processes. If there is a way in which qualia can be unrelated to mathematical structures it is also a way in which they can be unrelated to computational processes. If matter exists as a non-mathematical structure. then qualia can supervene on it, and not on only mathematical structures. Therefore , if matter exists, there is a way in which qualia can be unrelated to mathematical structures. Therefore, if matter exists, there is a way in which qualia can be unrelated to computational processes. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: This is not the roadmap
Le 24-juil.-06, à 02:26, 1Z a écrit : > OTOH, materialism explains how qualia can be unrelated to computation. Could you say how (without invoking words like "real")? bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: This is not the roadmap
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 23-juil.-06, à 02:43, 1Z a écrit : > > > There is no reason to think numbers can describe qualia at > > all, so the question of the "best" description hardly arises. > > That was my point. But then I can show this is a necessary consequence > of comp. > Materialist who are using comp as a pretext for not doing serious > philosophy of mind takes as granted that qualia can be described by > number or machine or theories. Comp explains how both qualia can be > related to a mixture of self-reference and unnameable truth. OTOH, materialism explains how qualia can be unrelated to computation. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: This is not the roadmap
Le 23-juil.-06, à 02:43, 1Z a écrit : > There is no reason to think numbers can describe qualia at > all, so the question of the "best" description hardly arises. That was my point. But then I can show this is a necessary consequence of comp. Materialist who are using comp as a pretext for not doing serious philosophy of mind takes as granted that qualia can be described by number or machine or theories. Comp explains how both qualia can be related to a mixture of self-reference and unnameable truth. Number cannot 3-describes qualia, but can build (correct) theories about them including explanation why numbers cannot describe them, yet bet instinctively on them before anything else. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: This is not the roadmap
Bruno Marchal wrote: > You asked me more difficult problems in the past, John. > *assuming comp*, there is an easy answer. Go to Numberplatonia, use > Goedel's technic to write a little program with the instruction "help > yourself". Pray each day your little program develop itself convenably, > perhaps with the help of the heaven. When sufficiently developed, > maybe after billions of years, invite e to the next grocery and buy er > a vanilla candy, and then ask er. E will give you the best description > you can ever hope of a taste of vanilla, corresponding to a billion > years of ordinary number manipulations and you can look at them if you > have print the execution of the program. There is no reason to think numbers can describe qualia at all, so the question of the "best" description hardly arises. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: This is not the roadmap
Thanks, Bruno, for your helping effort. It did not do too much for me because it started out with 'assuming comp' which means: we need nothing more than (number) trivialities and (as you wrote): > Numbers protects the free mind against a *vast* > class of reductionism< What I feel is the complete reductionism INTO numbers. No wonder if 'they' protect us against other types. Your 'vanilla story' did not ring a bell in my mind to an understganding about what you wrote. I learned that the square root of 2 is irrational, but did not learn what 2 may be if not two kikcs in the behind or two roses. Square rooting goes well within your 'manipuklating numbers' what I believed similarly to "Noah survived the flood". I call 'happiness of the mathematicians' the happiness of the believers not questioning what "number" may be and using them from pre-platonia on. I feel (not in numbers) that your mind is working in the numbers-maze so deeply that I doubt if your help copuld really induce me (from the unbiased outside) into the platonistic-Godelian number crunching wisdom. Thanks anyway for your friendly trying John --- Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > Le 21-juil.-06, � 22:52, John M a �crit : > > > Could we talk 'topics' without going into > trivialities what every child > > knows after the first visit to the grocery store? > > > But the cute thing (in my perhaps naive lobianity) > here is that you > don't need more than the trivialities every child > knows after the first > visit to the grocery store, to understand that, once > we assume comp, > Numbers protects the free mind against a *vast* > class of reductionism. > I should perhaps not insist on that because, > sometimes I ask myself, > humanity could be not mature enough, but there are > many reason to > believe that eventually all universal machines > sufficiently correct to > survive will converge toward a state of being > universal dissident, a > typical allergy to authoritative arguments. > > > As long as we cannot identify what a 'number' is, > it does not > > contribute to > > an understanding of reason. > > Could we identify what a human is? > > > What is '3' without monitoring something? > > With the Fi I tried to explain how far can numbers > can monitors > numbers, including partially themselves. > Also, I would get the feeling of lying to myself if > I was not > acknowledging that I understand better the number 3 > than an electron or > a theory about electrons. > > > (This is not a personal attack on you or YOUR > >theory, it is a common belief > > and I question its usability - not by opposing, > just curious to find a way > > to accept it and experience the happiness of the > mathematicians). > > > Do you know the proof that the square root of 2 is > irrational. It is an > impossibility theorem. Godel's incompletness and > Turing's > insolubilities are very deep impossibility theorem > concerning machine, > and us (assuming comp). The happiness of the > mathematician is of many > type: barock, romantic, jazz, mystery-inspired, > esthetic > > > As you can see, I have no idea about number > theory. Whenever I tried > > to read > > into it, I found myself (the text) inside the > >mindset which I wanted to > > approach from the outside. Nobody offered so far a > >way to "get in" if you are "outside" of it > > > I can offer my help, but I don't want to insist. > > > It is a magic and I do not like magic. > > I like true magic. I hate magic+ marmelade. > > > > Next time when I ask "how can you describe the > taste of vanilla by > > manipulating ordinary numbers"? TRY IT. > > You asked me more difficult problems in the past, > John. > *assuming comp*, there is an easy answer. Go to > Numberplatonia, use > Goedel's technic to write a little program with the > instruction "help > yourself". Pray each day your little program develop > itself convenably, > perhaps with the help of the heaven. When > sufficiently developed, > maybe after billions of years, invite e to the next > grocery and buy er > a vanilla candy, and then ask er. E will give you > the best description > you can ever hope of a taste of vanilla, > corresponding to a billion > years of ordinary number manipulations and you can > look at them if you > have print the execution of the program. > > If comp is true, nobody will know for sure which > numbers are > responsible for the vanilla qualia, although > empirical theories will > progress up to the point of buying "qualia". > Successes there will be > serendipitous, and unproved scientifically, but most > of us will not > care ... only for bugs ... and protection of privacy > (an explosively > daunting task of the future which will be made > tractable through > quantum information practice I think). > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are su
Re: This is not the roadmap
Le 21-juil.-06, à 22:52, John M a écrit : > Could we talk 'topics' without going into trivialities what every child > knows after the first visit to the grocery store? But the cute thing (in my perhaps naive lobianity) here is that you don't need more than the trivialities every child knows after the first visit to the grocery store, to understand that, once we assume comp, Numbers protects the free mind against a *vast* class of reductionism. I should perhaps not insist on that because, sometimes I ask myself, humanity could be not mature enough, but there are many reason to believe that eventually all universal machines sufficiently correct to survive will converge toward a state of being universal dissident, a typical allergy to authoritative arguments. > As long as we cannot identify what a 'number' is, it does not > contribute to > an understanding of reason. Could we identify what a human is? > What is '3' without monitoring something? With the Fi I tried to explain how far can numbers can monitors numbers, including partially themselves. Also, I would get the feeling of lying to myself if I was not acknowledging that I understand better the number 3 than an electron or a theory about electrons. > (This is not a personal attack on you or YOUR theory, it is a common > belief > and I question its usability - not by opposing, just curious to find > a way > to accept it and experience the happiness of the mathematicians). Do you know the proof that the square root of 2 is irrational. It is an impossibility theorem. Godel's incompletness and Turing's insolubilities are very deep impossibility theorem concerning machine, and us (assuming comp). The happiness of the mathematician is of many type: barock, romantic, jazz, mystery-inspired, esthetic > As you can see, I have no idea about number theory. Whenever I tried > to read > into it, I found myself (the text) inside the mindset which I wanted > to > approach from the outside. Nobody offered so far a way to "get in" if > you > are "outside" of it I can offer my help, but I don't want to insist. > It is a magic and I do not like magic. I like true magic. I hate magic+ marmelade. > Next time when I ask "how can you describe the taste of vanilla by > manipulating ordinary numbers"? TRY IT. You asked me more difficult problems in the past, John. *assuming comp*, there is an easy answer. Go to Numberplatonia, use Goedel's technic to write a little program with the instruction "help yourself". Pray each day your little program develop itself convenably, perhaps with the help of the heaven. When sufficiently developed, maybe after billions of years, invite e to the next grocery and buy er a vanilla candy, and then ask er. E will give you the best description you can ever hope of a taste of vanilla, corresponding to a billion years of ordinary number manipulations and you can look at them if you have print the execution of the program. If comp is true, nobody will know for sure which numbers are responsible for the vanilla qualia, although empirical theories will progress up to the point of buying "qualia". Successes there will be serendipitous, and unproved scientifically, but most of us will not care ... only for bugs ... and protection of privacy (an explosively daunting task of the future which will be made tractable through quantum information practice I think). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: This is not the roadmap
Dear Bruno, please, don't even read this: (This is not a personal attack on you or YOUR theory, it is a common belief and I question its usability - not by opposing, just curious to find a way to accept it and experience the happiness of the mathematicians). It is a retardating barrier for me to jump from thinking about reasonable (problematic?) topics into 2+2=4 or 3x17=367 or that 17 is a prime number. Could we talk 'topics' without going into trivialities what every child knows after the first visit to the grocery store? As long as we cannot identify what a 'number' is, it does not contribute to an understanding of reason. What is '3' without monitoring something? Why is it not the same as 35.678? or 5? (of course they are, just set the origo and the scale accordingly). And this 'meme'based illusion is used to explain 'serious' features (not quantized, counted, equated or compared values they refer to. Please remember these 3 last words!) As you can see, I have no idea about number theory. Whenever I tried to read into it, I found myself (the text) inside the mindset which I wanted to approach from the outside. Nobody offered so far a way to "get in" if you are "outside" of it. It is a magic and I do not like magic. I propose a test: Next time when I ask "how can you describe the taste of vanilla by manipulating ordinary numbers"? TRY IT. With friendship and ignorance John - Original Message - From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, July 21, 2006 10:37 AM Subject: This is not the roadmap This is not the roadmap. I think aloud in case it helps (me or someone else). Le 21-juil.-06, à 15:01, I wrote > This can be made precise with the logics G&Co, but for this I should > explain before the roadmap George has suggested (asap). My problem. How much should I rely on Plotinus? When people asks me for a non technical version of my saying, Plotinus' Enneads are quite close to that. You should not take his examples literally, but only its logic and the difficulties he encouters. I must think. Strictly speaking, math is what makes the explanation easier. In a nutshell I could perhaps try to put it in this way: One (among many) possible description of the comp ontology of a comp TOE, is just: Classical logic + the (recursive) definition of addition and multiplication. This gives Robinson Arithmetic (RA), one of the weakest theory possible. RA can prove that 4 + 5 = 5 + 4, but is already unable to prove that this is true for any number n. RA cannot generalize. It can prove that the sum of the first ten odd numbers 1+3+5+7+9+11+13+15+17+19 = 10 * 10, but RA cannot prove that for any n the sum of the n first odd numbers gives always the perefct square n * n. Yet, RA has enough existential provability ability so as to be able to represent the partial recursive functions, and from a recursion theorist point of view RA can be seen as a universal machine, and RA's theorem codes the generation of a universal dovetailing. (Technically RA is able to prove all true sigma-1 sentences, those which are like ExP(x) with P decidable). Now if I stop here, I would fall against a critic David Deutsch once made against Schmidhuber's "computationalist view of everything". It would be quasi trivial. So I add an epistemology: this concerns what richer machine's can prove. Those richer machines are emulated all the time in the sequence of simple existential proposition proved by RA. Then I do what Everett did for quantum mechanics: what can prove the lobian machine whos histories are generated by RA, or any DU, or just the sigma1 truth). (To understand this you need to understand the difference between computation or emulation, and proof). Many people are wrong about this. For example the (very rich) theory ZF can prove that the (rich) theory PA is consistent. PA cannot prove that. But PA can prove that ZF can prove PA's consistency. The main reason fro that, is that the fact that you can emulate Hitler's brain (in platonia) does not entail you will get Hitler's belief. This can be related to Dennett and Hofstadter correct (assuming comp) rebutal of Searles in the book "Mind's I". Even RA can prove that ZF can prove that PA and RA are consistent! But RA and PA and ZF can hardly prove that they are respectively consistent (no theories which can talk about addition and multiplication can prove their own consistency, but richer lobian machine can prove many things on simpler lobian machine, including what is true about the simpler machine that the simpler machine cannot prove). The lobian machine, my epistemology, is thus richer than the TOE comp basic ontology (given by RA or the UD). A typical lobian machine is given by the theory (or its corresponding theorem prover program if you prefer) PA (P
This is not the roadmap
This is not the roadmap. I think aloud in case it helps (me or someone else). Le 21-juil.-06, à 15:01, I wrote > This can be made precise with the logics G&Co, but for this I should > explain before the roadmap George has suggested (asap). My problem. How much should I rely on Plotinus? When people asks me for a non technical version of my saying, Plotinus' Enneads are quite close to that. You should not take his examples literally, but only its logic and the difficulties he encouters. I must think. Strictly speaking, math is what makes the explanation easier. In a nutshell I could perhaps try to put it in this way: One (among many) possible description of the comp ontology of a comp TOE, is just: Classical logic + the (recursive) definition of addition and multiplication. This gives Robinson Arithmetic (RA), one of the weakest theory possible. RA can prove that 4 + 5 = 5 + 4, but is already unable to prove that this is true for any number n. RA cannot generalize. It can prove that the sum of the first ten odd numbers 1+3+5+7+9+11+13+15+17+19 = 10 * 10, but RA cannot prove that for any n the sum of the n first odd numbers gives always the perefct square n * n. Yet, RA has enough existential provability ability so as to be able to represent the partial recursive functions, and from a recursion theorist point of view RA can be seen as a universal machine, and RA's theorem codes the generation of a universal dovetailing. (Technically RA is able to prove all true sigma-1 sentences, those which are like ExP(x) with P decidable). Now if I stop here, I would fall against a critic David Deutsch once made against Schmidhuber's "computationalist view of everything". It would be quasi trivial. So I add an epistemology: this concerns what richer machine's can prove. Those richer machines are emulated all the time in the sequence of simple existential proposition proved by RA. Then I do what Everett did for quantum mechanics: what can prove the lobian machine whos histories are generated by RA, or any DU, or just the sigma1 truth). (To understand this you need to understand the difference between computation or emulation, and proof). Many people are wrong about this. For example the (very rich) theory ZF can prove that the (rich) theory PA is consistent. PA cannot prove that. But PA can prove that ZF can prove PA's consistency. The main reason fro that, is that the fact that you can emulate Hitler's brain (in platonia) does not entail you will get Hitler's belief. This can be related to Dennett and Hofstadter correct (assuming comp) rebutal of Searles in the book "Mind's I". Even RA can prove that ZF can prove that PA and RA are consistent! But RA and PA and ZF can hardly prove that they are respectively consistent (no theories which can talk about addition and multiplication can prove their own consistency, but richer lobian machine can prove many things on simpler lobian machine, including what is true about the simpler machine that the simpler machine cannot prove). The lobian machine, my epistemology, is thus richer than the TOE comp basic ontology (given by RA or the UD). A typical lobian machine is given by the theory (or its corresponding theorem prover program if you prefer) PA (Peano arithmetic). It is given by -Classical logic -the (recursive) definitions of addition and multiplication -The infinity of induction axioms (read "A" "for all") like [P(0) and An(P(n) -> P(n+1))] -> AnP(n) This provides PA with incredible introspective abilities, enough for enabling it to discover its limitations and the geometry of those limitations. and eventually to correctly infer, from the logic of provability (note the "v) the logic of "probability" (note the "b") bearing on the collection of all their consistent extensions. And more. At least enough for discovering two, and then 4, 8, 16, ... plotinian-like hypostases (person notions), including the one which justify matter, both in the UDA sense, and in the plotinian sense (a "slight platonist correction of Aristotle theory of matter actually (I begun the reading of Aristotle at last). Note that the first primary hypostasis, truth, could aptly be called the zero person point of view. That could perhaps be related with Nagel's "point of view of nowhere". It is really here that Plotinus contradicts the more Aristotle, which first hypostasis, seems to be a 1-person, especially in the treatise (5.6) which has been abridged out in the pengwin paperbook Ennead (I guess a coincidence because that point is well explained in many other ennead's treatise, so it is normal to abridged this one for making possible to put the enneads in your pocket without demolishing the pants). I must think, the subject is difficult and goes over many discipl
