Re: [Evolution-hackers] Moving EExtension to libedataserver

2011-09-12 Thread Milan Crha
On Mon, 2011-09-12 at 09:27 -0400, Matthew Barnes wrote:
> On Mon, 2011-09-12 at 10:49 +0200, Christian Hilberg wrote: 
> > Am Montag 12 September 2011, um 09:57:26 schrieb Milan Crha:
> > > I wouldn't do that, as it doubles work for translators, because it's
> > > their time now. Does it make that large difference to "wait" for next
> > > two weeks? You can always do those things locally and branch&commit
> > > later anyway.
> 
> > Regarding the current plannings for porting evolution-kolab to a current 
> > dev 
> > version of Evo/E-D-S, it could prove very helpful to have this 
> > infrastructure 
> > available for basing our work on. We'd appreciate it much if the merge 
> > could 
> > be done as soon as the translator's window is closed and the merge can be 
> > done 
> > without foreseeable extra work for the release currently under preparation.
> 
> Very well, we'll branch then when the hard code freeze begins as we
> usually do.  The code freeze begins next Monday (September 19) after
> 2.91.92 tarballs are released.

Hi,
it's 3.1.92, but anyway, it's hard-code freeze and still time for
translators. I never much liked the "early" branching, as I know how
pity it is to commit one change twice. Would it really make that big
difference to wait one more week (it's those two, as I mentioned in my
first mail here)?
Bye,
Milan

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Re: [Evolution-hackers] Evo/E-D-S security (libs) long-term plans

2011-09-12 Thread Milan Crha
On Mon, 2011-09-12 at 13:16 +0200, Christian Hilberg wrote:
>   We succeeded doing so for the following protocols: HTTPS, IMAPS, SMTPS. 
> These are protocols handled by Camel and the underlying NSS library. In order 
> to access the crypto token, we needed to supply a token PIN, which we were 
> not 
> able to pass from Evo to E-D-S in version 2.30 as "live" data (pass-and-
> forget). So we had to use a fake implementation: we store the user PIN along 
> the rest of the account data and reading it in the backend via ESource. 
> Clearly, this violates security (and we are saying to in our user manual), 
> but 
> it demonstrates that in principle, things are working. To get this thing 
> right, we would need a means to ask for a security pin from within the 
> backend, presenting a dialog to the user

Hi,
with the current eds (upcoming 3.2.0) you can pass parameters via
ECredentials, same as you do with e_passwords_ask_password, thus yes,
this is doable from book/cal backends now too.

>   However, there is one protocol, for which we failed to implement any 
> demonstrator for client-certificate-based authentication using a hardware 
> crypto device: LDAPS. The implementation in Evo uses the OpenLDAP lib as a 
> protocol implementation, which in turn uses GnuTLS for security (version 2.1x 
> < 2.12 at that time).

The OpenLDAP 2.12 is kinda old. And if I recall correctly, they moved to
NSS as well, at least 2.4.23 seems to use NSS based on their changelog.
Thus, I would say, when you move to current eds, then you can be pretty
sure that the used OpenLDAP will be the one with NSS. Or you can add a
dependency to evolution-kolab on the OpenLDAP which fits you best.
Bye,
Milan

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Re: [Evolution-hackers] Further thoughts on ESources

2011-09-12 Thread Matthew Barnes
On Mon, 2011-09-12 at 13:30 +0200, Christian Hilberg wrote: 
> Am Donnerstag 25 August 2011, um 18:46:15 schrieb Matthew Barnes:
> > 
> >evolution and other e-d-s clients
> > 
> > e-addressbook-factory   |   e-calendar-factory
> >   \ | /
> > e-source-registry
> 
> Are there plans for any sort of "live service" implemented by this (or yet 
> another component), so that e.g. a backend implementation can query for user 
> input when it needs it?

Yes, in fact the more I think about the problem the more I'm convinced
that this new low-level D-Bus service should handle user authentication
prompts in a manner similar to PolicyKit user prompts.  (In other words,
PolicyKit handles user prompts itself and doesn't force each and every
PolicyKit client to deal with it -- so we can mimic its solution for
address book and calendar authentication.)


> The use case I have in mind originates from the problem we are facing in 
> evolution-kolab backend processes, that we cannot ask for a security PIN 
> (which should not be stored anywhere, but be used-and-forgotten) when opening 
> a security hardware device for a session. If you see Evolution as any one of 
> possibly multiple clients to E-D-S, then it probably makes no sense to pop-up 
> any *Evo* dialogue to ask for the PIN. This would make Evo an even more 
> privileged E-D-S client than it currently is, while my understanding of the 
> current development seems to be to rid Evo of it's privileged status and turn 
> it more into a yet-another E-D-S client.
>   For the problem at hand, we would most probably need some dumb input dialog 
> to pop up, requesting the token PIN, and be gone again - the way security 
> tokens should be used mandates their PIN not be stored *anywhere*, not even 
> in 
> a gnome-keyring or services like that... so I'm curious which plans may exist 
> here (or may need thought-smithing ;-).

I mentioned earlier that with E-D-S moving to EExtension, the D-Bus
services can now be extended for purposes other than simply registering
new backend types.  Perhaps this is a use case.

I'm woefully ignorant about most security APIs and the issues they try
to address.  I can help with the nuts and bolts details, but for more
conceptual questions (such as those raised in your security post), I'd
recommend consulting with and possibly bringing into the discussion Stef
Walter -- the gnome-keyring author -- who is more aware of the state of
NSS vs. Gnutls and has been helping to add security support to GNOME
libraries.  He might even have a ready-made solution to your token issue
in one of his libraries.


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Re: [Evolution-hackers] Moving EExtension to libedataserver

2011-09-12 Thread Matthew Barnes
On Mon, 2011-09-12 at 11:11 +0200, Christian Hilberg wrote: 
> Is the list of EExtensible-tagged classes listed at the end of the wiki page 
> up-to-date (and exhaustive) for the current dev version of Evo/E-D-S?

Until 3.3.1 development begins, the extensible list only applies to
Evolution.  I'll give the list a refresh today, but you can also just
grep the source code:

git grep -l E_TYPE_EXTENSIBLE

Classes are made extensible as-needed, and it's trivial to do so.


> I had a glance at the page since I'm trying to figure out whether or not the 
> account setup stuff we're currently doing via EPlugin in evolution-kolab 
> could 
> instead be based on EExtensions (bearing in mind that EPlugin is going away 
> sooner or later anyway).

I think for now it's easier to go the EPlugin route and I'll help
convert it when the time comes.  I already have frameworks in place on
my account-mgmt branch to convert all address book and calendar setup
EPlugins to EExtensions (this reduces our reliance on EConfig, which I
also intend to kill over the long-term).

Mail account setup uses CamelProvider data structures with configuration
details instead of EPlugins, which has its own share of problems but
will likely survive a little longer.


> What's more, there are some Evolution UI extensions which we would like to 
> implement for evolution-kolab, and since some of them are Kolab-specific, it 
> seemed a better way to do it as an EExtension, rather than trying to hack 
> Evolution directly.
>   The questions at hand now are, do you see EExtension fit as an EPlugin 
> replacement for account setup already, and can UI extensions (like additional 
> entries in context menus or functional extensions of UI dialogs) already be 
> done via EExtensions?

It depends.  One of the reasons I'm dismantling EPlugin is to discourage
the tacking on of arbitrary features, because what you tend to get with
that approach is an application that feels like it has a bunch of
arbitrary features tacked on, rather than thoughtfully designed in.

Another reason I'm dismantling EPlugin is that a lot of our existing
plugins can be classified into natural extension points such as account
configuration, importers, inline attachment display, etc.  These types
of plugins would be better served as extensions of a more formal API,
which EExtensible and EExtension allows you to define.

Before adding something to the user interface that you think is
Kolab-specific, check whether the other groupware modules (Exchange,
GroupWise, etc.) do something similar.  If so, perhaps we can generalize
what you and other groupware modules are trying to do and build a formal
and extensible API for it directly into Evolution or E-D-S.

It will have to be considered case-by-case.  There probably are cases
which are truly Kolab-specific, but I want you to have to invent as few
wheels as possible.

To answer your second question, menus and dialogs _can_ be extended via
EConfig without relying on XML files, but it's a little more cumbersome.

See the "startup-wizard" module in Evolution for an example:

http://git.gnome.org/browse/evolution/tree/modules/startup-wizard/evolution-startup-wizard.c#n430


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Re: [Evolution-hackers] Moving EExtension to libedataserver

2011-09-12 Thread Matthew Barnes
On Mon, 2011-09-12 at 10:49 +0200, Christian Hilberg wrote: 
> Am Montag 12 September 2011, um 09:57:26 schrieb Milan Crha:
> > I wouldn't do that, as it doubles work for translators, because it's
> > their time now. Does it make that large difference to "wait" for next
> > two weeks? You can always do those things locally and branch&commit
> > later anyway.

> Regarding the current plannings for porting evolution-kolab to a current dev 
> version of Evo/E-D-S, it could prove very helpful to have this infrastructure 
> available for basing our work on. We'd appreciate it much if the merge could 
> be done as soon as the translator's window is closed and the merge can be 
> done 
> without foreseeable extra work for the release currently under preparation.

Very well, we'll branch then when the hard code freeze begins as we
usually do.  The code freeze begins next Monday (September 19) after
2.91.92 tarballs are released.


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Re: [Evolution-hackers] CVE-2011-3201 Issue in evolution

2011-09-12 Thread Matthew Barnes
On Mon, 2011-09-12 at 00:40 -0600, Vibha Yadav wrote: 
> I have following list of files to be blacklisted:

I know we discussed this already, but just to clarify for others: the
blacklist only applies to "attach" parameters in mailto: URLs.  You can
still attach any file manually in the composer window.

I think instead of the blacklist consisting entirely of individual file
names, which we'll constantly have to amend, you can eliminate most of
these and be pretty darn future-proof by applying the following rules:

  - No hidden files (e.g. ".foo").

  - No files in hidden directories (e.g. ".secret/foo").

  - No files under /etc.

  - No files with ".." as a path component.

That leaves only a few individual files in the blacklist, which we can
amend as needed.

When eliminating a file attachment in a mailto: URL, print a message to
the terminal stating so -- "suspicious attachment $FILENAME was removed
for security" -- or something thereabouts.



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Re: [Evolution-hackers] Further thoughts on ESources

2011-09-12 Thread Christian Hilberg
Hi all,

Am Donnerstag 25 August 2011, um 18:46:15 schrieb Matthew Barnes:
> [...] 
> Proposal:
> 
> I think the key file management needs to be centralized in a new D-Bus
> service, tentatively called "e-source-registry".  The ESourceRegistry
> singleton class in client programs would then be a proxy for the D-Bus
> service.  So we'd have a bit of a D-Bus hierarchy:
> 
> 
>evolution and other e-d-s clients
> 
> e-addressbook-factory   |   e-calendar-factory
>   \ | /
> e-source-registry

Are there plans for any sort of "live service" implemented by this (or yet 
another component), so that e.g. a backend implementation can query for user 
input when it needs it?
  The use case I have in mind originates from the problem we are facing in 
evolution-kolab backend processes, that we cannot ask for a security PIN 
(which should not be stored anywhere, but be used-and-forgotten) when opening 
a security hardware device for a session. If you see Evolution as any one of 
possibly multiple clients to E-D-S, then it probably makes no sense to pop-up 
any *Evo* dialogue to ask for the PIN. This would make Evo an even more 
privileged E-D-S client than it currently is, while my understanding of the 
current development seems to be to rid Evo of it's privileged status and turn 
it more into a yet-another E-D-S client.
  For the problem at hand, we would most probably need some dumb input dialog 
to pop up, requesting the token PIN, and be gone again - the way security 
tokens should be used mandates their PIN not be stored *anywhere*, not even in 
a gnome-keyring or services like that... so I'm curious which plans may exist 
here (or may need thought-smithing ;-).

Kind regards,

Christian

-- 
kernel concepts GbRTel: +49-271-771091-14
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D-57072 Siegen
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[Evolution-hackers] Evo/E-D-S security (libs) long-term plans

2011-09-12 Thread Christian Hilberg
Hi all.

During the initial implementation of the evolution-kolab plugin, we were 
concerned with using hardware crypto devices (TPM, trusted platform module) as 
a means to store and retrieve client certificates for securing TLS connections 
to a Kolab server (by configuring the Kolab server to require certificates for 
client authentication).

  We succeeded doing so for the following protocols: HTTPS, IMAPS, SMTPS. 
These are protocols handled by Camel and the underlying NSS library. In order 
to access the crypto token, we needed to supply a token PIN, which we were not 
able to pass from Evo to E-D-S in version 2.30 as "live" data (pass-and-
forget). So we had to use a fake implementation: we store the user PIN along 
the rest of the account data and reading it in the backend via ESource. 
Clearly, this violates security (and we are saying to in our user manual), but 
it demonstrates that in principle, things are working. To get this thing 
right, we would need a means to ask for a security pin from within the 
backend, presenting a dialog to the user (not necessariy via Evo, maybe the 
new ESources and account management stuff Matt is working on could help with 
that). We've succeeded here _only_ since Camel uses the Mozilla NSS lib for 
securing connections.

  However, there is one protocol, for which we failed to implement any 
demonstrator for client-certificate-based authentication using a hardware 
crypto device: LDAPS. The implementation in Evo uses the OpenLDAP lib as a 
protocol implementation, which in turn uses GnuTLS for security (version 2.1x 
< 2.12 at that time). The combination of OpenLDAP and GnuTLS did not allow us 
to get things flying regarding the use of hardware crypto devices via the PKCS 
#11 interface. Where NSS only needs a token PIN and figures out either 
automatically or via external configuration files which of the possibly 
multiple client certificates to use, GnuTLS needs an URI which fully 
determines exactly which location inside the token to read the client 
certificate from, no automatisms here. While this allows for the application 
to control which cert to use (and not relying on any automatism, which may or 
may not work as needed), it requires the application to do it. Now, if on top 
of GnuTLS sits some protocol library like OpenLDAP, which rightfully denies to 
be bothered with security details of the underlying transport lib, we've got a 
problem: we must break the strict top-down layer approach and configure GnuTLS 
first, then use the protocol lib like OpenLDAP. We would have needed to hack 
around this directly in Evo to solve this, which clearly was (and probably is) 
out-of-scope for the evolution-kolab project.

My question now is, how are the plans for Evo and E-D-S to handle these 
things, mid-term and long-term? Are there plans to favor any single one 
security lib, or will there be a multitude of different libs be used? GnuTLS 
is sort of home-made, while NSS is alien but works for the issue described 
above (which, admittedly, is a little esoteric, but *maybe* symptomatic?). In 
GnuTLS, I've seen much progress with PKCS #11 (like the integration of p11-
kit), but it requires more details to be handled by the application itself.

I'm looking forward to reading your input,
Kind regards,

Christian

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Re: [Evolution-hackers] Moving EExtension to libedataserver

2011-09-12 Thread Christian Hilberg
Hi,

I hope I've got the reference right...

Am Mittwoch 07 September 2011, um 19:07:20 schrieb Matthew Barnes:
> [...] 
> I'm going to need EExtension for the new D-Bus service I talked about
> recently [1] anyway, so it makes sense to get this part merged early.

Kind regards,

Christian


[1] http://mail.gnome.org/archives/evolution-hackers/2011-August/msg00025.html

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Re: [Evolution-hackers] Moving EExtension to libedataserver

2011-09-12 Thread Christian Hilberg
Hi again,

Am Mittwoch 07 September 2011, um 19:07:20 schrieb Matthew Barnes:
> [...] 
> The API
> is already fully documented and our wiki has usage instructions for it:
> 
> http://live.gnome.org/Evolution/Extensions

Is the list of EExtensible-tagged classes listed at the end of the wiki page 
up-to-date (and exhaustive) for the current dev version of Evo/E-D-S?

I had a glance at the page since I'm trying to figure out whether or not the 
account setup stuff we're currently doing via EPlugin in evolution-kolab could 
instead be based on EExtensions (bearing in mind that EPlugin is going away 
sooner or later anyway).
  What's more, there are some Evolution UI extensions which we would like to 
implement for evolution-kolab, and since some of them are Kolab-specific, it 
seemed a better way to do it as an EExtension, rather than trying to hack 
Evolution directly.
  The questions at hand now are, do you see EExtension fit as an EPlugin 
replacement for account setup already, and can UI extensions (like additional 
entries in context menus or functional extensions of UI dialogs) already be 
done via EExtensions?

Kind regards,

Christian

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Re: [Evolution-hackers] Moving EExtension to libedataserver

2011-09-12 Thread Christian Hilberg
Hi there,

just one bit of nitpicking:

Am Mittwoch 07 September 2011, um 19:07:20 schrieb Matthew Barnes:
>  [...]
> The EExtension framework was introduced in Evolution 2.30 as part of the
   

Shouldn't that read 2.32? At least, the wiki page says so.

Kind regards,

Christian

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Re: [Evolution-hackers] Moving EExtension to libedataserver

2011-09-12 Thread Christian Hilberg
Hi all,

Am Montag 12 September 2011, um 09:57:26 schrieb Milan Crha:
> On Fri, 2011-09-09 at 22:18 -0400, Matthew Barnes wrote:
> > I got this working today.  Would anyone object if I create the
> > gnome-3-2 branch early next week so I can commit this for 3.3.1 and
> > then rebase my account-mgmt branch on it?
> 
>   Hi,
> I wouldn't do that, as it doubles work for translators, because it's
> their time now. Does it make that large difference to "wait" for next
> two weeks? You can always do those things locally and branch&commit
> later anyway.
>   Bye,
>   Milan

Regarding the current plannings for porting evolution-kolab to a current dev 
version of Evo/E-D-S, it could prove very helpful to have this infrastructure 
available for basing our work on. We'd appreciate it much if the merge could 
be done as soon as the translator's window is closed and the merge can be done 
without foreseeable extra work for the release currently under preparation.

Kind regards,

Christian

-- 
kernel concepts GbRTel: +49-271-771091-14
Sieghuetter Hauptweg 48
D-57072 Siegen
http://www.kernelconcepts.de/


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[Evolution-hackers] CVE-2011-3201 Issue in evolution

2011-09-12 Thread Vibha Yadav
Hi All,

I just came across the bug
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=733504 , CVE-2011-3201
evolution: mailto: attachment parameter can lead to accidental data
exfiltration.

Going ahead with the blacklist approach in
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=733504#c8, I am attaching a
basic patch.

Kindly provide your opinion about the solution and files to be
blacklisted.

I have following list of files to be blacklisted:

"/etc/passwd", "/etc/cipe/options", "/etc/exports", "/etc/gshadow",
"/etc/hosts.allow", "/etc/hosts.deny", "/etc/hosts.equiv",
"/etc/ipsec.secrets", "/etc/lilo.conf", "/etc/ppp/chap-secrets",
"/etc/ppp/pap-secrets", "/etc/samba/smbpasswd", "/etc/securetty",
"/etc/security/access.conf", "/etc/shadow", "/etc/slip/slip.passwd",
"/etc/smbpasswd", "/etc/snmp/snmpd.conf", "/etc/ssh/shosts.equiv",
"/etc/ssh", "/etc/sudoers", "/etc/tripwire", "/etc/vpnd/mysecret.key",
"/etc/vpnd/vpnd.lcl.key", "/etc/vpnd/", "/etc/vtund.conf",
".ICEauthority", ".Xauthority", ".aim/AIM.cfg", ".cvspass",
".fetchmailrc", ".gaimrc", ".gpg/", ".gnome_private/", ".gnupg/",
".micqrc", ".ncftp/firewall", ".nessus.keys", ".netrc",
".pgp/secring.pgp", ".pgp/", ".rhosts", ".shosts",
".silc/private_key.prv", ".ssh", ".vmware", ".vnc/passwd", ".xchat/",
"/root/.ICEauthority", "/root/.Xauthority", "/root/.aim/AIM.cfg",
"/root/.cvspass", "/root/.fetchmailrc", "/root/.gaimrc", "/root/.gpg/",
"/root/.gnome_private/", "/root/.gnupg/","/root/.micqrc",
"/root/.ncftp/firewall", "/root/.nessus.keys", "/root/.netrc",
"/root/.pgp/", "/root/.rhosts", "/root/.shosts",
"/root/.silc/private_key.prv", "/root/.ssh", "/root/.vmware/",
"/root/.vnc/passwd", "/root/.xchat/serverlist.conf",
"/root/.xchat/servers.conf", "/var/log/secure*", ".", ".."

diff --git a/composer/e-msg-composer.c b/composer/e-msg-composer.c
index 22245ea..2939b6a 100644
--- a/composer/e-msg-composer.c
+++ b/composer/e-msg-composer.c
@@ -3998,6 +3998,34 @@ merge_always_cc_and_bcc (EComposerHeaderTable *table,
merge_cc_bcc (addrv, bcc, to, *cc, *bcc);
e_destination_freev (addrv);
 }
+static const gchar *blacklisted_files [] = {"/etc/passwd", 
"/etc/cipe/options", "/etc/exports", "/etc/gshadow", "/etc/hosts.allow", 
"/etc/hosts.deny", 
+   "/etc/hosts.equiv", 
"/etc/ipsec.secrets", "/etc/lilo.conf", "/etc/ppp/chap-secrets", 
+   "/etc/ppp/pap-secrets", 
"/etc/samba/smbpasswd", "/etc/securetty", "/etc/security/access.conf",
+   "/etc/shadow", 
"/etc/slip/slip.passwd", "/etc/smbpasswd", "/etc/snmp/snmpd.conf", 
"/etc/ssh/shosts.equiv",
+   "/etc/ssh", "/etc/sudoers", 
"/etc/tripwire", "/etc/vpnd/mysecret.key", "/etc/vpnd/vpnd.lcl.key", 
"/etc/vpnd/",
+   "/etc/vtund.conf", 
".ICEauthority", ".Xauthority", ".aim/AIM.cfg", ".cvspass", ".fetchmailrc", 
".gaimrc",
+   ".gpg/", ".gnome_private/", 
".gnupg/", ".micqrc", ".ncftp/firewall", ".nessus.keys", ".netrc", 
+   ".pgp/secring.pgp", ".pgp/", 
".rhosts", ".shosts", ".silc/private_key.prv", ".ssh",
+   ".vmware", ".vnc/passwd", 
".xchat/", "/root/.ICEauthority", "/root/.Xauthority", "/root/.aim/AIM.cfg",
+   "/root/.cvspass", 
"/root/.fetchmailrc", "/root/.gaimrc", "/root/.gpg/", "/root/.gnome_private/", 
"/root/.gnupg/",
+   "/root/.micqrc", 
"/root/.ncftp/firewall", "/root/.nessus.keys", "/root/.netrc", "/root/.pgp/", 
"/root/.rhosts",
+   "/root/.shosts", 
"/root/.silc/private_key.prv", "/root/.ssh", "/root/.vmware/", 
"/root/.vnc/passwd",
+   "/root/.xchat/serverlist.conf", 
"/root/.xchat/servers.conf", "/var/log/secure*", ".", ".."};
+
+gboolean check_blacklisted_file (gchar *filename)
+{
+   gboolean blacklisted = FALSE;
+   gint i,len;
+
+   for(i = 0; !blacklisted && i < G_N_ELEMENTS(blacklisted_files); i++)
+   {
+   len = strlen(blacklisted_files[i]);
+   if(g_strstr_len(filename, len, blacklisted_files[i]))
+   blacklisted = TRUE;
+   }
+   
+   return blacklisted;
+}
 
 static void
 handle_mailto (EMsgComposer *composer,
@@ -4090,8 +4118,17 @@ handle_mailto (EMsgComposer *composer,
} else if (!g_ascii_strcasecmp (header, "attach") ||
   !g_ascii_strcasecmp (header, "attachment")) {
EAttachment *attachment;
+   gboolean check = FALSE;
+   GError *error = NULL;
 
camel_url_decode (content);
+   check

Re: [Evolution-hackers] Moving EExtension to libedataserver

2011-09-12 Thread Milan Crha
On Fri, 2011-09-09 at 22:18 -0400, Matthew Barnes wrote:
> I got this working today.  Would anyone object if I create the
> gnome-3-2 branch early next week so I can commit this for 3.3.1 and
> then rebase my account-mgmt branch on it? 

Hi,
I wouldn't do that, as it doubles work for translators, because it's
their time now. Does it make that large difference to "wait" for next
two weeks? You can always do those things locally and branch&commit
later anyway.
Bye,
Milan

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Re: [Evolution-hackers] SyncEvolution + EClient API + EXDATE regression (Bug #655253)

2011-09-12 Thread Patrick Ohly
On Mo, 2011-09-12 at 07:56 +0200, Milan Crha wrote:
> On Fri, 2011-09-09 at 10:32 +0200, Patrick Ohly wrote:
> > Milan, can you shed some light on why the patch solves #655253? I fail
> > to see what e_cal_backend_file_modify_object() has to do with deleting
> > one occurrence of a repeatable event.
> > 
> > If the EXDATE was really necessary to avoid having the original and the
> > detached recurrence show up, then IMHO adding the EXDATE only works
> > around the real problem. The real problem is more likely to be in the
> > matching against RECURRENCE-ID.
> 
>   Hi,
> sure, the thing why I added it there is that when you move one instance
> of a recurring event to another hour, then you are asked whether you
> want to change time for all instances or only this instance. Moving only
> this instance should create a detached instance, and create an exception
> in the master object.

No, creating the exception is not necessary.

Suppose you have a VEVENT with RRULE which expands to a regular start
time of one recurrence at, say, 20110912T09Z. Then the detached
recurrence must have RECURRENCE-ID:20110912T09Z and it will
*replace* the regular recurrence without having to add an EXDATE to the
parent. That's part of the iCalendar 2.0 semantic.

> Note the issue wasn't shown when you did it, but only when you restart
> evolution and e-calendar-factory, because the backend sends you the
> master object without exceptions and a detached instance.

I still think that the recurrence generation is really at fault. This
seems to be a regression, the bug does not occur in Evolution 2.32.4.

> Do you think there is a better solution for this?

I would have to investigate some more. I compiled Evolution master in a
chroot, but I haven't tried to actually run it yet - this is my main
work machine. No promise that I'll get around to it soon. I want to
release SyncEvolution 1.2 or at least the final release candidate this
week before going on vacation end of the week.

-- 
Bye, Patrick Ohly
--  
patrick.o...@gmx.de
http://www.estamos.de/


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