t; I see your point and that it is out of scope for the document. However, I
>>> feel the title and the abstract is then a bit misleading and should say that
>>> this document discusses security architectures and cryptographic functions
>>> for authentication/signing only?
org] Im Auftrag von Mohit Sethi
Gesendet: Sonntag, 6. August 2017 21:10
An: Carsten Bormann
Cc: lwip@ietf.org
Betreff: Re: [Lwip] WGLC for draft-ietf-lwig-crypto-sensors-03
Hi Carsten
This document looks at a very specific deployment scenario where
resource-constrained devices sign message obj
liche Nachricht-
> Von: Lwip [mailto:lwip-boun...@ietf.org] Im Auftrag von Mohit Sethi
> Gesendet: Sonntag, 6. August 2017 21:10
> An: Carsten Bormann
> Cc: lwip@ietf.org
> Betreff: Re: [Lwip] WGLC for draft-ietf-lwig-crypto-sensors-03
>
> Hi Carsten
>
> This document l
t: Sonntag, 6. August 2017 21:10
An: Carsten Bormann
Cc: lwip@ietf.org
Betreff: Re: [Lwip] WGLC for draft-ietf-lwig-crypto-sensors-03
Hi Carsten
This document looks at a very specific deployment scenario where
resource-constrained devices sign message objects. Therefore, it only documents
the perf
missunderstandings.
Regards
Tobias
-Ursprüngliche Nachricht-
Von: Lwip [mailto:lwip-boun...@ietf.org] Im Auftrag von Mohit Sethi
Gesendet: Sonntag, 6. August 2017 21:10
An: Carsten Bormann
Cc: lwip@ietf.org
Betreff: Re: [Lwip] WGLC for draft-ietf-lwig-crypto-sensors-03
Hi Carsten
This
Hi Carsten
This document looks at a very specific deployment scenario where
resource-constrained devices sign message objects. Therefore, it only
documents the performance of ECDSA sign operation.
I do think the numbers of Elliptic curve diffie-hellman key agreement
are useful for the commun
Hi Mohit,
One point that came up in the discussion in Prague was Diffie-Hellman
performance.
For a deployment that relies on symmetric keys for mutual authentication, it
may be useful to do an (ECC) D-H key agreement to achieve forward security.
I believe some numbers for that are available?
I
Hi all
The authors of the document believe that it is ready to move forward.
During the previous last call we had already received support from
several working group members.
Based on the feedback during the previous last call, we removed the
performance measurements of RSA key sizes smaller
