If nobody minds, I would like spend some time on this passage in chapter
two:
"regarding empiricism: the belief in nothing but singular empirical
propositions bars it from even defending its own principles because it
rejects the important possibility of reaching mediate knowledge from
immediate
Jeff D. and lists:
I'm all for the discussion you initiate below, Jeff. It's closer to my heart
than the stuff about reducibility is. And I'll let Frederik speak for himself,
but I didn't read him as focusing on reduction in his characterization of
psychologism. He does seem to make it central
Frederik, Ben, John C., et al. I found this a rich and fascinating exchange,
but I wonder whether the little word "in" did some bedeveling in the
discussion. There seems to be widespread agreement among us that thoughts
require some kind of material embodiment, that the very same thought can be
Please note that "physiosemiosis" and "pansemiosis" (or "otics") are NOT AT ALL
synonyms.
From: Frederik Stjernfelt [mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk]
Sent: Tuesday, September 09, 2014 18:31
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce List
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Physics & Semiosis
Dear Clark, list
If feel so
What I was getting out of Ch. 2, was a focus on the nature of reality and
existence. I got the sense that psychologism was based strictly around
individual existence, in particular, that of the human brain/mind - and that
this ignored any consideration of the nature of reality, i.e., of univers
At 04:20 PM 9/9/2014, Frederik wrote:
Dear Howard, list
This [complementarity of models] is an important issue. I do not
think it is a choice between a psychological and a non-psychological
model which must compete. It is a distinction between two levels of
description . . .
HP: That helps.
Lists,
In a summary statement of what "anti-psychologism" in logic is largely about,
Frederik focuses on the claim that the concepts in the theory of logic can't be
reduced to the concepts in the empirical science of psychology. While matters
of reduction may be relevant to understanding some
Dear Ben -
Den 10/09/2014 kl. 00.14 skrev Benjamin Udell
mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com>>
:
[BU] To explain nature, to come up with a new idea to explain it, requires
inference, but that inference is neither (A) deduction to elucidate what one
already knows or assumes, nor (B) induction from part to
Dear Clark, list
If feel somewhat bad of having brought the discussion down this tangent. (I’ve
changed subject as per request) I hope you don’t mind me making one final
comment.
Not at all, these are important questions.
On Sep 7, 2014, at 4:49 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt
mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk
Peircers,
I will have to be out of the loop for some days,
but this post will give me a peg on which I can
hang a few thoughts via mobile device that have
been tugging at the edge of my mind for a while.
Regards,
Jon
--
academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
my word press blog: h
Frederik, lists,
You wrote,
> [FS] You're right, it is rarely possible to define your way out
of any problem. I am not sure he thought signs and semiosis were
possible without living minds. The crux lies in "living minds like
yours and mine". P was anxious to distinguish between wha
If feel somewhat bad of having brought the discussion down this tangent. (I’ve
changed subject as per request) I hope you don’t mind me making one final
comment.
> On Sep 7, 2014, at 4:49 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
>
> Not all triadicity and thirdness is semiotic - that is my conclusion.
Dear Frederik,
I am more than gratified to find that you are beginning to appreciate the
felicities of the adjective form “non-psychological” in pointing to a higher
level of abstraction, or as I have often expressed it, the use of “non” as a
generalizing functor.
Regards,
Jon
http://inquir
Dear Howard, list
This is an important issue. I do not think it is a choice between a
psychological and a non-psychological model which must compete. It is a
distinction between two levels of description - one (the non-psychological) is
more general and adresses structures of thought and discov
Dear Ben, lists
[FS]> That is certainly correct - because he simply defined quasi-minds as a
logically interconnected series of signs - so thoughts appearing apart from a
mind is impossible by definition. But mind is not psychologically defined, nor
is only found in connection to human brains -
At 04:39 PM 9/8/2014, Frederik wrote:
So the "chain of reasoning", on a Peircean view, involves all sorts
of abductions -
HP: I'm sure this apparently unlimited view if reasoning is one
source of my misunderstanding of Peirce. I don't think of any
unconscious processes of abduction as reasoni
Subthread:
FS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13825
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13826
JBD:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13971
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13974
JA:http://perm
This concluding part of the article on Scientific Method from Baldwins
Dictionary, by Peirce and Baldwin, seems apropos here.
gary f.
(2) The most vital factors in the method of modern science have not been the
following of this or that logical prescription although these have had
thei
Dear Dr. Benjamin Udel,
Thank you for an absolutely fantastic exposition of the difference between
"between a logical conception of mind and a psychological conception of mind"
in Peirce! It is a perfect clarification of the existential fact that that all
views of thought are artificial balancin
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