At 10:38 AM 5/18/2015, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Howard, you wrote,
If one thinks this way, then every physical event is a measurement.
That won't work for an empiricist.
[End quote]
I've held off on replying because I didn't understand that remark
and I've blamed myself. Could you elaborate a b
OK, Gary F.
No need to go into such deepness. My remark was mostly accidental.
As I said, I follow and agree with your opinion on the core argument.
V.
2015-05-18 18:22 GMT-03:00 Gary Fuhrman :
> Vinicius, you wrote,
>
>
>
> [[ I meant to say that a sign must be general (a type or legisign)
> whe
Vinicius, you wrote,
[[ I meant to say that a sign must be general (a type or legisign) whenever it
represents dynamic objects such as natural classes, laws of nature and fictious
entities such as mathematical objects. ]]
Agreed. Such objects are hypostatic abstractions, I’d say, so I wou
Dear Gary F.
I see your point and understand it as you describe the origins of
propositions in perceptual judgements.
But I did not mean to say that a dynamic object is general just because we
have a concept usually associated with a word. I meant to say that a sign
must be general (a type or leg
Vinicius,
(and I’m copying this to the Peirce list as it may be of interest there),
Yes, I was oversimplifying a bit for the sake of emphasis. I’m trying to follow
Peirce’s usage of these terms, and there are some contexts where he speaks of
general objects. But mainly I had in mind contexts
Howard, lists,
Howard, you wrote,
If one thinks this way, then every physical event is a measurement.
That won't work for an empiricist.
[End quote]
I've held off on replying because I didn't understand that remark and
I've blamed myself. Could you elaborate a bit on it? What does
