Vinicius, (and I’m copying this to the Peirce list as it may be of interest there),
Yes, I was oversimplifying a bit for the sake of emphasis. I’m trying to follow Peirce’s usage of these terms, and there are some contexts where he speaks of general objects. But mainly I had in mind contexts like this: [[ That which is not general is singular; and the singular is that which reacts. The being of a singular may consist in the being of other singulars which are its parts. Thus heaven and earth is a singular; and its being consists in the being of heaven and the being of earth, each of which reacts and is therefore a singular, forming a part of heaven and earth. If I had denied that every perceptual judgment refers, as to its subject, to a singular, and that singular actually reacting upon the mind in forming the judgment, actually reacting too upon the mind in interpreting the judgment, I should have uttered an absurdity. For every proposition whatsoever refers as to its subject to a singular actually reacting upon the utterer of it and actually reacting upon the interpreter of it. All propositions relate to the same ever-reacting singular; namely, to the totality of all real objects. ]] —Peirce, Harvard Lecture 6 (1903), CP 5.152, EP2:208-19 Whether the object of the sign “the sun” is general or not depends on how strictly we are applying the logical term “singular.” If we apply it with absolute strictness, then we should say with Heraclitus that “the sun is new each day” (or even each minute that it actually appears), as an individual reaction has no continuity (as the concept of “the sun” obviously does). According to Peirce, the generality of a word means that it’s up to the interpreter to select an appropriate individual object for this occasion of the word’s use (often with the help of a nonverbal index); he doesn’t say that the dynamic object is general just because we have a concept habitually associated with the word. However, if we say that the earth revolves around the sun, that’s a fact, therefore a proposition, therefore a general. When we talk about facts, then, we are in some sense talking about general objects. That doesn’t mean that the dynamic objects of the facts we’re talking about are necessarily general. Gary f. From: Vinicius Romanini [mailto:vinir...@gmail.com] Sent: May 18, 2015 11:42 AM Dear Gary, Stan, list Gary, I agree with all you say but when you declare that "The dynamic object of a sign is singular, not general". The dynamic object of a legisign is always a general (such as a natural class, for instance). I agree that a sinsign has an individual existent for its dynamic object. On the other hand, a singular can be a general depending on the familiarity or collateral experience grounding it. The word "sun", which is a legisign, has for its dynamic object a singular existent object, namely the sun. But since the sun is a very familiar individual object, it is a logic general. In fact, the word "sun" predicates the well-known attributes of our star, while denoting the a universally familiar object. Vinicius 2015-05-18 12:12 GMT-03:00 Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> >: Stan, you are still conflating the sign with its object, and the percept with the interpretation of the percept. Percepts are biologically constructed but they are NOT socially constructed. S: Our RELATION to the “amount of ambient heat” is both biologically and culturally constructed. That is, the reading on the dial, while not predictable as such (in general it is because the dial itself was constructed in the context of our norms), is interpreted by our biology and culture. In some cultures a given temperature might be fine, while in another it would be outside functional normality. gf} This is true of the reading as interpretation. But that is an interpretation of the reading AS PERCEPT. Social construction itself would be impossible if there were no perceptual common ground (common to all human animals) to be the material out of which “norms” are constructed. An interpretant sign is not the same sign of which it is the interpretant. A percept is not an interpretation of that percept. It seems to me that you’re so determined to deny naïve realism that you replace it with an even more naïve idealism. I’m suggesting that you replace it with a semiotic realism instead. S: But that brute reaction was ‘invited’ by the construction of the experiment. gf} NO. A type of brute reaction was invited by the construction of the experiment. THAT brute reaction was a singular, logically individual event; if it wasn’t, then the procedure wasn’t an experiment. Every actual observation of a singular event is itself a singular event, which is then interpreted as an instance of a generic event such as a “temperature reading”. You are conflating the singular event with the generic event. You’re also conflating sign with object. The dynamic object of a sign is singular, not general. All words, on the other hand, are general to some degree (materially, as legisigns; formally, as symbols). “Observation,” being a word, is general, but its object is singular when it’s the perception of the height of a column of mercury at a particular time and place. The bottom line is that you’re beating a dead horse. Nobody denies that scientific knowledge is socially constructed, because it consists of symbolic signs. But everybody (except you) agrees that it’s fallible for the same reason. No matter how long you insist that the dynamic objects of those signs are socially constructed (and science is therefore entirely fictional), nobody’s going to accept that on your authority, because it’s nonsense. It not only ignores critical common sense but also sweeps the fallibility of science under the rug. Fiction is not fallible. Gary f. From: Stanley N Salthe [mailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu <mailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu> ] Sent: May 18, 2015 9:53 AM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee <mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee> Subject: [biosemiotics:8638] Re: Natural Gary(F) -- responding again: Stan, Concerning my reference to ‘the connection between facts (which are signs) and observations which are not socially constructed but “forced upon us” by an external reality:’ S: As Howard pointed out, this is the actual value of a reading obtained in a constructed experiment. But even it is constructed in the sense that the experiment was set up at a certain physical scale, and the reading was scaled as well. gf} I'm beginning to think that your “social construction” is pragmatically the same as Howard's “subjectivity.” But anyway, to take a concrete example: thermometers are certainly constructed, but temperature readings are not. Yes, the scale (Celsius or Fahrenheit or whatever) is conventional, but the amount of ambient heat in the air at at a specific time and place is not. If you say that the observed temperature is constructed, you are conflating the symbolically formulated result of the observation with the actual event of observing (or reading, or measuring, or whatever you want to call it.) (By the way, i think Howard's usage of the term “phenomenon” makes the same conflation. You nominalists are all alike. J ) S: Our RELATION to the “amount of ambient heat” is both biologically and culturally constructed. That is, the reading on the dial, while not predictable as such (in general it is because the dial itself was constructed in the context of our norms), is interpreted by our biology and culture. In some cultures a given temperature might be fine, while in another it would be outside functional normality. Looking at it semiotically, the reading as represented has the form of a fact, or proposition, or dicisign. The thermodynamic state of the air there and then is the dynamic object of that sign, and whatever part of the sign “separately indicates” that object is the subject of the dicisign. Its predicate, expressed in degrees or whatever, attributes a quality to that singular object. That quality must have a designatable place in the conceptual system of the observer. S: Yes -- see my above remarks. But the sign as a whole also virtually asserts that some “brute” reaction (using Peirce's terms) took place between the real external object and the predicator, or sensor, or instrument, and at that time, that reaction determined what the human observer would perceive, and thus what the actual reading (interpretant) would be. Such “brute reactions” are not socially constructed. They constitute the Secondness which has to be coupled with a Firstness (quality) in order for a sign (as triadic relation) to convey any information, as Peirce defines information. S: But that brute reaction was ‘invited’ by the construction of the experiment. So yes, you can say that formulated observations are socially constructed, but they are by no means independent of percepts, which we do not construct: percepts are psychologically and biologically and physically constructed, with each level of construction being the material cause of the next in the hierarchy, or holarchy. S: The percepts have been ‘invited’ by the constructed setup. Social construction is based on those other levels of construction. If the social construction of science were not at least partly determined by observable “brute reactions” — which are not in themselves intelligible, unless we can categorize them — then it would have no pragmatic value, either in the sense of Peircean pragmatism or in the sense you articulate here: S: “Pragmatic value!” Yes, that is the purpose of the experiments, either immediately or in general. S: Here I take you to refer to the practical usefulness of the constructed/discovered facts. Such facts relate to the world we construct by inhabiting it -- at a certain scale, with certain sense organs and logic. gf} No question that everything that happens, happens at a certain scale and in a certain situation. The same goes for the meaning of signs. But it strikes me as very one-sided to say that any organism constructs its ecological niche by inhabiting it. S: Not at all! This is now an acknowledge fact -- ‘niche construction’! I think it would be equally true, or more so (even in the case of humans), to say that the niche constructs the organism. Or better, they co-evolve, by reacting with and against each other, and taking habits along the way. S: That does not alter my point, just above [[ For the real world is the world of sensible experience, and it is a part of the process of sensible experience to locate its facts in the world of ideas. ]] — Peirce, CP 3.527 (1897) S; I’m afraid this is too ‘realist’ for me! STAN -- Vinicius Romanini, Ph.D. Professor of Communication Studies School of Communications and Arts University of Sao Paulo, Brazil www.minutesemeiotic.org <http://www.minutesemeiotic.org/> www.semeiosis.com.br <http://www.semeiosis.com.br/> Skype:vinicius_romanini
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