Vinicius, you wrote,
[[ I meant to say that a sign must be general (a type or legisign) whenever it represents dynamic objects such as natural classes, laws of nature and fictious entities such as mathematical objects. ]] Agreed. Such objects are hypostatic abstractions, I’d say, so I wouldn’t even argue against calling them “general objects” as you did before. But I think we’re getting into abstruse territory here, compared to the context of my dialogue with Stan. I’m still feeling my way around Peirce’s “Ten Main Trichotomies” (especially those he was tentative about himself), but I have no hesitation in affirming the difference between an actual observation (as an instance of sense perception) and the representation of that instance (which assigns to its singular subject a general predicate, and thus constructs a “fact”). Gary f. From: Vinicius Romanini [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: May 18, 2015 3:48 PM To: Gary Fuhrman Cc: [email protected]; Peirce-L 1 Subject: [biosemiotics:8644] Re: Natural Dear Gary F. I see your point and understand it as you describe the origins of propositions in perceptual judgements. But I did not mean to say that a dynamic object is general just because we have a concept usually associated with a word. I meant to say that a sign must be general (a type or legisign) whenever it represents dynamic objects such as natural classes, laws of nature and fictious entities such as mathematical objects. On the other hand, Peirce does say that dynamic objects might be natural classes such as mankind, the human race etc (he calls them collectives). And he also says that types (legisigns) must necessarily represent collectives. (see EP 2: 489). Vinicius
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