Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

> On Nov 24, 2015, at 2:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > No, I disagree; everything we experience is a triadic sign. A feeling is most > certainly a sign; it can be, all triadic parts of it, in a mode of Firstness. Not sure what you mean by “mode of firstness” here. If

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Frances to Edwina and Clark and others--- To muse the point, could it be for Peirce that pure feeling at least as "primal" phenomena and as felt by any basic "phanerism" might be a representamen that is not a sign, but that pure or sure feeling as felt by any mechanism of matter or organism of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Clark - mode is a synonym for category. Check out the ten signs 2.256. Thirdness can be 'pure' i.e., THirdness as Thirdness [3-3] or degenerate , which is Thirdness operating in a mode of Firstness or Thirdness operating in a mode of Secondness [3-1; 3-2]. There is no such thing as a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Frances. I'm not sure of your focus. There is no such thing as a 'representamen' all by itself, so, no such thing as a 'representamen that is not a sign'. The representamen is the mediate term or phase in the semiosic triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. It can function in any of the

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Rationalism : Philosophical and Scientific

John, Yes, that's why I prefer to speak of “empirical” and “rational” as referring to “aspects of reality” or “tendencies of mind”. I gave that bit from Runes as a standard point of departure only because it seemed to me that some folks here might be thinking of rationalism in that vein. I'm

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rationalism : Philosophical and Scientific

> On Nov 24, 2015, at 1:26 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > > Yes, that's why I prefer to speak of “empirical” and “rational” > as referring to “aspects of reality” or “tendencies of mind”. > I gave that bit from Runes as a standard point of departure > only because it seemed to me that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

No, I disagree; everything we experience is a triadic sign. A feeling is most certainly a sign; it can be, all triadic parts of it, in a mode of Firstness. I also disagree that, as you write, "the effect of a sign can be a feeling or a an action but that’s separate from the sign itself, " The

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rationalism : Philosophical and Scientific

If rationalism is the view that the real is what-can-be-thought, then the arch-rationalist is Parmenides. I would agree that Descartes is a foundationalist rationalist - and opine that Peirce is a non-foundationalist rationalist - and also a non-foundationalist empiricist. Peirce holds that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

> On Nov 24, 2015, at 11:00 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Yes, a 'habit' as general or common, transforms input data (the object/s) > into an Interpretant. The habit is thus operative within the representamen. > > Not all signs have feeling and action associated with

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rationalism : Philosophical and Scientific

> On Nov 24, 2015, at 11:28 AM, John Collier wrote: > > I don’t think that all rationalists were foundationalists. Descartes perhaps, > but I don’t think Leibniz or Spinoza were. Empiricists up to Reid were > foundationalists, and Mill was not. I think it is an

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Frances to Edwina and others--- (This topic threads away from the current subject.) It is my understanding that for Peirceanism there may be representamen that at least can be felt by some phanerisms to be objects, but such representamen that are not yet signs. It is my further phenomenal

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

> On Nov 24, 2015, at 10:14 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > No, a belief can be a 'Dicent Symbolic Legisign' where the > output/Interpretant is in a mode of Secondness; this would be a minor premise > - which is a belief. [2-3-3]. Or a rhematic indexical legisign

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Jeff, Franklin, list, I haven’t had time to follow this thread in all its detail, but have come across a couple of things that may be of use to it. In his first Harvard Lecture of 1903, Peirce introduced a new definition of pragmatism: “Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Rationalism : Philosophical and Scientific

I don’t think that all rationalists were foundationalists. Descartes perhaps, but I don’t think Leibniz or Spinoza were. Empiricists up to Reid were foundationalists, and Mill was not. I think it is an independent issue. Since there is a clear distinguishing feature, belief in the synthetic

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

> On Nov 24, 2015, at 7:12 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Briefly, a habit arises by chance and then becomes 'the norm', and thus, > strengthens itself and dominates other peripheral habits that might arise > dealing with a similar situation. > Habits are Thirdness and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rationalism : Philosophical and Scientific

> On Nov 24, 2015, at 12:03 AM, John Collier wrote: > > I disagree with the sharp division between empiricists and rationalists as > Jon draws it. He quotes: >> Rationalism: A method, or very broadly, a theory of philosophy, in which the >> criterion of truth is not

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

(I broke out your responses to make them a little easier) > On Nov 24, 2015, at 6:46 AM, Søren Brier wrote: > >> Which order are you speaking of here? Plotinus, among the neoplatonists has >> two classes of absolute otherness. On the one is the One which is pure >> potency and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

No, a belief can be a 'Dicent Symbolic Legisign' where the output/Interpretant is in a mode of Secondness; this would be a minor premise - which is a belief. [2-3-3]. Or a rhematic indexical legisign [1-2-3]..where the Interpretant is in a mode of Firstness. I didn't say that a belief was pure

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

List, Clark: On Nov 24, 2015, at 10:19 AM, Clark Goble wrote: > Even a particular belief is always still a general. Is this a logical assertion? If so, what are premises? Is it a deductive argument? Is it an inductive argument? Is it an abductive argument? Or, could is be a conditional

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Yes, a 'habit' as general or common, transforms input data (the object/s) into an Interpretant. The habit is thus operative within the representamen. Not all signs have feeling and action associated with them [see the ten classes of signs] Does a habit enable continuity (replication)? Yes;

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Briefly, a habit arises by chance and then becomes 'the norm', and thus, strengthens itself and dominates other peripheral habits that might arise dealing with a similar situation. Habits are Thirdness and thus, generalities. A belief is not necessarily a habit; it can be in a mode of