Gary F., Jeff, Francesco, List:
How would we reconcile this notion that a Sign can *create *its own Object
with Peirce's explicit statement elsewhere that (as Francesco noted) a Sign
does not even so much as *affect *its own Object?
CSP: In its relation to the Object, the Sign is *passive*;
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}Jerry, list
Here are some quotes:
4.536
"I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant,
the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that
is the
Gary,
Thank you for the comments. I will look up digital versions for the Arisbe
web.
The 3 main journals I found his works on Peirce were *Transactions of CSP
Society, American Journal of Semiotics*, and *Semiotische Berichte*. I was
unable to find the digital versions today, but I will try to
Jeff, Francesco, list,
In the discussion of an officer giving a soldier a command to "Ground Arms",
Jeff, I don’t see why you assume that the object created by the sign is the
immediate object. I think it is the dynamic object, the same one that
determines the Sign — which is of course an
Francesco, List:
Thank you for the citations.
CSP, cited by FB: *Subject *and *Object *are the same thing except for
trifling distinctions ... (EP 2:494; 1909)
This seems clear enough--except that just two paragraphs later, Peirce
explicitly made *the very same distinction* between Subject
Dear list,
I am not sure whether I am not heard or I am being ignored.
I suppose when I hear crickets, it could be either or both or neither.
Yet, the question is posed where
if the distinction between internal and external objects are important
enough to matter so as not to be
On 9/7/2018 10:51 AM, Francesco Bellucci wrote:
But what does "map his terminologies to FOL" mean, really?
I apologize. The word 'map' in that sentence was a careless
mistake. I've been working on AI and computational linguistics
for years, and I fully realize the enormous range of
Francesco, List,
I am interested in drawing out the implications of Peirce's suggestion that, in
some cases, the sign creates the immediate object. He uses the same language
of "creation" when he suggests that, in some cases, the sign can create its
interpretant.
In the discussion of an
Helmut, List
The DO is not affected by the sign. If the sign is "Obama is an
Englishman", Obama remains an American and is not affected by being
represented as an Englishman by the sign.
The IO is affected by the sign in this sense, that the sign says what its
own DO is, i.e. the sign has a
Francesco, List,
I feel that I cannot work with an equation or model in which a variable (O) stands for two totally different things, with something as fundamental as the epistemic cut going right through it. Is the DO influenced by the sign or not? Sometimes it is, sometimes not. If people talk
Dear list,
If:
“It's enough to distinguish the real thing as the external object (i.e.
external to the sign) and the subject of the sentence as the internal
object (i.e. internal to the sign)
then:
what is the ‘Object’ in Sign Object Interpretant or Object Sign
Interpretant?
Will you
Helmut, List
Subject in a sentence and object in the sentence as a sign are the same
> thing, yes. And the subject in the sentence is not external, so the object
> neither is. But the thing the object is about, is (external). So, is the
> thing the dynamic object, and the subject the immediate? I
John, list,
Subject in a sentence and object in the sentence as a sign are the same thing, yes. And the subject in the sentence is not external, so the object neither is. But the thing the object is about, is (external). So, is the thing the dynamic object, and the subject the immediate? I
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}John, Francesco, list
I'd like to thank you both for your posts of today - which, to me,
focus on the vital aspects of Peircean semiosis - namely, the
function of it as a logical pragmaticism.
1] John
John, List
You say "When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and
others, always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL."
I agree wholeheartedly that Peirce's lifelong main interest was in logic,
and that we should evaluate his semiotic doctrines assuming that he is
talking
Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,
FB
"Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling distinctions" (EP
2:494)
Yes! And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
logicians today. This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
confirm the point I was trying to make: From
Jon, List
*FB: Peirce says that a sentence's subject, i.e. the proper name, is its
"object" (he says so in very many places).*
*JAS: Please provide at least a couple of citations.*
"Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling distinctions"
(EP 2:494)
"A Proposition is a sign
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