Francesco, List:
Thank you for the citations.
CSP, cited by FB: *Subject *and *Object *are the same thing except for
trifling distinctions ... (EP 2:494; 1909)
This seems clear enough--except that just two paragraphs later, Peirce
explicitly made *the very same distinction* between Subject and Object that
I do--one that I think is hardly "trifling."
CSP: The Object of every Sign is an Individual, usually an Individual
Collection of Individuals. Its *Subjects*, i.e., the Parts of the Sign that
denote the Partial Objects, are either *directions for finding the Objects*
or are *Cyrioids*, i.e. signs of single Objects ... Such for example are
all *abstract *nouns, which are names of single characters, the personal
pronouns, and the demonstrative and relative pronouns, etc. By directions
for finding the Objects, for which I have as yet invented no other word
than "Selective*" I mean such as "Any" (i.e., any you please), "Some"
(i.e., one properly selected), etc. (EP 2:494-495; 1909)
In this context, it seems clear that by "Object" Peirce meant what he
called the *Dynamical *Object another two paragraphs later. I believe that
"Sign" here is shorthand for "Sign-Replica" (Token), since the external
Object of a Type is *not *an Individual, but a *collectively general *class.
He evidently had in mind Sign-Replicas that are combinations of other
Sign-Replicas in accordance with his "theorem" of the "science of
semeiotics," which "is that if any signs are connected, no matter how, the
resulting system constitutes one sign" (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904).
A Subject is not an Object of the complex Sign-Replica of which it is a
Part, it is *itself *a Sign-Replica that *denotes *one of those Objects.
Moreover, a Subject is *any* such constituent Sign-Replica that "cannot be
understood by a person who has no collateral acquaintance with" *its *Object
(SS 70; 1908). For an abstract noun (such as "mortality" or "lethargy"),
this Object is the Real character that it names. For a personal,
demonstrative, or relative pronoun, this Object is whatever it *indicates*
within the specific context of the utterance. For a quantified general
term, this Object is a member of the corresponding class to be chosen by
either the Utterer ("some") or the Interpreter ("any") if it is not already
identified ("this").
Now consider what Peirce wrote right before the quotation above.
CSP: In the first place, it should be observed that so far as the Sign
denotes its Object, it calls for no particular *intelligence *or *Reason *on
the part of its Interpreter. To read the Sign at all, and distinguish one
Sign from another, what is requisite is delicate perceptions and
acquaintance with what the usual concomitants of such appearances are, and
what the conventions of the systems of signs are. To know the Object, what
is requisite is previous experience of that Individual Object. (EP 2:494;
1909)
An Interpreter who only had mere Sign System Acquaintance could read the
Sign-Replica and understand what it denotes to the minimal extent of
knowing all of the definitions within the Sign System. This is that
Sign-Replica's *Immediate *Object--i.e., its Essential Breadth, which
corresponds to its Essential Depth, which is its Immediate Interpretant,
"its peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter ... an
abstraction, consisting in a Possibility" (SS 111; 1909). Anything
that is *capable
*of being interpreted as a Replica (Token) of a Sign (Type) within some
Sign System has an Immediate *Interpretant*, and therefore an Immediate
*Object*. However, an Interpreter must have Collateral Experience in order
to know the the Sign-Replica's *Dynamic *Object--i.e., its *Informed *
Breadth.
CSP, cited by FB: A Proposition is a sign which distinctly indicates the
Object which it denotes, called its Subject. (R 425:135-136, CP 2.95; 1902)
FB: the object indicated is "called" subject. Here it's not the subject
that indicates the object: it's the proposition that "distinctly" (=
separately) indicate its object (=subject)
Ordinarily "distinctly" is equated with "clearly," rather than
"separately." However, having read your book, I am aware that you cite
another passage on p. 293.
CSP: ... we may mean the immediate object, the object as the sign
represents it. For some signs separately represent their objects. Every
proposition does so ... we may mean the *immediate* interpretant, or that
which the sign itself represents to be its intended interpretant. For some
signs do separately represent their own interpretants, as an argument, for
example, generally does. (R 284:54-55; 1906)
However, the fact that some Signs (i.e., Rhemes) do not "distinctly" or
"separately" represent their Objects obviously does not entail that they do
not represent their Objects *at all*; in that case, they would not be
Signs! The *Immediate* Object is *whatever* aspect of a Sign-Replica
enables it to denote its *Dynamic* Object within a particular Sign System.
Incidentally, I am curious--for the sake of consistency, do you likewise
hold that *only* Arguments have Immediate *Interpretants*?
CSP, cited by FB: ... the demonstrative pronoun "that" ... is not a
Symbol, since it does not signify a general concept." (CP 2.261, EP 2:295;
1903)
FB: If the demonstrative pronoun "that" were capable to signify a general
concept, it would be a Symbol. For only symbols signify general objects.
But it is not: it is an index, because it signifies an individual object.
Which, by the way, also refutes your claim that "every sign has a general
object".
The text omitted at the ellipsis within the Peirce quote is actually quite
relevant here, as well as the sentence that follows it.
CSP: Thus, the demonstrative pronoun "that" is a Legisign, being a general
type; but it is not a Symbol, since it does not signify a general concept.
Its Replica draws attention to a single Object, and is a Rhematic Indexical
Sinsign. (*ibid*)
A Legisign in 1903 corresponds (at least approximately) to a Type or
Famisign in 1908, and "a Type must be a Collective" (EP 2:489), which I
believe means that its external Object is collectively general. Moreover,
it seems pertinent that Peirce did not say that only a Symbol can *denote *a
general concept, but that only a Symbol can *signify *a general concept;
and of course an Index can *only *denote its Object--it cannot signify
*anything*, "unless it involves an iconic part" (cf. EP 2:307; 1904).
Finally, a *Replica* of a demonstrative pronoun, as an *Instance *(Token)
of that Sign (Type), "draws attention to a single Object" at a
*particular *place
and time; but the Sign (Type) itself is capable of drawing attention to
*anything* at *any *place and time.
CSP, cited by FB: All general, or definable, Words, whether in the sense
of Types or of Tokens, are certainly Symbols. That is to say, they denote
the objects that they do by virtue only of there being a habit that
associates their signification with them. (CP 4.544; 1906)
Demonstrative pronouns are "definable words" that "denote the objects that
they do by virtue only of there being a habit" by which we *interpret *them
as Indices.
FB: According to Peirce, "---- is lethargic" is a rhematic symbol, and as
a symbol it has a general dynamic object (i.e. whatever possesses the
characters of lethargy). But as a rheme, it has no "hint" that indicates
that object, and thus has no immediate object.
If a Rheme has no "hint" that indicates its "general dynamic object"--i.e.,
no *Immediate *Object--then what makes it *possible* for us to know what a
Replica of it denotes *at all*? How does a dictionary, which obviously
possesses no Collateral Experience of any kind, indicate what the English
word "lethargic" denotes? It provides a *definition*, which is the word's
Immediate *Interpretant*, "its peculiar Interpretability"; and anything
possessing the characters stipulated by that definition is its Immediate
*Object*, that which the Sign-Replica is *capable *of denoting in
accordance with that particular Sign System (written English). The word
only *actually *denotes something--its *Dynamic *Object--when there is
an *Instance
*(Token) of the Sign (Type), which produces a *Dynamic *Interpretant.
FB: But let me notice that in order to fill in some of the gaps in
Peirce's theory one should be well aware of what those gaps are (and thus
the systematic work presupposes the exegetical one, but not vice versa).
I agree that exegesis comes first, and then systematic work synthesizes the
results of exegesis--in some cases going beyond it. The cycle is
subsequently repeated, as systematic results are tested against further
exegesis. Both approaches are necessary and valuable, and ideally they
complement rather than conflict with each other.
FB: But in order for a notion to fill in some gap in Peirce's theory, such
gap should be evident to the community of inquirers. If the gap is only
evident to the one who proposes the notion filling it, this is just to put
the cart before the horse.
Sometimes a gap is only evident to one member of the community *at first*,
who then must call it to the attention of the others and try to convince
them that it is really there. That is my approach to this List--I offer my
observations and interpretative hypotheses, along with my attempts to
systematize them, and see what kinds of feedback (positive and negative) I
receive. After all, as a self-described *amateur *philosopher, the
consequences for me of getting something terribly wrong in this forum are
pretty small; so as Peirce once put it, "*Nothing hazard, nothing gain*"
(EP 2:410; 1907).
I appreciate your (and others') willingness to engage with me in this
process. Again, I am open to persuasion that I am way off-base here, but
so far I still do not see it that way.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 5:17 AM, Francesco Bellucci <
bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:
> Jon, List
>
>
> *FB: Peirce says that a sentence's subject, i.e. the proper name, is its
> "object" (he says so in very many places).*
>
> *JAS: Please provide at least a couple of citations.*
>
> "Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling distinctions"
> (EP 2:494)
>
> "A Proposition is a sign which distinctly indicates the Object which it
> denotes, called its Subject" (R 425: 135–136) NB: the object indicated is
> "called" subject. Here it's not the subject that indicates the object: it's
> the proposition that "distinctly" (= separately) indicate its object
> (=subject)
>
> "The first member of the triplet, the “Seme,” embraces the logical Term,
> the Subject or Object of a sentence" (R 295: 26–30)
>
> "I term those occasions or objects which are denoted by the indices the
> subjects of the assertion" (CP 2.334)
>
> "That which a Sign 'stands for', or 'refers to' [...] is otherwise called
> its Object. Usage might, equally well, have made is call it the Subject,
> since there is no logical distinction between the two words." (R 849: 11)
>
>
> "That which a concept is 'about', that to which it applies, that which the
> predicate is spoken of, is called its object. In grammar, it is called the
> subject nominative. For the words 'subject' and 'object' mean pretty much
> the same thing" (R 659: 19–20)
>
>
> *JAS: Where did Peirce state that (only) Symbols have a general Object and
> (only) Indices have an individual Object? Again, my current understanding
> is instead that every Sign is a Type, has a General Object, and only exists
> in Replicas, each of which has an individual Dynamic Object.*
>
>
> Here for example:
>
>
> CSP: "the demonstrative pronoun "that" [...] is not a Symbol, since it
> does not signify a general concept." (EP 2: 295). If the demonstrative
> pronoun "that" were capable to signify a general concept, it would be a
> Symbol. For only symbols signify general objects. But it is not: it is an
> index, because it signifies an individual object. Which, by the way, also
> refutes your claim that "every sign has a general object".
>
> Other examples:
>
> CSP: "There are three kinds of representamens, or signs: icons, or images;
> indices; and symbols, or general signs" (R 492, 1903)
>
> CSP: "All general, or definable, Words, whether in the sense of Types or
> of Tokens, are certainly Symbols. That is to say, they denote the objects
> that they do by virtue only of there being a habit that associates their
> signification with them." (Prolegomena, 1906)
>
> CSP: "Deduction involves the analysis of the meanings of general signs,
> i.e. of symbols", CSP to F. A. Woods, R L 477 (1913).
>
> *JAS: The General Object of "_____ is lethargic" is the aggregate of Real
> substances that possess the character of lethargy, its Dynamic Object is
> whatever one of its Replicas actually denotes when employed in an Instance
> of the Sign, and its Immediate Object is whatever its Replica could denote
> to someone who knows only the definitions of English words.*
>
> Not according to Peirce. According to Peirce, "---- is lethargic" is a
> rhematic symbol, and as a symbol it has a general dynamic object (i.e.
> whatever possesses the characters of lethargy). But as a rheme, it has no
> "hint" that indicates that object, and thus has no immediate object.
> Neither the type of this rheme, nor its replicas can denote to someone
> who knows only the definitions of English words what the immediate object
> of this rheme is, but can denote to someone who knows only the definitions
> of English words to what *kind *of objects such a rheme would be
> applicable (= it denotes a general dynamic object). I repeat that talking,
> in contexts like this, of a general object as opposed to the dynamic and
> the immediate makes little (exegetical) sense to me.
>
> *JAS: I readily acknowledge that my approach is more systematic than
> exegetical. I am seeking to situate Signs and semiosis within an overall
> framework that makes sense to me, while remaining as faithful as possible
> to Peirce's concepts and terminology. You stated in your recent book that
> you "have not attempted to finish what Peirce left unfinished or to
> eliminate 'rubs and botches' from his work," such that your "exposition of
> Peirce’s theory of semiotics is no less incomplete than that theory itself
> was" (p. 10). I, on the other hand, am trying to fill in some of those
> gaps and further plow the ground that he has cleared and opened up for us
> as "a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman" (CP 5.488, EP 2:413; 1907)*
>
> Indeed our aims are not identical. But let me notice that in order to fill
> in some of the gaps in Peirce's theory one should be well aware of what
> those gaps are (and thus the systematic work presupposes the exegetical
> one, but not vice versa). But in order for a notion to fill in some gap in
> Peirce's theory, such gap should be evident to the community of inquirers.
> If the gap is only evident to the one who proposes the notion filling it,
> this is just to put the cart before the horse.
>
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