Sorry.
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Folks---
Sorry to ask here, but the instruction for changing to my new email address
has been lost by me. Thanks for any help in dealing with it.
---Frances
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Robert and Listers---
Received reply okay with apologies and thanks.
---Frances
From: Robert Junqueira
Sent: Thursday, 30 January, 2020 07:14
To: frances.ke...@sympatico.ca
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] TEST
It works
A quinta, 30 de jan de 2020, 12:01, mailto:frances.ke...@sympatico.ca> >
TEST
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TEST
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Curiosity---
At an anglophonic kennel club, if the toilet door sign has the word "pointers"
that stands for "men" as a male washroom, then the word "pointers" is seemingly
a different type, albeit a different synonym of sorts as determined by the same
meant object. It is after all the referred
Amin---
To help in your search for finding Canadian scholars or programs and courses in
Peircean semiotics, at Toronto (Ontario, Canada) perhaps try the University of
Toronto and maybe York University for some suggestions.
University of Toronto at Victoria College on their website offers a
Typologies of Semes
For what they are worth, here are some typologies of semes or
representational "signs" that various scholars have used on occasion in
their writings. The label "sign" is not always used by the writers as an
umbrella, so my term "seme" will have to do for now. The typologies
Frances to listers---
Stephen last mused roughly that many scientific studies actually relate to
semiotics and are inadvertent exercises in semiotic analysis. Following
along with that thought in mind, there are likely many proposals or notions
of tridential sign typologies posited by theorists
Frances to John and listers---
Wherever semiotics and logics might be located in a classification of the
sciences, it could be that only "formal" semiotics was intended to be the new
thrust for logics, but not a new label for logics; nor seemingly was it
intended that all of semiotics broadly
Frances to John and other interested listers---
In posting a revised tree diagram on a classification of the sciences you seem
to be positing in your guess some frustration over its original realist
framework, along with some irritation on where to locate a wider science of
semiotics as a
Frances to Edwina and Listers---
Thanks for your most recent reply, but please allow me to dig a little more
into Peircean writings for some clarity on his ideas about idealism and
representamen. Let me read further on specifically what the difference might be
for Peirce between "idealist
Frances to Edwina and listers---
My search goes on for a Peircean approach to at least metaphysical being. In
response to your kind reply, consider some of my rambling tentative guesses,
but without any specific Peircean references. (The new lettered paras directly
below roughly refer to the
Frances in the wings to Edwina and listers---
1. Allow me to musingly guess, it perhaps may be the representamen of phenomena
that fully fills the whole cosmic universe, allowing that there may also be
some primal phenomena that are not representamen, and that objects as signs
only fills a
Frances in the Wings to Helmut and Listers---
Would it not be more categorially consistent with the Peircean theory of signs
to hold that the inferred evaluated worth of a satisfactory and meaningful sign
in the broadest way is judged only by its informative interpretant. This
implies that
Listers involved in the subject---
My wild probing guess at dealing with the thorny issue of determinations and
also categories (but without specific references to Peircean passages) might be
to differentiate and define the sorts of objects that could broadly exist both
outside and inside
Frances to Edwina and Listers---
You partly stated in effect recently that a sign "is" meaning, and that if a
sign "has" no meaning then it is not a sign, but is say mere noise. This seems
wrong to me from a Peircean stance, but perhaps others here can clarify the
jargon and with some
Frances to Edwina and Clark and others---
To muse the point, could it be for Peirce that pure feeling at least as
"primal" phenomena and as felt by any basic "phanerism" might be a
representamen that is not a sign, but that pure or sure feeling as felt by
any mechanism of matter or organism of
Frances to Edwina and others---
(This topic threads away from the current subject.)
It is my understanding that for Peirceanism there may be representamen that
at least can be felt by some phanerisms to be objects, but such
representamen that are not yet signs. It is my further phenomenal
To listers, here is my take on this snarl of twine for what it is worth.
Objects emerging from pure phenomenal forms and their ideal things need only be
nonsign representamen that bear phenomenal continuence and yield phenomenal
existence. Objects that continue to exist as representamen can be
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