Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

List, Jeff: I concur with your elegantly phrased comments. When I posted my request, I was hoping that the enumeration would be specifically indexed to textual references. So, I am a bit disappointed. It would be nice mini-research project for an undergraduate student to collect CSP

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

On 3/10/2017 8:57 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: By contrast, Peirce's realism recognizes that "correspondence, coherence, consensus, and instrumental reliability are all essential and constitutive elements of truth--none is any more fundamental than the others. Moreover, each of these elements of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

> On Mar 10, 2017, at 6:57 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > In chapter 8 of Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism, Paul Forster > argues--convincingly, I think--that the different "theories of truth" are > competitors only within a nominalist epistemology and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

Clark, Jeff, List: In chapter 8 of *Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism*, Paul Forster argues--convincingly, I think--that the different "theories of truth" are competitors only within a nominalist epistemology and metaphysics. By contrast, Peirce's realism recognizes that "correspondence,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

List: In her book, Charles Peirces’s Pragmatic Pluralism, Rosenthal states: … the literature on Peirce contains “no fewer than thirteen distinct interpretations of Peirce’s views on the nature of truth”, attributing the account to Robert Almeder. She apparently intends contrast CSP’s

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

Jerry, Clark, list, In my response to Jeff B.D., I was defending the claim that board games are versions of mathematics. But I definitely do *not* restrict math to board games or to set-theoretic models. Jerry Many mathematicians reject set theory as a foundation for mathematics Yes. Peirce

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

I have thought of CSP as having much in common with the Common Sense philosophers. Their systematic scepticism in particular, and their emphasis on practical issues. The idea of atoms as we know not what exactly but small and localized and having properties that can interact with other

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

John: CSP’s interpretation of Boscovich’ian atoms was unique to CSP, at least that is my reading. I could find the CSP text if it is a substantial issue. It was in a short note on the classification of the elements. Note the dates of the two men. Do you have a significant reason for

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

Interesting discussion, but one that bothers me a bit due to my reading of Boscovic as an undergrad and my familiarity with the Scottish “Common Sense” philosophers. My understanding of Boscovician atoms is that they are centres od force fields that very in sign and intensity, being effective

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

> On Mar 7, 2017, at 9:10 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > On 3/7/2017 3:19 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: >> pure mathematics starts from a set of hypotheses of a particular sort, >> and it does not seem obvious to me that these games are grounded >> on such hypotheses. > > More

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

List, John: I’m rather pressed for time so only brief responses to your highly provocative post. Clearly, your philosophy of mathematics is pretty main stream relative to mine. But this is neither the time nor the place to develop these critical differences. My post was aimed directly at

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

On 3/8/2017 12:10 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: I'm trying to interpret Peirce's remarks about the importance of stating the mathematical hypotheses of a system precisely for the purpose of drawing conclusions with exactitude. I certainly agree. And the point I was trying to make is that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

John S, List, If my view of mathematics has been perverted, then the perversion wasn't caused by studying the works of the Bourbaki group (or something similar). Rather, I'm trying to interpret Peirce's remarks about the importance of stating the mathematical hypotheses of a system precisely

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

On 3/7/2017 3:19 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: pure mathematics starts from a set of hypotheses of a particular sort, and it does not seem obvious to me that these games are grounded on such hypotheses. More precisely, pure mathematics starts with axioms and definitions. A hypothesis is a

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

Dear list: I think one can easily underestimate the possibilities of what one is doing when one is playing games and potential consequences. “The discussion of questions like these brings one face to face with problems which offer as much intellectual challenge as quantum indeterminacy or

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

Hi John S, List, You say: For that matter, chess, go, and bridge are just as mathematical as any other branch of mathematics. They have different language games, but nobody worries about unifying them with algebra or topology. Peirce characterizes mathematics as a science in terms of the

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } John Sowa - very nice outline of 'thinking', which is, as you say, diagrammatic. And as you say, independent of any language or notation. The ability of the human species to 'symbolize', i.e., to transform that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

Jerry, We already have a universal foundation for logic. It's called "Peirce's semiotic". JLRC the mathematics of the continuous can not be the same as the mathematics of the discrete. Nor can the mathematics of the discrete become the mathematics of the continuous. They are all subsets of

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

    Supplement: Is there a crisis of systems theory, like I am feeling? If so, I have the hunch, that the reason for that is the blunt "Network" metaphor, whose wide use blocks the inquiry about structures, scales, continuity, processes, and so on. I feel, that the "Network" concept is normative

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

List, I guess it might help to talk about time (and space) scales now, and about systems hierarchies with the sytems having different time (and space) scales. I think that synechism is connected to (Peircean) monism. Eg. the dualism of mind and matter: Matter is effete mind. "Effete" is an

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

List, John: > On Mar 3, 2017, at 1:37 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > I am having a hard time following your thought process here, Yes, you certainly do. And, I can identify several conjectures why this is the case. At the top of the list of conjectures are the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

Jerry, Jon S, list, Jerry, you wrote, In MS 647, he compares a fact with "a chemical principle extracted therefrom by the power of Thought;” That is, the notion of a fact is in the past tense. It is completed and has an identity. It is no longer is question about the nature of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

Jerry C., LIst: Peirce makes it very clear elsewhere (and repeatedly) that a *true *continuum does not contain *any *points or other definite, indivisible parts. He defines it as that which has *indefinite *parts, all of which have parts of the same kind, such that it is *undivided* yet

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

List, Ben: Your recent posts contribute to a rather curious insight into CSP’s beliefs about the relationships between mathematics, chemistry and logic of scientific hypotheses. > On Mar 2, 2017, at 10:58 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > from MS 647 (1910) which appeared in