List, John:
3.418. "Thus, the question whether a fact is to be regarded as to referring to
a single thing or to more is a question of the form of the proposition under
which it suits our purposes to state the fact."
On Dec 6, 2015, at 6:26 AM, Franklin Ransom wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 4, 2015
Jerry, List:
I believe my metaphysics are those of C.S. Peirce. Peirce's pope-positivism is
also assumed explicitly in our book, Every Thing Must Go, which does take
modern physics as a starting point. So perhaps I have made my ideas clear, and
the resulting argument is pretty
Dear Franklin, List members:
I left out a more fundamental part of the argument that I will lay out now. It
is basically a very simple argument, though perhaps it is a bit subtle. I left
it out because the argument is fairly well known to Peirce scholars It appears
in several places in
John,
You said:
The physicalism stems from the Pragmatic Maxim, which makes any difference
> in meaning depend on a difference in possible experience together with
> Quine’s idea that the physical is just what we can experience. I take it
> that the last is also Peirce’s view, and he is no
List, John:
On Dec 6, 2015, at 8:04 AM, John Collier wrote:
> Peirce has a specific view of experience. Meaning has to be referenced to
> something, and that something cannot be internal (mental in one sense), or
> we go in circles (which is acceptable to some philosophers, but not to
>
John,
I don't think I have any significant disagreement with much of what you've
had to say concerning Peirce's commitment to the external element in
experience. I am curious though as to whether you believe you experience
external minds, and if so, whether you would count them as physical? I
Jerry,
I was talking about the manifestations of first ness, not the concept of
firstness, when I said that firstness has no structure. You are not talking
about the manifestations of firstness if you think they have structure. You
aren't talking about Peirce, here when you say things like
List, John:
On Dec 2, 2015, at 11:39 AM, John Collier wrote:
> Jerry, there is some very convoluted reasoning in this, but I will try to
> explain. See interspersed comments.
>
The message was only questions, with one except.
What reasoning you find convoluted is of your making, not mine.
>
Jerry, there is some very convoluted reasoning in this, but I will try to
explain. See interspersed comments.
John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier
From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com]
Sent: Wednesday, 02 December 2015 6:57 PM
To: Peirce-L
Cc:
List, Clark:
On Dec 2, 2015, at 10:18 AM, Clark Goble wrote:
> I’m not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where
> structures are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in
> itself without relations.
>
>From my perspective, this argument, ignores the
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