Hi,
It seems to me that signs have both formal and material aspects. If true,
there should be formal and material rhemes, dicisigns, and arguments.
Natural proposition, the topic of the current seminar on these lists, may
be considered as the material aspect of dicisign. If this line of
Section 3.6 of NP takes up the predicate part of the proposition and The
Iconical Side of Dicisigns. As Frederik remarks, the important and
controversial idea here is that general, schematic images play a central
role in logic and cognition (p. 61). The part of Peirce's Syllabus
(EP2:282) quoted
Gary F wrote:
1) Icons, representing Firstness, commit themselves to nothing, but their
connection (Thirdness) with experiential external Secondnesses constitutes
information. The Dicisign is the kind of sign which actually makes such a
connection. The generalized (and fallible!) commitment to
ET: nowhere in my post did I disagree with Peirce that 'icons commit
themselves to nothing at all'. Where do you come up with that conclusion?
GF: The first sentence of your previous post said: I think that Icons
commit themselves to connectivity and thus continuity. Now you claim to
have
Gary F - Nope - I don't think that you have effectively brushed the crumbs of
Edwina off your hands and can go on your merry way. [There! I told her off
didn't I. So much for her!] Why are you always so angry?
Icons don't commit themselves to any information or meaning - how can they -
but
Clark, your quotes from CP 3.433-5 jogged my memory and sent me back to
their source, Peirces 1896 Monist article The Regenerated Logic; and I
found there a good example of a Dicisign, given by Peirce several years
before he invented the term, yet fairly clear about the role of iconicity in
the
(The undistorted figure is attached.)
Ben wrote:
(100414-1)
Most generally a triad is a trio. A predicate is called triadic if it is
predicated of three objects like so: Pxyz. In Peirce's system a genuine
triad is one involving
Gary F., Edwina, Lists,
I find myself agreeing with both sides in this disagreement. Am I confused?
Icons themselves involve connectivity and thus continuity because a qualisign
may be connected to a token figure and a rule for interpreting those
connections--and not yet have the kind of
Lists,
The last paragraph in the earlier message contained errors--some of which were
caused by the autocorrect function on my email software. It is driving me
crazy, because it refuses to let terms like rheme and dicisign stay as I've
typed them.
It should read: Couldn't we simplify
Part of the problem may also be due to my understanding of the 'icon' in
that it is not a Sign, even though many seem to consider it as such. It is
the term for the Relation between the Dynamic Object and the Representamen.
A Sign is a triad and the Icon, as a single Relation, is not a Sign.
-- Forwarded message --
From: Tom Gollier tgoll...@gmail.com
Date: Sat, Oct 4, 2014 at 2:53 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Example of Dicisign?
To: Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru
Evgenii and list,
I find your example interesting in that the two kinds of denotation:
If a
I suspect, that in this quote Peirce meant sign for representamen, and by writing whether they be... he meant whether their object relation was This is inaccurate by Peirce. Edwina writes more accurately, and is right, I think: With Sign (first letter capital) she means the whole sign, and
There are two ways of dealing with Peirce, I've sensed.
One is to fathom what among however many thousands of writings he had in
mind and in essence engage in a form of hermeneutics. It reminds me of
seminary. The prize goes to whoever best recapitulates what he says and
what he means.
The other
Dear Stephen,
Rest assured that you are not confused.
I am afraid it is Edwina who seems confused about the meaning of an icon
that has dual meanings -- (i) one of the three relations between the
representamen and its object, which is the only meaning of 'icon' to her,
and (ii) the name of that
Helmut- you have it right.
That's why I prefer to use the term of 'representamen' rather than 'sign'
(note, as you say, lower case first letter). Peirce often used the term 'sign'
to mean not only the representamen, but even the relations ..eg..that between
the Representamen and the Object
Tom, I’m afraid you’re adding to the confusion here by talking about “two kinds
of denotation.”
In a proposition, the subject denotes objects, while the predicate signifies
characters. This is what Peirce is saying in your quote from “Kaina Stoicheia”
(MS 517), and it’s the standard
Gary F., Tom, list,
Gary, are you sure you're not confusing denotation with designation or
indication? The denotation of 'red' is all red things, or the population
of red things; the comprehension (or significance) of 'red' is the
quality _/red/ _ and all that that implies. That's why
Gary and list,
A does signify B in the first part of the quote. That's what I took as the
operational sense. But in the second part of the quote it says:
If a sign, A, only denotes real objects that are a part or the whole
of the objects denoted by another sign, B, then A is said to be a
And what makes a difference as always as that practical effect which is at
the end of every consideration. Or did he not say that too?
*@stephencrose https://twitter.com/stephencrose*
On Sat, Oct 4, 2014 at 6:19 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote:
Dear Stephen,
Rest assured that you
List, Frederik, Jon:
Pure Index?
Pure Icon?
Mysterious to me outside of the legisign commitment.
Within the domain of chemistry, Lavoisier's Principle asserts a legisign
concerning the concept of purity that CSP was certainly aware of. It is the
starting point for the natural propositions of
Edwina, Helmut, list,
To me,
A sign is anything that stands for something other (100414-1)
than itself, period.
In order for something (called representamen or sign) to stand for
something else (called object) to some one, that something must have some
effect (called interpretant) on
List, Frederik, Jeff:
On Oct 4, 2014, at 3:22 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
(citing CSP),
icons commit themselves to nothing at all
This is a clear and crisp example of the influence of historical usage on the
meaning of words, grammar, signs, symbols, terms, expressions, logic and so
At 01:39 PM 10/4/2014, Gary Fuhrman quotes Peirce:
Peirce: When an assertion is made, there really
is some speaker, writer, or other signmaker who
delivers it; and he supposes there is, or will
be, some hearer, reader, or other interpreter
who will receive it. It may be a stranger upon a
List, Stephen:
On Oct 4, 2014, at 5:17 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
in essence engage in a form of hermeneutics.
Consider the triadic triad:
It contains nine terms.
Five of these nine terms were of CSP coinage. CSP and CSP alone understands
why the majority of these nines terms were
Re: Jeffrey Brian Downard
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14434
Jeff, List,
I had a faint memory of discussing the relation between k-adic and k-tomic with
Tom Gollier in my early days on the Peirce List, and for once my memory serves
me well. I found this link
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