List, John:
Thank you for your clear exposition of your views. Better than most.
Never the less, I find the assertion:
> The usual reason beauty and truth are taken to be teleological terms is that
> they are values. They can’t be given a purely descriptive definition that
> doesn’t require em
> On Sep 27, 2014, at 6:05 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
>
> Have you read The God Problem by Harold Bloom. I have no science but it seems
> he is out to contradict every theory out there. He has one of his own about
> origins. Best, S
I confess I’ve not read that one, although I’ve read some of
> On Sep 28, 2014, at 2:29 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
>
> On 9/28/2014 11:22 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
>
>> > [JC] List, Ben, Clark:
>>
>> > I am surprised by the search for such a fine -scale parsing of the concept
>> > of "formal" causality (telos).
>>
> [BU] I'd regard formal causation
List, Cathy, JeffD
Just a simple fact and a simple comment.
The simple fact is that I have been on the faculty of an Institute for the
Study of Consciousness for more than 15 years after spending eight years
researching the design of drugs for epilepsy.
The simple comment is it is my personal
Frederik wrote:
"Frege used "thought" to refer to propositions, (092814-1)
as I understand him, and I am not clear whether
Peirce did the same."
So, it seems to me that, for Frege, "propositions" include "argument.
Why was it necessary for Peirce to distinguish between propositions a
(If the figure below is distorted, please refer to one of my earlier emails.)
Howard wrote:
". . . the bruteness of laws execute in real time at an (6985-1)
unalterable rate, whereas mathematical and logical rules
may be executed at your leisure with no effect on the
result. Laws do not exi
Dear All,
Yes, just to reiterate what has also been said by Jeff D in his post in
this thread – the key criterion for thought, and intelligent thought, is
not *consciousness* but *self-control*. I would go so far as to say that
these are quite orthogonal. One can have consciousness without
self-
It is my understanding that the three dicisigns Gary F is referring to are:
1) dicent indexical sinsign
2) dicent indexical legisign
3) dicent symbolic legisign
If "dicent sign" is synonymous with "dicisign" and if "a dicent symbolic
legisign (i.e., 3))is a proposition", my question is why ca
Stefan,
Excuse me for asking a silly question:
You wrote " . . . are unable to destinct their own dreams . . ."
Can you use "distinct" as a verb ? Or did you mean "distinguish" ?
With all the best.
Sung
> Ben, Gary, R., Gary F.,
>
> i've got to start from the end of your post. You speak of
Jerry, Clark, list,
Responses interleaved.
On 9/28/2014 11:22 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
> [JC] List, Ben, Clark:
> I am surprised by the search for such a fine -scale parsing of the
concept of "formal" causality (telos).
[BU] I'd regard formal causation generally as entelechiac causatio
List, Ben, Clark:
I am surprised by the search for such a fine -scale parsing of the concept of
"formal" causality (telos).
CSP used the triad - "thing, representation, form".
Mathematics uses the concept of formula generate forms, usually geometric forms.
As physics uses mathematics to genera
Why did I simply state beauty and truth are teleological terms - because I
was responding to Gary R's suggestion that we replace truth as a term. I
meant to say the terms have a standing whether anyone says so. They should
not be replaced. Clearly there is more to say including the fact that we
can
Jerry, List,
The usual reason beauty and truth are taken to be teleological terms is that
they are values. They can't be given a purely descriptive definition that
doesn't require empirical justification. That means that they can't be given
nontrivial definitions. The inability to define truth
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