Stefan, Excuse me for asking a silly question:
You wrote " . . . are unable to destinct their own dreams . . ." Can you use "distinct" as a verb ? Or did you mean "distinguish" ? With all the best. Sung > Ben, Gary, R., Gary F., > > i've got to start from the end of your post. You speak of the society > "rewarding diciplines" and this sheds a light on your idea of sociology > in this discussion. Your sociology consists of conscious actors who > reward, strive for power, wealth or status. This is more a rational > choice approach which is not the thing i was trying to hint at with my > Fleck example. And thats also not the thing sociology of knowlede is > interested in. It's about the knowledge underlying societal habits. > There are so many things we take for granted and we should explore why > we (did) take them for granted. And this not only the case in society it > is also the case in the sciences. > > Why did microbiologist search for syphillis in the blood? They searched > there because for centuries it was taken for granted that there is > something like "syphillitic blood". Was it possible to reproduce the > results? No, it was almost impossible to stabilize the results. Nowadays > we would stop researching with results like this. But they kept on > trying and trying until Wassermann found a way to stabilize the > experiment. Why did the retry and retry? Because it was clear that it > had to be there! > > The snake example: The snake example is so trivial and easy to > understand that we don't have to discuss it. Yes, it bites you -> you > are dead in tradtion A or B. There is no incompatiblity. But this is not > a real world example of a living science. Sciences are complex, they > consist of assumptions, crafting in the lab/the field, cognitive > training etc.. They are much more than the simple "if A then B" of > logic. Much knowledge and training is needed to come to the point where > one can write down a proposition like "if A then B". > > Nobody doubts that when you do exactly the same as another person that > the same will happen. "Experiences whose conditions are the same will > have the same general characters". But since scientific paradigms are > such complex structures it is not an easy task to create the same > conditions. You think its easy, just go to a lab and try to re-cook a > Wassermann-test! You say opinion and truth are not the same thing. Yes, > sure ,but how should we deal with the idea of the syphillitic blood? Is > it opinion or truth? They found it in the blood! And the idea to find it > in the blood is certainly a cultural import into science. > > But there are different Problems: a) Can there be different truths about > one object of investigation b) are there cultural imports into science > that influences the content of science and not only the organizational > context of research. What is organizational context? Org. context is for > me all the stuff you named: funding, rewarding, strive for power, money > etc.. An influence on the content instead is everything which is part of > the "how we see the object" of investigation. > > Karl Mannheim uses in "Ideology and Utopia" a good metaphor. He says > that we can look at a object from different perspectives and > objectivation is for him to take different positions relative to the > object. Trying to investigate the object beyond this is an absurdity > like seeing without perspective. > > You distinct between opinion and truth. Do you have the truth? No you > don't, like i don't. We both have beliefs we are willing to put on test. > But when you write somthing like: > > "Conflating opinion with truth seems to produce some light > pseudo-hallucinatory fun, at least that has been my consistent > experience since I was a teenager (as I said I do look at other > perspectives). It's the fun of absurdity. Yet, to build a theory on the > acceptance of that conflation is to build on broken logic, inquiry with > its bones broken, inquiry more susceptible than ever to social > manipulation, inquiry less likely than ever to be fruitful." > > it seems to me that you have the truth and you are able to destinct > between pseudo-hallucinations and non-hallucinations. You talk like you > are one of those who has left the cave and reached the light. Ben, i > don't really insinuate this, because it was written by you in the heat > of the moment. We are not far away from each other, but nonetheless this > paragraph shows we are still standing on different sides of a water > devide. There is a hair between us. My impression is you are trying to > pull the long-run-perspective on truth into the /now/ to safe some kind > of non-perspective-truth in science. > > Now, truth is for me a perfect sign which incorporates all possible > perspectives on an object. But we will be there only at the end of all > times. As long as we are not there we only have beliefs we are willing > to act upon. And as long we have not reached the all-perspectives-mode > we take in positions on objects and phenomena that are influenced by our > societal position, tradtions and our culture. The point is now that > modern science with its non-prespective-truth tries to erase these > influences in its representation. Part of this strategy is to make > influences, where the cleaning has not been finished, to exceptions or > to reduce the cultural influences to failed knowledge. > > * Just take insulin shock therapy. How was it possible that psychic > ill were tortured that way? It was only possible in a certain > culture of medicine. A culture where a real phycicist had to cut or > give drug. But psychatrist didn't have these instruments and so they > were inferior to real phycicist. That's the reason why they were so > eager to use insulin shocks, because when they used it they were > real phycicists. > * Look at nazi science. It is widley branded as pseudo-science to > clean science from this era. But there were nazi scientists whose > experiments would hold our standards today. But people say: Huh, in > the greater part it was pseudo science. Yes, so what? Just think of > Feynmans great "Cargo Cult Science", it shows that a lot of science > today is pseudo. How was nazi science possible? It was a child of > nazi germany. > * Take the scientific revolution. Where did the knowledge of the > scientific revolution come from like Steven Shapin asks? The "new > scientists" laughed about the scholastics who discussed "how many > angels can dance on top of a needle", but the logic of the new > scientists grounded on the work of scholastics. In the field of > chemistry the techniques of the bench work stemmed from alchemy. > Newton himself was an alchemist. > > All three examples are examples of the cleaning strategy. > > But back to the two problems: a) Can there be different truths about one > object of investigation? b) Are there cultural imports into science that > influence the content of science? > > * Ad a): No, this is not possible. If there are two truths about one > object, then it is due to different perspectives. But since the > perspectives are different there are not the same conditions and > hence not the same conclusions. But within one perspective the > results are intersubjective and reproducable. > > * Ad b) Yes, there are such imports and there are less dramatic > examples than those mentioned above. From my study time i knew at > last 6 different soil classifications. I googled it now and found > out there are even more and that pedologist have lost every > confidence that there ever will be a universal classification. If > you look at the classification you will reckon they are dependent on > the soil usage and engeneering techniques. But these both vary > greatly with different cultures. > > But pedology, physics or chemistry are not the main battle field. We > find examples there, they are insteresting and shed a light on the > cleaning practices, but they are not of vital importance. Like > Foucault identified it, the main battle field is anthropology. There > are everywhere cultural and ideological components in the content of > the sciences arround anthropology. And that is the reason why people > in the 60ies and 70ies read his historical investigations, which > ended in the 19th century, as critiques of the then contemporary > psychatry, medicine and criminology. He showed what was implicitly > taken for granted and people didn't like to see that. > > All of this hasn't something to do with fallibilism. Fallibilism works > only in one perspective, the tertium non datur works only in one > perspective. It has to do with pluralism and the possibility of other > world views. And therefore it is a legitimate endeavour to search for > traces of culture, tradition, ideology within the content of sciences. > They are not free of them. Its like Fleck writes in > "Wissenschaftstheoretische Probleme": "It is an extraordinary > interesting thing, how far scholars who dedicate their whole life to > destinct hallucinations from reality, are unable to destinct their own > dreams about science from the true form of science". > > > Best > Stefan > > > > > >> Stefan, Gary F., list, >> >> I was indeed addressing the snakebite example, just not mentioning it >> by name. If two traditions, two people, two of anything, arrive at >> incompatible conclusions about snakebites, then at most one of their >> conclusions is true. That's what "incompatible conclusions" means. It >> doesn't take Peircean semiotics or pragmatism to see it, it's >> elementary definitions and logic. >> >> I haven't ever argued or believed that judgments, that two given >> traditions' conclusions are incompatible, are infallible. I haven't >> ever argued or believed that society does not influence, help, or >> hinder inquiry, or contribute to focusing it in some directions rather >> than others. This sort of thing will result in society's influencing >> the opinions that result from actual inquiry. >> >> But opinion and truth are not the same thing. >> >> Conflating opinion with truth seems to produce some light >> pseudo-hallucinatory fun, at least that has been my consistent >> experience since I was a teenager (as I said I do look at other >> perspectives). It's the fun of absurdity. Yet, to build a theory on >> the acceptance of that conflation is to build on broken logic, inquiry >> with its bones broken, inquiry more susceptible than ever to social >> manipulation, inquiry less likely than ever to be fruitful. >> >> A challenge for inquiry and society is to overcome capricious or >> mischievous skews produced by society's influence on inquiry, without >> keeping society from helping inquiry thrive and vice versa. It's one >> thing for society to reward some disciplines more than others. In >> various cases there can be good reasons for that, bad reasons for >> that, and so on. The economy of inquiry itself may sometimes >> impoverish inquiries that would not have been all that costly and >> whose findings would have corrected and improved the inquiries that do >> proceed, but people can't know everything in advance, and people need >> to make choices. So inquiry will tend, even when going comparatively >> well, to have defects. But it can also correct and improve itself. >> It's another thing for society to reward disciplines with power, >> wealth, glamour, status, only for producing conclusions that suit >> society's preconceptions. And so on. >> >> Best, Ben >> >> On 9/23/2014 5:20 AM, sb wrote: >> >> Gary F., Ben, List, >> >> yes, it is an extremist position. Ludwik Fleck in some of his texts >> about the /Denkkollektive/ (thought collectives) comes close to this >> point. But his microbiological bench research maybe prevented him to >> fall prey to such solipcism. Also Latours (maybe polemic) can be read >> this way, but even he says now, facing the threat of climate change >> deniers, that he has gone to far. Apart from these two (and alleged >> epigones of social constructivism of different strives) i would say >> this is a crude misrepresentation of social constructivism. >> >> Yes, you may be right that you and Ben are just responding, but i have >> the imression that Stans polarization fell on just too fertile ground. >> Maybe it activated an already existent resentiment?! Now when Gary and >> Cathy applaud Bens post, i would follow them if it was not under the >> label of social constructivism. If we call it >> solipcism/relativism/culturalism i'd be fine. Nevertheless i feel >> uncomfortable with Bens post since it doesn't try to understand Stans >> position. >> >> Stan braught up the example "one must not tease certain snakes". If >> you tease the snake, it bites you, injects enough poison and there are >> no lucky circumstances that safe you, then you will die! These are the >> plain facts. But there can be different mythologies/theories arround >> this snake type. At this point i always remember the end of Ecos "Name >> of the Rose" when Adson and William discuss retrospective what has >> happend. Adson says to William: "Over the whole investigation we had >> the false premisses and the false hypothesis' but we came up with the >> right conclusion". Important in this example is now that they start >> with predjudice which turns out to be false. In the same manner >> scientists start with personaly, socially or tradionally conditioned >> predjudices. >> >> All scientific theories have a social import which is not forced upon >> us by reality. E.g. Fleck shows in his book that until the 20th >> century and the discovery of the Wassermann-reaction the syphillis >> research was influenced by the religious idea of the syphillitic blood >> as a punishment of god. In an enlightment perspective it is important >> to understand and explore such imports. Ben argues in his response >> only from an epistemological standpoint and ignores the importance of >> the sociologcal view Stan brings in. Sociologically the "claim of >> truth" as "truth" and the will to act upon this truth is a interesting >> phenomenon. At the same time Stan mixes up the epistemological and the >> sociological perspective and thinks we can conclude from the sociology >> of knowledge to epistemology. Once again, i do follow Bens critique, >> but it should also pick up the sociological perspective. >> >> Science is not only brought forward by empirical research and new >> theories, it is also brought forward by the critique of its own social >> boundedness. Sure, the sociological is from a different sphere but >> since it is from a different sphere it could and should inform >> science. From my point of view social constructivism/ sociology of >> knowledge and pragmatism are complementary, means pragmatism delivers >> the right epistemology for the sociology of knowledge. >> >> Best >> Stefan >> >> Am 22.09.14 14:22, schrieb Gary Fuhrman: > >
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