Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

I was pressed for time when I wrote my initial, brief response to this, so
I am coming back to it to make a few additional comments.

GR:  ... what Peirce calls the "pure zero" state (which, in my thinking, is
roughly equivalent to the later blackboard metaphor) ...


After reviewing Sheriff's chapter about all of this, and in light of the
additional discussions that have happened today, I am inclined to agree
with you.  He quotes CP 6.217, where Peirce calls it "absolutely undefined
and unlimited possibility--boundless possibility," and adds (importantly)
that "of *potential* being there was in that initial state no lack."  That
sounds like the clean blackboard to me.

GR:  "'Potential', in Peirce's usage, means indeterminate yet capable of
determination in any specific case" (CP 6.185-86) [Sheriff, 4).


This is another helpful definition.  By contrast, "an Idea is incapable of
perfect actualization on account of its essential vagueness" (EP 2.479);
i.e., it is a possibility (vague), but not a potentiality (general).  There
is still some mixing of these two concepts, but the distinction is
gradually becoming clearer in my mind.

GR:   I think it is possible to overemphasize this "parallel" [with
Genesis] ...


I agree, and I hope that it was clear when I drew the same parallel that I
was expressing my own view, not something that I attribute to Peirce.

GR:  I would tend to disagree with you, Jon, that this ur-continutiy is
"creat*ed*" 3ns; rather, I see it as "creat*ive*" 3ns as distinguished from
the 3ns that become the habits and laws of a created universe. So, in a
word, my view is that only these laws and habits are the 'created' 3nses.


I am still mulling this over for myself, but again, I suspect that your
terminology is closer to expressing how Peirce thought about the blackboard.

Regards,

Jon

On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 7:22 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> Thanks for the reminders about Sheriff's book; it was one of my first
> introductions to Peirce's thought, and I even re-read it recently, but I
> need to review the portions that you mentioned in light of the discussions
> in this thread.  Thanks also for the additional information on the role of
> the categories in Peirce's classification of the sciences.
>
> GR:  I would tend to disagree with you, Jon, that this ur-continutiy is
> "creat*ed*" 3ns; rather, I see it as "creat*ive*" 3ns as distinguished
> from the 3ns that become the habits and laws of a created universe. So, in
> a word, my view is that only these laws and habits are the 'created' 3nses.
>
>
> As I said, taking the blackboard to be created Thirdness is no more than a
> working hypothesis at this point.  If the diagram is confined to the
> blackboard itself, as Peirce's description seems to indicate, then your
> characterization makes more sense.  I am still toying with a couple of
> other alternatives, as well.
>
> GR:  How can one deny Peirce's own words here?
>
>
> Yes, any alleged "reading" or "interpretation" that directly contradicts
> what an author explicitly states in the text is obviously untenable.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 3:29 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, Edwina, Gary F, Soren, List,
>>
>> John Sheriff, in *Charles Peirce's Guess at the Riddle: Grounds for
>> Human Significance*, in commenting on what Peirce calls the "pure zero"
>> state (which, in my thinking, is roughly equivalent to the later blackboard
>> metaphor) quotes Peirce as follows: "So of potential being there was in
>> that initial state no lack" (CP 6.217) and continues, " 'Potential', in
>> Peirce's usage, means indeterminate yet capable of determination in any
>> specific case" (CP 6.185-86) [Sheriff, 4). This "potential being" is, then,
>> decidedly *not *the "nothing of negation," but rather "the germinal
>> nothing, in which the whole universe is involved or foreshadowed" (CP
>> 6.217).
>>
>> Sheriff had just prior to this written: "Peirce frequently drew the
>> parallel between his theory and the Genesis account" and discusses this in
>> a longish paragraph. I think it is possible to overemphasize this
>> "parallel" (and, as I've commented here in the past, Peirce's "pure
>> zero"--or ur-continuity in the blackboard metaphor--seems to me closer to
>> the Kemetic *Nun *in the dominant Ancient Egyptian creation myth; while
>> it should be noted in this regard that Peirce knew hieroglyphics and may
>> well have been acquainted with this myth).
>>
>> Jon wrote:
>>
>> [M]y current working hypothesis is that "Pure mind, as creative of
>> thought" (CP 6.490) is the Person who conceives the *possible *chalk
>> marks and then draws *some *of them on the blackboard, rather than the
>> blackboard itself as a "theater" where 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon, list - I'll try to reply below


1) ET:   I consider that the two descriptions of the emergence of the 
universe are not compatible.


  JON:I just offered a lengthy argument showing that they are compatible.  This 
obviously does not prove the correctness of either or both accounts, but it 
does demonstrate that they are not contradictory.

  EDWINA: Sorry- but your argument despite its length does not convince me. I 
consider the two arguments, one that explains the universe is self-organized 
and evolving with its full identity only emerging as the Final Interpretant in 
the future; and the other that the universe relies on an a priori Mind/God - to 
be incompatible.
  

  2) ET:  The 1.412 description is specific in  'the original chaos, therefore, 
where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere indeterminacy, in 
which nothing existed or really happened 1.411.


  JON:That "nothing existed or really happened" means that nothing was actual; 
it does not entail that nothing was real.

  EDWINA: Realities are generalizations - and generals do not 'exist' except 
within the particular. Your outline is Platonic - with Ideal Forms that are 
Real. Again, Peirce was not a Platonist and his generals, even though real, are 
part of the particular instantiation.
  

  3) ET:  THought separate from matter


  JON: Well, yes.  This is not problematic at all for me--or for Peirce, since 
he affirmed "the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone 
as primordial," because "matter is effete mind"; i.e., there can be mind 
without matter, but not matter without mind (CP 6.24-25).  I addressed this in 
the past thread about "Peirce's Objective Idealism."

  EDWINA: I  disagree with your interpretation. I don't see that 'matter as 
effete mind' means that mind and matter are separate. My interpretation is that 
- as in the  frog and the crystal - they are not separate.
  ---
  4) ET:  My reading of this - a pure disembodied mind - is that it is Platonic 
- and this contradicts Peirce's basic Aristotelianism which does not allow for 
Mind separated from Matter.


  JON: Although Peirce self-identified more with Aristotle, there are still 
Platonic aspects of his thought, some of them quite explicit.  For example, 
with respect to cosmology, we have already brought up the last Cambridge 
Conferences lecture, "The Logic of Continuity," in this thread.


CSP:   From this point of view we must suppose that the existing universe, 
with all its arbitrary secondness, is an offshoot from, or an arbitrary 
determination of, a world of ideas, a Platonic world; not that our superior 
logic has enabled us to reach up to a world of forms to which the real 
universe, with its feebler logic, was inadequate ...  The evolutionary process 
is, therefore, not a mere evolution of the existing universe, but rather a 
process by which the very Platonic forms themselves have become or are becoming 
developed ...   In short, if we are going to regard the universe as a result of 
evolution at all, we must think that not merely the existing universe, that 
locus in the cosmos to which our reactions are limited, but the whole Platonic 
world, which in itself is equally real, is evolutionary in its origin, too ... 
At the same time all this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the 
existing universe, but is merely a Platonic world, of which we are, therefore, 
to conceive that there are many, both coordinated and subordinated to one 
another; until finally out of one of these Platonic worlds is differentiated 
the particular actual universe of existence in which we happen to be. (CP 
6.192, 194, 200, 208; 1898)


  Peirce clearly stated here--several times, in multiple ways--that "a world of 
ideas, a Platonic world" (i.e., mind) precedes "the existing universe, with all 
its arbitrary secondness" (i.e., matter).  Just because something is "Platonic" 
does not entail that Peirce rejected it.

  EDWINA: I consider the above quotation to be an analysis of conceptualization 
 [our ideas, our factual experiences] - and not of the three categories and of 
matter and mind nor of the integral embodiment of the one with the other - as 
in the decapitated frog or the crystal.
  -
  5) ET:   I think you and even Peirce are, indeed, using the arguments for the 
'existence of God' from Anselm, the classical ontological argument, that If one 
can think of a perfect Being, then, this perfect being is realand..if such 
a belief is common, then, this is 'evidentiary' proof that such a being exists.


  JON: This is definitely not the argument that I am using, nor the one that 
Peirce used.  What we are discussing is more akin to the so-called 
"cosmological" and "transcendental" arguments, since it is grounded primarily 
in the 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:   I consider that the two descriptions of the emergence of the universe
are not compatible.


I just offered a lengthy argument showing that they *are *compatible.  This
obviously does not prove the *correctness *of either or both accounts, but
it does demonstrate that they are *not *contradictory.

ET:  The 1.412 description is specific in  'the original chaos, therefore,
where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere indeterminacy,
in which nothing existed or really happened 1.411.


That "nothing existed or really happened" means that nothing was *actual*;
it does not entail that nothing was *real*.

ET:  THought separate from matter


Well, yes.  This is not problematic at all for me--or for Peirce, since he
affirmed "the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone
as primordial," because "matter is effete mind"; i.e., there can be mind
without matter, but not matter without mind (CP 6.24-25).  I addressed this
in the past thread about "Peirce's Objective Idealism."

ET:  My reading of this - a pure disembodied mind - is that it is Platonic
- and this contradicts Peirce's basic Aristotelianism which does not allow
for Mind separated from Matter.


Although Peirce self-identified more with Aristotle, there are still
Platonic aspects of his thought, some of them quite explicit.  For example,
with respect to cosmology, we have already brought up the last Cambridge
Conferences lecture, "The Logic of Continuity," in this thread.

CSP:   From this point of view we must suppose that the existing universe,
with all its arbitrary secondness, is an offshoot from, or an arbitrary
determination of, a world of ideas, a Platonic world; not that our superior
logic has enabled us to reach up to a world of forms to which the real
universe, with its feebler logic, was inadequate ...  The evolutionary
process is, therefore, not a mere evolution of the existing universe, but
rather a process by which the very Platonic forms themselves have become or
are becoming developed ...   In short, if we are going to regard the
universe as a result of evolution at all, we must think that not merely the
existing universe, that locus in the cosmos to which our reactions are
limited, but the whole Platonic world, which in itself is equally real, is
evolutionary in its origin, too ... At the same time all this, be it
remembered, is not of the order of the existing universe, but is merely a
Platonic world, of which we are, therefore, to conceive that there are
many, both coordinated and subordinated to one another; until finally out
of one of these Platonic worlds is differentiated the particular actual
universe of existence in which we happen to be. (CP 6.192, 194, 200, 208;
1898)


Peirce clearly stated here--several times, in multiple ways--that "a world
of ideas, a Platonic world" (i.e., mind) precedes "the existing universe,
with all its arbitrary secondness" (i.e., matter).  Just because something
is "Platonic" does not entail that Peirce rejected it.

ET:   I think you and even Peirce are, indeed, using the arguments for the
'existence of God' from Anselm, the classical ontological argument, that If
one can think of a perfect Being, then, this perfect being is
realand..if such a belief is common, then, this is 'evidentiary' proof
that such a being exists.


This is definitely *not *the argument that I am using, nor the one that
Peirce used.  What we are discussing is more akin to the so-called
"cosmological" and "transcendental" arguments, since it is grounded
primarily in the reality of order and intelligibility in the existing
universe.  It has nothing to do with what "one can think" or "a perfect
Being."

ET:   I consider that this analysis is insufficient as proof ...


Who said anything about "proof"?  We have different hypotheses, for which
we have marshaled our supporting evidence; and as previously agreed, "many
others have to read Peirce - and - your and my comments - and make up their
minds as to how 'accurately' we interpret him."

ET:  I cannot explain these two, to my reading, very different descriptions
of the emergence and evolution of the universe of mind and matter - and
simply have to leave it as that: I cannot explain it.


You really should not give up so easily.  As I am sure you are aware,
Peirce would not countenance throwing up our hands and deeming *anything* to
be inexplicable; it is one of the "solutions" that he identified as
blocking the way of inquiry.  Besides, I already offered you an alternative
explanation--maybe he just changed his mind between 1887-1888 and 1908.  Of
course, another is that at least one of your readings is incorrect.

Regards,

Jon

On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 4:47 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list - I'm going to continue to disagree with your interpretation. I
> consider that the two descriptions of the emergence of the universe are not
> compatible. But - as to why Peirce wrote the two - of 

[PEIRCE-L] Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

I finally had a chance to take a look at the two letters in EP 2 that you
mentioned.  Here are each of the three Universes as defined in the one to
Lady Welby, followed by the corresponding text in "A Neglected Argument."

CSP:  One of these Universes embraces whatever has its Being in itself
alone, except that whatever is in this Universe must be present to one
consciousness, or be capable of being so present in its entire Being.  It
follows that a member of this universe need not be subject to any law, not
even to the principle of contradiction.  I denominate the objects of this
Universe *Ideas*, or *Possibles*, although the latter designation does not
imply capability of actualization. On the contrary as a general rule, if
not a universal one, an Idea is incapable of perfect actualization on
account of its essential vagueness if for no other reason.  For that which
is not subject to the principle of contradiction is essentially vague. (EP
2.478-479)


CSP:  Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, the first
comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the mind of poet,
pure mathematician, or another might give local habitation and a name
within that mind. Their very airy-nothingness, the fact that their Being
consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually
thinking them, saves their Reality. (CP 1.455)


These are basically consistent, although the letter to Welby clarifies that
"capability of getting thought"--what Peirce's definition of "Idea" in CP
1.452 called "capacity for getting fully represented"--"does not imply
capability of actualization."  This is thus the universe of pure
possibility, rather than potentiality.  Whatever belongs to this universe
"is not subject to the principle of contradiction" because it "is
essentially vague."

CSP:  Another Universe is that of, first, Objects whose Being consists in
their Brute reactions, and of, second, the facts (reactions, events,
qualities, etc.) concerning those Objects, all of which facts, in the last
analysis, consist in their reactions. I call the Objects, Things, or more
unambiguously, *Existents*, and the facts about them I call *Facts*.  Every
member of this Universe is either a Single Object subject, alike to the
Principles of Contradiction and to that of Excluded Middle, or it is
expressible by a proposition having such a singular subject. (EP 2.479)


CSP:  The second Universe is that of the Brute Actuality of things and
facts.  I am confident that their Being consists in reactions against Brute
forces, notwithstanding objections redoubtable until they are closely and
fairly examined. (CP 6.455)


These are also basically consistent, and the letter to Welby confirms that
whatever belongs to this universe is "subject, alike to the Principles of
Contradiction and to that of Excluded Middle."

CSP:  The third Universe consists of the co-being of whatever is in its
Nature *necessitant*, that is, is a Habit, a law, or something expressible
in a universal proposition.  Especially, *continua *are of this nature.  I
call objects of this universe *Necessitants*.  It includes whatever we can
know by logically valid reasoning. (EP 2.479)


CSP:  The third Universe comprises everything whose being consists in
active power to establish connections between different objects, especially
between objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is
essentially a Sign--not the mere body of the Sign, which is not essentially
such, but, so to speak, the Sign's Soul, which has its Being in its power
of serving as intermediary between its Object and a Mind.  Such, too, is a
living consciousness, and such the life, the power of growth, of a plant.
Such is a living constitution--a daily newspaper, a great fortune, a social
"movement." (CP 6.455)


These seem to have some important differences.  In particular, the letter
to Welby describes the scope of this universe in terms of habits, laws, and
(especially) continua, rather than Signs.  It then goes on (EP 2.480) to
discuss how a Sign, rather than always belonging to the third universe, can
be a Possible (Tone or Mark), an Existent (Token), or a Necessitant
(Type).  The letter to James confirm that "A *Sign *is anything of either
of the three Universes ..." (EP 2.497)

Here we see the association of the modality of Signs with the three
categories, as Edwina has been advocating--and therefore the three
universes, if my hypothesis is right that the latter correspond to (and
perhaps even replace) the former.  It thus leaves me wondering how to
interpret CP 1.480, where Peirce stated that "a triad if genuine cannot be
in the world of quality nor in that of fact" and "a *thoroughly *genuine
triad is separated entirely from those worlds and exists in the universe of
*representations*."  One plausible explanation is that Peirce simply
changed his mind about this between c.1896 and 1908; another is that what
he meant by "world" or "universe" in 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon, list - I'm going to continue to disagree with your interpretation. I 
consider that the two descriptions of the emergence of the universe are not 
compatible. But - as to why Peirce wrote the two - of course, that is beyond 
me. 

The 1.412 description is specific in  'the original chaos, therefore, where 
there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere indeterminacy, in which 
nothing existed or really happened 1.411.  And his outline of the emergence of 
both matter and mind seem to me, [I've provided the quotes before] a clear 
outline of the self-organization and evolution of both.
There is, in this outline,  no a priori Mind - pure or otherwise.

Then, in 6.490, Peirce talks about the 'disembodied spirit or pure mind, has 
its being out of time' - This is clear - that we have here an a priori agency 
which "is destined to think all that is is capable of thinking".THought 
separate from matter This means, also, that this Pure Mind is NOT a 'state 
of utter nothingness'.

 My reading of this - a pure disembodied mind - is that it is Platonic - and 
this contradicts Peirce's basic Aristotelianism which does not allow for Mind 
separated from Matter. 

That is, throughout Peirce's many discussions of Mind and Matter and his 
discussion of the three categories - we do not read [as far as i can recollect] 
any hint of their  separation, any suggestion that Mind is 'disembodied' and 
'full-of-its truths'. Indeed, Thirdness is, as embedded within 
Secondness/Firstness - always able to change and evolve its habits, something a 
pure Mind would not do.

So- my reading of these two sections is that they are two completely different 
outlines, and are incompatible with each other. I think you and even Peirce 
are, indeed, using the arguments for the 'existence of God' from Anselm, the 
classical ontological argument, that If one can think of a perfect Being, then, 
this perfect being is realand..if such a belief is common, then, this is 
'evidentiary' proof that such a being exists.  I consider that this analysis is 
insufficient as proof - and that the very notion of a 'pure mind' contradicts 
the outline of a  self-organized mind-matter universe that Peirce provided in 
'A guess at the riddle'. 

I cannot explain these two, to my reading, very different descriptions of the 
emergence and evolution of the universe of mind and matter - and simply have to 
leave it as that: I cannot explain it. As an atheist and someone who accepts 
the power of self-organization and evolution, I admit to being drawn to the 
1.412 Guess at the Riddle [and other outlines of agapasm and evolution] rather 
than the agential power-of-god outline. But that doesn't mean anything 
conclusive - other than an awareness of my own predeliction for the one outline 
versus the other! But - I do think they are incompatible.

Edwina




  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Saturday, October 15, 2016 5:05 PM
  Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology


  Edwina, List:


ET:  I think you will have to admit that neither you nor I know for sure 
which of the two arguments for the emergence of the universe are 'really held' 
by Peirce.


  On the contrary--I think that we do know for sure, or at least have to 
assume, that Peirce "really held" what he said in "A Guess at the Riddle" in 
1887-1888, and "really held" what he said in "A Neglected Argument" in 1908.  
This is why I always try to include the date with any quotation from him--it is 
important to recognize its timing within the overall development of his 
thought, which was far from static.


  The question, then, is simply whether the 1908 statements that I have cited 
represent a significant change in his views over two decades, or if they are 
compatible with the 1887-1888 paragraph that you quoted below.  Again, I think 
that CP 6.490--which also dates to 1908, and in fact was intended precisely to 
serve as a supplement to "A Neglected Argument"--strongly suggests the latter 
conclusion.  My apologies in advance for the lengthy excerpts this time.


A full exposition of the pragmaticistic definition of Ens necessarium would 
require many pages; but some hints toward it may be given. A disembodied 
spirit, or pure mind, has its being out of time, since all that it is destined 
to think is fully in its being at any and every previous time. But in endless 
time it is destined to think all that it is capable of thinking. Order is 
simply thought embodied in arrangement; and thought embodied in any other way 
appears objectively as a character that is a generalization of order, and that, 
in the lack of any word for it, we may call for the nonce, "Super-order." It is 
something like uniformity. The idea may be caught if it is described as that of 
which order and uniformity are particular varieties.   Pure mind, as creative 
of thought, must, so far as it is manifested in time, appear as 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Maxims (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list:



Wonderful!  Thank you for stating your position clearly.



So now, all we need decide is whether CP 5.189 is or is not a pragmatic
maxim.

But before that, we need to decide whether it is or is not a maxim.

For a pragmatic maxim belongs to the set of maxims.



Here are some standards for “maxim”:



‘*Every man who has seen the world knows that nothing is so useless as a
general maxim’*, wrote Lord Macaulay in 1827.



In Macaulay’s view, outlined here, maxims are essentially for the purpose
of regulating conduct by preventing foolish action, but do not often work.



General maxims’ are for the improvement and education of the masses and
might occasionally prevent folly..



But in pre-theoretical thought, maxims are a way of preserving truth, a way
of ‘thinking memorable thoughts’, the very stuff of knowledge, replete with
communal values.



They are used by, and of, the socially-elevated as much as the common
people; by and of women; in a casual, ordinary ‘*ofost is selost’* (haste
is best) way, as well as for narrative, rhetorical and emphatic purpose. “

*~* Paul Cavill, Maxims in Old English Poetry





“A *form*, consisting in universality; and in this view the formula of the
moral imperative is expressed thus, that the

maxims must be so chosen as if they were to serve as universal laws of
nature.”

~Kant



As to reasons for why pragmatic maxim, I would refer to Jon and John’s
arguments.



But what I would also like to point out are their reasons for why CP 5.189
is *NOT* a maxim, much less a pragmatic one, for there must also be reasons
to suspect A is *not* true.



I would challenge you to defend that position.

That is, the *reasons* for why CP 5.189 as a pragmatic maxim is surprising
and/or suspicious to you.



Thank you for the conversation.



Best,

Jerry Rhee

On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 1:43 PM, John Collier  wrote:

> I agree with Jon, of course. He is right about the confusion, and the
> issue I tried to address in my previous post was to find some common
> unifying factor, not necessarily the best statement of the pragmatic maxim.
> Nonetheless, I believe there are better and worse versions, and that these
> are far outweighed by partial versions (not to mention outright
> misunderstandings).
>
>
>
> The non-existence of a single or best pragmatic maxim in Peirce makes
> Jerry’s request of me impossible to satisfy., as I tried in a rather around
> about way to explain.
>
>
>
> John Collier
>
> Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
>
> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* Saturday, 15 October 2016 8:24 PM
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Maxims (was Peirce's Cosmology)
>
>
>
> List:
>
>
>
> Per Gary R.'s request, I am shifting this discussion to a new thread
> topic.  I would appreciate it if others would do likewise when extending
> any of the other ongoing conversations about pragmatic maxims or other
> subjects besides Peirce's cosmology.
>
>
>
> There seems to be a confusion here between "*the *pragmatic maxim," which
> is a very specific principle of *methodeutic *with multiple formulations
> in Peirce's writings, and "*the best* pragmatic maxim," which is not
> something that Peirce ever discussed as far as I can tell.  In particular,
> CP 5.189 is not *the *pragmatic maxim, nor even *a* pragmatic maxim in
> the same sense, so it is certainly not *the best* pragmatic maxim.  For
> one thing, as we established recently in another thread, it is the form of
> inference for abduction *only*, and thus falls under logical *critic*.
> *The* pragmatic maxim subsequently serves as a tool for admitting
> hypotheses that are amenable to deductive explication and inductive
> evaluation, and rejecting those that are not.
>
>
>
> In any case, there is no need to guess or speculate *which *pragmatic
> maxim Peirce had in mind when he wrote the following ...
>
>
>
> That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render
> needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as
> hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful
> suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all *that the maxim of pragmatism
> really pretends to do, at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is
> not understood as a proposition in psychology. (CP 5.196; 1903)
>
>
>
> ... because he told us *in the very next sentence*.
>
>
>
> For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have no logical
> effect or import differing from that of a second conception except so far
> as, taken in connection with other conceptions and intentions, it might
> conceivably modify our practical conduct differently from that second
> conception.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>
> 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  I think you will have to admit that neither you nor I know for sure
which of the two arguments for the emergence of the universe are 'really
held' by Peirce.


On the contrary--I think that we do know for sure, or at least have to
assume, that Peirce "really held" what he said in "A Guess at the Riddle"
in 1887-1888, and "really held" what he said in "A Neglected Argument" in
1908.  This is why I always try to include the date with any quotation from
him--it is important to recognize its timing within the overall development
of his thought, which was far from static.

The question, then, is simply whether the 1908 statements that I have cited
represent a significant *change *in his views over two decades, or if they
are *compatible *with the 1887-1888 paragraph that you quoted below.
Again, I think that CP 6.490--which also dates to 1908, and in fact was
intended precisely to serve as a supplement to "A Neglected
Argument"--strongly suggests the latter conclusion.  My apologies in
advance for the lengthy excerpts this time.

A full exposition of the pragmaticistic definition of *Ens necessarium*
would require many pages; but some hints toward it may be given. A
disembodied spirit, or pure mind, has its being out of time, since all that
it is destined to think is fully in its being at any and every previous
time. But in endless time it is destined to think all that it is capable of
thinking. Order is simply thought embodied in arrangement; and thought
embodied in any other way appears objectively as a character that is a
generalization of order, and that, in the lack of any word for it, we may
call for the nonce, "Super-order." It is something like uniformity. The
idea may be caught if it is described as that of which order and uniformity
are particular varieties.   Pure mind, as creative of thought, must, so far
as it is manifested in time, appear as having a character related to the
habit-taking capacity, just as super-order is related to uniformity.


I have already discussed the hint that *Ens necessarium* is "pure mind."
 The rest of this passage implies that thought is always "embodied" in some
kind of "super-order," of which order and uniformity are two examples.
Peirce then draws an analogy--the thought-creating character of pure mind
is to the habit-taking capacity as super-order is to uniformity.  Since he
just said that uniformity is a particular variety of super-order, the
habit-taking capacity must be a particular variety of the thought-creating
character of pure mind.  Recall that the "second flash" of CP 1.412 came
about "by the principle of habit"; so evidently it was a manifestation of
pure mind, as creative of thought.  Likewise for the "other successions
ever more and more closely connected, the habits and the tendency to take
them ever strengthening themselves."  While CP 1.412 might plausibly be
interpreted in isolation as describing "the self-organized emergence of the
Universe" with "no metaphysical Agent" involved, CP 6.490 indicates that
the habit-taking capacity depends on there being such an Agent.

Now imagine, in such vague way as such a thing can be imagined, a perfect
cosmology of the three universes. It would prove all in relation to that
subject that reason could desiderate; and of course all that it would prove
must, in actual fact, now be true. But reason would desiderate that that
should be proved from which would follow all that is in fact true of the
three universes; and the postulate from which all this would follow must
not state any matter of fact, since such fact would thereby be left
unexplained. That perfect cosmology must therefore show that the whole
history of the three universes, as it has been and is to be, would follow
from a premiss which would not suppose them to exist at all. Moreover, such
premiss must in actual fact be true. But that premiss must represent a
state of things in which the three universes were completely nil.
Consequently, whether in time or not, the three universes must actually be
absolutely necessary results of a state of utter nothingness. We cannot
ourselves conceive of such a state of nility; but we can easily conceive
that there should be a mind that could conceive it, since, after all, no
contradiction can be involved in mere non-existence. A state in which there
should be absolutely no super-order whatsoever would be such a state of
nility. For all Being involves some kind of super-order.


This is a difficult passage, but it s me to strikes me as a kind of *reductio
ad absurdum *for any claim that the universe came about *without *the
Reality of God.  A "perfect cosmology" conforming to such a claim "must not
state any matter of fact," but must instead "follow from a premiss which
would not suppose [the three universes] to exist at all."  As a result,
"the three universes must actually be absolutely necessary results of a
state of utter nothingness"; that is, "A state in which there should be
absolutely no 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

[Edwina Taborsky]

Jon, list:

I think you will have to admit that neither you nor I know for sure which of 
the two arguments for the emergence of the universe are 'really held' by 
Peirce.  There is, A,  the self-organized emergence and evolution of Mind and 
Matter within the axioms of the three categories - and this reference to the 
embodiment and evolution of Mind with Matter is found all through Peirce's 
writings. And, there is, B, the introduction of an a priori agency,  God, in a 
later text- without any real examination of the relation of Mind and Matter in 
this god-created universe.

Your reliance on "IF it's written at a later date, THEN, this means Peirce 
believed in its axioms even more' - is merely your view of linear writing. 
Then, there is your own open declaration of theism - and my equally open 
declaration of atheism. These have to affect each of us.

This leads me to conclude that - as I said, neither you nor I know which of the 
two arguments is 'really held' by Peirce. I think we'll have to leave it at 
that.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: tabor...@primus.ca ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Saturday, October 15, 2016 2:42 PM
  Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology


  Edwina, List:


ET:  What i read from the above is the self-organized emergence of the 
Universe.


  Peirce wrote "A Guess at the Riddle" in 1887-1888 and "A Neglected Argument" 
in 1908.  The latter, including its various drafts, states explicitly that in 
Peirce's belief, God is Really creator of all three Universes of Experience and 
everything in them, without exception.  This means that either (a) he changed 
his mind at some point during the intervening twenty years, or (b) he saw no 
incompatibility between the two positions.  His cosmological remarks in CP 
6.490, written only a little later in 1908 than the article itself, suggest 
strongly that (b) is the case.


  Regards,


  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
  www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


  On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 8:26 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

Gary R - you wrote:

"I am not an atheist because, for one thing, I refuse to 'reduce' the 
origins of this cosmos to an improbably singularity (a Big Bang--and, as you 
probably know, there is not one version of this theory, but several, and 
competing theories as well, although the current scientific dogma won't allow 
for that). 


Nor do I see self-organization (a sound enough principle) and self-creation 
(whatever that may mean) as the only principles of semiosis, life and 
evolution."

I certainly won't critique or comment on your rejection of atheism as 
that's hardly my right, but I'd like to comment on the 'singularity of origin 
of our universe' [Big Bang] and self-organization.

With regard to the singular explosive origin, there certainly are numerous 
theories, including for or against the Big Bang. Since I am rejecting a 
metaphysical origin [God] as the origin of the universe, I stick with the Big 
Bang for now. I refer to Peirce's 'A Guess at the Riddle'...

"The original chaos, therefore, where there was no regularity, was in 
effect a state of mere indeterminacy in which nothing existed or really 
happened. 
Our conceptions of the first stages of development, before time yet 
existed, must be as vague and figurative as the expressions of the first 
chapter of Genesis. Out of the womb of indeterminacy we must say that there 
would have come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a 
flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash. 
Though time would not yet have been, this second flash  was in some sense after 
the first, because resulting from it. Then there would have come other 
successions ever more and more closely connected, the habits and the tendency 
to take them ever strengthening themselves, until the events would have been 
bound together into something like a continuous flow.' 1.412

What i read from the above is the self-organized emergence of the Universe. 
There is no metaphysical Agent [God- which requires an a priori agency, 
something which the Scholastics dealt with by not dealing with it except within 
belief] - but - the basic principles of organization of the three categories 
ARE there. And that's all three - pure spontaneity, discrete instantiations, 
and regularity or habit-taking. These are all aspects of Mind - and matter, as 
Peirce constantly wrote, is 'effete Mind'. So, Mind seems to be primal...and 
even, self-organized.

As Peirce outlined in his examples of crystals as instantiations of Mind, 
or the decapitated frog which, lacking a brain, 'almost reasons. The habit that 
is in his cerebellum serves as a major premiss. The excitation of a drop of 
acid is his minor premiss. And his conclusion is the act of wiping it away. All 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Maxims (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[John Collier]

I agree with Jon, of course. He is right about the confusion, and the issue I 
tried to address in my previous post was to find some common unifying factor, 
not necessarily the best statement of the pragmatic maxim. Nonetheless, I 
believe there are better and worse versions, and that these are far outweighed 
by partial versions (not to mention outright misunderstandings).

The non-existence of a single or best pragmatic maxim in Peirce makes Jerry’s 
request of me impossible to satisfy., as I tried in a rather around about way 
to explain.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, 15 October 2016 8:24 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Maxims (was Peirce's Cosmology)

List:

Per Gary R.'s request, I am shifting this discussion to a new thread topic.  I 
would appreciate it if others would do likewise when extending any of the other 
ongoing conversations about pragmatic maxims or other subjects besides Peirce's 
cosmology.

There seems to be a confusion here between "the pragmatic maxim," which is a 
very specific principle of methodeutic with multiple formulations in Peirce's 
writings, and "the best pragmatic maxim," which is not something that Peirce 
ever discussed as far as I can tell.  In particular, CP 5.189 is not the 
pragmatic maxim, nor even a pragmatic maxim in the same sense, so it is 
certainly not the best pragmatic maxim.  For one thing, as we established 
recently in another thread, it is the form of inference for abduction only, and 
thus falls under logical critic.  The pragmatic maxim subsequently serves as a 
tool for admitting hypotheses that are amenable to deductive explication and 
inductive evaluation, and rejecting those that are not.

In any case, there is no need to guess or speculate which pragmatic maxim 
Peirce had in mind when he wrote the following ...

That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render 
needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as 
hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful 
suggestions; and, furthermore, this is all that the maxim of pragmatism really 
pretends to do, at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is not 
understood as a proposition in psychology. (CP 5.196; 1903)

... because he told us in the very next sentence.

For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have no logical effect or 
import differing from that of a second conception except so far as, taken in 
connection with other conceptions and intentions, it might conceivably modify 
our practical conduct differently from that second conception.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 12:14 PM, Jerry Rhee 
> wrote:
John Collier, John Sowa, Kirsti Maatanen, Edwina Taborsky, list:

John Collier:
But that is my point.  Isn't a pragmatic maxim to be taken strictly since it is 
carefully crafted, with logographic necessity, then it shouldn't be handled 
loosely.  To say that such things are in the pragmatic maxim (the pragmatic 
maxim and not a pragmatic maxim) also implies that it is in ONE pragmatic 
maxim, the best one.  So, which one?  I think this is the matter that does not 
get criticized enough.
__

John Sowa, Edwina:

"logos means something rather like calculation than religion..." ~Strauss

“The little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three --in a word, number 
and calculation: --do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of them?

Sophist, statesman, philosopher! O my dear Theodorus, do my ears truly witness 
that this is the estimate formed of them by the great calculator and 
geometrician?”
~Plato

“By understanding both sophistry (in its highest as well as in its lower 
meanings) and statesmanship, one will understand what philosophy is.”~Strauss

“When a reputable witness makes, or witnesses make, an assertion which 
experience renders highly improbable, or when there are other independent 
arguments in its favor, each independent argument pro or con produces a certain 
impression upon the mind of the wise man, dependent for its quantity upon the 
frequency with which arguments of those kinds lead to the truth, and the 
algebraical sum of these impressions is the resultant impression that measures 
the wise man’s state of opinion on the whole.” ~Peirce

The way begets one;
One begets two;
Two begets three;
Three begets the myriad creatures.
~Lau 42


Kirsti,

You said:
I just wished to point out that it indeed is very important to study in detail 
the exact wording CSP worked 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  What i read from the above is the self-organized emergence of the
Universe.


Peirce wrote "A Guess at the Riddle" in 1887-1888 and "A Neglected
Argument" in 1908.  The latter, including its various drafts, states
explicitly that in Peirce's belief, God is Really creator of all three
Universes of Experience and everything in them, without exception.  This
means that either (a) he changed his mind at some point during the
intervening twenty years, or (b) he saw no incompatibility between the two
positions.  His cosmological remarks in CP 6.490, written only a little
later in 1908 than the article itself, suggest strongly that (b) is the
case.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 8:26 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R - you wrote:
>
> "I am not an atheist because, for one thing, I refuse to 'reduce' the
> origins of this cosmos to an improbably singularity (a Big Bang--and, as
> you probably know, there is not one version of this theory, but several,
> and competing theories as well, although the current scientific dogma won't
> allow for that).
>
> Nor do I see self-organization (a sound enough principle) and
> self-creation (whatever that may mean) as the only principles of semiosis,
> life and evolution."
>
> I certainly won't critique or comment on your rejection of atheism as
> that's hardly my right, but I'd like to comment on the 'singularity of
> origin of our universe' [Big Bang] and self-organization.
>
> With regard to the singular explosive origin, there certainly are numerous
> theories, including for or against the Big Bang. Since I am rejecting a
> metaphysical origin [God] as the origin of the universe, I stick with the
> Big Bang for now. I refer to Peirce's 'A Guess at the Riddle'...
>
> "The original chaos, therefore, where there was no regularity, was in
> effect a state of mere indeterminacy in which nothing existed or really
> happened.
> Our conceptions of the first stages of development, before time yet
> existed, must be as vague and figurative as the expressions of the first
> chapter of Genesis. Out of the womb of indeterminacy we must say that there
> would have come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call
> a flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second
> flash. Though time would not yet have been, this second flash  was in some
> sense after the first, because resulting from it. Then there would have
> come other successions ever more and more closely connected, the habits and
> the tendency to take them ever strengthening themselves, until the events
> would have been bound together into something like a continuous flow.'
> 1.412
>
> What i read from the above is the self-organized emergence of the
> Universe. There is no metaphysical Agent [God- which requires an a priori
> agency, something which the Scholastics dealt with by not dealing with it
> except within belief] - but - the basic principles of organization of the
> three categories ARE there. And that's all three - pure spontaneity,
> discrete instantiations, and regularity or habit-taking. These are all
> aspects of Mind - and matter, as Peirce constantly wrote, is 'effete Mind'.
> So, Mind seems to be primal...and even, self-organized.
>
> As Peirce outlined in his examples of crystals as instantiations of Mind,
> or the decapitated frog which, lacking a brain, 'almost reasons. The habit
> that is in his cerebellum serves as a major premiss. The excitation of a
> drop of acid is his minor premiss. And his conclusion is the act of wiping
> it away. All that is of any value in the operation of ratiocination is
> there, except only one thing. What he lacks is the power of prepatory
> meditation" 6.286.
>
> Just so- the above triad is a semiosic action - and equally applicable to
> a crystal, which also lacks the power of prepatory meditation but does have
> the entire semiosic act/syllogism within it.
>
> Edwina
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

[PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Maxims (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

Per Gary R.'s request, I am shifting this discussion to a new thread
topic.  I would appreciate it if others would do likewise when extending
any of the other ongoing conversations about pragmatic maxims or other
subjects besides Peirce's cosmology.

There seems to be a confusion here between "*the *pragmatic maxim," which
is a very specific principle of *methodeutic *with multiple formulations in
Peirce's writings, and "*the best* pragmatic maxim," which is not something
that Peirce ever discussed as far as I can tell.  In particular, CP 5.189
is not *the *pragmatic maxim, nor even *a* pragmatic maxim in the same
sense, so it is certainly not *the best* pragmatic maxim.  For one thing,
as we established recently in another thread, it is the form of inference
for abduction *only*, and thus falls under logical *critic*.  *The* pragmatic
maxim subsequently serves as a tool for admitting hypotheses that are
amenable to deductive explication and inductive evaluation, and rejecting
those that are not.

In any case, there is no need to guess or speculate *which *pragmatic maxim
Peirce had in mind when he wrote the following ...

That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render
needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as
hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful
suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all *that the maxim of pragmatism
really pretends to do, at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is
not understood as a proposition in psychology. (CP 5.196; 1903)


... because he told us *in the very next sentence*.

For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have no logical effect
or import differing from that of a second conception except so far as,
taken in connection with other conceptions and intentions, it might
conceivably modify our practical conduct differently from that second
conception.


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 12:14 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> John Collier, John Sowa, Kirsti Maatanen, Edwina Taborsky, list:
>
> John Collier:
> But that is my point.  Isn't a pragmatic maxim to be taken strictly since
> it is carefully crafted, with logographic necessity, then it shouldn't be
> handled loosely.  To say that such things are in the pragmatic maxim (the
> pragmatic maxim and not a pragmatic maxim) also implies that it is in ONE
> pragmatic maxim, the best one.  So, which one?  I think this is the matter
> that does not get criticized enough.
> __
>
> John Sowa, Edwina:
>
>
>
> "*logos* means something rather like calculation than religion..."
> ~Strauss
>
>
>
> “The little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three --in a word, number
> and calculation: --do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of
> them?
>
>
>
> Sophist, statesman, philosopher! O my dear Theodorus, do my ears truly
> witness that this is the estimate formed of them by the great calculator
> and geometrician?”
> ~Plato
>
>
>
> “By understanding both sophistry (in its highest as well as in its lower
> meanings) and statesmanship, one will understand what philosophy
> is.”~Strauss
>
>
>
> “When a reputable witness makes, or witnesses make, an assertion which
> experience renders highly improbable, or when there are other independent
> arguments in its favor, each independent argument *pro* or *con* produces
> a certain impression upon the mind of the wise man, dependent for its
> quantity upon the frequency with which arguments of those kinds lead to the
> truth, and the algebraical sum of these impressions is the resultant
> impression that measures the wise man’s state of opinion on the whole.”
> ~Peirce
>
>
>
> The way begets one;
> One begets two;
> Two begets three;
> Three begets the myriad creatures.
>
> ~Lau 42
>
> 
>
>
>
> Kirsti,
>
>
>
> You said:
>
> I just wished to point out that it indeed is very important to study in
> detail the exact wording CSP worked with for decades. Especially those
> wordings he stick up with in his latest years.
>
>
>
> Peirce is greatly enhanced through a direct examination of nature.
>
> “That is why I prefer the study of nature,” said Goethe, “which does not
> allow such sickness to arise. For there we have to do with infinite and
> eternal truth that immediately rejects anyone who does not proceed neatly
> and honestly in observing and handling his subject. I am also certain that
> many a person who is dialectically sick could find a beneficial cure in the
> study of nature."
>
> And Plato because “It (pragmaticism) appears to have been virtually the
> philosophy of Socrates.”
>
>
>
> And Aristotle because, “The principles therefore are, in a way, not more
> in number than the contraries, but as it were two, nor yet precisely two,
> since there is a difference of 

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

[Helmut Raulien]

 

Gary, list,

well, "everything in general and nothing in particular" does make some sense to me, I admit. With "patronizing" I did not mean anything you or anybody else on this list have written, but the rhetorical move of some esoterians, to say you have to follow their way of thinking (or not thinking) and their gurus, and some time later you will understand. Like humble obeying as a path to wisdom, like a haiku, a paradoxon or an antinomy you must accept instead of solve it, something like that. There is a story of a Zen-master who hits his pupil with a cane towards enlightement, in the Baghavad-Gita there is a war with many casualities in the duty of enlightement, Fakirs sit on nails for it, or cease to eat, and in the Bible there is the story about Hiob. It has nothing to do with you or Peirce or this list. I also did not mean to pin you on something you merely have mentioned (the Egyptian myth of Atum). Indeed by explaining the combination of all and nothing with everything in general and nothing in particular has showed me, that it is not a total antinomy as I had thought. But "in general" and "in particular" are both relativations of the concepts "all" and "nothing". A nothing with possibilities is not an absolute nothing, and an "everything in general" is not a complete everything, it lacks the concretenesses a real everything should contain too.

Best,

Helmut


15. Oktober 2016 um 01:21 Uhr
 "Gary Richmond" 
 



Helmut, List,

 

Helmut wrote: ""Atum", the ancient Egyptian myth, as you wrote, is the state of the beginning, and it is nothing and everything at the same time."

 

I do not  subscribe to and am certainly not proselytizing the Kemetic myth, just offering it as a possible source (along with Tohu Bohu, and the other deep and/or dark and/or vague and/or oceanic-watery creation myths), a mere possible source for Peirce's more scientific musings (or, as he wrote, pre-scientific) musings on early cosmology. Or, perhaps it's just a suggestive parallel. You wrote:

 


So the Egyptians concluded that at the beginning there should have been a situation which is both, "all" and "nothing" at the same time. But all is the opposite of nothing, isnt it.


 

and then go on to suggest that there is something "patronizing" in  suggesting that it may be possible to see "all" and "nothing"  "at the same time." Yet in Peirce's more scientific (or, perhaps, less mythological) view, in this early cosmological context this is exactly what he does in suggesting that here it is a matter of a kind of proto-state of "everything in general and nothing in particular." This has always made some sense to me, but if it doesn't to you, well, so be it. But there is absolutely nothing patronizing in it, that's for sure.

 

As for Time, that is ceratinly too vast a topic even in Peirce's thinking alone to attempt to summarize anything which might be of value here. But I will note that in the context of his early cosmological thinking he is at pains to say that even when it is necessary to write, say, "this then that," that strictly speaking, there was not yet TIme, so that "this then that" can only be a manner of speaking and can't be taken literally.

 

I am not an atheist but, as I believe Peirce was not, I am also not a doctrinaire or dogmatic theist. It is possible to be a religious person and still maintain a scientific attitude. In my opinion, Peirce is  one of the most extraordinarily developed examples of this kind of person.

 

I am not an atheist because, for one thing, I refuse to 'reduce' the origins of this cosmos to an improbably singularity (a Big Bang--and, as you probably know, there is not one version of this theory, but several, and competing theories as well, although the current scientific dogma won't allow for that). 

 

Nor do I see self-organization (a sound enough principle) and self-creation (whatever that may mean) as the only principles of semiosis, life and evolution.

 

Best,

 

Gary R


 







 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

C 745

718 482-5690





 

On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 5:56 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:




 

Dear list members,

I am afraid this is not very Peirce-related, but I want to say something about the creation concept, as I more and more am getting the opinion, that it is anthropocentric and misleading. "Atum", the ancient Egyptian myth, as you wrote, is the state of the beginning, and it is nothing and everything at the same time. I think this is impossible. Either there was nothing or everything. If there was nothing at the beginning, then evolution is based on creation. If there was everything, then it is based on limitation by habit-taking: Viable events and patterns are reinforced, nonviable ones are forgotten. Obviously there is both, creativity, and habit-taking. So the Egyptians concluded that at the beginning there 

[PEIRCE-L] was Peirce's Cosmology and Pragmatic Maxim

[Jerry Rhee]

John Collier, list:



You said:

…all three elements are involved in the pragmatic maxim.

…there are various differently stated versions of the pragmatic maxim, and
it is also implicit in other work by Peirce.



My question is, *the pragmatic maxim* is not the same as “other work by
Peirce” because maxims are carefully constructed, short expressions of
principles.  They have different functions than essays or books.  You can
put them in your pocket and keep them handy, share it with friends who
don’t know Peirce, etc…



It is true that there are several pragmatic maxims.

So, to which pragmatic maxim were you referring when you asserted that “all
three elements are involved in the pragmatic maxim”?



Thanks,
Jerry Rhee

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

[Jerry Rhee]

John Collier, John Sowa, Kirsti Maatanen, Edwina Taborsky, list:

John Collier:
But that is my point.  Isn't a pragmatic maxim to be taken strictly since
it is carefully crafted, with logographic necessity, then it shouldn't be
handled loosely.  To say that such things are in the pragmatic maxim (the
pragmatic maxim and not a pragmatic maxim) also implies that it is in ONE
pragmatic maxim, the best one.  So, which one?  I think this is the matter
that does not get criticized enough.

__

John Sowa, Edwina:



"*logos* means something rather like calculation than religion..." ~Strauss



“The little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three --in a word, number
and calculation: --do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of
them?



Sophist, statesman, philosopher! O my dear Theodorus, do my ears truly
witness that this is the estimate formed of them by the great calculator
and geometrician?”
~Plato



“By understanding both sophistry (in its highest as well as in its lower
meanings) and statesmanship, one will understand what philosophy
is.”~Strauss



“When a reputable witness makes, or witnesses make, an assertion which
experience renders highly improbable, or when there are other independent
arguments in its favor, each independent argument *pro* or *con* produces a
certain impression upon the mind of the wise man, dependent for its
quantity upon the frequency with which arguments of those kinds lead to the
truth, and the algebraical sum of these impressions is the resultant
impression that measures the wise man’s state of opinion on the whole.”
~Peirce



The way begets one;
One begets two;
Two begets three;
Three begets the myriad creatures.

~Lau 42





Kirsti,



You said:

I just wished to point out that it indeed is very important to study in
detail the exact wording CSP worked with for decades. Especially those
wordings he stick up with in his latest years.



Peirce is greatly enhanced through a direct examination of nature.

“That is why I prefer the study of nature,” said Goethe, “which does not
allow such sickness to arise. For there we have to do with infinite and
eternal truth that immediately rejects anyone who does not proceed neatly
and honestly in observing and handling his subject. I am also certain that
many a person who is dialectically sick could find a beneficial cure in the
study of nature."

And Plato because “It (pragmaticism) appears to have been virtually the
philosophy of Socrates.”



And Aristotle because, “The principles therefore are, in a way, not more in
number than the contraries, but as it were two, nor yet precisely two,
since there is a difference of essential nature, but three…”



So, if Aristotle, Plato and Nature to understand Peirce, then how many
years for each and how would you resolve any differences, should any
conflicts arise?  Which should take precedence?



I would recommend starting with Nature, then all three; more or less…

If true, then there should be no conflict and the problem would lie with
me.


"Now the partisan, when he is engaged in a dispute, cares nothing about the
rights of the question, but is anxious only to convince his hearers of his
own assertions. And the difference between him and me at the present moment
is merely this — that whereas he seeks to convince his hearers that what he
says is true, I am rather seeking to convince myself; to convince my
hearers is a secondary matter with me." ~Plato on the attitude in dialectic



Best,
Jerry Rhee









On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 12:01 PM, John Collier  wrote:

> Jerry, there are various differently stated versions of the pragmatic
> maxim, and it is also implicit in other work by Peirce.
>
>
>
> One way of putting the maxim is that any difference in meaning implies a
> difference in the possibilities of (external) experience on which they are
> grounded. You can experience this as a feeling (what might be true) as an
> inferred difference, or as an explanation of the difference. Of course,
> separating the three except in the abstract, is impossible. That is what I
> meant when I said I thought Edwina was right about inseperability. She may
> have meant more or less that I didn’t notice.
>
>
>
> This sort of thinking is found throughout Peirce’s writing. I don’t think
> there are any grounds for controversy about that. The interesting thing to
> me, in this case, is that it can be applied reflectively.
>
>
>
> John Collier
>
> Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
>
> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> *From:* Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* Saturday, 15 October 2016 6:31 PM
> *To:* John F Sowa 
> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
>
>
>
> John Collier, list:
>
>
>
> You said:  I agree with Edwina that all three elements are involved in
> the pragmatic maxim.
>
>
>
> Do you mind stating where, in 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

[John Collier]

Jerry, there are various differently stated versions of the pragmatic maxim, 
and it is also implicit in other work by Peirce.

One way of putting the maxim is that any difference in meaning implies a 
difference in the possibilities of (external) experience on which they are 
grounded. You can experience this as a feeling (what might be true) as an 
inferred difference, or as an explanation of the difference. Of course, 
separating the three except in the abstract, is impossible. That is what I 
meant when I said I thought Edwina was right about inseperability. She may have 
meant more or less that I didn’t notice.

This sort of thinking is found throughout Peirce’s writing. I don’t think there 
are any grounds for controversy about that. The interesting thing to me, in 
this case, is that it can be applied reflectively.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, 15 October 2016 6:31 PM
To: John F Sowa 
Cc: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

John Collier, list:

You said:  I agree with Edwina that all three elements are involved in the 
pragmatic maxim.

Do you mind stating where, in the pragmatic maxim, it says this?

I'm not questioning whether it is or not.  I'm just not sure to what you are 
referring.

Thank you,
Jerry R

On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 11:26 AM, John F Sowa 
> wrote:
On 10/15/2016 9:26 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Since I am rejecting a metaphysical origin [God] as the origin
of the universe, I stick with the Big Bang for now.

I agree with Heraclitus and my namesake, John the Evangelist:

Heraclitus wrote about the logos — translated variously as word,
speech, or reason: "all things (panta) come into being according to
this logos." The Greek concept of logos, which can also be translated
account, reckoning, or even computation is broad enough to encompass
all the abstractions of mathematics, metaphysics, and the sciences.

A few centuries after Heraclitus, John the Evangelist wrote "In the
beginning was the logos, and the logos was with God, and God was the
logos. It was in the beginning with God. All things (panta) came into
being through it, and without it nothing that has come to be came into
being" (1,1-3).  John and Heraclitus used the same words logos, panta,
and gignomai (come to be).  What they meant by those words, however,
has been a matter of debate for millennia.

As a realist, I believe that the logos exists.  To relate it to modern
science and to Peirce, I believe that the logos is the truth that is
the goal of unrestricted inquiry by unlimited generations of "scientific
intelligence" by which Peirce meant any intelligence that is capable of
learning from experience.

John


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to 
peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send 
a message not to PEIRCE-L but to 
l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe 
PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .






-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

[Edwina Taborsky]

Yes - this account of the 'logos' has long been with us, and is, as you say, 
extremely broad in meaning and thus, open to endless debate.


I, unfortunately [why, why did my father select such a name?] don't have a 
namesake and so can't rely on any connection with a past erudite mind...


I am equally a realist but I don't believe that the logos, understood in 
this sense, as an a priori Mind, 'exists' i.e.,  has any a priori nature. 
Instead, I consider that Mind and Matter emerged, in that 'flash', together 
and both effect and affect the other in a constantly evolving and 
increasingly complex manner.


Matter could not last beyond the immediacy of a second without the 
stabilizing habits of Mind. And Mind could not function except within the 
existentiality of Matter. [See 1.412 and elsewhere for the relation between 
Matter and Mind].


What's the point of both? I think it has something to do with energy. 
Energy would dissipate to its lowest level, i.e., to chaos, without its 
being 'trapped' within morphologies of existential particular Instances - 
i.e., as Signs. To become entrapped requires both 'being particular in a 
separate cell wall so to speak' [an act of Secondness] but also within the 
stabilizing continuity of habits [Thirdness] - and yet, able to adapt 
[Firstness]. So- the three categories are primal modes. And - the triad of 
organization [O-R-I] is equally primal for it enables these three categories 
to function and relate. And enables that particular instance, eg, an atom, 
to maintain continuity of TYPE [as a hydrogen atom] and yet interact with 
other atoms, eg, of another TYPE [oxygen] and so  form a more complex 
instantiation of water.


So, rather than 'the truth'..that is the goal of unrestricted inquiry - I 
see the agenda as merely the maintenance of energy, as Matter and Mind, 
within the universe. I'm afraid I don't see anything as noble, within the 
universe,  as an agenda of Truth. Rather - Truth is an agenda specific to 
cognitive beings, to our human species. Here it is indeed a noble 
endeavour - but we are unfortunately, by the addition of 'imagination', 
capable of both truth and complete and total self-delusion. And we have 
difficulty, often, of differentiating the two.


Edwina


- Original Message - 
From: "John F Sowa" 

To: 
Sent: Saturday, October 15, 2016 12:26 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology



On 10/15/2016 9:26 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Since I am rejecting a metaphysical origin [God] as the origin
of the universe, I stick with the Big Bang for now.


I agree with Heraclitus and my namesake, John the Evangelist:

Heraclitus wrote about the logos — translated variously as word,
speech, or reason: "all things (panta) come into being according to
this logos." The Greek concept of logos, which can also be translated
account, reckoning, or even computation is broad enough to encompass
all the abstractions of mathematics, metaphysics, and the sciences.

A few centuries after Heraclitus, John the Evangelist wrote "In the
beginning was the logos, and the logos was with God, and God was the
logos. It was in the beginning with God. All things (panta) came into
being through it, and without it nothing that has come to be came into
being" (1,1-3).  John and Heraclitus used the same words logos, panta,
and gignomai (come to be).  What they meant by those words, however,
has been a matter of debate for millennia.

As a realist, I believe that the logos exists.  To relate it to modern
science and to Peirce, I believe that the logos is the truth that is
the goal of unrestricted inquiry by unlimited generations of "scientific
intelligence" by which Peirce meant any intelligence that is capable of
learning from experience.

John









-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to 
peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L 
but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the 
BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm 
.










-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

[Gary Richmond]

Jerry, Edwina, John C,

It might be helpful to all, and also for the purpose of archiving, if one
of you would move this discussion to a differently named thread in your
next post as it seems not closely connected to the subject--Peirce's
cosmology--of this thread.

As I noted several weeks ago, the usual way this is done is to post with
the new Subject title, followed by, in this case, "was, Peirce's Cosmology."

Gary (writing as list moderator)


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 12:30 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> John Collier, list:
>
> You said:  I agree with Edwina that all three elements are involved in
> the pragmatic maxim.
>
> Do you mind stating where, in the pragmatic maxim, it says this?
>
> I'm not questioning whether it is or not.  I'm just not sure to what you
> are referring.
>
> Thank you,
> Jerry R
>
> On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 11:26 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>
>> On 10/15/2016 9:26 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>>
>>> Since I am rejecting a metaphysical origin [God] as the origin
>>> of the universe, I stick with the Big Bang for now.
>>>
>>
>> I agree with Heraclitus and my namesake, John the Evangelist:
>>
>> Heraclitus wrote about the logos — translated variously as word,
>> speech, or reason: "all things (panta) come into being according to
>> this logos." The Greek concept of logos, which can also be translated
>> account, reckoning, or even computation is broad enough to encompass
>> all the abstractions of mathematics, metaphysics, and the sciences.
>>
>> A few centuries after Heraclitus, John the Evangelist wrote "In the
>> beginning was the logos, and the logos was with God, and God was the
>> logos. It was in the beginning with God. All things (panta) came into
>> being through it, and without it nothing that has come to be came into
>> being" (1,1-3).  John and Heraclitus used the same words logos, panta,
>> and gignomai (come to be).  What they meant by those words, however,
>> has been a matter of debate for millennia.
>>
>> As a realist, I believe that the logos exists.  To relate it to modern
>> science and to Peirce, I believe that the logos is the truth that is
>> the goal of unrestricted inquiry by unlimited generations of "scientific
>> intelligence" by which Peirce meant any intelligence that is capable of
>> learning from experience.
>>
>> John
>>
>>
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
>> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
>> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce
>> -l/peirce-l.htm .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

[Jerry Rhee]

John Collier, list:

You said:  I agree with Edwina that all three elements are involved in the
pragmatic maxim.

Do you mind stating where, in the pragmatic maxim, it says this?

I'm not questioning whether it is or not.  I'm just not sure to what you
are referring.

Thank you,
Jerry R

On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 11:26 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 10/15/2016 9:26 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
>> Since I am rejecting a metaphysical origin [God] as the origin
>> of the universe, I stick with the Big Bang for now.
>>
>
> I agree with Heraclitus and my namesake, John the Evangelist:
>
> Heraclitus wrote about the logos — translated variously as word,
> speech, or reason: "all things (panta) come into being according to
> this logos." The Greek concept of logos, which can also be translated
> account, reckoning, or even computation is broad enough to encompass
> all the abstractions of mathematics, metaphysics, and the sciences.
>
> A few centuries after Heraclitus, John the Evangelist wrote "In the
> beginning was the logos, and the logos was with God, and God was the
> logos. It was in the beginning with God. All things (panta) came into
> being through it, and without it nothing that has come to be came into
> being" (1,1-3).  John and Heraclitus used the same words logos, panta,
> and gignomai (come to be).  What they meant by those words, however,
> has been a matter of debate for millennia.
>
> As a realist, I believe that the logos exists.  To relate it to modern
> science and to Peirce, I believe that the logos is the truth that is
> the goal of unrestricted inquiry by unlimited generations of "scientific
> intelligence" by which Peirce meant any intelligence that is capable of
> learning from experience.
>
> John
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

[John F Sowa]

On 10/15/2016 9:26 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Since I am rejecting a metaphysical origin [God] as the origin
of the universe, I stick with the Big Bang for now.


I agree with Heraclitus and my namesake, John the Evangelist:

Heraclitus wrote about the logos — translated variously as word,
speech, or reason: "all things (panta) come into being according to
this logos." The Greek concept of logos, which can also be translated
account, reckoning, or even computation is broad enough to encompass
all the abstractions of mathematics, metaphysics, and the sciences.

A few centuries after Heraclitus, John the Evangelist wrote "In the
beginning was the logos, and the logos was with God, and God was the
logos. It was in the beginning with God. All things (panta) came into
being through it, and without it nothing that has come to be came into
being" (1,1-3).  John and Heraclitus used the same words logos, panta,
and gignomai (come to be).  What they meant by those words, however,
has been a matter of debate for millennia.

As a realist, I believe that the logos exists.  To relate it to modern
science and to Peirce, I believe that the logos is the truth that is
the goal of unrestricted inquiry by unlimited generations of "scientific
intelligence" by which Peirce meant any intelligence that is capable of
learning from experience.

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary R - you wrote:

"I am not an atheist because, for one thing, I refuse to 'reduce' the origins 
of this cosmos to an improbably singularity (a Big Bang--and, as you probably 
know, there is not one version of this theory, but several, and competing 
theories as well, although the current scientific dogma won't allow for that). 


Nor do I see self-organization (a sound enough principle) and self-creation 
(whatever that may mean) as the only principles of semiosis, life and 
evolution."

I certainly won't critique or comment on your rejection of atheism as that's 
hardly my right, but I'd like to comment on the 'singularity of origin of our 
universe' [Big Bang] and self-organization.

With regard to the singular explosive origin, there certainly are numerous 
theories, including for or against the Big Bang. Since I am rejecting a 
metaphysical origin [God] as the origin of the universe, I stick with the Big 
Bang for now. I refer to Peirce's 'A Guess at the Riddle'...

"The original chaos, therefore, where there was no regularity, was in effect a 
state of mere indeterminacy in which nothing existed or really happened. 
Our conceptions of the first stages of development, before time yet existed, 
must be as vague and figurative as the expressions of the first chapter of 
Genesis. Out of the womb of indeterminacy we must say that there would have 
come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then 
by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash. Though time 
would not yet have been, this second flash  was in some sense after the first, 
because resulting from it. Then there would have come other successions ever 
more and more closely connected, the habits and the tendency to take them ever 
strengthening themselves, until the events would have been bound together into 
something like a continuous flow.' 1.412

What i read from the above is the self-organized emergence of the Universe. 
There is no metaphysical Agent [God- which requires an a priori agency, 
something which the Scholastics dealt with by not dealing with it except within 
belief] - but - the basic principles of organization of the three categories 
ARE there. And that's all three - pure spontaneity, discrete instantiations, 
and regularity or habit-taking. These are all aspects of Mind - and matter, as 
Peirce constantly wrote, is 'effete Mind'. So, Mind seems to be primal...and 
even, self-organized.

As Peirce outlined in his examples of crystals as instantiations of Mind, or 
the decapitated frog which, lacking a brain, 'almost reasons. The habit that is 
in his cerebellum serves as a major premiss. The excitation of a drop of acid 
is his minor premiss. And his conclusion is the act of wiping it away. All that 
is of any value in the operation of ratiocination is there, except only one 
thing. What he lacks is the power of prepatory meditation" 6.286.  

Just so- the above triad is a semiosic action - and equally applicable to a 
crystal, which also lacks the power of prepatory meditation but does have the 
entire semiosic act/syllogism within it.

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Gary Richmond 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Friday, October 14, 2016 7:21 PM
  Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology


  Helmut, List,


  Helmut wrote: ""Atum", the ancient Egyptian myth, as you wrote, is the state 
of the beginning, and it is nothing and everything at the same time."

  I do not  subscribe to and am certainly not proselytizing the Kemetic myth, 
just offering it as a possible source (along with Tohu Bohu, and the other deep 
and/or dark and/or vague and/or oceanic-watery creation myths), a mere possible 
source for Peirce's more scientific musings (or, as he wrote, pre-scientific) 
musings on early cosmology. Or, perhaps it's just a suggestive parallel. You 
wrote:


So the Egyptians concluded that at the beginning there should have been a 
situation which is both, "all" and "nothing" at the same time. But all is the 
opposite of nothing, isnt it.


  and then go on to suggest that there is something "patronizing" in  
suggesting that it may be possible to see "all" and "nothing"  "at the same 
time." Yet in Peirce's more scientific (or, perhaps, less mythological) view, 
in this early cosmological context this is exactly what he does in suggesting 
that here it is a matter of a kind of proto-state of "everything in general and 
nothing in particular." This has always made some sense to me, but if it 
doesn't to you, well, so be it. But there is absolutely nothing patronizing in 
it, that's for sure.


  As for Time, that is ceratinly too vast a topic even in Peirce's thinking 
alone to attempt to summarize anything which might be of value here. But I will 
note that in the context of his early cosmological thinking he is at pains to 
say that even when it is necessary to write, say, "this then that," that 
strictly speaking, there was not yet TIme, so that "this 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

[John Collier]

I agree with Edwina that all three elements are involved in the pragmatic 
maxim. Itself it is a representamen of the possibility of (discovering) meaning 
(or at least meaning differences). It is also, as an object, a methodology, but 
understood not as some theory but was a way in which something, in this case 
the determination of meaning, is done. As interpretant it gives the meaning of 
meaning, or perhaps better, the meaning of how to determine meaning.

It is tempting to see the representamen as possible meaning (or difference in 
meaning – the  version I prefer), its object as meaning, and it gives the 
meaning of meaning, its final interpretant being the integrated whole of 
meaning. However I think this would ignore its pragmatic aspect, which places 
emphasis on doing things like making mean9ngs clear.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, 15 October 2016 2:32 AM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Cc: Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

Edwina, list:

I apologize if I missed something but what you just stated was basically all 
only generals.

What I am asking for is to apply those generals to the question of the 
pragmatic maxim and provide the argumentation, that is, the specific premisses 
(e.g., what is the object or original stimuli?).

That is,

1) If the pragmatic maxim is the object,
then what is the representamen and what the interpretant?

2) If the pragmatic maxim is the representamen/index,
then what is the object/icon and what the interpretant/symbol?

_

Here is a clearer way of putting things.  You said:

The Object of a syllogism is the minor premise  (the surprising fact, C, is 
observed...)

the Representamen is the major premise  (But if A were...)

the Interpretant is the Conclusion. (B, that which goes from surprise to 
suspect is true).

So, is the following correct?  If not, please correct me.

1)C = pragmatic maxim
   A = Consider what effects…
   B = lots of freedom for what I can conceive about which you will deny

or,

2)C = pragmaticism
   A = pragmatic maxim
   B = Consider what effects…

For case 2), do you see why I object to “Consider what effects…”?
It doesn’t fully/wholly/completely capture the essence of pragmaticism, e.g., 
things like the categories, of which there are three; ordinality, philosophy of 
Socrates, the commens, convergence to truth, etc...

Best,
Jerry Rhee

Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you 
conceive the objects of your conception to have. Then, your conception of those 
effects is the whole of your conception of the object.

On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 7:22 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
Gary R., List:

Thanks for the reminders about Sheriff's book; it was one of my first 
introductions to Peirce's thought, and I even re-read it recently, but I need 
to review the portions that you mentioned in light of the discussions in this 
thread.  Thanks also for the additional information on the role of the 
categories in Peirce's classification of the sciences.

GR:  I would tend to disagree with you, Jon, that this ur-continutiy is 
"created" 3ns; rather, I see it as "creative" 3ns as distinguished from the 3ns 
that become the habits and laws of a created universe. So, in a word, my view 
is that only these laws and habits are the 'created' 3nses.

As I said, taking the blackboard to be created Thirdness is no more than a 
working hypothesis at this point.  If the diagram is confined to the blackboard 
itself, as Peirce's description seems to indicate, then your characterization 
makes more sense.  I am still toying with a couple of other alternatives, as 
well.

GR:  How can one deny Peirce's own words here?

Yes, any alleged "reading" or "interpretation" that directly contradicts what 
an author explicitly states in the text is obviously untenable.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 3:29 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
Jon, Edwina, Gary F, Soren, List,

John Sheriff, in Charles Peirce's Guess at the Riddle: Grounds for Human 
Significance, in commenting on what Peirce calls the "pure zero" state (which, 
in my thinking, is roughly equivalent to the later blackboard metaphor) quotes 
Peirce as follows: "So of potential being there was in that initial state no 
lack" (CP 6.217) and continues, " 'Potential', in Peirce's usage, means 
indeterminate yet capable of determination in any specific 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

[kirstima]

Dear Jerry R.

I can assure you, there was nothing pejorative in my intention in 
responding to you. I just wished to point out that it indeed is very 
important to study in detail the exact wording CSP worked with for 
decades. Especially those wordings he stick up with in his latest years.


These formulations also should be studied in the context they appeared. 
Thus not just ripped off the context.


There is no easy way to understand CSP. It does take time and toil.

Of course you are free to take any stand you wish, as to how and what 
CSP should have offered to all possible readers. - Your wish, however, 
does not make your claim justified.


I do not find it justified. - That's about all I wish to say.

Best, Kirsti

Jerry Rhee kirjoitti 14.10.2016 23:53:

Dear Kirsti, John, list:

Ironic how something that is supposed to be (critical) common sense
and a method to make our ideas clear, that it should lead to such lack
thereof and even to passionate disagreement, eh?  But not so
surprising if one understands Socratic irony, which is to know why
spiritedness over desire as ally of reason.  After all, pragmaticism
“appears to have been virtually the philosophy of Socrates.”

___

In response to your comment and suggestion:

I think you label my posts as being nominalist with pejorative
intention.  But I recognize great value in nominalism.  James and
Peirce were friends and so were Thrasymachus and Socrates (more or
less).

The calling to attention the question of whether CP 5.189 is or is not
a pragmatic maxim represents a nominalistic act.  For_ the birth of a
poet is the principal event in chronology. _ And “a poet, if he is
really to be a poet, should not only put together words, but should
invent stories…the poet, according to the tradition which has ever
prevailed among us, and is accepted of all men, when he sits down on
the TRIPOD OF THE MUSE, is not in his right mind; like a fountain, he
allows to flow out freely whatever comes in…”

“…in the manner of a perfect sophist”, ‘only glance at the
ambition of the men around you, and you will have to wonder at the
unreasonableness of what I have told you, unless you are careful to
consider how singularly they are affected with the LOVE OF WINNING A
NAME, “and laying up fame immortal for all time to come.”

Admittedly, the problem with poetry, when contrasted against that of
the philosopher (aged chorus) is:

“For the poet need not know the third point, viz., whether the
imitation is good or not, though he can hardly help knowing the laws
of melody and rhythm.

But the AGED CHORUS MUST KNOW ALL THE THREE, THAT THEY MAY CHOOSE THE
BEST, and that which is nearest to the best; for otherwise they will
never be able to charm the souls of young men in the way of virtue.”


The above argues that the poet and philosopher have different talents
and different roles in reasoning.  This will mean that we should have
different expectations for what poets and philosophers do.  (The issue
with Mach appears to be a separate one involving the
statesman/scientist, which is Second.  For it is the case too often
that the Second does not recognize, or is not aware, of the value of
First in chronology.)

Despite your accusation, I consider myself a good pragmatist.  That
is, I expect a good naming to be followed by good definition, which
will then stimulate good mediation of the essence.

But these are old patterns; patterns that seemingly pop up anew with
each generation.  (Think of the never-ending but interesting question,
“what is…the scientific method?”)  Yet, if such generals are of
such importance, then a good philosopher will have gotten ahead of
such problems already.  An open question is whether Peirce has done
so, whether he has done so through design of a pragmatic maxim, and
whether he was successful.

_

What I’d like to request of readers is to keep in mind what exactly
the purpose of pragmatic maxims are (for Peirce has indicated
several).  Not a pragmatic maxim for specialized readers of Peirce but
a maxim for that Stranger with general awareness of the classics who
comes to Peirce with no special knowledge of Peirce; a Stranger who
has interest in seeing what Peirce has to add to the ancient
tradition.

I think a good maxim ought to, on its own, be able to inform that
Stranger about what he should know about pragmatism.  I think this is
a common-sense expectation.  That is, a good maxim ought to inform and
prescribe good action for not only past patterns but future patterns;
patterns of political conflict such as that which happens on this list
all too often.

Therefore, I would ask, if you don’t mind, to humor me by simply
stating the two formulations you mentioned, so that we can explore its
goodness and completeness together.  Perhaps we can even list and rank
the various maxims as determined by their beauty/standards and not
simply based on our recent customs, which can be indubitable.
Moreover, if any of them are found beautiful enough