Dear Jerry R.

I can assure you, there was nothing pejorative in my intention in responding to you. I just wished to point out that it indeed is very important to study in detail the exact wording CSP worked with for decades. Especially those wordings he stick up with in his latest years.


These formulations also should be studied in the context they appeared. Thus not just ripped off the context.

There is no easy way to understand CSP. It does take time and toil.

Of course you are free to take any stand you wish, as to how and what CSP should have offered to all possible readers. - Your wish, however, does not make your claim justified.

I do not find it justified. - That's about all I wish to say.

Best, Kirsti

Jerry Rhee kirjoitti 14.10.2016 23:53:
Dear Kirsti, John, list:

Ironic how something that is supposed to be (critical) common sense
and a method to make our ideas clear, that it should lead to such lack
thereof and even to passionate disagreement, eh?  But not so
surprising if one understands Socratic irony, which is to know why
spiritedness over desire as ally of reason.  After all, pragmaticism
“appears to have been virtually the philosophy of Socrates.”

_______

In response to your comment and suggestion:

I think you label my posts as being nominalist with pejorative
intention.  But I recognize great value in nominalism.  James and
Peirce were friends and so were Thrasymachus and Socrates (more or
less).

The calling to attention the question of whether CP 5.189 is or is not
a pragmatic maxim represents a nominalistic act.  For_ the birth of a
poet is the principal event in chronology. _ And “a poet, if he is
really to be a poet, should not only put together words, but should
invent stories…the poet, according to the tradition which has ever
prevailed among us, and is accepted of all men, when he sits down on
the TRIPOD OF THE MUSE, is not in his right mind; like a fountain, he
allows to flow out freely whatever comes in…”

“…in the manner of a perfect sophist”, ‘only glance at the
ambition of the men around you, and you will have to wonder at the
unreasonableness of what I have told you, unless you are careful to
consider how singularly they are affected with the LOVE OF WINNING A
NAME, “and laying up fame immortal for all time to come.”

Admittedly, the problem with poetry, when contrasted against that of
the philosopher (aged chorus) is:

“For the poet need not know the third point, viz., whether the
imitation is good or not, though he can hardly help knowing the laws
of melody and rhythm.

But the AGED CHORUS MUST KNOW ALL THE THREE, THAT THEY MAY CHOOSE THE
BEST, and that which is nearest to the best; for otherwise they will
never be able to charm the souls of young men in the way of virtue.”


The above argues that the poet and philosopher have different talents
and different roles in reasoning.  This will mean that we should have
different expectations for what poets and philosophers do.  (The issue
with Mach appears to be a separate one involving the
statesman/scientist, which is Second.  For it is the case too often
that the Second does not recognize, or is not aware, of the value of
First in chronology.)

Despite your accusation, I consider myself a good pragmatist.  That
is, I expect a good naming to be followed by good definition, which
will then stimulate good mediation of the essence.

But these are old patterns; patterns that seemingly pop up anew with
each generation.  (Think of the never-ending but interesting question,
“what is…the scientific method?”)  Yet, if such generals are of
such importance, then a good philosopher will have gotten ahead of
such problems already.  An open question is whether Peirce has done
so, whether he has done so through design of a pragmatic maxim, and
whether he was successful.

_________

What I’d like to request of readers is to keep in mind what exactly
the purpose of pragmatic maxims are (for Peirce has indicated
several).  Not a pragmatic maxim for specialized readers of Peirce but
a maxim for that Stranger with general awareness of the classics who
comes to Peirce with no special knowledge of Peirce; a Stranger who
has interest in seeing what Peirce has to add to the ancient
tradition.

I think a good maxim ought to, on its own, be able to inform that
Stranger about what he should know about pragmatism.  I think this is
a common-sense expectation.  That is, a good maxim ought to inform and
prescribe good action for not only past patterns but future patterns;
patterns of political conflict such as that which happens on this list
all too often.

Therefore, I would ask, if you don’t mind, to humor me by simply
stating the two formulations you mentioned, so that we can explore its
goodness and completeness together.  Perhaps we can even list and rank
the various maxims as determined by their beauty/standards and not
simply based on our recent customs, which can be indubitable.
Moreover, if any of them are found beautiful enough to be eternal,
then we could even label the _best_ one as _divine_.

For “_what task in life could we have performed nobler than this__,
to write what is of great service to mankind and to bring the nature
of things into the light for all to see?”_

_ _

Best,

Jerry Rhee

On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 3:29 PM, Gary Richmond
<gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote:

Jon, Edwina, Gary F, Soren, List,

John Sheriff, in _Charles Peirce's Guess at the Riddle: Grounds for
Human Significance_, in commenting on what Peirce calls the "pure
zero" state (which, in my thinking, is roughly equivalent to the
later blackboard metaphor) quotes Peirce as follows: "So of
potential being there was in that initial state no lack" (CP 6.217)
and continues, " 'Potential', in Peirce's usage, means indeterminate
yet capable of determination in any specific case" (CP 6.185-86)
[Sheriff, 4). This "potential being" is, then, decidedly _not _the
"nothing of negation," but rather "the germinal nothing, in which
the whole universe is involved or foreshadowed" (CP 6.217).

Sheriff had just prior to this written: "Peirce frequently drew the
parallel between his theory and the Genesis account" and discusses
this in a longish paragraph. I think it is possible to overemphasize
this "parallel" (and, as I've commented here in the past, Peirce's
"pure zero"--or ur-continuity in the blackboard metaphor--seems to
me closer to the Kemetic _Nun _in the dominant Ancient Egyptian
creation myth; while it should be noted in this regard that Peirce
knew hieroglyphics and may well have been acquainted with this
myth).

Jon wrote:

[M]y current working hypothesis is that "Pure mind, as creative of
thought" (CP 6.490) is the Person who conceives the _possible
_chalk marks and then draws _some _of them on the blackboard,
rather than the blackboard itself as a "theater" where chalk marks
somehow spontaneously appear; instead, the blackboard represents
_created _Thirdness. However, I will tentatively grant that your
analysis may be closer to what Peirce himself had in mind.

I would tend to disagree with you, Jon, that this ur-continutiy is
"creat_ed_" 3ns; rather, I see it as "creat_ive_" 3ns as
distinguished from the 3ns that become the habits and laws of a
created universe. So, in a word, my view is that only these laws and
habits are the 'created' 3nses.

One way of considering this is via the Ancient Egyptian myths just
mentioned. In these Kemetic myths there is "one incomprehensible
Power, alone, unique, inherent in the Nun, the indefiniable cosmic
sea, the infinite source of the Universe, outside of any notion of
Space or Time." At Heliopolis this Power, the Creator, is given the
name, Atum, "which means both All and Nothing [involving] the
potential totality of the Universe which is as yet unformed and
intangible. . . Atum must. . . distinguish himself from the Nun and
thus annihilate the Nun in its original inert state." (all
quotations are from Lucie Lamy's book, _Egyptian Mysteries: New
light on ancient knowledge_, p 8, a popularization of her
grandfather, R. A. Schwaller de Lubicz's, great scholarly work in
Egyptology, still not as influential in that field as it ought to be
in my opinion).

I won't go further into this myth now except to note that even at
this 'stage' of proto-creation that the above "first act is
expressed in three major ways" such that A_tum_, as _tum_ in Nun,
"projects" himself as Khepri (that is, becoming, or potential). All
the _neteru_ ('powers' according to S. de Lubicz, but usually
translated incorrectly as 'gods') will follow from that priordial
'act'.

Although there might now be this disagreement as to what the
ur-continuity represents, I would not disagree with you whatsoever,
Jon, in your view that it was Peirce's belief that God is "Really
creator of all three Universes of Experience" since opposition to
this view would fly in the face of Peirce own words: "The word
'God' ... is _the _definable proper name, signifying _Ens
necessarium_; in my belief Really creator of all three Universes of
Experience" (CP 6.452). How can one deny Peirce's own words here?

Returning now to Sheriff's book, after a fascinating Preface (which,
for one example, makes pointed reference to Stephen Hawking's essay,
"A Unified Theory of the Universe Would Be the Ultimate Triumph of
Human Reason"), Chapter 1, "Peirce's Cosmogonic Philosophy" opens
with this quote:"[T]he problem of how genuine triadic relations
first arose in the world is a better, because more definite,
formulation of the problem of how life came about."(6.322)

Moving on to another topic taken up in this thread, Edwina's claim
that _everything_ is semiosic does not seem to acknowledge the
pervasive use of the categories throughout Peirce's _oevre _which
does not pertain to semiotics as such, including his classification
of the sciences (as you mentioned), nor the placement of the first
of the cenoscopic sciences, viz., phenomenology, well ahead of logic
as semeiotic in this classification, nor the content of
phenomenology itself, concerned explicitly with categorial relations
in themselves (and there is much, much else which Peirce
emphatically associated with the categories which is not semeiotic).

But considering for now just Peirce's Classification of the
Sciences, Beverly Kent, who wrote the only book length monograph on
the topic, _Charles S. Peirce: Logic and the Classification of the
Sciences_, has a number of things to say about the categories in
relation to the classification. For example, after mentioning that
one of his earliest classification schemes was based on the
categories, Kent comments: "Fearing that his trichotomic might be
misleading him, he set it aside and developed alternative schemes,
only to find himself ineluctably led back. Even so, it was some time
before he conceded that the resulting divisions conformed to his
categories" (Kent, 19). Phyllis Chiasson, as I recall, makes much
the same point.

Kent later remarks that regarding his final _Outline Classification
of the Sciences_ (which he stuck with, prefaced virtually all his
subsequent works in logic with, and thought "sufficiently
satisfactory" as late as 1911), that Peirce wrote that "most of the
divisions are 'trichotomic' " (Kent, 121) in the sense of involving
the three categories (much as Jon outlined them in a recent post).

Best,

Gary R

GARY RICHMOND
PHILOSOPHY AND CRITICAL THINKING
COMMUNICATION STUDIES
LAGUARDIA COLLEGE OF THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
C 745
718 482-5690 [1]

On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 8:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:

Edwina, List:

ET: When you say that _some _of Peirce's positions are perfectly
clear and not reasonably disputable - again, this is your opinion.

Are you claiming here that _none_ of Peirce's positions are
perfectly clear and not reasonably disputable--i.e., that _all_ of
his positions are at least somewhat murky, and thus open for debate?
Is there _anything _that you would confidently assert to be
Peirce's position, without qualifying it as merely your
interpretation or opinion?

ET: I happen to disagree with your view of Peirce's view on 'god-
as 'creator of the three universes.

My view is that in Peirce's belief, God as _Ens necessarium_ is
Really creator of all three Universes of Experience. Peirce wrote,
in CP 6.452, "The word 'God' ... is _the _definable proper name,
signifying _Ens necessarium_; in my belief Really creator of all
three Universes of Experience." What is the basis for your
disagreement with me about Peirce's view on this--i.e., what
meaningful difference do you see between my statement of it and his
own?

ET: I completely disagree with you on the above.

My view is that Peirce's view is that all signs are genuine triads,
and thus must be in the universe of representations. Peirce wrote,
in CP 1.480, "a triad if genuine cannot be in the world of quality
nor in that of fact," which means that it can only be "in the
universe of _representations_." What is the basis for your
disagreement with me about Peirce's view on this--i.e., what
meaningful difference do you see between my statement of it and his
own?

ET: A quality IS a qualisign! ... There is no such thing as a
'quality' in itself.

Are you saying that _all _qualities are _also _qualisigns--i.e.,
tthat here is no distinction between the two? If so, do you believe
that this was Peirce's view, as well? If so, based on what specific
passages in his writings?

Thanks,

Jon

On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 5:20 PM, Edwina Taborsky
<tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

1) Jon - When you say that _some_ of Peirce's positions are
perfectly clear and not reasonably disputable - again, this is your
opinion. I happen to disagree with your view of Peirce's view on
'god- as 'creator of the three universes. You have your opinion -
and again, I think it is incorrect for you to declare that you
'read' Peirce 'exactly correctly'.

2) Now - when you write:
"My example was a qualisign, which as a _quality_ (as well as an
icon and rheme) is entirely in the mode of Firstness, but as a
_sign_--at least, according to Peirce in CP 1.480--can only belong
to the third Universe."

I completely disagree with you on the above. The whole triad - a
rhematic iconic qualisign - is entirely in the mode of Firstness and
is a sign. And does NOT belong to the third Universe. There is no
such thing as a single relation i.e.,the Representamen-Object,
existing on its own. The triad of all three relations is
irreducible. O-R; R-R; R-I. None of these exist on their own but
within the triad. A Qualisign is a quality, a feeling - and is not
in the 'third Universe'.

A quality IS a qualisign! There is no such thing as something
operating outside of the triad. There is no such thing as a
'quality' in itself.
The definition of a sign is its triadic set of Relations: That
between the Representamen and the Object; that of the Representamen
in itself; that between the Representamen and the Interpretant. The
Representamen acts as mediation - and can be in a mode of Firstness.
An Interpretant is not an Object but is an 'output' interpretation
linked by the Representamen to the stimuli of the Object.

And again - of the ten classes of SIGNS, four of them do NOT have
their Representamen operating in a mode of Thirdness. That includes
the genuine sign of a rhematic iconic qualisign; and the Dicent
Indexical Sinsign...
And yet - these are legitimate SIGNS. They have no Thirdness in
them at all.
See 2.227 and on.

Again, the triad is basic to semiosis; it does not necessarily
require Thirdness in its component [again, see the ten classes
2.227..] and ..there is no such thing as a 'quality' or indeed
anything, functioning outside of the semiosic triad.

Edwina
----- Original Message -----
FROM: Jon Alan Schmidt
TO: Edwina Taborsky
CC: Peirce-L

SENT: Thursday, October 13, 2016 5:42 PM
SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

Edwina, List:

ET: We each read him a different way and I don't think that you
have the right to self-define yourself as someone who is
'one-with-Peirce'.

Those are your words, not mine; I have _never _claimed to be "one
with Peirce." What I _have _claimed is that _some _of Peirce's
positions are perfectly clear and not reasonably disputable, whether
I happen to agree with him or not. That he believed in the Reality
of God as _Ens necessarium_, Creator of all three Universes of
Experience, is one of those--and I _do _happen to agree with him
about that. At the same time, this is not to say that his entire
"view of Mind and creation" was identical to my own; I am quite
certain that it was not.

ET: I think that many others have to read Peirce - and - your and
my comments - and make up their minds as to how 'accurately' we
interpret him.

On this, we are in complete agreement.

ET: I read 6.455 differently than you do - I don't see that eg the
mathematical reasoning is in a categorical mode of Firstness. It IS
pure ideational - which would be, in the ten classes, a pure
Argument [symbolic legisign argment O-R-I]; that is - ENTIRELY IN
THIRDNESS.

Again, this conflates the _mode _of a sign with the Universe of
Experience to which it belongs, although I am not even sure that all
mathematical reasoning should be assigned to the Universe of Ideas.
My example was a qualisign, which as a _quality_ (as well as an icon
and rheme) is entirely in the mode of Firstness, but as a _sign_--at
least, according to Peirce in CP 1.480--can only belong to the third
Universe.

ET: I don't see that a qualisign - one entirely in a mode of
Firstness - has any 'active power to establish connections between
different objects' and therefore, I simply don't see how you can
declare that it belongs to 'Thirdness'.

If something does not have "active power to establish connections
between different objects," then it is not a _sign _at all--in this
case, it is merely a _quality_, rather than a _qualisign_. The very
definition of what it means to _be _a sign is that it is able to
connect different objects--specifically, an object with an
interpretant.

ET: With regard to your reading of 1.480- Peirce refers to THREE
kinds of 'genuine triads'.

Yes, he does; but he also goes on to say that "a triad if genuine
cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of fact," which means
that all three kinds of genuine triads can only be "in the universe
of _representations_." Again, this is not about the _mode _of the
sign, which can be in any of the three categories, but about the
_Universe of Experience _where it belongs. Peirce then adds,
"Indeed, representation necessarily involves a genuine triad. For
it involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or
inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting thought.
Now this is neither a matter of fact, since thought is general, nor
is it a matter of law, since thought is living." Here we see that
_all_ representation--i.e., all sign-action, all
semeiosis--necessarily involves a genuine triad, which can only be
in the third Universe precisely _because _it mediates between an
object and interpretant. We also see that "thought is general" and
"thought is living," which is another way of saying that thought is
Thirdness--which makes sense, since all thought is in _signs_.

Regards,

Jon

On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 3:55 PM, Edwina Taborsky
<tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

Jon- I don't think you can move into saying 'If I [Jon] am wrong
inthis, then Peirce was wrong]. We remain, all of us, readers of
Peirce - and thus - interpreters. We each read him a different way
and I don't think that you have the right to self-define yourself as
someone who is 'one-with-Peirce'. I think that many others have to
read Peirce - and - your and my comments - and make up their minds
as to how 'accurately' we interpret him.

For example - I consider that EVERYTHING is semiosic - whereas, I'm
not sure what meaning you assign to the word. For me - all actions
within the physico-chemical, biological and socioconceptual world
are semiosic - and don't need human agency to be such. Again,
'matter is effete mind'.

I read 6.455 differently than you do - I don't see that eg the
mathematical reasoning is in a categorical mode of Firstness. It IS
pure ideational - which would be, in the ten classes, a pure
Argument [symbolic legisign argment O-R-I]; that is - ENTIRELY IN
THIRDNESS.

So, i don't equate the three universes to match the three
categories. The quotation you provide "I said that a thoroughly
genuine triad in a mode of Firstness (i.e., a qualisign) belongs to
the third Universe of Experience, as something "_whose being
consists in active power to establish connections between different
objects"_ (CP 6.455). .....I consider that this _quote _refers to
Thirdness. And therefore - I don't see that a qualisign - one
entirely in a mode of Firstness - has any 'active power to establish
connections between different objects' and therefore, I simply don't
see how you can declare that it belongs to 'Thirdness'.

With regard to your reading of 1.480- Peirce refers to THREE kinds
of 'genuine triads'. I read a genuine triad as operational in A
quality and in A fact. So- 1-1-1, a qualisign, is a triad in a total
mode of Firstness; it is a 'feeling of redness' but it is NOT the
same as a _thoroughly genuine triad_' which involves generality or
Thirdness. A 2-2-2 or Dicent Sinsign is a triad in a total mode of
Secondness, eg, a weathervane - but it is not the same as a
_thoroughly genuine triad_ which involves generality or Thirdness.
So, again, a triad in a mode of Firstness does not, in my readings
of Peirce, belong in 'the Third universe'; there is no generality.
Firstness has no capacity to 'make connections', to mediate, to
connect. That is the nature of Firstness - its isolate vividness.
So- we disagree in our readings.

As for your interpretation of God and Peirce - I maintain that it
remains your interpretation and that Peirce's view of Mind and
creation - is quite different from yours.

Edwina
----- Original Message -----
FROM: Jon Alan Schmidt
TO: Edwina Taborsky

CC: Peirce-L
SENT: Thursday, October 13, 2016 4:13 PM
SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

Edwina, List:

I try to be careful about only attributing to Peirce, rather than
myself, those things that strike me as incontrovertibly clear in his
writings--things that the vast majority of Peirce scholars recognize
to be HIS views, as expressed in those writings. I do not subscribe
to the approach that all interpretations are equally valid; while
there can certainly be legitimate differences, there are also
objectively _incorrect_ readings, assuming (as Gary F. once put it)
that Peirce said what he meant and meant what he said. Of course, I
am (very) fallible, so I may (and probably do) overreach in some
cases. I even conceded in my last post, "We might quibble about
these particular assignments of the labels, which are just off the
top of my head." The overall point remains--Peirce _did not_ limit
the categories to semeiosis, as you apparently do. If you are right
to do so, then not only am I wrong about this, but Peirce was also
wrong about it.

There seems to be a particular terminological difficulty with the
word "mode." I did not say "that a pure or genuine triad in a mode
of Firstness [O-R-I all in a mode of Firstness] belongs in a _mode_
of representation," I said that a thoroughly genuine triad in a mode
of Firstness (i.e., a qualisign) belongs to the third Universe of
Experience, as something "whose being consists in active power to
establish connections between different objects" (CP 6.455). In
some contexts, the categories do correspond to modes, such as
possible/actual/habitual; but not always. In any case, what I said
is perfectly consistent with what Peirce wrote in CP 1.480 (not CP
1.515, as I indicated in my response to Jeff)--"a triad if genuine
cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of fact ... But a
_thoroughly_ genuine triad is separated entirely from those worlds
and exists in the universe of _representations_." So I am not the
only one claiming that "it belongs primarily to the third
Universe"--Peirce did, as well. If I am wrong about this, then
Peirce was also wrong about it.

Finally, there is nothing to debate with respect to whether Peirce
believed in the Reality of God as _Ens necessarium_ and Creator of
all three Universes of Experience--he says so plainly in CP 6.452.
If I am wrong about this, then Peirce was also wrong about it.

Regards,

Jon

On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 2:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky
<tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

Jon, you wrote:

"For Peirce, the categories do not _only _function within the O-R-I
triad--for one thing, they are _everywhere _in his architectonic
arrangement of the sciences!"

PLEASE - do not write as if you alone are the sole interpreter of
Peirce. Therefore, please write something like: ' In my [Jon Alan
Schmidt] interpretation, the categories of Peirce do not only
function within the O-R-I triad...etc etc.

Do you see the difference? I am always careful to make it clear that
what I write is MY interpretation of Peirce. I do not write as if I
had the direct or correct view of Peirce.

Now - to your points -

1) With regard to genuine - I don't see that a pure or genuine
triad in a mode of Firstness [O-R-I all in a mode of Firstness]
belongs in a mode of representation - and representation suggests
Thirdness or the use of some symbolic mediation. I simply don't see
how you can claim that "it belongs primarily to the Third Universe'
[by which I am assuming that you mean to Thirdness]??

Jeff has provided a quote: "For while a triad if genuine cannot be
in the world of quality nor in that of fact, yet it may be a mere
law, or regularity, of quality or of fact." 1.515***ET - I cannot
find this quote at 1.515.

However ,Peirce does write that 'Secondness is an essential part of
Thirdness...and Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness
and Thirdness' 1.530 - which is why I consider that the three
categories are a complex embedded function.

2) Therefore I disagree with your aligning various sciences with the
categories. I don't think that his differentiation of the various
sciences etc has any real relationship to the categories. The
categories, as I read Peirce, refer to the phaneron- "the collective
total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind
quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not"
1.284

Jon, you wrote: "For sciences of discovery, mathematics as
Firstness, philosophy as Secondness, and special sciences as
Thirdness; "

I don't see this. Peirce certainly classified the various fields of
studies - but not within the categories. Mathematics, which refers
to 'feelings and quality'? Philosophy referring to actual facts?

But he certainly classified fields of study into 'threes'. - and one
can see that some of the descriptions of the modal categories can be
loosely applied - i.e., abduction does indeed have an element of
'feeling, quality, freedom'; and induction does have an element of
actual fact; and deduction does have an element of necessity. But I
think this is a loose description for all three are, after all,
aspects of reasoning [Thirdness].

3) I don't see that Peirce accepted a pre-existent creator.
"Out of the womb of indeterminacy, we must say that there would have
come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a
flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second
flash. Thought time would not yet have been, this second flash was
in some sense after the first, because resulting from it" 1.412.

Now - this self-organized complexity didn't need a prior 'ens
necessarium'. I am aware, Jon, of your view of genesis and god,
since you have provided your supportive quotations from the Bible -
which sees god as an agential creator - but - I don't see that this
Agential Force is accepted by Peirce. Peirce sees 'Mind' as the
agential force - an ongoing, evolving, open force - and a part of
matter - i.e., not separate from matter- and therefore not prior to
time or matter. [see his discussion in the Reality of God - 6.489
....

Edwina
----- Original Message -----
FROM: Jon Alan Schmidt
TO: Edwina Taborsky
CC: Jeffrey Brian Downard ; Peirce-L
SENT: Thursday, October 13, 2016 2:20 PM
SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

Edwina, List:

ET: Your post outlines the three 'pure' triads where the Relations
between the Object-Representamen-Interpretant are all of one mode;
all in the mode of Firstness or Secondness or Thirdness.

I do not believe that Jeff's post was referring to the O-R-I
relations specifically, but rather to triadic relations in general,
since that is what Peirce discussed in the quoted paper. In other
words, O-R-I is not the _only kind_ of triad, even though it is
probably the _paradigmatic example _of a triad.

In any case, Peirce stated quite clearly that all _genuine _triads
belong to the world of representation, and not to the world of
quality or the world of fact. These are undoubtedly what he later
called the three Universes of Experience--quality corresponds to
Ideas, fact to Brute Actuality, and representation to Signs.
However, this is not to say that all signs are in the _mode _of
Thirdness; i.e., Necessitants. Even a qualisign, which must be
iconic and rhematic in its relations to its object and interpretant,
and thus is classified entirely in the mode of Firstness, belongs
primarily to the third Universe--its "being consists in active power
to establish connections between different objects." However,
specifically as a _quali_sign--a quality that is a sign--it also, in
some sense, belongs to the first Universe. Likewise, a sinsign
belongs to both the third Universe as a sign and the second Universe
as an existent. I am still thinking through how all of this works,
including how the R-O and R-I relations fit into the picture, so I
would welcome input from others on it.

ET: As such the categories only function within the triad - the
O-R-I triad.

Perhaps this is our fundamental disagreement, at least when it comes
to this subject. For Peirce, the categories do not _only _function
within the O-R-I triad--for one thing, they are _everywhere _in his
architectonic arrangement of the sciences! For sciences of
discovery, mathematics as Firstness, philosophy as Secondness, and
special sciences as Thirdness; for philosophy, phenomenology
(phaneroscopy) as Firstness, normative sciences as Secondness, and
metaphysics as Thirdness; for normative sciences, esthetics as
Firstness, ethics as Secondness, logic (semeiotic) as Thirdness.
Within mathematics, the categories manifest as monads, dyads, and
triads; within phaneroscopy, as quality, reaction, and
representation; within metaphysics, as possibility, actuality, and
necessity (habituality); within logic, as speculative grammar,
critic, and methodeutic. We might quibble about these particular
assignments of the labels, which are just off the top of my head,
but the point is that restricting the categories to semeiosis is
decidedly contrary to Peirce's own approach.

ET: I don't see either that the 'pure or genuine Thirdness' - the
Symbolic Legisign Argument [O-R-I] can be an 'ens necessarium'
because I consider that our universe requires both Firstness and
Secondness and I therefore reject such a pre-existent 'Platonic
creator of all three modes or universes'.

No one is suggesting that "pure or genuine Thirdness" is identical
to an Argument; this thread concerns metaphysics in general, and
cosmology in particular, rather than semeiotic. Even if "our
universe [now] requires both Firstness and Secondness," this does
not _entail _that they were also required "before" our actual
universe came into being. While you "reject such a pre-existent
'Platonic creator of all three modes or universes," Peirce quite
explicitly believed in just such a Creator, and I honestly do not
see how any _legitimate_ reading of "A Neglected Argument" can deny
this.

CSP: The word "God," so "capitalized" (as we Americans say), is
_the _definable proper name, signifying _Ens necessarium_; in my
belief Really creator of all three Universes of Experience. (CP
6.452)

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]

On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 12:02 PM, Edwina Taborsky
<tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

Jeffrey, list: Your post outlines the three 'pure' triads where the
Relations between the Object-Representamen-Interpretant are all of
one mode; all in the mode of Firstness or Secondness or Thirdness.
These are only three of the ten - and the function of the
non-genuine or degenerate modes is, in my view, to provide the
capacity for evolution, adaptation and change. That is, Firstness
linked to Secondness and Thirdness, as in the vital, vital triad of
the Rhematic Indexical Legisign - introduces novelty to actuality to
habit. That's quite something.

My point is that the modal categories have no 'per se' reality [Jon
considers that both Firstness and Thirdness have such a reality] but
are modes of organization and experience of matter/concepts within
ongoing events, i.e, 'matter is effete Mind'. As such the categories
only function within the triad - the O-R-I triad.

I don't see either that the 'pure or genuine Thirdness' - the
Symbolic Legisign Argument [O-R-I] can be an 'ens necessarium'
because I consider that our universe requires both Firstness and
Secondness and I therefore reject such a pre-existent 'Platonic
creator of all three modes or universes'. That is - I'm aware that
Jon bases his reading of Peirce also within his belief in Genesis
and God - but I can't see this same view within the writings of
Peirce.

Edwina

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