Jon, list - I'm going to continue to disagree with your interpretation. I 
consider that the two descriptions of the emergence of the universe are not 
compatible. But - as to why Peirce wrote the two - of course, that is beyond 
me. 

The 1.412 description is specific in  'the original chaos, therefore, where 
there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere indeterminacy, in which 
nothing existed or really happened 1.411.  And his outline of the emergence of 
both matter and mind seem to me, [I've provided the quotes before] a clear 
outline of the self-organization and evolution of both.
There is, in this outline,  no a priori Mind - pure or otherwise.

Then, in 6.490, Peirce talks about the 'disembodied spirit or pure mind, has 
its being out of time' - This is clear - that we have here an a priori agency 
which "is destined to think all that is is capable of thinking".THought 
separate from matter???? This means, also, that this Pure Mind is NOT a 'state 
of utter nothingness'.

 My reading of this - a pure disembodied mind - is that it is Platonic - and 
this contradicts Peirce's basic Aristotelianism which does not allow for Mind 
separated from Matter. 

That is, throughout Peirce's many discussions of Mind and Matter and his 
discussion of the three categories - we do not read [as far as i can recollect] 
any hint of their  separation, any suggestion that Mind is 'disembodied' and 
'full-of-its truths'. Indeed, Thirdness is, as embedded within 
Secondness/Firstness - always able to change and evolve its habits, something a 
pure Mind would not do.

So- my reading of these two sections is that they are two completely different 
outlines, and are incompatible with each other. I think you and even Peirce 
are, indeed, using the arguments for the 'existence of God' from Anselm, the 
classical ontological argument, that If one can think of a perfect Being, then, 
this perfect being is real....and..if such a belief is common, then, this is 
'evidentiary' proof that such a being exists.  I consider that this analysis is 
insufficient as proof - and that the very notion of a 'pure mind' contradicts 
the outline of a  self-organized mind-matter universe that Peirce provided in 
'A guess at the riddle'. 

I cannot explain these two, to my reading, very different descriptions of the 
emergence and evolution of the universe of mind and matter - and simply have to 
leave it as that: I cannot explain it. As an atheist and someone who accepts 
the power of self-organization and evolution, I admit to being drawn to the 
1.412 Guess at the Riddle [and other outlines of agapasm and evolution] rather 
than the agential power-of-god outline. But that doesn't mean anything 
conclusive - other than an awareness of my own predeliction for the one outline 
versus the other! But - I do think they are incompatible.

Edwina




  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Saturday, October 15, 2016 5:05 PM
  Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology


  Edwina, List:


    ET:  I think you will have to admit that neither you nor I know for sure 
which of the two arguments for the emergence of the universe are 'really held' 
by Peirce.


  On the contrary--I think that we do know for sure, or at least have to 
assume, that Peirce "really held" what he said in "A Guess at the Riddle" in 
1887-1888, and "really held" what he said in "A Neglected Argument" in 1908.  
This is why I always try to include the date with any quotation from him--it is 
important to recognize its timing within the overall development of his 
thought, which was far from static.


  The question, then, is simply whether the 1908 statements that I have cited 
represent a significant change in his views over two decades, or if they are 
compatible with the 1887-1888 paragraph that you quoted below.  Again, I think 
that CP 6.490--which also dates to 1908, and in fact was intended precisely to 
serve as a supplement to "A Neglected Argument"--strongly suggests the latter 
conclusion.  My apologies in advance for the lengthy excerpts this time.


    A full exposition of the pragmaticistic definition of Ens necessarium would 
require many pages; but some hints toward it may be given. A disembodied 
spirit, or pure mind, has its being out of time, since all that it is destined 
to think is fully in its being at any and every previous time. But in endless 
time it is destined to think all that it is capable of thinking. Order is 
simply thought embodied in arrangement; and thought embodied in any other way 
appears objectively as a character that is a generalization of order, and that, 
in the lack of any word for it, we may call for the nonce, "Super-order." It is 
something like uniformity. The idea may be caught if it is described as that of 
which order and uniformity are particular varieties.   Pure mind, as creative 
of thought, must, so far as it is manifested in time, appear as having a 
character related to the habit-taking capacity, just as super-order is related 
to uniformity.


  I have already discussed the hint that Ens necessarium is "pure mind."  The 
rest of this passage implies that thought is always "embodied" in some kind of 
"super-order," of which order and uniformity are two examples.  Peirce then 
draws an analogy--the thought-creating character of pure mind is to the 
habit-taking capacity as super-order is to uniformity.  Since he just said that 
uniformity is a particular variety of super-order, the habit-taking capacity 
must be a particular variety of the thought-creating character of pure mind.  
Recall that the "second flash" of CP 1.412 came about "by the principle of 
habit"; so evidently it was a manifestation of pure mind, as creative of 
thought.  Likewise for the "other successions ever more and more closely 
connected, the habits and the tendency to take them ever strengthening 
themselves."  While CP 1.412 might plausibly be interpreted in isolation as 
describing "the self-organized emergence of the Universe" with "no metaphysical 
Agent" involved, CP 6.490 indicates that the habit-taking capacity depends on 
there being such an Agent.


    Now imagine, in such vague way as such a thing can be imagined, a perfect 
cosmology of the three universes. It would prove all in relation to that 
subject that reason could desiderate; and of course all that it would prove 
must, in actual fact, now be true. But reason would desiderate that that should 
be proved from which would follow all that is in fact true of the three 
universes; and the postulate from which all this would follow must not state 
any matter of fact, since such fact would thereby be left unexplained. That 
perfect cosmology must therefore show that the whole history of the three 
universes, as it has been and is to be, would follow from a premiss which would 
not suppose them to exist at all. Moreover, such premiss must in actual fact be 
true. But that premiss must represent a state of things in which the three 
universes were completely nil. Consequently, whether in time or not, the three 
universes must actually be absolutely necessary results of a state of utter 
nothingness. We cannot ourselves conceive of such a state of nility; but we can 
easily conceive that there should be a mind that could conceive it, since, 
after all, no contradiction can be involved in mere non-existence. A state in 
which there should be absolutely no super-order whatsoever would be such a 
state of nility. For all Being involves some kind of super-order.


  This is a difficult passage, but it s me to strikes me as a kind of reductio 
ad absurdum for any claim that the universe came about without the Reality of 
God.  A "perfect cosmology" conforming to such a claim "must not state any 
matter of fact," but must instead "follow from a premiss which would not 
suppose [the three universes] to exist at all."  As a result, "the three 
universes must actually be absolutely necessary results of a state of utter 
nothingness"; that is, "A state in which there should be absolutely no 
super-order whatsoever."  But in such a state, absolutely nothing is absolutely 
necessary; in fact, there cannot be any Being whatsoever, since "all Being 
involves some kind of super-order."  Hence the Reality of God--an eternal 
Being, Ens necessarium--is the only premiss that can account for the reality of 
the three universes, without already assuming it.


    Any such super-order would be a super-habit. Any general state of things 
whatsoever would be a super-order and a super-habit. In that state of absolute 
nility, in or out of time, that is, before or after the evolution of time, 
there must then have been a tohu bohu of which nothing whatever affirmative or 
negative was true universally. There must have been, therefore, a little of 
everything conceivable.


  Peirce explicitly mentioned the first chapter Genesis in CP 1.412, and 
invoked it again here--tohu bohu is the Hebrew expression in verse 2 that is 
usually translated as something like "without form and void."  The notion of a 
state where "nothing whatever affirmative or negative was true universally," 
which thus involves "a little of everything conceivable," is consistent with 
Peirce's late theory of a continuum.  It does not consist of discrete points, 
as Cantor and others defined it, but of potential points that are welded 
together and thus indistinct.  Even this description is misleading, because the 
contiguous points do not comprise the continuum; the latter is the more 
fundamental concept.  The principles of non-contradiction and excluded middle 
thus do not apply, unless and until an actual point is determined, which is a 
discontinuity.  Continuity is generality, and generality of any kind is 
impossible in the absence of super-order and super-habit; i.e., the Reality of 
God.


    There must have been here and there a little undifferentiated tendency to 
take super-habits. But such a state must tend to increase itself. For a 
tendency to act in any way, combined with a tendency to take habits, must 
increase the tendency to act in that way. Now substitute in this general 
statement for "tendency to act in any way" a tendency to take habits, and we 
see that that tendency would grow. It would also become differentiated in 
various ways.


  This really says nothing different from the last sentence of CP 1.412 that 
you quoted.  So it looks like Peirce has not changed his basic cosmology over 
the intervening two decades; he has simply clarified the necessity of the 
Reality of God before it ever could have gotten off the ground.


  Regards,


  Jon


  On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 2:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

    Jon, list:

    I think you will have to admit that neither you nor I know for sure which 
of the two arguments for the emergence of the universe are 'really held' by 
Peirce.  There is, A,  the self-organized emergence and evolution of Mind and 
Matter within the axioms of the three categories - and this reference to the 
embodiment and evolution of Mind with Matter is found all through Peirce's 
writings. And, there is, B, the introduction of an a priori agency,  God, in a 
later text- without any real examination of the relation of Mind and Matter in 
this god-created universe.

    Your reliance on "IF it's written at a later date, THEN, this means Peirce 
believed in its axioms even more' - is merely your view of linear writing. 
Then, there is your own open declaration of theism - and my equally open 
declaration of atheism. These have to affect each of us.

    This leads me to conclude that - as I said, neither you nor I know which of 
the two arguments is 'really held' by Peirce. I think we'll have to leave it at 
that.

    Edwina
      ----- Original Message ----- 
      From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
      To: tabor...@primus.ca ; Peirce-L 
      Sent: Saturday, October 15, 2016 2:42 PM
      Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology


      Edwina, List: 


        ET:  What i read from the above is the self-organized emergence of the 
Universe.


      Peirce wrote "A Guess at the Riddle" in 1887-1888 and "A Neglected 
Argument" in 1908.  The latter, including its various drafts, states explicitly 
that in Peirce's belief, God is Really creator of all three Universes of 
Experience and everything in them, without exception.  This means that either 
(a) he changed his mind at some point during the intervening twenty years, or 
(b) he saw no incompatibility between the two positions.  His cosmological 
remarks in CP 6.490, written only a little later in 1908 than the article 
itself, suggest strongly that (b) is the case.


      Regards,


      Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
      Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
      www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


      On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 8:26 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> 
wrote:

        Gary R - you wrote:

        "I am not an atheist because, for one thing, I refuse to 'reduce' the 
origins of this cosmos to an improbably singularity (a Big Bang--and, as you 
probably know, there is not one version of this theory, but several, and 
competing theories as well, although the current scientific dogma won't allow 
for that). 


        Nor do I see self-organization (a sound enough principle) and 
self-creation (whatever that may mean) as the only principles of semiosis, life 
and evolution."

        I certainly won't critique or comment on your rejection of atheism as 
that's hardly my right, but I'd like to comment on the 'singularity of origin 
of our universe' [Big Bang] and self-organization.

        With regard to the singular explosive origin, there certainly are 
numerous theories, including for or against the Big Bang. Since I am rejecting 
a metaphysical origin [God] as the origin of the universe, I stick with the Big 
Bang for now. I refer to Peirce's 'A Guess at the Riddle'...

        "The original chaos, therefore, where there was no regularity, was in 
effect a state of mere indeterminacy in which nothing existed or really 
happened. 
        Our conceptions of the first stages of development, before time yet 
existed, must be as vague and figurative as the expressions of the first 
chapter of Genesis. Out of the womb of indeterminacy we must say that there 
would have come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a 
flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash. 
Though time would not yet have been, this second flash  was in some sense after 
the first, because resulting from it. Then there would have come other 
successions ever more and more closely connected, the habits and the tendency 
to take them ever strengthening themselves, until the events would have been 
bound together into something like a continuous flow.....' 1.412

        What i read from the above is the self-organized emergence of the 
Universe. There is no metaphysical Agent [God- which requires an a priori 
agency, something which the Scholastics dealt with by not dealing with it 
except within belief] - but - the basic principles of organization of the three 
categories ARE there. And that's all three - pure spontaneity, discrete 
instantiations, and regularity or habit-taking. These are all aspects of Mind - 
and matter, as Peirce constantly wrote, is 'effete Mind'. So, Mind seems to be 
primal...and even, self-organized.

        As Peirce outlined in his examples of crystals as instantiations of 
Mind, or the decapitated frog which, lacking a brain, 'almost reasons. The 
habit that is in his cerebellum serves as a major premiss. The excitation of a 
drop of acid is his minor premiss. And his conclusion is the act of wiping it 
away. All that is of any value in the operation of ratiocination is there, 
except only one thing. What he lacks is the power of prepatory meditation" 
6.286.  

        Just so- the above triad is a semiosic action - and equally applicable 
to a crystal, which also lacks the power of prepatory meditation but does have 
the entire semiosic act/syllogism within it.

        Edwina


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