Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., Jeff, Francesco, List:

How would we reconcile this notion that a Sign can *create *its own Object
with Peirce's explicit statement elsewhere that (as Francesco noted) a Sign
does not even so much as *affect *its own Object?

CSP:  In its relation to the Object, the Sign is *passive*; that is to say,
its correspondence to the Object is brought about by an effect upon the
Sign, the Object remaining unaffected. (EP 2:544n22; 1906)


I have referred to this several times recently as the "directionality" of
semiosis, "from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant" (*ibid*).
Regarding the "Ground arms!" example specifically, Peirce wrote just a few
weeks later that "the Dynamic Interpretant is in the thump of the muskets
on the ground, or rather it is the Act of their Minds" (EP 2:499; 1909).  I
do not see how one action can be *both *the Object *and *the Interpretant
of the *same *Sign.

Instead, I find much more plausible Peirce's previous assessment that "the
object the command represents is the will of the officer that the butts of
the muskets be brought down to the ground" (CP 5.473; 1907).  In fact,
right before the sentence that Jeff quoted, he said something similar.

CSP:  The Object of the Command "Ground arms!" is the immediately
subsequent action of the soldiers so far as it is affected by the molition
expressed in the command. It cannot be understood unless collateral
observation shows the speaker's relation to the rank of soldiers. You may
say, if you like, that the Object is in the Universe of things desired by
the Commanding Captain at that moment. Or since the obedience is fully
expected, it is in the Universe of his expectation. (CP 8.178, EP 2:493;
1909)


>From this, it seems to me that (as Gary F. noted) the Dynamic Object of the
command is the action that the officer *intends*, while its Dynamic
Interpretant is the action that the soldiers *execute*; but I would
certainly not consider these to be "identical."  On the contrary, this is
consistent with Peirce's identification of the Object and Interpretant as
the "essential ingredient" of the Utterer and Interpreter, respectively
(cf. EP 2:404-409; 1907).  I further suggest that the Immediate
Interpretant of the command is its *definition *within the Sign System of
military lingo, and its Immediate Object is the action that its
Utterer is *capable
*of intending accordingly.

As for relative pronouns, Peirce did not say that they create *their own*
Objects, but that their Objects are "the images in the mind which *previous
*words have created" (CP 2.305; 1901-1902, emphasis added).  I believe that
these are the *Interpretants *of those previous words, rather than their
Immediate Objects, based on other passages in the same letter quoted above.

CSP:  A Sign is a Cognizable that ... so determines some actual or
potential Mind, the determination whereof I term the Interpretant created
by the Sign ... The Sign creates something in the Mind of the Interpreter
... And this creature of the Sign is called the Interpretant. It is created
by the Sign ... It is created in a Mind ...  (EP 2:492-493; 1909)


Finally, I am not sure that it was any particular "insight about the
relations between indices and immediate objects" that enabled Peirce to
"reduce to rule the logic of triadic and higher relations."  It may have
simply been his recognition that Indices are required for *all *reasoning--not
only regarding matters of fact, but also in pure mathematics.  On the other
hand ...

CSP:  An *index *represents an object by virtue of its connection with it.
It makes no difference whether the connection is natural, or artificial, or
merely mental. There is, however, an important distinction between two
classes of indices. Namely, some merely stand for things or individual
quasi-things with which the interpreting mind is already acquainted, while
others may be used to ascertain facts. Of the former class, which may be
termed *designations*, personal, demonstrative, and relative pronouns,
proper names, the letters attached to a geometrical figure, and the
ordinary letters of algebra are examples. They act to force the attention
to the thing intended. Designations are absolutely indispensable both to
communication and to thought. No assertion has any meaning unless there is
some designation to show whether the universe of reality or what universe
of fiction is referred to. (CP 8.368n23; c. 1899-1900?)


Of course, "Designative" was later one of Peirce's names for a Sign for
which the Mode of Presentation of the *Immediate *Object is Existent; so
perhaps this is what he had in mind when writing CP 2.305.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 5:13 PM,  wrote:

> Jeff, Francesco, list,
>
> In the discussion of an officer giving a soldier a command to "Ground
> Arms", Jeff, I don’t see why 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jerry, list

Here are some quotes:

4.536

"I have already noted that a Sign has an Object and an Interpretant,
the latter being that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that
is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an
exertion or to a Sign, which determination is the Interpretant. But
it remains to point out that there are usually two Objects, and more
than two Interpretants. Namely, we have to distinguish the Immediate
Object, which is the Object as the Sign itself represents it, and
whose Being is thus dependent upon the Representation of it in the
Sign, from the Dynamical Object, which is the Reality which by some
means contrives to determines the Sign to its Repesentation".

See also 5.473, where he differentiates 'that thing which causes a
sign as such is called the objectbut more accurately, the
existent object' [this is from the example of Ground arms]. Note -
Peirce changed the 'existent object to Dynamic Object...

And, the immediate object is the 'mental representation - NOT the
interpretation, but the mental representation..

8.314, 1909] 
 We must distinguish between the Immediate Object - ie the Object as
represented in the sign, and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object
is altogether fictive, I must choose a different term, therefore, )
say rather the Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things,
the Sign cannot express, which it can only indicate and leave the
interpreter to find out by collateral experience"...and the example
is the weather and his wife's question about it..

"Its Immediate Object is the notion of the present weather so far as
this is common to her mind and mind - not the character of it, but the
identity of it.."The Dynamical Object is the identity of the actual or
Real meteorological conditions at the moment …

I don't know if the above is of any use to you.

Edwina.
 On Fri 07/09/18  4:11 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
Dear list, 
I am not sure whether I am not heard or I am being ignored. 
I suppose when I hear crickets, it could be either or both or
neither. 
Yet, the question is posed where  
if the distinction between internal and external objects are
important enough to matter so as not to be trifling; that it ought to
be saved when discussing general matters regarding triadic relations, 

then  

that rule should be remembered in any algorithm put forth regarding
relations of sign object interpretant or object sign interpretant.   

But I don’t see how this can be done. 
Will no one help me?   

Where is the reference that decides the matter,  

or is this distinction not important enough for a philosopher?   
If the distinction is not important enough for a philosopher,  

then Peirce, surely, would have ignored or not treated of the
matter. 
With best wishes, 
 Jerry R 
 On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 3:03 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
 On 9/7/2018 10:51 AM, Francesco Bellucci wrote:
  But what does "map his terminologies to FOL" mean, really?
  I apologize.  The word 'map' in that sentence was a careless
 mistake.  I've been working on AI and computational linguistics
 for years, and I fully realize the enormous range of difficulties.
 For example, I have been quoting Peirce's note to B. E. Smith
 for years.
  So, it is one thing to say that we should evaluate Peirce's
 semiotic ideas on the background of logic: this I agree
 wholeheartedly and I wrote a book based precisely on this idea.
  Yes.  I have read many of your writings and cited some of them.
 I think they're very good.
 But I want to emphasize that a very useful subset of any natural
 language can indeed be mapped to FOL.  The earliest example is
 Ockham's theory of propositions, which is Part II of Summa Logicae.
 In that book, which Peirce had lectured on at Harvard, Ockham
 developed a model-theoretic semantics for a very useful subset
 of Latin:  simple sentences in Aristotle's four sentence types,
 and Boolean connectives for AND, OR, NOT, and IF-THEN.
 That version of Latin can express a large subset of FOL.
 Furthermore, the discourse representation structures (DRS) by
 Hans Kamp, which are widely used in computational linguistics,
 are limited to FOL.  In fact, they are isomorphic to Peirce's
 Alpha + Beta EGs.  For an overview, see slides 25 to 32 of
 http://jfsowa.com/talks/egintro.pdf [2]
 John
 -
 PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY
ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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Links:
--

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Brief note on the passing of V. Tejera at 95 years

[Atila Bayat]

Gary,
Thank you for the comments. I will look up digital versions for the Arisbe
web.

The 3 main journals I found his works on Peirce were *Transactions of CSP
Society, American Journal of Semiotics*, and *Semiotische Berichte*.  I was
unable to find the digital versions today, but I will try to get them out
this fall (I work from hardcopy).

I think VT’s books have shown that Peirce was more consistent in his usage
than our contemporary counterparts in Habermas, Eco, and Barthes. The main
driver was to use Peirce’s way of thinking to address aesthetics and
poetics as philosophic. He took the disciplines of aesthetics, semeiotic
and poetics as the disciplines to understand literary art, an effort he
advanced since his dissertation in 1956.

For his examination on the Hypothesis of Continuity in Parmenides, and
Peirce, I would direct you to chapters 17-18 in *Two Metaphysical
Naturalisms* 2015. These were long slated for publication, with some
overlap in the chapters - the editorial decision was to place them together
in that book without reducing them into one. VT was particular that
Parmenides is correct in conceptualizing Being in the sense of the All as
the exclusive alternative of not-being, opposing the view that something
can both be and not-be.

Taken together, I think he sought to formalize how art addresses the human
condition, at a certain level which he calls the perspective of humanity –
see his *Literature, Criticism and the Theory of Signs* book. Also, see
these 2 main papers here which continue the train of thought;

 "A Peircean Semeiotic for the Human Sciences, with Special Reference to
Aesthetics," *European Journal for Semiotic Studies* Vol.8 (2,3) and
Annales d' Esthetique Athens Greece: 1992-1993 Vol. 31-32

"Generality and Reflective Quality in Works of Art: A Peircean Account,"
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy Vol. XI, No.4, pp. 280-296



The other articles I have to note;

"Peirce's Semeiotic, and the Aesthetics of Literature," Transactions of the
C.S. Peirce Society XXIX (1993)



"The Triadic Semeiotic of Visual and Verbal Communication," *Semiotische
Berichte* SB 1,2,3,495 pp. 313-323 Jg.19 1-4, 1995

"To Which of Peirce's Sign Classes to Works of Art Belong?" *Semiotische
Berichte* SB 2,3,4/1996 pp. 321-328

"Eco, Peirce and Interpretationism, Review-Essay of *The Limits of
Interpretation"*

American Journal of Semiotics Vol.8 (1991). Reprinted in *Reading Eco: An
Anthology*, edited by Rocco Capozzi, Indiana University Press 1997

"Interpretation Theory and the Inadequacies of Binarist Semiology,"
*Semiotische
Berichte. *pp. 299-312 1995

"Semiotics, the Modes of Judgment & the Nature of Criticism," published in
ed. Gerard Deledalle *Signs of Humanity* L'homme et ses signes Volume III,
Mouton de Gruyter, Approaches to Semiotics 107. Also published in Semiotik
Interdisziplinar *European Journal for Semiotic Studies* V/VI Vol. 7-3,4
1995, pp. 669-683 [Chapter 4 of *Literature, Criticism, and the Theory of
Signs*]

"The Primacy of the Aesthetic in Peirce, and Classic American Philosophy,"
MS published in ed. Herman Parret, *Peirce and Value Theory*, (John
Benjamins Publishing, 1994)

"Lacan's Theory of Meaning, and Semeiotics," American Journal of Semiotics
No. X (1995-96)

"Has Habermas Understood Peirce?" Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce
Society Winter, 1996, Vol. XXXII, No. 1
Regards,
Atila


On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 7:28 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Dear Atila Bayat,
>
> Thank you for providing this excellent short biography of Victorino
> Tejera, a man who was not only an extraordinary scholar, but also teacher,
> poet, translator, and diplomat. What an extraordinary life!
>
> If feasible, we would like to place some of his scholarly work in the
> Peirce-Related Papers section of the Arisbe website:
> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/ so that if you know how that might possibly
> be facilitated, please do not hesitate to contact me or Ben Udell.
>
> And now I must locate my old copy of Jack Kerouac's *On the Road* to see
> how V.Tejera (aka 'Victor Villanueva') is characterized in that iconic
> piece of American biofiction.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
> *718 482-5690*
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 6:38 PM Atila Bayat  wrote:
>
>> Dear All,
>>
>> Professor Tejera was a sometime contributor to the Peirce list in the mid
>> 1990's in contact with J. Ransdell. He wrote two books in Semiotics, and
>> many articles as well. I can supply a complete bibliography upon request.
>> He contributed "The Centrality of Art in Classic American Philosophy" to
>> the Peirce sesquicentennial at Harvard in 1989 (which he asked me to read
>> on his behalf).
>>
>> His 2 semiotics books were;
>>
>> *1) Semiotics From Peirce to Barthes: A Conceptual Introduction to the
>> Study of Communication, Interpretation, and Expression* published by
>> E.J. Brill in 1988.
>>

RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[gnox]

Jeff, Francesco, list,

In the discussion of an officer giving a soldier a command to "Ground Arms",
Jeff, I don’t see why you assume that the object created by the sign is the
immediate object. I think it is the dynamic object, the same one that
determines the Sign — which is of course an imperative sentence. It’s a
peculiarity of imperatives that their dynamic object is in a sense identical
with their dynamic interpretant; an order is given (especially in the
context of a military drill) with the intention of being obeyed with as
little intellection as possible interfering with the dyadic force of the
order. That is, the interpretant is to be caused by the utterance of the
sign with no more interpretation than the automatic muscular action with
which the soldiers have been trained to respond to that sign. Ideally, the
only difference between the action intended by the officer and that carried
out by the soldiers is that the one precedes and ‘triggers’ the other.

If you ask what the immediate object of that sign, I’d be tempted to say
that it’s simply the words, “Ground arms.” Those words are the “hint”, the
part of the sign which indicates the dynamic object (which is both the
officer’s intention and the soldiers’ action). But I’m not sure what the
implications of this view would be for the “reduction to rule” problem you
introduce in the latter part of your post. 

Gary f.

 

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard  
Sent: 7-Sep-18 15:58
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Francesco Bellucci

Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

 

Francesco, List,

 

I am interested in drawing out the implications of Peirce's suggestion that,
in some cases, the sign creates the immediate object.  He uses the same
language of "creation" when he suggests that, in some cases, the sign can
create its interpretant.

 

In the discussion of an officer giving a soldier a command to "Ground Arms",
for instance, Peirce says "At any rate, it [i.e, object] determines the Sign
although it [i.e., the immediate object] is to be created by the Sign by the
circumstance that its Universe is relative to the momentary state of mind of
the officer. (CP 8.178)

 

The case is clearer, he says, when we consider relative pronouns. He puts
the point in the following way: 

 

Thus, while demonstrative and personal pronouns are, as ordinarily used,
"genuine indices," relative pronouns are "degenerate indices"; for though
they may, accidentally and indirectly, refer to existing things, they
directly refer, and need only refer, to the images in the mind which
previous words have created. (CP, 2.305)

 

I find the implications of these claims about the creation of immediate
objects to be of some interest. In the same paragraph, he says:

 

Accordingly, we find that indices are absolutely indispensable in
mathematics; and until this truth was comprehended, all efforts to reduce to
rule the logic of triadic and higher relations failed; while as soon as it
was once grasped the problem was solved (my emphasis). The ordinary letters
of algebra that present no peculiarities are indices. So also are the
letters A, B, C, etc., attached to a geometrical figure. Lawyers and others
who have to state a complicated affair with precision have recourse to
letters to distinguish individuals. Letters so used are merely improved
relative pronouns. 

 

Why, do you think, was this insight about the relations between indices and
immediate objects necessary in order to "reduce to rule" the logic of
triadic and higher relations? It isn't clear to me why previous efforts
failed or what the successful "reduction to a rule" really involves.

 

Yours,

 

Jeff

 

 

 

 

 

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

  _  

From: Francesco Bellucci mailto:bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> >
Sent: Friday, September 7, 2018 12:12:24 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu  
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object 

 

Helmut, List 

 

The DO is not affected by the sign. If the sign is "Obama is an Englishman",
Obama remains an American and is not affected by being represented as an
Englishman by the sign. 

 

The IO is affected by the sign in this sense, that the sign says what its
own DO is, i.e. the sign has a proper part of it that indicates the DO. In
this sense, the "being" of the IO depends on the sign, i.e. depends on being
that part of the sign that indicates the DO

 

Francesco

 

On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 8:47 PM, Helmut Raulien mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de> > wrote:

Francesco, List,

I feel that I cannot work with an equation or model in which a variable (O)
stands for two totally different things, with something as fundamental as
the epistemic cut going right through it. Is the DO influenced by the sign
or not? Sometimes it is, sometimes not. If people talk about the andromeda
galaxy, it is clear, that the andromeda 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Francesco, List:

Thank you for the citations.

CSP, cited by FB:  *Subject *and *Object *are the same thing except for
trifling distinctions ... (EP 2:494; 1909)


This seems clear enough--except that just two paragraphs later, Peirce
explicitly made *the very same distinction* between Subject and Object that
I do--one that I think is hardly "trifling."

CSP:  The Object of every Sign is an Individual, usually an Individual
Collection of Individuals. Its *Subjects*, i.e., the Parts of the Sign that
denote the Partial Objects, are either *directions for finding the Objects*
or are *Cyrioids*, i.e. signs of single Objects ... Such for example are
all *abstract *nouns, which are names of single characters, the personal
pronouns, and the demonstrative and relative pronouns, etc. By directions
for finding the Objects, for which I have as yet invented no other word
than "Selective*" I mean such as "Any" (i.e., any you please), "Some"
(i.e., one properly selected), etc. (EP 2:494-495; 1909)


In this context, it seems clear that by "Object" Peirce meant what he
called the *Dynamical *Object another two paragraphs later.  I believe that
"Sign" here is shorthand for "Sign-Replica" (Token), since the external
Object of a Type is *not *an Individual, but a *collectively general *class.
He evidently had in mind Sign-Replicas that are combinations of other
Sign-Replicas in accordance with his "theorem" of the "science of
semeiotics," which "is that if any signs are connected, no matter how, the
resulting system constitutes one sign" (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904).

A Subject is not an Object of the complex Sign-Replica of which it is a
Part, it is *itself *a Sign-Replica that *denotes *one of those Objects.
Moreover, a Subject is *any* such constituent Sign-Replica that "cannot be
understood by a person who has no collateral acquaintance with" *its *Object
(SS 70; 1908).  For an abstract noun (such as "mortality" or "lethargy"),
this Object is the Real character that it names.  For a personal,
demonstrative, or relative pronoun, this Object is whatever it *indicates*
within the specific context of the utterance.  For a quantified general
term, this Object is a member of the corresponding class to be chosen by
either the Utterer ("some") or the Interpreter ("any") if it is not already
identified ("this").

Now consider what Peirce wrote right before the quotation above.

CSP:  In the first place, it should be observed that so far as the Sign
denotes its Object, it calls for no particular *intelligence *or *Reason *on
the part of its Interpreter. To read the Sign at all, and distinguish one
Sign from another, what is requisite is delicate perceptions and
acquaintance with what the usual concomitants of such appearances are, and
what the conventions of the systems of signs are. To know the Object, what
is requisite is previous experience of that Individual Object. (EP 2:494;
1909)


An Interpreter who only had mere Sign System Acquaintance could read the
Sign-Replica and understand what it denotes to the minimal extent of
knowing all of the definitions within the Sign System.  This is that
Sign-Replica's *Immediate *Object--i.e., its Essential Breadth, which
corresponds to its Essential Depth, which is its Immediate Interpretant,
"its peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter ... an
abstraction, consisting in a Possibility" (SS 111; 1909).  Anything
that is *capable
*of being interpreted as a Replica (Token) of a Sign (Type) within some
Sign System has an Immediate *Interpretant*, and therefore an Immediate
*Object*.  However, an Interpreter must have Collateral Experience in order
to know the the Sign-Replica's *Dynamic *Object--i.e., its *Informed *
Breadth.

CSP, cited by FB:  A Proposition is a sign which distinctly indicates the
Object which it denotes, called its Subject. (R 425:135-136, CP 2.95; 1902)
FB:  the object indicated is "called" subject. Here it's not the subject
that indicates the object: it's the proposition that "distinctly" (=
separately) indicate its object (=subject)


Ordinarily "distinctly" is equated with "clearly," rather than
"separately."  However, having read your book, I am aware that you cite
another passage on p. 293.

CSP:   ... we may mean the immediate object, the object as the sign
represents it.  For some signs separately represent their objects.  Every
proposition does so ... we may mean the *immediate* interpretant, or that
which the sign itself represents to be its intended interpretant.  For some
signs do separately represent their own interpretants, as an argument, for
example, generally does. (R 284:54-55; 1906)


However, the fact that some Signs (i.e., Rhemes) do not "distinctly" or
"separately" represent their Objects obviously does not entail that they do
not represent their Objects *at all*; in that case, they would not be
Signs!  The *Immediate* Object is *whatever* aspect of a Sign-Replica
enables it to denote its *Dynamic* Object within a particular Sign 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



I am not sure whether I am not heard or I am being ignored.



I suppose when I hear crickets, it could be either or both or neither.



Yet, the question is posed where



if the distinction between internal and external objects are important
enough to matter so as not to be trifling; that it ought to be saved when
discussing general matters regarding triadic relations,



then

that rule should be remembered in any algorithm put forth regarding
relations of sign object interpretant or object sign interpretant.

But I don’t see how this can be done.



Will no one help me?

Where is the reference that decides the matter,

or is this distinction not important enough for a philosopher?



If the distinction is not important enough for a philosopher,

then Peirce, surely, would have ignored or not treated of the matter.



With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 3:03 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 9/7/2018 10:51 AM, Francesco Bellucci wrote:
>
>> But what does "map his terminologies to FOL" mean, really?
>>
>
> I apologize.  The word 'map' in that sentence was a careless
> mistake.  I've been working on AI and computational linguistics
> for years, and I fully realize the enormous range of difficulties.
> For example, I have been quoting Peirce's note to B. E. Smith
> for years.
>
> So, it is one thing to say that we should evaluate Peirce's
>> semiotic ideas on the background of logic: this I agree
>> wholeheartedly and I wrote a book based precisely on this idea.
>>
>
> Yes.  I have read many of your writings and cited some of them.
> I think they're very good.
>
> But I want to emphasize that a very useful subset of any natural
> language can indeed be mapped to FOL.  The earliest example is
> Ockham's theory of propositions, which is Part II of Summa Logicae.
>
> In that book, which Peirce had lectured on at Harvard, Ockham
> developed a model-theoretic semantics for a very useful subset
> of Latin:  simple sentences in Aristotle's four sentence types,
> and Boolean connectives for AND, OR, NOT, and IF-THEN.
> That version of Latin can express a large subset of FOL.
>
> Furthermore, the discourse representation structures (DRS) by
> Hans Kamp, which are widely used in computational linguistics,
> are limited to FOL.  In fact, they are isomorphic to Peirce's
> Alpha + Beta EGs.  For an overview, see slides 25 to 32 of
> http://jfsowa.com/talks/egintro.pdf
>
> John
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
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Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[John F Sowa]

On 9/7/2018 10:51 AM, Francesco Bellucci wrote:

But what does "map his terminologies to FOL" mean, really?


I apologize.  The word 'map' in that sentence was a careless
mistake.  I've been working on AI and computational linguistics
for years, and I fully realize the enormous range of difficulties.
For example, I have been quoting Peirce's note to B. E. Smith
for years.


So, it is one thing to say that we should evaluate Peirce's
semiotic ideas on the background of logic: this I agree
wholeheartedly and I wrote a book based precisely on this idea.


Yes.  I have read many of your writings and cited some of them.
I think they're very good.

But I want to emphasize that a very useful subset of any natural
language can indeed be mapped to FOL.  The earliest example is
Ockham's theory of propositions, which is Part II of Summa Logicae.

In that book, which Peirce had lectured on at Harvard, Ockham
developed a model-theoretic semantics for a very useful subset
of Latin:  simple sentences in Aristotle's four sentence types,
and Boolean connectives for AND, OR, NOT, and IF-THEN.
That version of Latin can express a large subset of FOL.

Furthermore, the discourse representation structures (DRS) by
Hans Kamp, which are widely used in computational linguistics,
are limited to FOL.  In fact, they are isomorphic to Peirce's
Alpha + Beta EGs.  For an overview, see slides 25 to 32 of
http://jfsowa.com/talks/egintro.pdf

John

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Francesco, List,



I am interested in drawing out the implications of Peirce's suggestion that, in 
some cases, the sign creates the immediate object.  He uses the same language 
of "creation" when he suggests that, in some cases, the sign can create its 
interpretant.



In the discussion of an officer giving a soldier a command to "Ground Arms", 
for instance, Peirce says "At any rate, it [i.e, object] determines the Sign 
although it [i.e., the immediate object] is to be created by the Sign by the 
circumstance that its Universe is relative to the momentary state of mind of 
the officer. (CP 8.178)



The case is clearer, he says, when we consider relative pronouns. He puts the 
point in the following way:



Thus, while demonstrative and personal pronouns are, as ordinarily used, 
"genuine indices," relative pronouns are "degenerate indices"; for though they 
may, accidentally and indirectly, refer to existing things, they directly 
refer, and need only refer, to the images in the mind which previous words have 
created. (CP, 2.305)



I find the implications of these claims about the creation of immediate objects 
to be of some interest. In the same paragraph, he says:



Accordingly, we find that indices are absolutely indispensable in mathematics; 
and until this truth was comprehended, all efforts to reduce to rule the logic 
of triadic and higher relations failed; while as soon as it was once grasped 
the problem was solved (my emphasis). The ordinary letters of algebra that 
present no peculiarities are indices. So also are the letters A, B, C, etc., 
attached to a geometrical figure. Lawyers and others who have to state a 
complicated affair with precision have recourse to letters to distinguish 
individuals. Letters so used are merely improved relative pronouns.



Why, do you think, was this insight about the relations between indices and 
immediate objects necessary in order to "reduce to rule" the logic of triadic 
and higher relations? It isn't clear to me why previous efforts failed or what 
the successful "reduction to a rule" really involves.



Yours,



Jeff







Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Francesco Bellucci 
Sent: Friday, September 7, 2018 12:12:24 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

Helmut, List

The DO is not affected by the sign. If the sign is "Obama is an Englishman", 
Obama remains an American and is not affected by being represented as an 
Englishman by the sign.

The IO is affected by the sign in this sense, that the sign says what its own 
DO is, i.e. the sign has a proper part of it that indicates the DO. In this 
sense, the "being" of the IO depends on the sign, i.e. depends on being that 
part of the sign that indicates the DO

Francesco

On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 8:47 PM, Helmut Raulien 
mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de>> wrote:
Francesco, List,
I feel that I cannot work with an equation or model in which a variable (O) 
stands for two totally different things, with something as fundamental as the 
epistemic cut going right through it. Is the DO influenced by the sign or not? 
Sometimes it is, sometimes not. If people talk about the andromeda galaxy, it 
is clear, that the andromeda galaxy is no affected at all by the sign. If they 
are talking about their friendship, it (the DO "our friendship") certainly is 
(affected by the sign).
I am just looking for consistencies of models, and model´s applicational 
performances. Maybe expecting too much, please excuse my muttering!
Best,
Helmut

 07. September 2018 um 19:52 Uhr
 "Francesco Bellucci" 
mailto:bellucci.france...@googlemail.com>> 
wrote:

Helmut, List

Subject in a sentence and object in the sentence as a sign are the same thing, 
yes. And the subject in the sentence is not external, so the object neither is. 
But the thing the object is about, is (external). So, is the thing the dynamic 
object, and the subject the immediate? I would be not happy with saying so, 
because the dynamic object is the object too.

It's enough to distinguish the real thing as the external object (i.e. external 
to the sign) and the subject of the sentence as the internal object (i.e. 
internal to the sign). Or, as Peirce did, to distinguish a dynamic from an 
immediate object. At that point, the dynamic object is the object too, but so 
is the subject of the sentence

F

To solve this problem, as the only way it seems to me to say:
The immediate object is what the sign carries for information about the thing. 
The dynamic object is not the thing, but the role the thing plays in the sign 
minus the immediate object. That would be e.g. the knowledge that the thing 
exists (or doesn´t, like a phenix), and that there is a lot about the thing 
unknown by the sign´s interpreter/s.
But that would be saying, that the dynamic object is internal to the sign in 
the way that 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

Helmut, List

The DO is not affected by the sign. If the sign is "Obama is an
Englishman", Obama remains an American and is not affected by being
represented as an Englishman by the sign.

The IO is affected by the sign in this sense, that the sign says what its
own DO is, i.e. the sign has a proper part of it that indicates the DO. In
this sense, the "being" of the IO depends on the sign, i.e. depends on
being that part of the sign that indicates the DO

Francesco

On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 8:47 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Francesco, List,
> I feel that I cannot work with an equation or model in which a variable
> (O) stands for two totally different things, with something as fundamental
> as the epistemic cut going right through it. Is the DO influenced by the
> sign or not? Sometimes it is, sometimes not. If people talk about the
> andromeda galaxy, it is clear, that the andromeda galaxy is no affected at
> all by the sign. If they are talking about their friendship, it (the DO
> "our friendship") certainly is (affected by the sign).
> I am just looking for consistencies of models, and model´s applicational
> performances. Maybe expecting too much, please excuse my muttering!
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>  07. September 2018 um 19:52 Uhr
>  "Francesco Bellucci"  wrote:
>
> Helmut, List
>
>
>> Subject in a sentence and object in the sentence as a sign are the same
>> thing, yes. And the subject in the sentence is not external, so the object
>> neither is. But the thing the object is about, is (external). So, is the
>> thing the dynamic object, and the subject the immediate? I would be not
>> happy with saying so, because the dynamic object is the object too.
>>
>
> It's enough to distinguish the real thing as the external object (i.e.
> external to the sign) and the subject of the sentence as the internal
> object (i.e. internal to the sign). Or, as Peirce did, to distinguish a
> dynamic from an immediate object. At that point, the dynamic object is the
> object too, but so is the subject of the sentence
>
> F
>
>
>> To solve this problem, as the only way it seems to me to say:
>> The immediate object is what the sign carries for information about the
>> thing. The dynamic object is not the thing, but the role the thing plays in
>> the sign minus the immediate object. That would be e.g. the knowledge that
>> the thing exists (or doesn´t, like a phenix), and that there is a lot about
>> the thing unknown by the sign´s interpreter/s.
>> But that would be saying, that the dynamic object is internal to the sign
>> in the way that it is plaing a role for it (has a function), and external,
>> in the way that it is knowledge not shared by the sign´s interpreter´s.
>> So I think that both, immediate and dynamic object, are not the thing,
>> but its roles or functions within the sign. Unknown knowledge is internal
>> in the way, that, although the knowledge is external, the knowledge that
>> the knowledge is unknown is a function inside the sign.
>> So the DO is external, but that doesn´t mean that it is not internal.
>> Problem solved, Peirce not contradicted, everybody happy. If only that
>> would be so easy.
>> Best, Helmut
>>  07. September 2018 um 16:39 Uhr
>>
>> "John F Sowa"  wrote:
>>
>> Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,
>>
>> FB
>> > "Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling
>> distinctions" (EP 2:494)
>>
>> Yes! And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
>> logicians today. This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
>> confirm the point I was trying to make: From age 12 to 74, Peirce
>> was a logician. Every version of logic that he used or invented
>> had a precise mapping to his algebra of 1885, to his later EGs,
>> and to the most widely used logics today.
>>
>> Peirce was also a professional lexicographer. Note his letter
>> to the editor of the Century Dictionary, Benjamin E. Smith, who
>> had also been one of his students at Johns Hopkins:
>>
>> > The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the
>> > same thing, all the ideas that seek expression, is the most
>> > stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished
>> > logician must break down in it utterly; and even for the strongest
>> > man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and
>> > faculty.
>>
>> Implication: Over the years, Peirce had described his logics and
>> the versions designed by other logicians in various ways. He also
>> explored other versions in his Gamma graphs, 3-valued logic, modal
>> logics, and metalanguage. But his first-order logic was equivalent
>> to the core (Alpha + Beta) of existential graphs, and to "classical
>> first-order logic" today. For the history, see "Peirce the logician"
>> by Hilary Putnam: http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm
>>
>> When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and others,
>> always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL. If they
>> can't, then ask what extensions or variations would be needed.

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Helmut Raulien]

Francesco, List,

I feel that I cannot work with an equation or model in which a variable (O) stands for two totally different things, with something as fundamental as the epistemic cut going right through it. Is the DO influenced by the sign or not? Sometimes it is, sometimes not. If people talk about the andromeda galaxy, it is clear, that the andromeda galaxy is no affected at all by the sign. If they are talking about their friendship, it (the DO "our friendship") certainly is (affected by the sign).

I am just looking for consistencies of models, and model´s applicational performances. Maybe expecting too much, please excuse my muttering!

Best,

Helmut

 

 07. September 2018 um 19:52 Uhr
 "Francesco Bellucci"  wrote:
 


Helmut, List
 







Subject in a sentence and object in the sentence as a sign are the same thing, yes. And the subject in the sentence is not external, so the object neither is. But the thing the object is about, is (external). So, is the thing the dynamic object, and the subject the immediate? I would be not happy with saying so, because the dynamic object is the object too.







 

It's enough to distinguish the real thing as the external object (i.e. external to the sign) and the subject of the sentence as the internal object (i.e. internal to the sign). Or, as Peirce did, to distinguish a dynamic from an immediate object. At that point, the dynamic object is the object too, but so is the subject of the sentence

 

F

 







To solve this problem, as the only way it seems to me to say:

The immediate object is what the sign carries for information about the thing. The dynamic object is not the thing, but the role the thing plays in the sign minus the immediate object. That would be e.g. the knowledge that the thing exists (or doesn´t, like a phenix), and that there is a lot about the thing unknown by the sign´s interpreter/s.

But that would be saying, that the dynamic object is internal to the sign in the way that it is plaing a role for it (has a function), and external, in the way that it is knowledge not shared by the sign´s interpreter´s.

So I think that both, immediate and dynamic object, are not the thing, but its roles or functions within the sign. Unknown knowledge is internal in the way, that, although the knowledge is external, the knowledge that the knowledge is unknown is a function inside the sign.

So the DO is external, but that doesn´t mean that it is not internal. Problem solved, Peirce not contradicted, everybody happy. If only that would be so easy.

Best, Helmut


 07. September 2018 um 16:39 Uhr


"John F Sowa"  wrote:
 





Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,

FB
> "Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling distinctions" (EP 2:494)

Yes! And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
logicians today. This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
confirm the point I was trying to make: From age 12 to 74, Peirce
was a logician. Every version of logic that he used or invented
had a precise mapping to his algebra of 1885, to his later EGs,
and to the most widely used logics today.

Peirce was also a professional lexicographer. Note his letter
to the editor of the Century Dictionary, Benjamin E. Smith, who
had also been one of his students at Johns Hopkins:

> The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the
> same thing, all the ideas that seek _expression_, is the most
> stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished
> logician must break down in it utterly; and even for the strongest
> man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and
> faculty.

Implication: Over the years, Peirce had described his logics and
the versions designed by other logicians in various ways. He also
explored other versions in his Gamma graphs, 3-valued logic, modal
logics, and metalanguage. But his first-order logic was equivalent
to the core (Alpha + Beta) of existential graphs, and to "classical
first-order logic" today. For the history, see "Peirce the logician"
by Hilary Putnam: http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm

When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and others,
always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL. If they
can't, then ask what extensions or variations would be needed.

ET
> I'm trying to emphasize... that Peircean semiotics is not
> expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in its pragmatic
> application to material life.
>
> My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce
> is often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since
> Peirce often changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the
> vital ground of Peircean semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental
> nature of Peircean semiotics - which is its pragmaticism.

I completely agree. But Peirce's logic was constant while his
terminology was changing. Peirce put far more emphasis on mapping
logic to and from perception and action than anyone else. But 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



If:

“It's enough to distinguish the real thing as the external object (i.e.
external to the sign) and the subject of the sentence as the internal
object (i.e. internal to the sign)



then:

what is the ‘Object’ in Sign Object Interpretant or Object Sign
Interpretant?



Will you supply a reference where the matter can be settled?



With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 12:52 PM, Francesco Bellucci <
bellucci.france...@googlemail.com> wrote:

> Helmut, List
>
> Subject in a sentence and object in the sentence as a sign are the same
>> thing, yes. And the subject in the sentence is not external, so the object
>> neither is. But the thing the object is about, is (external). So, is the
>> thing the dynamic object, and the subject the immediate? I would be not
>> happy with saying so, because the dynamic object is the object too.
>>
>
> It's enough to distinguish the real thing as the external object (i.e.
> external to the sign) and the subject of the sentence as the internal
> object (i.e. internal to the sign). Or, as Peirce did, to distinguish a
> dynamic from an immediate object. At that point, the dynamic object is the
> object too, but so is the subject of the sentence
>
> F
>
>
>> To solve this problem, as the only way it seems to me to say:
>> The immediate object is what the sign carries for information about the
>> thing. The dynamic object is not the thing, but the role the thing plays in
>> the sign minus the immediate object. That would be e.g. the knowledge that
>> the thing exists (or doesn´t, like a phenix), and that there is a lot about
>> the thing unknown by the sign´s interpreter/s.
>> But that would be saying, that the dynamic object is internal to the sign
>> in the way that it is plaing a role for it (has a function), and external,
>> in the way that it is knowledge not shared by the sign´s interpreter´s.
>> So I think that both, immediate and dynamic object, are not the thing,
>> but its roles or functions within the sign. Unknown knowledge is internal
>> in the way, that, although the knowledge is external, the knowledge that
>> the knowledge is unknown is a function inside the sign.
>> So the DO is external, but that doesn´t mean that it is not internal.
>> Problem solved, Peirce not contradicted, everybody happy. If only that
>> would be so easy.
>> Best, Helmut
>>  07. September 2018 um 16:39 Uhr
>>
>> "John F Sowa"  wrote:
>>
>> Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,
>>
>> FB
>> > "Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling
>> distinctions" (EP 2:494)
>>
>> Yes! And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
>> logicians today. This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
>> confirm the point I was trying to make: From age 12 to 74, Peirce
>> was a logician. Every version of logic that he used or invented
>> had a precise mapping to his algebra of 1885, to his later EGs,
>> and to the most widely used logics today.
>>
>> Peirce was also a professional lexicographer. Note his letter
>> to the editor of the Century Dictionary, Benjamin E. Smith, who
>> had also been one of his students at Johns Hopkins:
>>
>> > The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the
>> > same thing, all the ideas that seek expression, is the most
>> > stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished
>> > logician must break down in it utterly; and even for the strongest
>> > man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and
>> > faculty.
>>
>> Implication: Over the years, Peirce had described his logics and
>> the versions designed by other logicians in various ways. He also
>> explored other versions in his Gamma graphs, 3-valued logic, modal
>> logics, and metalanguage. But his first-order logic was equivalent
>> to the core (Alpha + Beta) of existential graphs, and to "classical
>> first-order logic" today. For the history, see "Peirce the logician"
>> by Hilary Putnam: http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm
>>
>> When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and others,
>> always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL. If they
>> can't, then ask what extensions or variations would be needed.
>>
>> ET
>> > I'm trying to emphasize... that Peircean semiotics is not
>> > expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in its pragmatic
>> > application to material life.
>> >
>> > My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce
>> > is often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since
>> > Peirce often changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the
>> > vital ground of Peircean semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental
>> > nature of Peircean semiotics - which is its pragmaticism.
>>
>> I completely agree. But Peirce's logic was constant while his
>> terminology was changing. Peirce put far more emphasis on mapping
>> logic to and from perception and action than anyone else. But his
>> terminology was idiosyncratic. His logic is the foundation for
>> relating his 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

Helmut, List

Subject in a sentence and object in the sentence as a sign are the same
> thing, yes. And the subject in the sentence is not external, so the object
> neither is. But the thing the object is about, is (external). So, is the
> thing the dynamic object, and the subject the immediate? I would be not
> happy with saying so, because the dynamic object is the object too.
>

It's enough to distinguish the real thing as the external object (i.e.
external to the sign) and the subject of the sentence as the internal
object (i.e. internal to the sign). Or, as Peirce did, to distinguish a
dynamic from an immediate object. At that point, the dynamic object is the
object too, but so is the subject of the sentence

F


> To solve this problem, as the only way it seems to me to say:
> The immediate object is what the sign carries for information about the
> thing. The dynamic object is not the thing, but the role the thing plays in
> the sign minus the immediate object. That would be e.g. the knowledge that
> the thing exists (or doesn´t, like a phenix), and that there is a lot about
> the thing unknown by the sign´s interpreter/s.
> But that would be saying, that the dynamic object is internal to the sign
> in the way that it is plaing a role for it (has a function), and external,
> in the way that it is knowledge not shared by the sign´s interpreter´s.
> So I think that both, immediate and dynamic object, are not the thing, but
> its roles or functions within the sign. Unknown knowledge is internal in
> the way, that, although the knowledge is external, the knowledge that the
> knowledge is unknown is a function inside the sign.
> So the DO is external, but that doesn´t mean that it is not internal.
> Problem solved, Peirce not contradicted, everybody happy. If only that
> would be so easy.
> Best, Helmut
>  07. September 2018 um 16:39 Uhr
>
> "John F Sowa"  wrote:
>
> Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,
>
> FB
> > "Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling distinctions"
> (EP 2:494)
>
> Yes! And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
> logicians today. This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
> confirm the point I was trying to make: From age 12 to 74, Peirce
> was a logician. Every version of logic that he used or invented
> had a precise mapping to his algebra of 1885, to his later EGs,
> and to the most widely used logics today.
>
> Peirce was also a professional lexicographer. Note his letter
> to the editor of the Century Dictionary, Benjamin E. Smith, who
> had also been one of his students at Johns Hopkins:
>
> > The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the
> > same thing, all the ideas that seek expression, is the most
> > stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished
> > logician must break down in it utterly; and even for the strongest
> > man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and
> > faculty.
>
> Implication: Over the years, Peirce had described his logics and
> the versions designed by other logicians in various ways. He also
> explored other versions in his Gamma graphs, 3-valued logic, modal
> logics, and metalanguage. But his first-order logic was equivalent
> to the core (Alpha + Beta) of existential graphs, and to "classical
> first-order logic" today. For the history, see "Peirce the logician"
> by Hilary Putnam: http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm
>
> When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and others,
> always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL. If they
> can't, then ask what extensions or variations would be needed.
>
> ET
> > I'm trying to emphasize... that Peircean semiotics is not
> > expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in its pragmatic
> > application to material life.
> >
> > My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce
> > is often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since
> > Peirce often changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the
> > vital ground of Peircean semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental
> > nature of Peircean semiotics - which is its pragmaticism.
>
> I completely agree. But Peirce's logic was constant while his
> terminology was changing. Peirce put far more emphasis on mapping
> logic to and from perception and action than anyone else. But his
> terminology was idiosyncratic. His logic is the foundation for
> relating his terminology to any versions in use today.
>
> That foundation is key to bringing Peirce into the 21st century.
> Logicians, philosophers, and computer scientists today will never
> study Peirce unless we can show exactly how his writings relate
> to what they're doing now and what they still need to do.
>
> JAS
> > my own purpose in focusing so much on Peirce's concepts and
> > terminology in logic as semeiotic is not for its own sake, but
> > primarily for the purpose of making our ideas clear.
>
> Yes. That was Peirce's motivation throughout his career. And logic
> 

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Helmut Raulien]

 

John, list,

Subject in a sentence and object in the sentence as a sign are the same thing, yes. And the subject in the sentence is not external, so the object neither is. But the thing the object is about, is (external). So, is the thing the dynamic object, and the subject the immediate? I would be not happy with saying so, because the dynamic object is the object too.

To solve this problem, as the only way it seems to me to say:

The immediate object is what the sign carries for information about the thing. The dynamic object is not the thing, but the role the thing plays in the sign minus the immediate object. That would be e.g. the knowledge that the thing exists (or doesn´t, like a phenix), and that there is a lot about the thing unknown by the sign´s interpreter/s.

But that would be saying, that the dynamic object is internal to the sign in the way that it is plaing a role for it (has a function), and external, in the way that it is knowledge not shared by the sign´s interpreter´s.

So I think that both, immediate and dynamic object, are not the thing, but its roles or functions within the sign. Unknown knowledge is internal in the way, that, although the knowledge is external, the knowledge that the knowledge is unknown is a function inside the sign.

So the DO is external, but that doesn´t mean that it is not internal. Problem solved, Peirce not contradicted, everybody happy. If only that would be so easy.

Best, Helmut


 07. September 2018 um 16:39 Uhr
"John F Sowa"  wrote:
 

Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,

FB
> "Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling distinctions" (EP 2:494)

Yes! And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
logicians today. This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
confirm the point I was trying to make: From age 12 to 74, Peirce
was a logician. Every version of logic that he used or invented
had a precise mapping to his algebra of 1885, to his later EGs,
and to the most widely used logics today.

Peirce was also a professional lexicographer. Note his letter
to the editor of the Century Dictionary, Benjamin E. Smith, who
had also been one of his students at Johns Hopkins:

> The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the
> same thing, all the ideas that seek _expression_, is the most
> stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished
> logician must break down in it utterly; and even for the strongest
> man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and
> faculty.

Implication: Over the years, Peirce had described his logics and
the versions designed by other logicians in various ways. He also
explored other versions in his Gamma graphs, 3-valued logic, modal
logics, and metalanguage. But his first-order logic was equivalent
to the core (Alpha + Beta) of existential graphs, and to "classical
first-order logic" today. For the history, see "Peirce the logician"
by Hilary Putnam: http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm

When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and others,
always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL. If they
can't, then ask what extensions or variations would be needed.

ET
> I'm trying to emphasize... that Peircean semiotics is not
> expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in its pragmatic
> application to material life.
>
> My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce
> is often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since
> Peirce often changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the
> vital ground of Peircean semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental
> nature of Peircean semiotics - which is its pragmaticism.

I completely agree. But Peirce's logic was constant while his
terminology was changing. Peirce put far more emphasis on mapping
logic to and from perception and action than anyone else. But his
terminology was idiosyncratic. His logic is the foundation for
relating his terminology to any versions in use today.

That foundation is key to bringing Peirce into the 21st century.
Logicians, philosophers, and computer scientists today will never
study Peirce unless we can show exactly how his writings relate
to what they're doing now and what they still need to do.

JAS
> my own purpose in focusing so much on Peirce's concepts and
> terminology in logic as semeiotic is not for its own sake, but
> primarily for the purpose of making our ideas clear.

Yes. That was Peirce's motivation throughout his career. And logic
was always his primary tool, as he said explicitly in 1877.

JAS
> Peirce defined pragmatism as "no attempt to determine any truth
> of things," but rather "merely a method of ascertaining the meanings
> of hard words and of abstract concepts" (CP 5.464, EP 2:400; 1907).

Yes. And remember his comment to Benjamin Smith.

JAS
> no one on the List is advocating "Platonic idealism."
> Why keep bringing it up?

I was citing Peirce's "three universes": possibility, actuality,
and the necessitated. 

[PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, Francesco, list

I'd like to thank you both for your posts of today - which, to me,
focus on the vital aspects of Peircean semiosis - namely, the
function of it as a logical pragmaticism.

1] John wrote: "  But Peirce's logic was constant while his 
  terminology was changing.  Peirce put far more emphasis on mapping 
  logic to and from perception and action than anyone else.  But his 
  terminology was idiosyncratic.  His logic is the foundation for 
  relating his terminology to any versions in use today"

I fully agree - Peirce changed his terms frequently and my view is
that the focus should not be to insist on a specific singular meaning
of a term, but to analyze the function of that term in the whole
system: that logic-of-pragmaticism. And by the way- I understand
logic as the foundation of all life, from the physico-chemical to the
biological to the human conceptual. So - logical processes and
pragmaticism are not human endeavours but are universal actions; that
is, they are all 'relations of reason' [see John's 5.448 quotations
below].

2] With regard to my concern about a retreat into Platonic idealism,
this was based in the JAS concept of the 'genuine Sign' which is fully
general - about which Francesco has also queried. 

3] And - making our ideas clear, to me, isn't based on insisting on
terms with singular definitive meanings that are not open to
interpretation but are instead authoritative as almost necessary
laws, but on interpretation - and this includes examining the logical
relations within the semiosic interaction - which action is always
triadic. Quite frankly, I think one can use different terms for these
semiosic relations; certainly, I think we can examine the works of
various researchers in physics, biology and cognition - and even
though they use different terms - I think we might see that they are
all talking about the same issues - those logical semiosic relations
that exist in the world.

4]I acknowledge that my interest is in exploring the power of
Peircean semiosis to explain what is going on in the actual world -
in physics, chemistry, biology, economics and societies - and yes, I
claim that semiosis does function in all these realms. Because the
universe is logical.  As Peirce said - 

"  It seems a strange thing, when one comes to ponder over it, that
a sign 
  should leave its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning; but
the 
  explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire
universe 
 — not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider
universe, 
  embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which
we are 
  all accustomed to refer to as "the truth" — that all this
universe is 
  perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs"
[5.448 #1]

And by 'sign', I understand not the term but the process, the
triadic process of logical relations.

Edwina
 On Fri 07/09/18 10:39 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS, 
 FB 
 > "Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling
distinctions" (EP 2:494) 
 Yes!  And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by 
 logicians today.  This quotation and the others cited by Francesco 
 confirm the point I was trying to make:  From age 12 to 74, Peirce 
 was a logician.  Every version of logic that he used or invented 
 had a precise mapping to his algebra of 1885, to his later EGs, 
 and to the most widely used logics today. 
 Peirce was also a professional lexicographer.  Note his letter 
 to the editor of the Century Dictionary, Benjamin E. Smith, who 
 had also been one of his students at Johns Hopkins: 
 > The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the 
 > same thing, all the ideas that seek expression, is the most 
 > stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished 
 > logician must break down in it utterly; and even for the strongest

 > man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and 
 > faculty. 
 Implication:  Over the years, Peirce had described his logics and 
 the versions designed by other logicians in various ways.  He also 
 explored other versions in his Gamma graphs, 3-valued logic, modal 
 logics, and metalanguage.  But his first-order logic was equivalent 
 to the core (Alpha + Beta) of existential graphs, and to "classical 
 first-order logic" today.  For the history, see "Peirce the
logician" 
 by Hilary Putnam:  http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm [1] 
 When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and others, 
 always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL.  If they 
 can't, then ask what extensions or variations would be needed. 
 ET 
 > I'm trying to emphasize... that Peircean semiotics is not 
 > expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in its pragmatic 
 > application to material life. 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

John, List

You say "When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and
others, always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL."

I agree wholeheartedly that Peirce's lifelong main interest was in logic,
and that we should evaluate his semiotic doctrines assuming that he is
talking logic.

But what does "map his terminologies to FOL" mean, really? Peirce
discovered quantification theory. This theory proved that a proposition is
not composed of general signs alone (symbols), but needs to use indices.
Thus a proposition as "Something loves anything" requires two indices
("something" and "anything") and a symbol ("---loves"). A symbol is a
sign whose object is general, an index a sign whose object is individual.

This is a "grammatical" (= semiotic) analysis of the proposition, and is
informed by the discovery of quantification (in a sense, the discovery of
FOL). But what could it mean to "map his grammatical (= semiotic)
terminologies to FOL" if not this? It cannot mean that we should describe
his grammatical (=semiotic) terms by means of FOL. For in that case, we
would need FOL to describe his grammatical notions, which in their turn are
the instrument for a grammatical description of FOL. We would be launched
in a vicious circle.

So, it is one thing to say that we should evaluate Peirce's semiotic ideas
on the background of logic: this I agree wholeheartedly and I wrote a book
based precisely on this idea. Another thing would be to describe those
ideas by means of that which those ideas were intended to describe.

best
Francesco


On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 4:39 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,
>
> FB
>
>> "Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling distinctions"
>> (EP 2:494)
>>
>
> Yes!  And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
> logicians today.  This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
> confirm the point I was trying to make:  From age 12 to 74, Peirce
> was a logician.  Every version of logic that he used or invented
> had a precise mapping to his algebra of 1885, to his later EGs,
> and to the most widely used logics today.
>
> Peirce was also a professional lexicographer.  Note his letter
> to the editor of the Century Dictionary, Benjamin E. Smith, who
> had also been one of his students at Johns Hopkins:
>
> The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the
>> same thing, all the ideas that seek expression, is the most
>> stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished
>> logician must break down in it utterly; and even for the strongest
>> man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and
>> faculty.
>>
>
> Implication:  Over the years, Peirce had described his logics and
> the versions designed by other logicians in various ways.  He also
> explored other versions in his Gamma graphs, 3-valued logic, modal
> logics, and metalanguage.  But his first-order logic was equivalent
> to the core (Alpha + Beta) of existential graphs, and to "classical
> first-order logic" today.  For the history, see "Peirce the logician"
> by Hilary Putnam:  http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm
>
> When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and others,
> always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL.  If they
> can't, then ask what extensions or variations would be needed.
>
> ET
>
>> I'm trying to emphasize... that Peircean semiotics is not
>> expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in its pragmatic
>> application to material life.
>>
>> My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce
>> is often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since
>> Peirce often changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the
>> vital ground of Peircean semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental
>> nature of Peircean semiotics - which is its pragmaticism.
>>
>
> I completely agree.  But Peirce's logic was constant while his
> terminology was changing.  Peirce put far more emphasis on mapping
> logic to and from perception and action than anyone else.  But his
> terminology was idiosyncratic.  His logic is the foundation for
> relating his terminology to any versions in use today.
>
> That foundation is key to bringing Peirce into the 21st century.
> Logicians, philosophers, and computer scientists today will never
> study Peirce unless we can show exactly how his writings relate
> to what they're doing now and what they still need to do.
>
> JAS
>
>> my own purpose in focusing so much on Peirce's concepts and
>> terminology in logic as semeiotic is not for its own sake, but
>> primarily for the purpose of making our ideas clear.
>>
>
> Yes. That was Peirce's motivation throughout his career.  And logic
> was always his primary tool, as he said explicitly in 1877.
>
> JAS
>
>> Peirce defined pragmatism as "no attempt to determine any truth
>> of things," but rather "merely a method of ascertaining the meanings
>> of hard words and of abstract concepts" (CP 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[John F Sowa]

Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,

FB

"Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling distinctions" (EP 
2:494)


Yes!  And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
logicians today.  This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
confirm the point I was trying to make:  From age 12 to 74, Peirce
was a logician.  Every version of logic that he used or invented
had a precise mapping to his algebra of 1885, to his later EGs,
and to the most widely used logics today.

Peirce was also a professional lexicographer.  Note his letter
to the editor of the Century Dictionary, Benjamin E. Smith, who
had also been one of his students at Johns Hopkins:


The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the
same thing, all the ideas that seek expression, is the most
stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished
logician must break down in it utterly; and even for the strongest
man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and
faculty.


Implication:  Over the years, Peirce had described his logics and
the versions designed by other logicians in various ways.  He also
explored other versions in his Gamma graphs, 3-valued logic, modal
logics, and metalanguage.  But his first-order logic was equivalent
to the core (Alpha + Beta) of existential graphs, and to "classical
first-order logic" today.  For the history, see "Peirce the logician"
by Hilary Putnam:  http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm

When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and others,
always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL.  If they
can't, then ask what extensions or variations would be needed.

ET

I'm trying to emphasize... that Peircean semiotics is not
expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in its pragmatic
application to material life.

My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce
is often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since
Peirce often changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the
vital ground of Peircean semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental
nature of Peircean semiotics - which is its pragmaticism. 


I completely agree.  But Peirce's logic was constant while his
terminology was changing.  Peirce put far more emphasis on mapping
logic to and from perception and action than anyone else.  But his
terminology was idiosyncratic.  His logic is the foundation for
relating his terminology to any versions in use today.

That foundation is key to bringing Peirce into the 21st century.
Logicians, philosophers, and computer scientists today will never
study Peirce unless we can show exactly how his writings relate
to what they're doing now and what they still need to do.

JAS

my own purpose in focusing so much on Peirce's concepts and
terminology in logic as semeiotic is not for its own sake, but
primarily for the purpose of making our ideas clear.


Yes. That was Peirce's motivation throughout his career.  And logic
was always his primary tool, as he said explicitly in 1877.

JAS

Peirce defined pragmatism as "no attempt to determine any truth
of things," but rather "merely a method of ascertaining the meanings
of hard words and of abstract concepts" (CP 5.464, EP 2:400; 1907).


Yes.  And remember his comment to Benjamin Smith.

JAS

no one on the List is advocating "Platonic idealism."
Why keep bringing it up?


I was citing Peirce's "three universes":  possibility, actuality,
and the necessitated.  Mathematical entities are "real possibles"
in Peirce's terms.  For an analysis of Peirce's ideas about these
issues, I recommend an article by Susan Haack:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/247935387_Peirce_and_Logicism_Notes_Towards_an_Exposition_1993

On page 9, she wrote

at CP 4.118 (1893) Peirce speaks of "the Platonic world of pure
forms with which mathematics is always dealing," and in the
prospectus for his 12-volume _Principles of Philosophy_ (c. 1893)
he entitles the third volume, _Plato's World: an Elucidation of
the Ideas of Modern Mathematics_.  But at 4.161 (c. 1897) we read...

If this is Platonism, it is Platonism of a very distinctively
Peircean stripe.


Edwina

I think one can get trapped in the isolation of words and should
instead, consider their function in the actual world.


Yes.  But Peirce claimed that math and logic, formal and informal,
are the foundation for all the sciences and all the ways of thinking
and acting in the world.  (See his 1903 classification.)

William James could not fully understand Peirce because he did
not know logic.   WJ was never able to understand Peirce's
logic and his distinction between pragmatism and pragmaticism.

In the excerpts below, note that nearly every sentence uses logical
terminology.  (This excerpt happens to be something I was recently
reading, but you can find many more examples in all his writings.)

John
___

5.448.  Perhaps a more scientific pair of definitions would be 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

[Francesco Bellucci]

Jon, List


*FB:  Peirce says that a sentence's subject, i.e. the proper name, is its
"object" (he says so in very many places).*

*JAS: Please provide at least a couple of citations.*

"Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling distinctions"
(EP 2:494)

 "A Proposition is a sign which distinctly indicates the Object which it
denotes, called its Subject" (R 425: 135–136) NB: the object indicated is
"called" subject. Here it's not the subject that indicates the object: it's
the proposition that "distinctly" (= separately) indicate its object
(=subject)

 "The first member of the triplet, the “Seme,” embraces the logical Term,
the Subject or Object of a sentence" (R 295: 26–30)

"I term those occasions or objects which are denoted by the indices the
subjects of the assertion" (CP 2.334)

"That which a Sign 'stands for', or 'refers to' [...] is otherwise called
its Object. Usage might, equally well, have made is call it the Subject,
since there is no logical distinction between the two words." (R 849: 11)


"That which a concept is 'about', that to which it applies, that which the
predicate is spoken of, is called its object. In grammar, it is called the
subject nominative. For the words 'subject' and 'object' mean pretty much
the same thing" (R 659: 19–20)


*JAS: Where did Peirce state that (only) Symbols have a general Object and
(only) Indices have an individual Object?  Again, my current understanding
is instead that every Sign is a Type, has a General Object, and only exists
in Replicas, each of which has an individual Dynamic Object.*


Here for example:


CSP: "the demonstrative pronoun "that" [...] is not a Symbol, since it does
not signify a general concept." (EP 2: 295). If the demonstrative pronoun
"that" were capable to signify a general concept, it would be a Symbol. For
only symbols signify general objects. But it is not: it is an index,
because it signifies an individual object. Which, by the way, also refutes
your claim that "every sign has a general object".

Other examples:

CSP: "There are three kinds of representamens, or signs: icons, or images;
indices; and symbols, or general signs" (R 492, 1903)

CSP: "All general, or definable, Words, whether in the sense of Types or of
Tokens, are certainly Symbols. That is to say, they denote the objects that
they do by virtue only of there being a habit that associates their
signification with them." (Prolegomena, 1906)

CSP: "Deduction involves the analysis of the meanings of general signs,
i.e. of symbols", CSP to F. A. Woods, R L 477 (1913).

*JAS: The General Object of "_ is lethargic" is the aggregate of Real
substances that possess the character of lethargy, its Dynamic Object is
whatever one of its Replicas actually denotes when employed in an Instance
of the Sign, and its Immediate Object is whatever its Replica could denote
to someone who knows only the definitions of English words.*

Not according to Peirce. According to Peirce, " is lethargic" is a
rhematic symbol, and as a symbol it has a general dynamic object (i.e.
whatever possesses the characters of lethargy). But as a rheme, it has no
"hint" that indicates that object, and thus has no immediate object.
Neither the type of this rheme, nor its replicas can denote to someone who
knows only the definitions of English words what the immediate object of
this rheme is, but  can denote to someone who knows only the definitions of
English words to what *kind *of objects such a rheme would be applicable (=
it denotes a general dynamic object). I repeat that talking, in contexts
like this, of a general object as opposed to the dynamic and the immediate
makes little (exegetical) sense to me.

*JAS: I readily acknowledge that my approach is more systematic than
exegetical.  I am seeking to situate Signs and semiosis within an overall
framework that makes sense to me, while remaining as faithful as possible
to Peirce's concepts and terminology.  You stated in your recent book that
you "have not attempted to finish what Peirce left unfinished or to
eliminate 'rubs and botches' from his work," such that your "exposition of
Peirce’s theory of semiotics is no less incomplete than that theory itself
was" (p. 10).  I, on the other hand, am trying to fill in some of those
gaps and further plow the ground that he has cleared and opened up for us
as "a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman" (CP 5.488, EP 2:413; 1907)*

Indeed our aims are not identical. But let me notice that in order to fill
in some of the gaps in Peirce's theory one should be well aware of what
those gaps are (and thus the systematic work presupposes the exegetical
one, but not vice versa). But in order for a notion to fill in some gap in
Peirce's theory, such gap should be evident to the community of inquirers.
If the gap is only evident to the one who proposes the notion filling it,
this is just to put the cart before the horse.

On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 6:31 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Francesco, List:
>
>