Jon, Kirstima, List,
I am not clear about (besides many others) the term "Nominalism", and why everybody does not like nominalism. Ockham thougt, that universals do not have an extra-mental substance. I think it is ok. to guess so, if I think, that the universe has a mind. So universals are not e
Thank you, Edwina (and you all, Jon, John...). I understood that Nominalism means to reduce (or upduce?) everything to a symbol of a secondness, a language that adresses brute facts. So bio- and physicochemical semiotics are ignored, as there is no symbolic language. Only humans have languages, so
Edwina,
I agree, by adopting Peirce´s definition of "Nothing", which is only a no-thing, meaning no things, no secondnesses, but possibilities there are, even limitless. So Peirces "Nothing" is not the absence of possibilities. Maybe this Peircean "Nothing" is the same like the Thoran/Biblical "T
develop when matter develops. So, before there was matter, this 'Nothing' is not Firstness. As Peirce outlines it - it is 'nothing'. Firstness is a powerful mode of organization of matter, rejecting closure, limits, borders. And certainly, since matter at this pretemporal phase hasn&
nal Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 2:09 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
Edwina, list,
If there are limitless possibilities in the beginning, and then evolve things
idebound with habits" (CP 6.158); and that "dead matter would be merely the final result of the complete induration of habit reducing the free play of feeling and the brute irrationality of effort to complete death" (CP 6.201).
Regards,
Jon
On Tue, Jan 24, 20
n
On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 3:35 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
Jon, List,
Ok, so, again, a term problem. so, if habit is not exclusively a mental fact, I might agree. Like in cybernetics, there are catastrophic and counter-regulative circles, and when first a c
n without habit, 1ns and 2ns without 3ns, is blank nothing.
Regards,
Jon
On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 4:29 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
Jon,
I think my problem is that I see "habit" and "continuity" as phenomena, or effects, and ask myself: E
Jon, List,
The second point to me seems like Radical Constructivism, and the first point like Two-Realms-theory by Luther and Calvin (maybe by Platon too?).
The first point is new to me, and perhaps an answer to the question I always have had: In the old times people were all quite faithful, so
Supplement:
A third point is being introduced by Eugene Halton in his post just sent:
Nominalism claims, that social affairs are not real/natural. Eugene presents for example Hume´s view that only human egocentrism is natural, as only the individual is real, and therefore a strong state gove
Supp-supplement:
In my view of sytems theory, a system is more than it´s parts, of course, and what is more, is real and natural. But in my opinion "natural" does not mean "good for us". A sytem that contains other systems, like a society that contains individuals, or their communications, co
List,
I think that I mostly think in diagrams and pictures, even when I think about words. I think that at this point, there is helpful Peirces three modes of consciousness: Primisense, Altersense and Medisense. They are connected with the three categories, and with the three object relations as
Jerry, John, List,
It would be interesting to ask somebody who has been born blind. A word is a string of letters, and a melody a string of sounds. But the perceived thing of a word is a term, and that is not a string. A melody perceived neither is.
Maybe to call that, what it is, a picture or a
List,
I guess it might help to talk about time (and space) scales now, and about systems hierarchies with the sytems having different time (and space) scales. I think that synechism is connected to (Peircean) monism.
Eg. the dualism of mind and matter: Matter is effete mind. "Effete" is an unusu
Supplement:
Is there a crisis of systems theory, like I am feeling? If so, I have the hunch, that the reason for that is the blunt "Network" metaphor, whose wide use blocks the inquiry about structures, scales, continuity, processes, and so on. I feel, that the "Network" concept is normative
Dear List Members,
I think, that the Peircean truth is the similarity between the immediate and the dynamical object, achieved in the infinite future, and this similarity will be perfect (after indefinite time), when the only aspect, that tells it (the similarity) from sameness, is, that the imme
questions in my mind.
On Mar 17, 2017, at 3:20 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
Dear List Members,
I think, that the Peircean truth is the similarity between the immediate and the dynamical object, achieved in the infinite future, and this similarity will be perfect (aft
hing, so you might find Peirce-pertinent discussion under that search tag.
Regards,
Jon
Sent from my iPad
On Mar 17, 2017, at 4:20 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
Dear List Members,
I think, that the Peircean truth is the similarity between the immediate and t
o such thing, so you might find Peirce-pertinent discussion under that search tag.
Regards,
Jon
Sent from my iPad
On Mar 17, 2017, at 4:20 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
Dear List Members,
I think, that the Peircean truth is the similarity between the immediate an
List,
In common language the word "truth" is used for two different things: The fact and it´s representation (the truth independent of observation, and the truth as represented- correct representatrion). In philosophy it mostly is only used for the representation, and means a correct representatio
mmediate and dynamic object are a very clear explanation of that difference that makes as just humans...
All the best
Claudio
Helmut Raulien escribió el 25/03/2017 a las 20:05:
List,
In common language the word "truth" is used for two different things: The fact and it´s repres
tations.
And both concepts of immediate and dynamic object are a very clear explanation of that difference that makes as just humans...
All the best
Claudio
Helmut Raulien escribió el 25/03/2017 a las 20:05:
List,
In common language the word "truth" is used for two different thi
ee that we can only change the Immediate Object
we can never grasp anything of the Dynamic Object without transforming it at the same time in an Immediate Object
the Dynamic Object is like "the carrot in front of the donkey" (I don't know if this is also an English _expression_), we w
diate Object
we can never grasp anything of the Dynamic Object without transforming it at the same time in an Immediate Object
the Dynamic Object is like "the carrot in front of the donkey" (I don't know if this is also an English _expression_), we will never reach it... happily...
one' entities.
Edwina
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On Mon 27/03/17 3:22 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
List,
Edwina, I think, that there are four kinds of dyna
istic/"literal-bound" by adhering carefully to what Peirce actually wrote about these matters.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Tue, Ma
e contact of the insect as pollination. Both are transformed.
Edwina
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On Tue 28/03/17 7:03 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
Jon,
hese realms...and I admit that I'm not much interested in using Peirce within the linguistic or human conceptual analysis.
Edwina
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On Wed 29/03/17 3:35
that sounds VERY similar to Peirce's cosmological outline [1.412] of the emergence of the FORMS within the universe. [See his A Guess at the Riddle].
And, as Spencer Brown acknowledges the influence of Peirce - one can see that influence throughout his remarkable book.
Edwina
--
This
Jeffrey, List,
I like you 6 points for orientation how to discuss. I can find an argument of mine from this thread in points 5 and 1. The subject was, that Peirce believed in completely satisfying results due to final study. This applies eg. to dynamical object and final interpretant.
Eg. he wro
hilosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 12:45 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
Jeffrey, List,
I like you 6 points for orientation how to discuss. I can find an argument of mine from this thr
List,
Jeffrey, I too had problems with that. Now I think, that Peirce uses the term "habit" in a broader sense: Usually, when I hear or read "habit" I think of a gradual approximation process. This cannot be the case with conservation of energy, because exact conservation cannot be approached: If
imus - Canada's
largest alternative telecommunications provider.
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On Fri 31/03/17 2:46 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
List,
Jeffrey, I too had problems with that. Now I think, that Peirce uses the term "habit" in a broader sense: Usua
common concept, connects them to the wider community.
Edwina
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On Fri 31/03/17 4:26 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
Edwina,
The imme
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On Fri 31/03/17 4:26 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
Edwina,
The immediate interpretant is internal, but a concept is formed by a society, which the indi
List,
I think that the language we have is not exact enough for discussing semiotics. Misunderstandings are produced, one after another. We should construct a more exact language, and use inexact terms no longer. Examples:
-The term "is": In taxonomy, classification, it is used for something b
List,
I think there are two signs we are talking about: The law formation sign, and a law application (instantiation?) sign.
In the law formation sign, it depends on ones belief, which kind of interpretant the law is: Does the law not change anymore, then the interpretant is final, and the immed
John, List,
Speaking of inanimate reactions, and assumed, that there are natural laws existing governing them, whether or not they have been thoroughly analyzed by humans, I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token, but the law itself at work. That is so, because in inanimate
John, List,
I think so, after your proof!
Best, Helmut
08. April 2017 um 21:57 Uhr
"John F Sowa"
On 4/8/2017 2:59 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token,
> but the law itself at work.
I agree.
> So law is all
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On Sat 08/04/17 2:59 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
John, List,
Speaking of inanimate reactions, and assumed, that there are natural laws existing governing them, whe
argest alternative telecommunications provider.
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On Sun 09/04/17 12:32 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
Edwina, List,
my point was, that a token is embodied, but a molecule has no clear borders (of it´s body), as it contains electrons, whose orbi
Clark, Edwina, Stephen, List,
I do not see, that there is an either-or, regarding memes and rational beliefs, or diffusion versus narratives, or subconscious versus conscious structure-elements. I think, that there is both, and that it always is good to make the subconscious conscious, that is,
Supplement:
Sorry that I always add supplements, but now there is something about diffusion I want tio add: A crystal of potassium permanganate diffuses in water and turns it pink, but in oil it does not. A meme or an idea diffuses only when it is put into a proper social environment, tha
what is the point of their existence? What is being transmitted if not meaning?
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: John Collier
To: Edwina Taborsky ; Helmut Raulien
Cc: cl...@lextek.com ; Peirce-L
Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2015 3:46 PM
Subject: RE: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (wa
'?
Edwina
----- Original Message -
From: Helmut Raulien
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: John Collier ; cl...@lextek.com ; Peirce-L
Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2015 2:24 PM
Subject: Aw: Re: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)
Dear Edwina and All,
the bin
Dear Edwina, Gary F., List,
Maybe the problem is, that we cannot say, that before there were humans who were able to call something somehow, there were no things. So I propose to amplify the "being-called-" condition towards "application-" or "interaction-" condition. I think, that there are th
. My main point was to amplify the anthropocentric "being-called-condition" of a thing towards the universal "interaction-condition", in accord with your response.
Best,
Helmut
"Edwina Taborsky"
See my responses below.
- Original Message -
F
of a thing towards the universal "interaction-condition", in accord with your response.
Best,
Helmut
"Edwina Taborsky"
See my responses below.
- Original Message -
From: Helmut Raulien
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: g...@gnusystems.ca ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Hi! This is all very confusing to me. Language, words, versus reality: Is this the real contradiction? Is truth, expressed with language/words something that has been there in the far past: "In the beginning there was the word" (logos) (Bible), or something in the far future: "Final interpretant"
;
On Oct 23, 2015, at 12:31 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
Hi! This is all very confusing to me. Language, words, versus reality: Is this the real contradiction? Is truth, expressed with language/words something that has been there in the far past: "In the beg
if reality really is like that. I also dislike Nietzsche. I rather like Kant. But now I am out of arguments- read and write you all later!
Best,
Helmut
"Clark Goble"
On Oct 23, 2015, at 12:31 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
Hi! This is all very co
l term: In this case perhaps a universal teleology or telos?
Best,
Helmut
"Clark Goble" wrote:
On Oct 23, 2015, at 1:21 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
I thought, that "final interpretant" had something to do with truth. But you wrote, that i
List,
I consider as follows the difference between "object" in common understanding, and the Peircean object: In common sense, an objects main trait is its permanence, and also its spatial limitation. So it is an entity, something that is, i.e. exists (limited in space, but not in time). But in
List,
I consider as follows the difference between "object" in common understanding, and the Peircean object: In common sense, an objects main trait is its permanence, and also its spatial limitation. So it is an entity, something that is, i.e. exists (limited in space, but not in tim
Gary f.
} The map is not the territory. [Korzbyski] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de]
Sent: 25-Oct-15 07:16
List,
I consider as follows the difference between "object" in common understandi
nflicting truths, it is indispensable to distinguish the immediate object from the dynamical object. ]] —EP2:477
Gary f.
} The map is not the territory. [Korzbyski] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de]
Sent: 25-Oct-15 07:16
Lis
<s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
Date: Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 8:18 PM
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes An Object?
To: Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
Cc: frances.ke...@sympatico.ca, Gary <g...@gnusystems.ca>, Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Helmut. list
previous post to
". . .dyadic interactions cannot lead to any communication."
Thanks.
Sung
-- Forwarded message --
From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
Date: Sun, Oct 25, 2015 at 8:18 PM
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Seeing Things : What Makes
explain/understand logic.
If I'm looking at this wrong, feel free to set me straight.
Regards,
Tom Wyrick
On Oct 26, 2015, at 4:15 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
Sung, List,
And is a physical interaction a triadic Sign? Eg: A pho
: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl
Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3
On Tue, Oct 27, 2015 at 11:19 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
You are right: It is random, i.e. meaningless. I had not focused on "meaning", but on "representation" (thirdness): I thought it was
thing. Usually do.
"... chance ... a mathematical term to express with accuracy the characteristics of freedom or spontaneity." Peirce: CP 6.202
Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl
Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3
On Tue, Oct 27, 2015 at 11:19 AM,
2
Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl
Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3
On Tue, Oct 27, 2015 at 11:19 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
You are right: It is random, i.e. meaningless. I had not focused on "meaning", but on "
Jon, Jeff, List,
I like Jeffs term: "Starting point". I suspect, that -isms are not necessarily ideologies, but often just concepts specific to their starting points of consideration. If this is so, then they can meet and agree. For example: Is nominalism an ideology that denies the existence of
Supplement: In what I wrote, there is a sort of fallacy: It is not only about starting points, but rather about choice of method. One method is eager to look for parallelities between the evolution of knowledge in the observers mind and the (suggested) historical evolution of the observed. The
Hi!
"degenerate" supposes a devolution, but there is none. Reference to an interpretant is thirdness, but if the interpretant relation does not contain thirdness, because it is not an argument, but eg. a rheme: Then it is not degenerated, because it has not been an argument before. If the object r
f an algebraic locus, a locus of any order or class consisting of an aggregation of lower forms. Thus, two straight lines form a degenerate conic.
[End quote]
Best, Ben
On 11/8/2015 12:37 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
Hi!
"degenerate" supposes a devolution, but there is none. Referenc
ion among those two
trichotomies.
Best, Ben
On 11/9/2015 12:47 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> Ben, List,
>
> I am sorry for having not known this (scientifical) meaning of
> "degenerate". Now, do you think, that abduction, induction, and
> deduction somehow can be assigned
as. On the other hand, for my part
I haven't noticed a particular functional connection among those two
trichotomies.
Best, Ben
On 11/9/2015 12:47 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> Ben, List,
>
> I am sorry for having not known this (scientifical) meaning of
> "degenerate&quo
Franklin, Gary, list,
I guess that a sign has an outside respect (of the dynamical object concerning an external meaning) and an inside (self, eigen) respect of what kind of sign it is, which class it belongs to. The dynamical object there is not the external meaning, but the sign itself, exter
. Moreover, I am somewhat unclear as to whether you are interested in discussing Peirce's work. If you might oblige, would you be able to say how acquainted you are with CSP's writings? Perhaps we could begin from there, starting with what you already understand so that we can find a common g
n being defined, is distinguished from the concept of the Dynamic Object. The Dynamic Object is external to the sign, while the Immediate Object is internal to the sign.
I hope this helps.
-- Franklin
---
On Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 11:11 AM
sign mediates between an object and an interpretant, there is a sense in which understanding or interpreting a sign leads one to infer the object.
Okay, perhaps I could somehow go through and comment on something else, but that's enough for now, I need a break for a bit. I hope what
sea, I would just suggest the same papers I already have. If you would like to discuss any of them in a thread, I'll be happy to participate, with the exception of the letters to Welby; I learned the hard way to avoid those for now.
-- Franklin
--
become able to interpret physical connections we were not able to before. And this is not true of us simply as individual interpreters, but as a community of inquiry, or scientific community.
-- Franklin
---
On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 3:28 AM, Helmut Raul
ndividual interpreters, but as a community of inquiry, or scientific community.
-- Franklin
---
On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 3:28 AM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
Franklin,
right! For example, the idea, that a common knowledge can be a d
Stan, all,
am I right with guessing, that "logic" is, what Peirce calls "argumentation", and may lead to a cosmological concept of "universe", and what might lead to an idea, a guess, or a perception of "everything", might be, what Peirce calls "neglected argument", or "humble argument"? So, tw
Dear list members,
I think, that the connection between thirdness and triadicity is, that thirdness has three modes (subcategories): 3.1, 3.2, 3.3. So maybe with this respect, one can say, that thirdness is triadic, is that so? Relation, I think, is secondness, as written in the "New List of Cat
Dear All,
Regarding the three types of triadic relations (comparison, performance, thought), I would say, that the thought-type, which is of category three, is the one about semiotical 3adic relations, or signs. The comparison type, I think, is eg. a mathematical elementary 3adic relation, a subs
Gary R., Gary F., list,
Yes! It is very helpful, and your post too! To me it points at two different kinds of analysis: The analysis of the laws of a general affair, and the analysis of specialization possibilities (Im sure there may be better terms). In both kinds of analysis the Peircean modal
Clark, lists,
you wrote:
"Yet his broad notion of mind and habits actually fits cosmology quite well."
I always have a problem at this point. Isnt it so, that natural laws and natural constants havent change at all since the big bang? I like tychism, synechism, and agapism very much though, as
eirce's categories," I do most certain agree with him when he writes:
"Real potentiality. . . is only possible if Thirdness is First."
(Evolutionary Metaphysics: the development of Peirce's theory of categories, 191).
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Phi
Hi Jon, All,
I dont want to interrupt the discussion about terms, but I have a question that is about the mathematical relation- but I think this consideration might be expanded to semantics and semiotics. In mathematics, I have read somewhere, a relation is a subset of a cartesian product. Now I
Hi!
Have I understood correctly:
--Embodiment means, that it is a complete triadic sign, eg.:
(1), qualisign, is not embodied, (1.1), iconic qualisign, is not completely embodied either, but (1.1.1), rhematic iconic qualisign, is embodied?
--Degenerate is everything that is not all thirdness,
Supplement: Or is it so, that embodiment is already with a dyad (representamen and object), as you have written? But can that be- I thought that a sign is always a triad ("irreducible"), and never a dyad? Degeneracy, is it the same as involvement: Eg. a written word is a legisign, which involv
Gary f, list,
Thank you, Gary F., and I should not so quickly have asked this silly question. I understand it like this: Quali-, sin,- legisign is the first level of classification, then in the second level there are six, and ten in the third level. The third level (the ten classes) is the level
Supplement: I just have looked into Stans papers, and I think, I wrote something wrong in the mice-example. The highest level in subsumptive (eg. classification) hierarchy is the observer level, that should be the individual level. Or is it the biologist, who is exploring mice? I dont know. Bu
sign relations, almost all the literature so far has tackled only the case of elementary sign relations.
Regards,
Jon
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
On Dec 3, 2015, at 5:52 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:
Hi Jon, All,
I dont want to interrupt the discussion about te
make contact with
> empirical phenomena and ground logical theories in observational data.
>
> Well, it's later than I thought, so I'll have to break here.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On 12/8/2015 11:42 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
>> Jon, list,
>> thank you,
ions. Beyond its theoretical importance, the extensional
> aspect of relations is the interface where relations make contact with
> empirical phenomena and ground logical theories in observational data.
>
> Well, it's later than I thought, so I'll have to break here.
>
> Re
Degenerateness, I think, is a relation too. So, something may be (regarded for) degenerate, if you look at it as a mode. Because degeneracy is a trait of modes. But if you look at the same thing regarding it for a sign (a triadic sign), then degeneracy is not something you can assign to it. And an
Clark, list,
you wrote: " If you have the form but not the matter then it’s degenerate.". Thank you: This way eventually, after a long time, I think I understand why it is called degenerate. Maybe it is like this: "matter" may be understood for "reason", like in the question "Whats the matter?",
Supplement: So, degeneracy is not a de-evolution or reverse (de-) generation, but an incomplete or wrong comprehension of how something has been generated (and so the reason why it has), based on the fact, that the generation process is not easily observable, not observable at all, or not observ
John, Sung, list,
for me, as far as I understand, "types" and "classes" are synonyms. The difference between the "9 types of signs" and the "10 classes of signs" is not, as I understand it, a matter of "type" versus "class", but of what it is a type/class of. Id say, the 10 classes are classes of
Supplement: I think: The 10 classes of (triadic) signs are 3 classes, that have 6 subclasses (modes), that have 10 subclasses. The 9 types of representamen relations are 3 classes with 9 modes. These three classes are: Relation of the representamen with itself, with the object, and with the in
as addressed my concern in a post to the list that crossed mine to him.
John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier
From: John Collier
Sent: Monday, 21 December 2015 01:36
To: 'Helmut Raulien'
Subject: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and tri
tions or triples.
As a result, the classification of single triples and their components
gets us only so far in the classification of triadic relations proper,
and except in very special cases not very far at all.
Regards,
Jon
On 12/12/2015 4:32 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> Supplement: I suspe
lassification of single triples and their components
gets us only so far in the classification of triadic relations proper,
and except in very special cases not very far at all.
Regards,
Jon
On 12/12/2015 4:32 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> Supplement: I suspect, that my below consideration is non-P
quite complex.
Best,
Helmut
Gesendet: Montag, 28. Dezember 2015 um 05:10 Uhr
Von: "Jon Awbrey"
An: "Helmut Raulien"
Cc: "Peirce List"
Betreff: Re: Relations & Their Relatives
Inquiry Blog
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/12/08/relations-their-relatives
"Reply all" has failed, I dont know why, so I send it to the Peirce list now. I am not sure, whether this is correct, but this thread should have something to do with the Peirce list, because, as far as I know, I am not a member of the Sadhu-Sangha-list. In the "concerns" line, the Peirce list is
Supplement: Now a crude proposal to triadize the "good versus bad"- problem of rating qualia and to solve the "dualism versus monism" problem by (reconstructingly after Peirce) introducing triadism (which may be looked at as a kind of monism, due to the irreducibility of the triad): "Good" in
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