Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Logic of Ingenuity

Clark, List: Not at all, and I agree with you about the distinction between pre-modern trades and modern engineering. I think that the fairly ubiquitous use of *mathematical *models (i.e., diagrams) to *analyze *artifacts in advance of actually making or building them is what mainly

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

Clark, List: CG: Yes, if there were a late quote along those lines that would have answered my question directly. I suspect though that is just someone assuming it’s merely regulative. How about this one, from Peirce's definition of "synechism" in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: The Logic of Ingenuity

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } Jon- I would agree with you. I think of these terminologies as terms for typologies of the types of relations within the semiosic triad, according to modal category. Since the Peircean semiosic triad [the Sign] is

[PEIRCE-L] Re: The Logic of Ingenuity

Ben, List, I think it was Herbert Simon who I first recall lumping engineering under the heading of the “design sciences” but I don't know if that usage was original with him. Coincidentally, again, if you believe in such things, I've been reviewing a number of old discussions on the Peirce

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Invitation to a ttend a talk by Fernando Zalamea, March 1, 2017, NYC

List, Fernando Zalamea's talk last evening at the Microsoft Technology Center was, in my opinion, in every way extraordinary. I was delighted to see some friends and colleagues in attendance, and hope that others on this list and on the Semiotics Web list as well were able to join us remotely

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

> On Mar 2, 2017, at 9:58 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > In the Wikipedia article "Synechism," somebody wrote, without providing a > reference, "The fact that some things are ultimate may be recognized by the > synechist without abandoning his standpoint, since synechism is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

"To go further than this, and try to establish abstract laws of greatness and superiority, *is to argue without an object*; in practical life, particular facts count more than generalizations. Enough has now been said about these questions of possibility and the reverse, of past or future fact,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

Jon S., list, By jove, I think you've got it. I've just added it as a reference at the Synechism wiki https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synechism#Hypotheses . - Best, Ben On 3/2/2017 3:09 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: Clark, List: CG: Yes, if there were a late quote along those lines that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

Jerry C., LIst: Peirce makes it very clear elsewhere (and repeatedly) that a *true *continuum does not contain *any *points or other definite, indivisible parts. He defines it as that which has *indefinite *parts, all of which have parts of the same kind, such that it is *undivided* yet

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

Jon, Charles, List, Jon wrote: Where exactly did Peirce say "that truth cannot be known by means of signs"? I don't believe that Peirce ever did say anything of the sort. It seems to me that what Charles may be claiming is that since the sheet of assertion represents TRUTH, than that and that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: The Logic of Ingenuity

Jon S., list, As far as I can tell, satisficing is just a third way between optimization and bare-minimum constraint satisfaction (any feasible solution). Same forest of decision-making and trade-offs; different tree. Herbert Simon: "...decision makers can satisfice either by finding

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Truth as Regulative or Real : Logical Graphs

Charles, List, Let's consider Peirce's logical graphs at the alpha level, the abstract forms of which can be interpreted for propositional logic. I say “can be interpreted” advisedly because the system of graphs themselves form an uninterpreted syntax, the formulas of which have no fixed

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

Charles, List, You wrote: In his diagrammatic logic Peirce posited the sheet of assertions as the fundamental ground of semiosis. He called the sheet of assertion TRUTH (in caps). It is represented by the unmarked space that is there prior to and in which cuts are inscribed, a cut being the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

List, Ben: Your recent posts contribute to a rather curious insight into CSP’s beliefs about the relationships between mathematics, chemistry and logic of scientific hypotheses. > On Mar 2, 2017, at 10:58 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > from MS 647 (1910) which appeared in

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real

Charles, Gary R., List: Where exactly did Peirce say "that truth cannot be known by means of signs"? If all thought is in signs, as Peirce clearly held, then this would seem to entail that truth cannot be known at all. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer,