Charles, Gary R., List: Where exactly did Peirce say "that truth cannot be known by means of signs"? If all thought is in signs, as Peirce clearly held, then this would seem to entail that truth cannot be known at all.
Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 4:57 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Charles, List, > > You wrote: > > In his diagrammatic logic Peirce posited the sheet of assertions as the > fundamental ground of semiosis. He called the sheet of assertion TRUTH (in > caps). It is represented by the unmarked space that is there prior to and > in which cuts are inscribed, a cut being the representation of an > assertion. > > Doesn't this imply that truth is prior to representation? And thus, while > truth is the ground of representation, it is itself unrepresentable? > > I think that you may be correct about TRUTH in all caps (or even one cap, > Truth). But Peirce also in some places remarks that Truth corresponds to > Reality, and it seems to me that much as we can approach the truth (small > 't') of some matters, we do experience the reality (small 'r') of some > things (and one should note that in this smaller sense, there is certainly > untruth/falsehood and unreality/fantasy, the latter in the sense recently > discussed here that the content of a dream isn't real even while the > dreaming of it most assuredly is). > > I think so. And this is another way of saying, as Peirce, did, that truth > cannot be known by means of signs. But this does not imply that it cannot > be known. > > But it seems to me (and I recall Peirce saying that the progress of > science, for example, strongly suggests it) that we *can* approach truth > (albeit fallibly) in some matters even as we can experience reality (albeit > partically)--and both involving, it seems to me in good part, signs. > > Would you explain what you mean by writing that that although you believe > that truth can't be know through signs that "this does not imply that it > cannot be known"? > > Best, > > Gary R > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* > > On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 5:36 PM, Charles Pyle <charlesp...@comcast.net> > wrote: > >> I think the following is at least tangentially related to this discussion >> of truth. >> >> In his diagrammatic logic Peirce posited the sheet of assertions as the >> fundamental ground of semiosis. He called the sheet of assertion TRUTH (in >> caps). It is represented by the unmarked space that is there prior to and >> in which cuts are inscribed, a cut being the representation of an >> assertion. >> >> Doesn't this imply that truth is prior to representation? And thus, while >> truth is the ground of representation, it is itself unrepresentable? >> >> I think so. And this is another way of saying, as Peirce, did, that truth >> cannot be known by means of signs. But this does not imply that it cannot >> be known. >> >> On March 2, 2017 at 3:54 PM Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: >> >> On Mar 2, 2017, at 1:09 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> CG: Yes, if there were a late quote along those lines that would have >> answered my question directly. I suspect though that is just someone >> assuming it’s merely regulative. >> >> How about this one, from Peirce's definition of "synechism" in Baldwin's >> *Dictionary >> of Philosophy and Psychology* (1902)? >> >> CSP: It would, therefore, be most contrary to his own principle for the >> synechist not to generalize from that which experience forces upon him, >> especially since it is only so far as facts can be generalized that they >> can be understood; and the very reality, in his way of looking at the >> matter, is nothing else than the way in which facts must ultimately come to >> be understood. There would be a contradiction here, if this ultimacy were >> looked upon as something to be absolutely realized; but the synechist >> cannot consistently so regard it. Synechism is not an ultimate and absolute >> metaphysical doctrine; *it is a regulative principle of logic, >> prescribing what sort of hypothesis is fit to be entertained and examined.* >> (CP 6.173) >> >> That’s really close but not quite there. Note the last part which I >> highlighted. Logically it’s regulative in terms of what hypotheses can be >> examined. So it’s a way of casting off a hypothesis somewhat akin to the >> way the positivists dismissed many things as meaningless. So while >> synechism isn’t a metaphysical doctrine the question of truth and >> continuity can still entail metaphysical doctrines once those are examined >> as a hypothesis. >> >> His point is just that as a regulatory principle we have to assume that >> things aren’t inexplicable. So we can’t assume my question is inexplicable. >> But that doesn’t mean of course we have a metaphysical answer for my >> question. >> >> Now if we simply extend from the idea of continuity to metaphysics we’re >> doing it wrong. However if we’re extending from modal realism to the >> question of whether there is a real possibility of stability (i.e. >> something beyond the regulative) I think we’re making a different sort of >> argument. Maybe I’m wrong in that though. >> >>
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
