Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perplexing

[Stephen C. Rose]

I agree as well.  As important may be observations of Deely and others who
have already taken large steps in liberating Peirce's thought. I think
there is some urgency in establishing a triadic perspective about which
there should be little debate.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sat, Apr 7, 2018 at 2:07 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> I strongly agree with Mike B and Gary R.
>
> MB
>
>> I humbly suggest that intersection of interests is a more practical
>> domain of inquiry than trying to find where your interpretations differ.
>>
>
> GR
> I have always thought... that those who want to promote Peirce's
> philosophy in the world at large ought attempt to find what is most
>
> powerful, potentially productive and heuristic in Peirce that we can
> more or less come to tentatively and fallibly agree on. Perhaps then
> we can explore ways to send his profound insights into the world,
> agreeing that some of these are considerable, perhaps inestimable
> potential value.
>
>
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perplexing

[Helmut Raulien]

List, I think, for example, before we further analyze which determines which, e.g. the FI the DI or not, we should first get to a clearer definition of "determination", also by looking how it is used today in mathematics: deterministic chaos versus non-deterministic. Is determination non-causal, not completely ("straightforwardly") causal, or completely causal? If Peirce´s use of the term differs from the contemporary mathematical term meaning, it is difficult.

Also, the question appeared by the way, whether the two objects and the three interpretants are aspects or two or three different objects or interpretants. I think, we should get to a consensus about that. I e.g. think, the two or three are not only aspects, but functional parts of the object and the interpretant. Every time there is talk about externality or internality of a sign part to the sign, I am annoyed somehow, because I (imho) think: Being a functional part of something is not about that.

I also am totally unclear about this replica-thing. Why is something a replica, if something similar has happened before?

I also feel unwell with boiling thirdness down to habits. I think it is habits and laws, and think, that there are laws that are not habits, but universal necessities, e.g. the (or most, or some) laws of logic.

Best, Helmut

 

 07. April 2018 um 08:07 Uhr
 "John F Sowa" 
 

I strongly agree with Mike B and Gary R.

MB
> I humbly suggest that intersection of interests is a more practical
> domain of inquiry than trying to find where your interpretations differ.

GR
I have always thought... that those who want to promote Peirce's
philosophy in the world at large ought attempt to find what is most
powerful, potentially productive and heuristic in Peirce that we can
more or less come to tentatively and fallibly agree on. Perhaps then
we can explore ways to send his profound insights into the world,
agreeing that some of these are considerable, perhaps inestimable
potential value.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perplexing

[John F Sowa]

I strongly agree with Mike B and Gary R.

MB

I humbly suggest that intersection of interests is a more practical
domain of inquiry than trying to find where your interpretations differ.


GR
I have always thought... that those who want to promote Peirce's
philosophy in the world at large ought attempt to find what is most
powerful, potentially productive and heuristic in Peirce that we can
more or less come to tentatively and fallibly agree on. Perhaps then
we can explore ways to send his profound insights into the world,
agreeing that some of these are considerable, perhaps inestimable
potential value.

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Perplexing

[Gary Richmond]

Mike, Edwina, Jon, list,

Mike wrote: "Let's consider the entire world of Peirce aficionados, past
and present. There is a reason both of you [Edwina and Jon S] study and
feel so passionately about Peirce. I humbly suggest that intersection of
interests is a more practical domain of inquiry than trying to find where
your interpretations differ."


I would tend to *strongly* agree, Mike. I have always thought, and
occasionally suggested on this list, that those who want to promote
Peirce's philosophy in the world at large (whose achievements are most
certainly not at all limited to semeiotics) ought attempt to find what is
most powerful, potentially productive and heuristic in Peirce that we can
more or less come to tentatively and fallibly agree on. Perhaps then we can
explore ways to send his profound insights into the world, agreeing that
some of these are considerable, perhaps inestimable potential value.

On the other hand, little of value, at least it seems to me, comes of the
tendency to debate (pro and con can tend to degenerate into
'my view' is correct and 'your view' is not and, further, even denying that
this is happening).

Peirce wrote both that* logic* is rooted in the *social principle* and the
converse, that the *social principle* is rooted in *logic *(Ben Udell and I
wrote a short book chapter on this theme). Conversely, ego is seen by
Peirce as pretty much an impediment to the growth of science, and more
generally, to the evolution of intelligence and the advance of humane
culture (I personally have at times found it very difficult to 'check' my
ego).

The emphasis in my view ought be *much* less on debate than on
collaborative inquiry. I personally think that if any forum members want to
debate matters introduced on the list that they ought to take much--if not
most--of it off-list when it's become clear that that is what it has, in my
opinion, *degenerated* into. Debate can feel for observers of it here,
exhausting, enervating and, in a word, tedious.

So, I would only add to what Mike has written a question: What can we who
value the vast intellect of Peirce, a scientist and philosopher who has
been called "America's greatest thinker" by some rather substantial
thinkers; again, what can those of us who resolutely believe that he has
much of value to offer in consideration of, for prime example,
methodological approaches not only to issues in science and philosophy, but
to what some have called the "wicked problems" of our present era
(including a number of ethical and metaphysical issues), what can we offer
towards the explication and promulgating of Peirce's work?

So, potentially working towards discovering "intersections of interest" as
Mike put it, I'd ask: Is it possible for us to at least attempt to fathom
together, make sense of together, try to find what in his vast philosophy
that we can tend to agree is of importance and value? Can we begin to offer
what we *together* might think could help clarify, develop, and, perhaps,
*finally* promote the dissemination of what we, hopefully, can come to
agree is important, even essential, in Peirce's thought? Lacking that,
we'll just continue to endlessly debate--in vain. Perhaps this is nothing
but a pipe dream, at least for this forum.

So, I guess along with Mike I'm saying something like: Endless debate
blocks the way of inquiry. Debate is *not* inquiry, it is *mere*
debate, only contention. And, I'd add, almost always deeply infused with
ego (while it seems to me that especially some, but by all means not all,
very sharp intellects are prone to it--Peirce suggests in one place that,
especially for keen intellects, the concept of involution, for example, is
difficult to grasp).

To conclude: As many of us here have come to see over the years and
decades, Peirce is much too complex, subtle, contradictory (in the sense of
Walt Whitman, I'd suggest), much too *profound* to be *debated*.

As for being "a positive contributor" to the list, Mike, you've already
proven yourself to be one.

Best,

Gary




*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Apr 6, 2018 at 11:46 PM, Mike Bergman  wrote:

> Hi Edwina, Jon,
>
> I have changed the subject line. It would not bother me if this is the
> only item on the thread.
>
> Somehow, again, you two go hammer-and-tongs at one another. Edwina, you
> know as well as any of us how closely Peirce tied semiosis to logic. Jon,
> you will cite stanza and verse but also know well that form-matter-entelchy
> is but one of scores of trichotomous relations using the universal
> categories that Peirce put forward.
>
> Let's consider the entire world of Peirce aficionados, past and present.
> There is a reason both of you study and feel so passionately about Peirce.
> I humbly suggest that intersection of interests is a more practical domain
> of inquiry than trying to find where your interpretations diff

[PEIRCE-L] Perplexing

[Mike Bergman]

  
  
Hi Edwina, Jon,
I have changed the subject line. It would not bother me if
this is the only item on the thread.
  
Somehow, again, you two go hammer-and-tongs at one another.
Edwina, you know as well as any of us how closely Peirce tied
semiosis to logic. Jon, you will cite stanza and verse but also
know well that form-matter-entelchy is but one of scores of
trichotomous relations using the universal categories that
Peirce put forward.
Let's consider the entire world of Peirce aficionados, past
and present. There is a reason both of you study and feel so
passionately about Peirce. I humbly suggest that intersection of
interests is a more practical domain of inquiry than trying to
find where your interpretations differ.
Just saying.
I know I have not been contributing much myself to the list
recently. I hope to be a more positive contributor going forward.
Best, Mike
  
On 4/6/2018 10:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

  Edwina, List:


As I have noted before when making this substitution,
  Peirce defined logic (in the broad sense) as semeiotic
  and beliefs as habits.  The subject matter of
  normative science consists of the relations of phenomena to
  ends, and the ideal end of semiosis is the
  development of habits that would never be confounded by
  subsequent experience--including, but not limited to, true
  beliefs.  Again, this is a regulative hope, not
  something that will ever actually be achieved.


Turning to metaphysics, the habit-taking tendency is the
  primordial law of mind, from which all physical laws--inveterate
  habits--are derived (cf. CP 6.24-25; 1891).  However, as
  you rightly point out, freedom and spontaneity still prevent
  their complete induration (cf. CP 6.201; 1898). 
  Hence recognizing that a Sign is an Entelechy (3ns), as Peirce
  himself explicitly did, does not at all deny the Reality of
  Form (1ns) and Matter (2ns); on the contrary, I see it as an
  integral aspect of his robust three-Category realism.


Regards,


Jon S.

  
  On Fri, Apr 6, 2018 at 9:03 PM,
Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

  Jon, List-
  With regard to the statement by Jon:
  
"My long-term objective in all of this remains to
  understand how semeiotic may be defined as the science
  of the laws of the stable establishment of habits (cf.
  CP 3.429; 1896).  That includes the inveterate habits
  of matter, as well as the self-controlled habits of
  Persons."
  
  The actual reference to Peirce is not about semeiotic
but about logic: "Logic may be defined as the science of
the laws of the stable establishment of beliefs". 3.429
  Semeiosis is actually a 'far-from-equilibrium' or
unstable process, functioning within three, not one, but
three modal categories. Only one of them, Thirdness,
refers to habits or stability. The vital, absolutely
necessary mode of Firstness , inserts the capacity to
break up, modify, adapt, change, evolve, those habits.
And the equally necessary mode of Secondness locates
both Firstness and Thirdness within individual, diverse,
local, interactive, networking instantiations of both
habits and novelty.  
  To reduce semiosis to only one of the three modal
categories is setting up an idealistic ontology - and
this is not, in my view, Peircean semiosis.
  Edwina

  

  


-- 
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Michael K. Bergman
Cognonto Corporation
319.621.5225
skype:michaelkbergman
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