Re: Infinitely Unlikely Coincidences [WAS Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier]
On Feb 20, 2008 6:13 AM, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The possibility of mind uploading to computers strictly depends on functionalism being true; if it isn't then you may as well shoot yourself in the head as undergo a destructive upload. Functionalism (invented, and later repudiated, by Hilary Putnam) is philosophy of mind if anything is philosophy of mind, and the majority of cognitive scientists are functionalists. Are you still happy asserting that it's all bunk? Philosophy is in most cases very inefficient, hence wasteful. It puts very much into building its theoretical constructions, few of which are useful for understainding reality. It might be fun for those who like this kind of thing, but it is a bad tool. -- Vladimir Nesov [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Infinitely Unlikely Coincidences [WAS Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier]
Vladimir Nesov wrote: On Feb 20, 2008 6:13 AM, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The possibility of mind uploading to computers strictly depends on functionalism being true; if it isn't then you may as well shoot yourself in the head as undergo a destructive upload. Functionalism (invented, and later repudiated, by Hilary Putnam) is philosophy of mind if anything is philosophy of mind, and the majority of cognitive scientists are functionalists. Are you still happy asserting that it's all bunk? Philosophy is in most cases very inefficient, hence wasteful. It puts very much into building its theoretical constructions, few of which are useful for understainding reality. It might be fun for those who like this kind of thing, but it is a bad tool. *** humor intended *** Oddly enough, one Webster definition of philosopher is one who seeks wisdom or enlightenment. Nothing wrong with that. It seems that when philosophy is implemented it becomes like nuclear physics e.g. break down all the things we essentially understand until we come up with pieces, which we give names to, and then admit we don't know what the names identify - other than broken pieces of something we used to understand when it was whole. My limited experience with those who practice philosophy is that they love to go to the absurd - I suspect this is meant as a means of proof, but often comes across as macho philosophoso. Kind of I can prove anything you say is absurd. I welcome the thoughts of Philosophers. --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Infinitely Unlikely Coincidences [WAS Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier]
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 20/02/2008, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I am aware of some of those other sources for the idea: nevertheless, they are all nonsense for the same reason. I especially single out Searle: his writings on this subject are virtually worthless. I have argued with Searle to his face, and I have talked with others (Hofstadter, for example) who have also done so, and the consensus among these people is that his arguments are built on confusion. Just to be clear, this is *not* the same as Searle's Chinese Room argument, which only he seems to find convincing. Oh, my word: if only it was just him! He was at the Tucson Consciousness conference two years ago, and in his big talk he strutted about the stage saying I invented the Chinese Room thought experiment, and the Computationalists tried to explain it away for twenty years until finally the dust settled, and now finally they have given up and everyone agrees that I WON! This statement was followed by tumultuous applause and cheers from a large fraction of the 800+ audience. You're right that it is not the same as the Chinese Room, but if I am not mistaken this was one of his attempts to demolish a reply to the Chinese Room. Richard Loosemore --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Infinitely Unlikely Coincidences [WAS Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier]
Quoting Vladimir Nesov [EMAIL PROTECTED]: On Feb 20, 2008 6:13 AM, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The possibility of mind uploading to computers strictly depends on functionalism being true; if it isn't then you may as well shoot yourself in the head as undergo a destructive upload. Functionalism (invented, and later repudiated, by Hilary Putnam) is philosophy of mind if anything is philosophy of mind, and the majority of cognitive scientists are functionalists. Are you still happy asserting that it's all bunk? Philosophy is in most cases very inefficient, hence wasteful. It puts very much into building its theoretical constructions, few of which are useful for understainding reality. It might be fun for those who like this kind of thing, but it is a bad tool. I would beg to differ. Philosophy, science and society dance together. Philosophy contributes to understanding reality or whatever reality might be. Gudrun -- Vladimir Nesov [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Infinitely Unlikely Coincidences [WAS Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier]
On 2/20/08, Stan Nilsen [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: It seems that when philosophy is implemented it becomes like nuclear physics e.g. break down all the things we essentially understand until we come up with pieces, which we give names to, and then admit we don't know what the names identify - other than broken pieces of something we used to understand when it was whole. My limited experience with those who practice philosophy is that they love to go to the absurd - I suspect this is meant as a means of proof, but often comes across as macho philosophoso. Kind of I can prove anything you say is absurd. I welcome the thoughts of Philosophers. I think most or at least many philosophers, myself included, would actually agree that most of what (usually other) philosophers produce is garbage. Of course, they won't agree about *which* philosophical views and methods are garbage. I would propose that the primary explanation for this is simply that philosophy is really, really hard. It is almost by definition those areas of intellectual inquiry in which there is little established methodology. (I think that is a little overstated since at least in analytic philosophy, there is broad agreement on the logical structure of arguments and rather less broad but growing agreement on the nature of conceptual analysis.) Notice that it is not just philosophers who say stupid stuff in philosophy. Evolutionary biologists, computer scientists, economists, scientists, and just people in general can all be found saying stupid things when they try to venture into ethics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, etc. In fact, I would say that professional philosophers have a significantly better track record in philosophy than people in general or the scientific community when they venture into philosophy (which may not say very much about their track record on an absolute scale). By the way, I think this whole tangent was actually started by Richard misinterpreting Lanier's argument (though quite understandably given Lanier's vagueness and unclarity). Lanier was not imagining the amazing coincidence of a genuine computer being implemented in a rainstorm, i.e. one that is robustly implementing all the right causal laws and the strong conditionals Chalmers talks about. Rather, he was imagining the more ordinary and really not very amazing coincidence of a rainstorm bearing a certain superficial isomorphism to just a trace of the right kind of computation. He rightly notes that if functionalism were committed to such a rainstorm being conscious, it should be rejected. I think this is true whether or not such rainstorms actually exist or are likely since a correct theory of our concepts should deliver the right results as the concept is applied to any genuine possibility. For instance, if someone's ethical theory delivers the result that it is perfectly permissible to press a button that would cause all conscious beings to suffer for all eternity, then it is no legitimate defense to claim that's okay because it's really unlikely. As I tried to explain, I think Lanier's argument fails because he doesn't establish that functionalism is committed to the absurd result that the rainstorms he discusses are conscious or genuinely implementing computation. If, on the other hand, Lanier were imagining a rainstorm miraculously implementing real computation (in the way Chalmers discusses) and somehow thought that was a problem for functionalism, then of course Richard's reply would roughly be the correct one. --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Infinitely Unlikely Coincidences [WAS Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier]
John Ku wrote: By the way, I think this whole tangent was actually started by Richard misinterpreting Lanier's argument (though quite understandably given Lanier's vagueness and unclarity). Lanier was not imagining the amazing coincidence of a genuine computer being implemented in a rainstorm, i.e. one that is robustly implementing all the right causal laws and the strong conditionals Chalmers talks about. Rather, he was imagining the more ordinary and really not very amazing coincidence of a rainstorm bearing a certain superficial isomorphism to just a trace of the right kind of computation. He rightly notes that if functionalism were committed to such a rainstorm being conscious, it should be rejected. I think this is true whether or not such rainstorms actually exist or are likely since a correct theory of our concepts should deliver the right results as the concept is applied to any genuine possibility. For instance, if someone's ethical theory delivers the result that it is perfectly permissible to press a button that would cause all conscious beings to suffer for all eternity, then it is no legitimate defense to claim that's okay because it's really unlikely. As I tried to explain, I think Lanier's argument fails because he doesn't establish that functionalism is committed to the absurd result that the rainstorms he discusses are conscious or genuinely implementing computation. If, on the other hand, Lanier were imagining a rainstorm miraculously implementing real computation (in the way Chalmers discusses) and somehow thought that was a problem for functionalism, then of course Richard's reply would roughly be the correct one. Oh, I really don't think I made that kind of mistake in interpreting Lanier's argument. If Lanier was attacking a very *particular* brand of functionalism (the kind that would say isomorphism is everything, so any isomorphism between a rainstorm and a conscious computer, even for just a millisecond, would leave you no option but to say that the rainstorm is conscious), then perhaps I agree with Lanier. That kind of simplistic functionalism is just not going to work. But I don't think he was narrowing his scope that much, was he? If so, he was attacking a straw man. I just assumed he wasn't doing anything so trivial, but I stand to be corrected if he was. I certainly thought that may of the people who cited Lanier's argument were citing it as a demolition of functionalism in the large. There are many functionalists who would say that what matters is a functional isomorphism, and that even though we have difficulty at this time saying exactly what we mean by a functional isomorphism, nevertheless it is not good enough to simply find any old isomorphism (especially one which holds for only a moment). I would also point out one other weakness in his argument: in order to get his isomorphism to work, he almost certainly has to allow the hypothetical computer to implement the rainstorm at a different level of representation from the consciousness. It is only if you allow this difference of levels between the two things that the hypothetical machine is guaranteed to be possible. If the two things are suposed to be present at exactly the same level of representation in the machine, then I am fairly sure that the machine is over-constrained and thus we cannot say that such a machine is, in general possible. But if they happen at different levels, then the argument falls appart for a different reason: you can always make two systems coexist in this way, but that does not mean that they are the same system. There is no actual isomorphism in this case. This, of course, was Searle's main mistake: understanding of English and Chinese were happening in two different levels, therefore two different systems, and nobody claims that what one system understands, the other must also be understanding. (Searle's main folly, of course, is that he has never shown any sign of being able to understand this point). Richard Loosemore --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Infinitely Unlikely Coincidences [WAS Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier]
On 21/02/2008, John Ku [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: By the way, I think this whole tangent was actually started by Richard misinterpreting Lanier's argument (though quite understandably given Lanier's vagueness and unclarity). Lanier was not imagining the amazing coincidence of a genuine computer being implemented in a rainstorm, i.e. one that is robustly implementing all the right causal laws and the strong conditionals Chalmers talks about. Rather, he was imagining the more ordinary and really not very amazing coincidence of a rainstorm bearing a certain superficial isomorphism to just a trace of the right kind of computation. He rightly notes that if functionalism were committed to such a rainstorm being conscious, it should be rejected. Only if it is incompatible with the world we observe. -- Stathis Papaioannou --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Infinitely Unlikely Coincidences [WAS Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier]
On 2/20/08, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 21/02/2008, John Ku [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: By the way, I think this whole tangent was actually started by Richard misinterpreting Lanier's argument (though quite understandably given Lanier's vagueness and unclarity). Lanier was not imagining the amazing coincidence of a genuine computer being implemented in a rainstorm, i.e. one that is robustly implementing all the right causal laws and the strong conditionals Chalmers talks about. Rather, he was imagining the more ordinary and really not very amazing coincidence of a rainstorm bearing a certain superficial isomorphism to just a trace of the right kind of computation. He rightly notes that if functionalism were committed to such a rainstorm being conscious, it should be rejected. Only if it is incompatible with the world we observe. I think that's the wrong way to think about philosophical issues. It seems you are trying to import a scientific method to a philosophical domain where it does not belong. Functionalism is a view about how our concepts work. It is not tested by whether it is falisified by observations about the world. Or if you prefer, conceptual analysis does produce scientific hypotheses about the world, but the part of the world in question is within our own heads, something that we ourselves don't have transparent access to. If we had transparent access to the way our concepts work, the task of cognitive science and philosophy and along with it much of AI would be considerably easier. Our best way of testing these hypotheses at the moment is to see whether a proposed analysis would best explain our uses of the concept and our conceptual intuitions. Sometimes, especially with people who have been in the grip of a theory, people can (often only partially) switch what concept is linked to a lexical item and not realize they are (sometimes) using the word differently from others (including their past selves). Then the debate gets much more complicated and may among other things, have to get into the normative issue of which concept(s) we ought to use. Chances are, though, unless the revision was carefully thought out and defended rather than accidentally slipped into, it will not serve the presumably important functions for which we had the original concept. --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Infinitely Unlikely Coincidences [WAS Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier]
On 21/02/2008, John Ku [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 2/20/08, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 21/02/2008, John Ku [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: By the way, I think this whole tangent was actually started by Richard misinterpreting Lanier's argument (though quite understandably given Lanier's vagueness and unclarity). Lanier was not imagining the amazing coincidence of a genuine computer being implemented in a rainstorm, i.e. one that is robustly implementing all the right causal laws and the strong conditionals Chalmers talks about. Rather, he was imagining the more ordinary and really not very amazing coincidence of a rainstorm bearing a certain superficial isomorphism to just a trace of the right kind of computation. He rightly notes that if functionalism were committed to such a rainstorm being conscious, it should be rejected. Only if it is incompatible with the world we observe. I think that's the wrong way to think about philosophical issues. It seems you are trying to import a scientific method to a philosophical domain where it does not belong. Functionalism is a view about how our concepts work. It is not tested by whether it is falisified by observations about the world. Or if you prefer, conceptual analysis does produce scientific hypotheses about the world, but the part of the world in question is within our own heads, something that we ourselves don't have transparent access to. If we had transparent access to the way our concepts work, the task of cognitive science and philosophy and along with it much of AI would be considerably easier. Our best way of testing these hypotheses at the moment is to see whether a proposed analysis would best explain our uses of the concept and our conceptual intuitions. Functionalism at least has the form of a scientific hypothesis, in that it asserts that a functionally equivalent analogue of my brain will have the same mental properties. Even though in practice it isn't empirically falsifiable we can examine it to make sure it is internally consistent, compatible with observed reality, and in keeping with the principle of Occam's razor. We should certainly be wary of a theory that sounds ridiculous, but unless it fails in one of these three areas it is wrong to dismiss it. -- Stathis Papaioannou --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Infinitely Unlikely Coincidences [WAS Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier]
On 19/02/2008, John Ku [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Yes, you've shown either that, or that even some occasionally intelligent and competent philosophers sometimes take seriously ideas that really can be dismissed as obviously ridiculous -- ideas which really are unworthy of careful thought were it not for the fact that pinpointing exactly why such ridiculous ideas are wrong is so often fruitful (as in the Chalmers article). It doesn't sound so strange when you examine the distinction between the computation and the implementation of the computation. An analogy is the distinction between a circle and the implementation of a circle. It might be objected that it is ridiculous to argue that any irregular shape looked at with the right transformation matrix is an implementation of a circle. The objection is valid under a non-trivial definition of implementation. A randomly drawn perimeter around a vicious dog on a tether does not help you avoid getting bitten unless you have the relevant transformation matrix and can do the calculations in your head, which would be no better than having no implementation at all but just instructions on how to draw the circle de novo. Thus, implementation is linked to utility. Circles exist in the abstract as platonic objects, but platonic objects don't interact with the real world until they are implemented, and implemented in a particular useful or non-trivial way. Similarly, computations exist as platonic objects, such as Turing machines, but don't play any part in the real world unless they are implemented. There is an abstract machine adding two numbers together, but this no use to you when you are doing your shopping unless it is implemented in a useful and non-trivial way, such as in an electronic calculator or in your brain. Now, consider the special case of a conscious computation. If this computation is to interact with the real world it must fulfil the criteria for non-trivial implementation as discussed. A human being would be an example of this. But what if the computation creates an inputless virtual world with conscious inhabitants? Unless you are prepared to argue that the consciousness of the inhabitants is contingent on interaction with the real world there seems no reason to insist that the implementation be non-trivial or useful in the above sense. Consciousness would then be a quality of the abstract platonic object, as circularity is a quality of the abstract circle. I might add that there is nothing in this which contradicts functionalism, or for that matter geometry. -- Stathis Papaioannou --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Infinitely Unlikely Coincidences [WAS Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier]
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 19/02/2008, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Sorry, but I do not think your conclusion even remotely follows from the premises. But beyond that, the basic reason that this line of argument is nonsensical is that Lanier's thought experiment was rigged in such a way that a coincidence was engineered into existence. Nothing whatever can be deduced from an argument in which you set things up so that a coincidence must happen! It is just a meaningless coincidence that a computer can in theory be set up to be (a) conscious and (b) have a lower level of its architecture be isomorphic to a rainstorm. I don't see how the fact something happens by coincidence is by itself a problem. Evolution, for example, works by means of random genetic mutations some of which just happen to result in a phenotype better suited to its environment. By the way, Lanier's idea is not original. Hilary Putnam, John Searle, Tim Maudlin, Greg Egan, Hans Moravec, David Chalmers (see the paper cited by Kaj Sotola in the original thread - http://consc.net/papers/rock.html) have all considered variations on the theme. At the very least, this should indicate that the idea cannot be dismissed as just obviously ridiculous and unworthy of careful thought. I am aware of some of those other sources for the idea: nevertheless, they are all nonsense for the same reason. I especially single out Searle: his writings on this subject are virtually worthless. I have argued with Searle to his face, and I have talked with others (Hofstadter, for example) who have also done so, and the consensus among these people is that his arguments are built on confusion. (And besides, I don't stop thinking just because others have expressed their view of an idea: I use my own mind, and if I can come up with an argument against the idea, I prefer to use that rather than defer to authority. ;-) ) But going back to the question at issue: this coincidence is a coincidence that happens in a thought experiment. If someone constructs a thought experiment in which they allow such things as computers of quasi-infinite size, they can make anything happen, including ridiculous coincidences! If you set the thought experiment up so that there is enough room for a meaningless coincidence to occur within the thought experiment, then what you have is *still* just a meaningless coincidence. I don't think I can put it any plainer than that. Richard Loosemore --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Infinitely Unlikely Coincidences [WAS Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier]
During the late 70's when I was at McGill, I attended a public talk given by Feynman on quantum physics. After the talk, and in answer to a question posed from a member of the audience, Feynman said something along the lines of : I have here in my pocket a prescription from my doctor that forbids me to answer questions from or get into discussions with philosophers or something like that. After spending the last couple of days reading all the links on the outrageous proposition that rocks, rainstorms or plates of spaghetti implement the mind, I now understand Feynman's sentiment. What a waste of mental energy. A line of discussion as equally fruitless as solipsism. I am in full agreement with Richard Loosemore on this one. Eric B. Ramsay Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 20/02/2008, Richard Loosemore wrote: I am aware of some of those other sources for the idea: nevertheless, they are all nonsense for the same reason. I especially single out Searle: his writings on this subject are virtually worthless. I have argued with Searle to his face, and I have talked with others (Hofstadter, for example) who have also done so, and the consensus among these people is that his arguments are built on confusion. Just to be clear, this is *not* the same as Searle's Chinese Room argument, which only he seems to find convincing. -- Stathis Papaioannou --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?; Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Infinitely Unlikely Coincidences [WAS Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier]
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 18/02/2008, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [snip] But again, none of this touches upon Lanier's attempt to draw a bogus conclusion from his thought experiment. No external observer would ever be able to keep track of such a fragmented computation and as far as the rest of the universe is concerned there may as well be no computation. This makes little sense, surely. You mean that we would not be able to interact with it? Of course not: the poor thing will have been isolated from meanigful contact with the world because of the jumbled up implementation that you posit. Again, though, I see no relevant conclusion emerging from this. I cannot make any sense of your statement that as far as the rest of the universe is concerned there may as well be no computation. So we cannot communicate with it anymore that should not be surprising, given your assumptions. We can't communicate with it so it is useless as far as what we normally think of as computation goes. A rainstorm contains patterns isomorphic with an abacus adding 127 and 498 to give 625, but to extract this meaning you have to already know the question and the answer, using another computer such as your brain. However, in the case of an inputless simulation with conscious inhabitants this objection is irrelevant, since the meaning is created by observers intrinsic to the computation. Thus if there is any way a physical system could be interpreted as implementing a conscious computation, it is implementing the conscious computation, even if no-one else is around to keep track of it. Sorry, but I do not think your conclusion even remotely follows from the premises. But beyond that, the basic reason that this line of argument is nonsensical is that Lanier's thought experiment was rigged in such a way that a coincidence was engineered into existence. Nothing whatever can be deduced from an argument in which you set things up so that a coincidence must happen! It is just a meaningless coincidence that a computer can in theory be set up to be (a) conscious and (b) have a lower level of its architecture be isomorphic to a rainstorm. It is as simple as that. Richard Loosemore --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Infinitely Unlikely Coincidences [WAS Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier]
On 19/02/2008, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Sorry, but I do not think your conclusion even remotely follows from the premises. But beyond that, the basic reason that this line of argument is nonsensical is that Lanier's thought experiment was rigged in such a way that a coincidence was engineered into existence. Nothing whatever can be deduced from an argument in which you set things up so that a coincidence must happen! It is just a meaningless coincidence that a computer can in theory be set up to be (a) conscious and (b) have a lower level of its architecture be isomorphic to a rainstorm. I don't see how the fact something happens by coincidence is by itself a problem. Evolution, for example, works by means of random genetic mutations some of which just happen to result in a phenotype better suited to its environment. By the way, Lanier's idea is not original. Hilary Putnam, John Searle, Tim Maudlin, Greg Egan, Hans Moravec, David Chalmers (see the paper cited by Kaj Sotola in the original thread - http://consc.net/papers/rock.html) have all considered variations on the theme. At the very least, this should indicate that the idea cannot be dismissed as just obviously ridiculous and unworthy of careful thought. -- Stathis Papaioannou --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Infinitely Unlikely Coincidences [WAS Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier]
On 2/18/08, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: By the way, Lanier's idea is not original. Hilary Putnam, John Searle, Tim Maudlin, Greg Egan, Hans Moravec, David Chalmers (see the paper cited by Kaj Sotola in the original thread - http://consc.net/papers/rock.html) have all considered variations on the theme. At the very least, this should indicate that the idea cannot be dismissed as just obviously ridiculous and unworthy of careful thought. Yes, you've shown either that, or that even some occasionally intelligent and competent philosophers sometimes take seriously ideas that really can be dismissed as obviously ridiculous -- ideas which really are unworthy of careful thought were it not for the fact that pinpointing exactly why such ridiculous ideas are wrong is so often fruitful (as in the Chalmers article). --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Infinitely Unlikely Coincidences [WAS Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier]
On 2/17/08, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: If computation is multiply realizable, it could be seen as being implemented by an endless variety of physical systems, with the right mapping or interpretation, since anything at all could be arbitrarily chosen to represent a tape, a one, a zero, or whatever. Sure, pretty much anything could be used as a symbol to represent anything else, but the representing would consist in the network of causal interactions that constitute the symbol manipulation, not in the symbols themselves. (And certainly not in anyone having to be around to understand the machinery of symbol manipulation going on.) --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Infinitely Unlikely Coincidences [WAS Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier]
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 17/02/2008, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The first problem arises from Lanier's trick of claiming that there is a computer, in the universe of all possible computers, that has a machine architecture and a machine state that is isomorphic to BOTH the neural state of a brain at a given moment, and also isomorphic to the state of a particular rainstorm at a particular moment. In the universe of all possible computers and programs, yes. This is starting to be rather silly because the rainstorm and computer then diverge in their behavior in the next tick of the clock. Lanier then tries to persuade us, with some casually well chosen words, that he can find a computer that will match up with the rainstorm AND the brain for a few seconds, or a few minutes ... or ... how long? Well, if he posits a large enough computer, maybe the whole lifetime of that brain? The problem with this is that what his argument really tells us is that he can imagine a quasi-infinitely large, hypothetical computer that just happens to be structured to look like (a) the functional equivalent of a particular human brain for an indefinitely long period of time (at least the normal lifetime of that human brain), and, coincidentally, a particular rainstorm, for just a few seconds or minutes of the life of that rainstorm. The key word is coincidentally. There is no reason why it has to be *the same* computer from moment to moment. If your mind were uploaded to a computer and your physical brain died, you would experience continuity of consciousness (or if you prefer, the illusion of continuity of consciousness, which is just as good) despite the fact that there is a gross physical discontinuity between your brain and the computer. You would experience continuity of consciousness even if every moment were implemented on a completely different machine, in a completely different part of the universe, running in a completely jumbled up order. Some of this I agree with, though it does not touch on the point that I was making, which was that Lanier's argument was valueless. The last statement you make, though, is not quite correct: with a jumbled up sequence of episodes during which the various machines were running the brain code, he whole would lose its coherence, because input from the world would now be randomised. If the computer was being fed input from a virtual reality simulation, that would be fine. It would sense a sudden change from real world to virtual world. But again, none of this touches upon Lanier's attempt to draw a bogus conclusion from his thought experiment. No external observer would ever be able to keep track of such a fragmented computation and as far as the rest of the universe is concerned there may as well be no computation. This makes little sense, surely. You mean that we would not be able to interact with it? Of course not: the poor thing will have been isolated from meanigful contact with the world because of the jumbled up implementation that you posit. Again, though, I see no relevant conclusion emerging from this. I cannot make any sense of your statement that as far as the rest of the universe is concerned there may as well be no computation. So we cannot communicate with it anymore that should not be surprising, given your assumptions. But if the computation involves conscious observers in a virtual reality, why should they be any less conscious due to being unable to observe and interact with the substrate of their implementation? No reason at all! They would be conscious. Isaac Newton could not observe and interact with the substrate of his implementation, without making a hole in his skull that would have killed his brain ... but that did not have any bearing on his consciousness. In the final extrapolation of this idea it becomes clear that if any computation can be mapped onto any physical system, the physical system is superfluous and the computation resides in the mapping, an abstract mathematical object. This is functionalism, no? I am not sure if you are disagreeing with functionalism or supporting it. ;-) Well, the computation is not the implemenatation, for sure, but is it appropriate to call it an abstract mathematical mapping? This leads to the idea that all computations are actually implemented in a Platonic reality, and the universe we observe emerges from that Platonic reality, as per eg. Max Tegmark and in the article linked to by Matt Mahoney: I don't see how this big jump follows. I have a different interpretation that does not need Platonic realities, so it looks like a non-sequiteur to me. http://www.mattmahoney.net/singularity.html I ind most of what Matt says in this article to be incoherent. Assertions pulled out of thin air and citing of unjustifiable claims made by others as if they were god-sent truth. Richard Loosemore
Re: Infinitely Unlikely Coincidences [WAS Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier]
--- Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: When people like Lanier allow themselves the luxury of positing infinitely large computers (who else do we know who does this? Ah, yes, the AIXI folks), they can make infinitely unlikely coincidences happen. It is a commonly accepted practice to use Turing machines in proofs, even though we can't actually build one. Hutter is not proposing a universal solution to AI. He is proving that it is not computable. Lanier is not suggesting implementing consciousness as a rainstorm. He is refuting its existence. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier
--- John Ku [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 2/16/08, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I would prefer to leave behind these counterfactuals altogether and try to use information theory and control theory to achieve a precise understanding of what it is for something to be the standard(s) in terms of which we are able to deliberate. Since our normative concepts (e.g. should, reason, ought, etc) are fundamentally about guiding our attitudes through deliberation, I think they can then be analyzed in terms of what those deliberative standards prescribe. I agree. I prefer the approach of predicting what we *will* do as opposed to what we *ought* to do. It makes no sense to talk about a right or wrong approach when our concepts of right and wrong are programmable. I don't quite follow. I was arguing for a particular way of analyzing our talk of right and wrong, not abandoning such talk. Although our concepts are programmable, what matters is what follows from our current concepts as they are. There are two main ways in which my analysis would differ from simply predicting what we will do. First, we might make an error in applying our deliberative standards or tracking what actually follows from them. Second, even once we reach some conclusion about what is prescribed by our deliberative standards, we may not act in accordance with that conclusion out of weakness of will. It is the second part where my approach differs. A decision to act in a certain way implies right or wrong according to our views, not the views of a posthuman intelligence. Rather I prefer to analyze the path that AI will take, given human motivations, but without judgment. For example, CEV favors granting future wishes over present wishes (when it is possible to predict future wishes reliably). But human psychology suggests that we would prefer machines that grant our immediate wishes, implying that we will not implement CEV (even if we knew how). Any suggestion that CEV should or should not be implemented is just a distraction from an analysis of what will actually happen. As a second example, a singularity might result in the extinction of DNA based life and its replacement with a much faster evolutionary process. It makes no sense to judge this outcome as good or bad. The important question is the likelihood of this occurring, and when. In this context, it is more important to analyze the motives of people who would try to accelerate or delay the progression of technology. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Infinitely Unlikely Coincidences [WAS Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier]
Matt Mahoney wrote: --- Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: When people like Lanier allow themselves the luxury of positing infinitely large computers (who else do we know who does this? Ah, yes, the AIXI folks), they can make infinitely unlikely coincidences happen. It is a commonly accepted practice to use Turing machines in proofs, even though we can't actually build one. So? That was not the practice that I condemned. My problem is with people like Hutter or Lanier using thought experiments in which the behavior of quasi-infinite computers is treated as if it were a meaningful thing in the real universe. There is a world of difference between that and using Turing machines in proofs. Hutter is not proposing a universal solution to AI. He is proving that it is not computable. He is doing nothing of the sort. As I stated in the quote above, he is drawing a meaningless conclusion by introducing a quasi-infinite computation into his proof: when people try to make claims about the real world (i.e. claims about what artificial intelligence is) by postulating machines with quasi-infinite amounts of computation going on inside them, they can get anything to happen. Lanier is not suggesting implementing consciousness as a rainstorm. He is refuting its existence. And you missed what I said about Lanier, apparently. He refuted nothing. He showed that with a quasi-infinite computer in his thought experiment, he can make a coincidence happen. Big deal. Richard Loosemore --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier
On 2/17/08, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Nevertheless we can make similar reductions to absurdity with respect to qualia, that which distinguishes you from a philosophical zombie. There is no experiment to distinguish whether you actually experience redness when you see a red object, or simply behave as if you do. Nor is there any aspect of this behavior that could not (at least in theory) be simulated by a machine. You are relying on a partial conceptual analysis of qualia or consciousness by Chalmers that maintains that there could be an exact physical duplicate of you that is not conscious (a philosophical zombie). While he is in general a great philosopher, I suspect his arguments here ultimately rely too much on moving from, I can create a mental image of a physical duplicate and subtract my image of consciousness from it, to therefore, such things are possible. At any rate, a functionalist would not accept that analysis. On a functionalist account, consciousness would reduce to something like certain representational activities which could be understood in information processing terms. A physical duplicate of you would have the same information processing properties, hence the same consciousness properties. Once we understand the relevant properties it would be possible to test whether something is conscious or not by seeing what information it is or is not capable of processing. It is hard to test right now because we have at the moment only very incomplete conceptual analyses. --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: Infinitely Unlikely Coincidences [WAS Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier]
On 18/02/2008, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The last statement you make, though, is not quite correct: with a jumbled up sequence of episodes during which the various machines were running the brain code, he whole would lose its coherence, because input from the world would now be randomised. If the computer was being fed input from a virtual reality simulation, that would be fine. It would sense a sudden change from real world to virtual world. The argument that is the subject of this thread wouldn't work if the brain simulation had to interact with the world at the level of the substrate it is being simulated on. However, it does work if you consider an inputless virtual environment with conscious inhabitants. Suppose you are now living in such a simulation. From your point of view, today is Monday and yesterday was Sunday. Do you have any evidence to support the belief that Sunday was was actually run yesterday in the real world, or that it was run at all? The simulation could have been started up one second ago, complete with false memories of Sunday. Sunday may not actually be run until next year, and the version of you then will have no idea that the future has already happened. But again, none of this touches upon Lanier's attempt to draw a bogus conclusion from his thought experiment. No external observer would ever be able to keep track of such a fragmented computation and as far as the rest of the universe is concerned there may as well be no computation. This makes little sense, surely. You mean that we would not be able to interact with it? Of course not: the poor thing will have been isolated from meanigful contact with the world because of the jumbled up implementation that you posit. Again, though, I see no relevant conclusion emerging from this. I cannot make any sense of your statement that as far as the rest of the universe is concerned there may as well be no computation. So we cannot communicate with it anymore that should not be surprising, given your assumptions. We can't communicate with it so it is useless as far as what we normally think of as computation goes. A rainstorm contains patterns isomorphic with an abacus adding 127 and 498 to give 625, but to extract this meaning you have to already know the question and the answer, using another computer such as your brain. However, in the case of an inputless simulation with conscious inhabitants this objection is irrelevant, since the meaning is created by observers intrinsic to the computation. Thus if there is any way a physical system could be interpreted as implementing a conscious computation, it is implementing the conscious computation, even if no-one else is around to keep track of it. -- Stathis Papaioannou --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier
--- John Ku [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 2/17/08, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Nevertheless we can make similar reductions to absurdity with respect to qualia, that which distinguishes you from a philosophical zombie. There is no experiment to distinguish whether you actually experience redness when you see a red object, or simply behave as if you do. Nor is there any aspect of this behavior that could not (at least in theory) be simulated by a machine. You are relying on a partial conceptual analysis of qualia or consciousness by Chalmers that maintains that there could be an exact physical duplicate of you that is not conscious (a philosophical zombie). While he is in general a great philosopher, I suspect his arguments here ultimately rely too much on moving from, I can create a mental image of a physical duplicate and subtract my image of consciousness from it, to therefore, such things are possible. My interpretation of Chalmers is the opposite. He seems to say that either machine consciousness is possible or human consciousness is not. At any rate, a functionalist would not accept that analysis. On a functionalist account, consciousness would reduce to something like certain representational activities which could be understood in information processing terms. A physical duplicate of you would have the same information processing properties, hence the same consciousness properties. Once we understand the relevant properties it would be possible to test whether something is conscious or not by seeing what information it is or is not capable of processing. It is hard to test right now because we have at the moment only very incomplete conceptual analyses. It seems to me the problem is defining consciousness, not testing for it. What computational property would you use? For example, one might ascribe consciousness to the presence of episodic memory. (If you don't remember something happening to you, then you must have been unconscious). But in this case, any machine that records a time sequence of events (for example, a chart recorder) could be said to be conscious. Or you might ascribe consciousness to entities that learn, seek pleasure, and avoid pain. But then I could write a simple program like http://www.mattmahoney.net/autobliss.txt with these properties. It seems to me that any other testable property would have the same problem. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier
--- John Ku [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 2/15/08, Eric B. Ramsay [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: http://www.jaronlanier.com/aichapter.html I take it the target of his rainstorm argument is the idea that the essential features of consciousness are its information-processing properties. I believe his target is the existence of consciousness. There are many proofs showing that the assumption of consciousness leads to absurdities, which I have summarized at http://www.mattmahoney.net/singularity.html In mathematics, it should not be necessary to prove a theorem more than once. But proof and belief are different things, especially when the belief is hard coded into the brain. For now, these apparent paradoxes are just philosophical arguments because they depend on technologies that have not yet been developed, such as AGI, uploading, copying people, and programming the brain. But we will eventually have to confront them. The result will not be pretty. The best definition (not solution) of friendliness is probably CEV ( http://www.singinst.org/upload/CEV.html ) which can be summarized as our wish if we knew more, thought faster, were more the people we wished we were, had grown up farther together. What would you wish for if your brain was not constrained by the hardwired beliefs and goals that you were born with and you knew that your consciousness did not exist? What would you wish for if you could reprogram your own goals? The logical answer is that it doesn't matter. The pleasure of a thousand permanent orgasms is just a matter of changing a few lines of code, and you go into a degenerate state where learning ceases. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier
Eric B. Ramsay wrote: I don't know when Lanier wrote the following but I would be interested to know what the AI folks here think about his critique (or direct me to a thread where this was already discussed). Also would someone be able to re-state his rainstorm thought experiment more clearly -- I am not sure I get it: http://www.jaronlanier.com/aichapter.html Lanier's rainstorm argument is spurious nonsense. It relies on a sleight of hand, and preys on the inability of most people to notice the point at which he slips from valid-analogy to nonsense-analogy. He also then goes on to use a debating trick that John Searle is fond of: he claims that the people who disagree with his argument always choose a different type of counter-argument. His implication is that, because the follow different paths, therefore they don't agree about what is wrong, therefore ALL of them are fools, and therefore NONE of their counter-arguments are valid. Really. I like Jaron Lanier as a musician, but this is drivel. Richard Loosemore --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier
On 17/02/2008, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Lanier's rainstorm argument is spurious nonsense. That's the response of most functionalists, but an explanation as to why it is spurious nonsense is needed. And some such as Hans Moravec have actually conceded that the argument is valid: http://www.frc.ri.cmu.edu/~hpm/project.archive/general.articles/1998/SimConEx.98.html -- Stathis Papaioannou --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier
On 2/16/08, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I would prefer to leave behind these counterfactuals altogether and try to use information theory and control theory to achieve a precise understanding of what it is for something to be the standard(s) in terms of which we are able to deliberate. Since our normative concepts (e.g. should, reason, ought, etc) are fundamentally about guiding our attitudes through deliberation, I think they can then be analyzed in terms of what those deliberative standards prescribe. I agree. I prefer the approach of predicting what we *will* do as opposed to what we *ought* to do. It makes no sense to talk about a right or wrong approach when our concepts of right and wrong are programmable. I don't quite follow. I was arguing for a particular way of analyzing our talk of right and wrong, not abandoning such talk. Although our concepts are programmable, what matters is what follows from our current concepts as they are. There are two main ways in which my analysis would differ from simply predicting what we will do. First, we might make an error in applying our deliberative standards or tracking what actually follows from them. Second, even once we reach some conclusion about what is prescribed by our deliberative standards, we may not act in accordance with that conclusion out of weakness of will. Allowing for the possibility of genuine error is one of the big tasks to be accomplished by a theory of intentionality. Take an example from our more ordinary concepts, though the same types of problems will arise for our deliberative standards. If I see a cow in the night and my concept of horse fires, what makes it the case that this particular firing of 'horse' is an error? Why does my concept horse really only correctly refer to horses rather than the disjunction horses-or-cows-in-the-night? (Although I earlier mentioned that I think Dretske's information theoretic semantics is probably the most promising theory of intentionality, it is at the moment unable to deliver the right semantics in the face of these types of errors.) I actually think the second difference poses a very similar type of problem. What makes it the case that we sometimes really do act out of weakness of will rather than it being the case that our will really endorsed that apparent exception in this particular case while presumably endorsing something different the rest of the time? --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier
--- Eric B. Ramsay [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I don't know when Lanier wrote the following but I would be interested to know what the AI folks here think about his critique (or direct me to a thread where this was already discussed). Also would someone be able to re-state his rainstorm thought experiment more clearly -- I am not sure I get it: http://www.jaronlanier.com/aichapter.html This is a nice proof of the non-existence of consciousness (or qualia). Here is another (I came across on sl4): http://youtube.com/watch?v=nx6v30NMFV8 Such reductions to absurdity are possible because the brain is programmed to not accept the logical result. Consciousness is hard to define but you know what it is. It is what makes you aware, the little person inside your head that observes the world through your perceptions, that which distinguishes you from a philosophical zombie. We normally associate consciousness with human traits such as episodic memory, response to pleasure and pain, fear of death, language, and a goal of seeking knowledge through experimentation. (Imagine a person without any of these qualities). These traits are programmed into our DNA because they increase our fitness. You cannot change them, which is what these proofs would do if you could accept them. Unfortunately, this question will have a profound effect on the outcome of a singularity. Assuming recursive self improvement in a competitive environment, we should expect agents (possibly including our uploads) to believe in their own consciousness, but there is no evolutionary pressure to also believe in human consciousness. Even if we successfully constrain the process so that agents have the goal of satisfying our extrapolated volition, then logically we should expect those agents (knowing what we cannot know) to conclude that human brains are just computers and our existence doesn't matter. It is ironic that our programmed beliefs leads us to advance technology to the point where the question can no longer be ignored. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
Re: [singularity] AI critique by Jaron Lanier
On 16/02/2008, Kaj Sotala [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: However, despite what is claimed, not every physical process can be interpreted to do any computation. To do such an interpretation, you have to do so after the fact: after all the raindrops have fallen, you can assign their positions formal roles that correspond to computation, but you can't *predict* what positions will be assigned what roles ahead of the time - after all, they are just randomly falling raindrops. You can't actually *use* the rainstorm to compute anything, like you could use a computer - you have to first do the computation yourself, then assign each state of the rainstorm a position that corresponds to the steps in your previous computation. Sure, you can't interact with the raindrop computation, but that doesn't mean it isn't conscious. Suppose a civilization built a computer implementing a virtual environment with conscious inhabitants, but no I/O. The computer is launched into space and the civilization is completely destroyed when its sun goes nova. A billion years later, the computer is found by another civilization which figures out how the power supply works and starts it up, firing the virtual inhabitants into life. As far as the second civilization is concerned, the activity in the computer could mean anything or nothing, like the patterns in a rainstorm. Just as the space of all possible rainstorms contains one that is isomorphic with any given computer implementing a particular program, so the space of all possible computers that an alien civilization might build contains one that is isomorphic with any sufficiently large rainstorm. It doesn't matter that manual for the computer represented by the rainstorm has been lost, or that the computer was never actually built: all that matters for the program to be implemented is that it rain. -- Stathis Papaioannou --- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
