Thanks to everyone that replied to this last call. In summary, there is
support to move the draft forward with the minor editorial changes
discussed on the list. We’ll start the process of moving this along to the
IESG for publication.
Thanks,
Joe, Sean, and Chris
> On May 31, 2019, at 5:31 PM, Geoff Keating wrote:
>
>
>
>> On 21 May 2019, at 2:08 pm, Hugo Krawczyk wrote:
>>
>> A clarification on the text suggest below by Russ.
>>
>> The way I see it, the external PSK as used in
>> draft-ietf-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk is not intended as a
On 5/31/2019, 17:34, "TLS on behalf of Geoff Keating" wrote:
>> On 21 May 2019, at 2:08 pm, Hugo Krawczyk wrote:
>>
>> A clarification on the text suggest below by Russ.
>>
>> The way I see it, the external PSK as used in
draft-ietf-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk is not
> On 21 May 2019, at 2:08 pm, Hugo Krawczyk wrote:
>
> A clarification on the text suggest below by Russ.
>
> The way I see it, the external PSK as used in
> draft-ietf-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk is not intended as a means of
> authentication but as a way of regaining forward secrecy in
On 5/22/2019 11:06 AM, Russ Housley wrote:
>
> Christian:
>
>> On 5/15/2019 6:20 AM, Joseph Salowey wrote:
>>> The last call has come and gone without any comment. Please
>>> indicate if you have reviewed the draft even if you do not have
>>> issues to raise so the chairs can see who has
Christian:
> On 5/15/2019 6:20 AM, Joseph Salowey wrote:
>> The last call has come and gone without any comment. Please indicate if you
>> have reviewed the draft even if you do not have issues to raise so the
>> chairs can see who has reviewed it. Also indicate if you have any plans to
>>
Weird. I sent this message this morning, and it did not arrive on the list.
On 5/22/2019 1:09 AM, Christian Huitema wrote:
> On 5/15/2019 6:20 AM, Joseph Salowey wrote:
>> The last call has come and gone without any comment. Please indicate
>> if you have reviewed the draft even if you do not
A clarification on the text suggest below by Russ.
The way I see it, the external PSK as used in
draft-ietf-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk is not intended as a means of
authentication but as a way of regaining forward secrecy in case the
(EC)DHE mechanism is ever broken (e.g., by cryptanalysis or
> On May 20, 2019, at 8:25 PM, Geoffrey Keating wrote:
>
> Joseph Salowey writes:
>
>> The last call has come and gone without any comment. Please indicate if
>> you have reviewed the draft even if you do not have issues to raise so the
>> chairs can see who has reviewed it. Also indicate
* I don’t think I get it. There’s a ton of submissions at NIST PQC, most
came with some formal proofs. I can’t believe none of them is good enough.
Anything from that pool should be better than nothing…?
We want to wait until NIST decides and not jump the gun.
* Also, if you do have a
Geoffrey:
>
> The last call has come and gone without any comment. Please indicate if
>> you have reviewed the draft even if you do not have issues to raise so the
>> chairs can see who has reviewed it. Also indicate if you have any plans to
>> implement the draft.
>
> I looked at the draft.
>
lt;mailto:hous...@vigilsec.com>
>> Date: Monday, May 20, 2019 at 3:21 PM
>> To: Joe Salowey <mailto:j...@salowey.net>
>> Cc: IETF TLS <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
>> Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk
>>
>> TL
n behalf of
> Russ Housley mailto:hous...@vigilsec.com>>
> Date: Monday, May 20, 2019 at 3:21 PM
> To: Joe Salowey mailto:j...@salowey.net>>
> Cc: IETF TLS mailto:tls@ietf.org>>
> Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk
>
> TLS 1.3
Joseph Salowey writes:
> The last call has come and gone without any comment. Please indicate if
> you have reviewed the draft even if you do not have issues to raise so the
> chairs can see who has reviewed it. Also indicate if you have any plans to
> implement the draft.
I looked at the
at 3:21 PM
To: Joe Salowey
Cc: IETF TLS
Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk
TLS 1.3 Extension for Certificate-based Authentication with an External PSK
ensures the US Government has a quantum-resistant option for TLS in the interim
years until post-quantum
*From: *TLS on behalf of Russ Housley
*Date: *Monday, May 20, 2019 at 3:21 PM
*To: *Joe Salowey
*Cc: *IETF TLS
*Subject: *Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk
TLS 1.3 Extension for Certificate-based Authentication with an
External PSK ensures the US Government has
.
From: TLS on behalf of Russ Housley
Date: Monday, May 20, 2019 at 3:21 PM
To: Joe Salowey
Cc: IETF TLS
Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk
TLS 1.3 Extension for Certificate-based Authentication with an External PSK
ensures the US Government has a quantum
TLS 1.3 Extension for Certificate-based Authentication with an External PSK
ensures the US Government has a quantum-resistant option for TLS in the interim
years until post-quantum algorithms emerge from the NIST process. For this
reason, there is an intent to specify this extension in future
On 15 May 2019, at 9:20, Joseph Salowey wrote:
The last call has come and gone without any comment. Please indicate
if
you have reviewed the draft even if you do not have issues to raise so
the
chairs can see who has reviewed it. Also indicate if you have any
plans to
implement the draft.
Joe,
I reviewed the draft and sent comments directly to Russ in the
form of a marked up Word document (which is why I didn’t previously post my
input to the list). I’ve no problems with the document advancing based on
Russ’ -01 update.
The last call has come and gone without any comment. Please indicate if
you have reviewed the draft even if you do not have issues to raise so the
chairs can see who has reviewed it. Also indicate if you have any plans to
implement the draft.
On Tue, Apr 9, 2019 at 8:51 PM Joseph Salowey
This is the working group last call for the "TLS 1.3 Extension for
Certificate-based Authentication with an External Pre-Shared Key” draft
available at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk/..
Please review the document and send your comments to the list by
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