Re: [tor-dev] Better relay uptime visualisation

to gauge load. Then they start at a random time during the day/month, but early enough that they think they'll still use all their bandwidth. I wonder if we're seeing another phenomenon? (daily / monthly server restarts?) Or we could be seeing hibernation failing to work as intended. Tim

Re: [tor-dev] Scaling Tor Metrics, Round 2

h your latest visualizations. This > is pending on the JavaScript decision though. Do David's visualisations already use JavaScript? We could always do what we did with the bubble graphs, and make (another) part of the metrics site use JavaScript. Or are we waiting to choose a language before

Re: [tor-dev] RFC: AEZ for relay cryptography, v2

gt; > We might want the property that after every cell, we can forget > some secret that would enable us to decrypt that cell if we saw > it again. > > … Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3

Re: [tor-dev] Scaling Tor Metrics

> On 28 Nov 2015, at 01:22, thomas lörtsch <t...@rat.io> wrote: > > I don’t even know what those .tpo’s he mentions are. .tpo is an abbreviation for .torproject.org <http://torproject.org/> : a server under the Tor Project's domain. Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345

Re: [tor-dev] Graphs - Estimated Traffic Capacity

ny preemptively built paths to cannibalize or not. If so, it's side is typically 4 hops, if not, it is 3. It would be great to have some stats for typical path lengths, is there an open ticket for this, or should I create one? Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor

Re: [tor-dev] Shared random value calculation edge cases (proposal 250)

cture will also have to change to commit H(H(RN)). > > For spec readability, maybe we could have: > > RN = 255-bit random number > REVEAL_VALUE = H(RN) > > and then use REVEAL_VALUE in REVEAL and COMMIT. Jacob/David/George, We typically add a distinguishing value to ha

Re: [tor-dev] Shared random value calculation edge cases (proposal 250)

iod) That way, clients and relays don't need to do anything special: there will always be a SRV in the consensus. This means that the SR consensus method will always produce a SR value, which I believe is a much better property than occasionally failing to produce a value. Tim Tim Wilson

Re: [tor-dev] DoS resistance for Next-Generation Onion Services

Hi George, Please see below for a spec patch covering this email thread and various issues discussed on Trac and tor-dev@ > On 20 Nov 2015, at 00:13, George Kadianakis <desnac...@riseup.net> wrote: > > Tim Wilson-Brown - teor <teor2...@gmail.com <mailto:teor2...@gmail.com&

Re: [tor-dev] DoS resistance for Next-Generation Onion Services

> On 20 Nov 2015, at 12:21, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor <teor2...@gmail.com> wrote: > > ... > > A full list of changes is: > ... > * randomise revision-counter to avoid information leaks > … I just pushed a fixup to this commit: the revision-counter requires a

Re: [tor-dev] Just releasted : haskell-tor

Ayms/node-Tor > Java: https://silvertunnel.org/doc/netlib.html , > https://subgraph.com/orchid/ <https://subgraph.com/orchid/> Also Java: ​ <https://github.com/owenson/tor-research-framework>https://github.com/owenson/tor-research-framework <https://github.com/owenson/tor-resear

Re: [tor-dev] DoS resistance for Next-Generation Onion Services

> >SALT (random bytes from above) [16 bytes] >ENCRYPTED The plaintext encrypted with S [variable] >MAC MAC of both above fields[32 bytes] Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) [0]: https://www.benthamsgaze.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/sucu-torscaling.

[tor-dev] prop224: "revision-counter" field leaks service/intro point stability

revision-counter? Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F signature.asc Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail ___ tor-dev mailing li

Re: [tor-dev] Starting on an Easy Bug #16846

ear more flags (future-proof this function by zeroing out the entire structure, then copying the flags we know we want) https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16849 Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E

Re: [tor-dev] documentation for new offline master key functionality (--keygen is undocumented)

I am assuming that a RSA key with a missing ed25519 key is treated the same as a RSA key with a different ed25519 key: the authorities reject the relay with the missing ed25519 key from the consensus.) This is a good reason to use offline ed25519 master

Re: [tor-dev] documentation for new offline master key functionality (--keygen is undocumented)

On 16 Nov 2015, at 02:37, s7r <s...@sky-ip.org> wrote: >> Does a tor operator has to SIGHUP a running tor instance after >> copying the new signing keys to the appropriate folder or will tor >> attempt to reload that file as soon as this signing key expires? >

Re: [tor-dev] possible to run --keygen non-interactively?

o --keygen >> >> or >> >> whatyouwanttodo --keygen < EOF These alternatives will produce different outputs: The /dev/null alternative produces no input data. The echo "" alternative produces a newline on most platforms.

Re: [tor-dev] Hidden service patch workshop on #tor-dev IRC channel

t. (I'm hoping I'll have time after I finish a grant proposal, and also finish fallback directories (#15775) and multiple bootstrap connections (#4483)). Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F

Re: [tor-dev] Update of prop#250: Random Number Generation During Tor Voting

ALL the reveal phase as > opposite to missing the last 3 consecutive ones). > > What do you think? Whatever we decide, can we make it a torrc option? That way, authorities running the SR code can bootstrap relatively quickly in test networks. (The fastest possible bootstrap would have 1 SR

[tor-dev] Changing Rendezvous Single Onion Service at Runtime

with this new restriction? I want to check we aren't breaking any neat onion service uses, if we force Tor to restart when changing path lengths. Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F

[tor-dev] Alternate Single Onion Service Designs

multiple flavours? Could they get that big if we support enough functionality? Or are we better to implement secure, one-size-fits-all defaults, and ask users and operators to sacrifice some performance? Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at blah dot im OTR

[tor-dev] DoS resistance for Next-Generation Onion Services

or.) Security Proofs: The modified security proof in Mitigation #3 would need to check out for me to be comfortable with this option. Conclusion: Can we consider Mitigation #1: creating a different blinded public key for each replica? This would double the number of ke

Re: [tor-dev] Alternate Single Onion Service Designs

introduction for a European rendezvous point could be sent to a nearby European data center to perform the actual rendezvous. Alternately, it could be send to a lightly-loaded instance. Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 975586

Re: [tor-dev] Tor dev meeting times this week and beyond!

workshop: Tuesday at 0100 UTC (Monday at 8:00pm EST, Monday at 5:00pm PST) or Monday at 0100 UTC (Sunday at 8:00pm EST, Sunday at 5:00pm PST) Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F signat

Re: [tor-dev] Update of prop#250: Random Number Generation During Tor Voting

similar. Any adversary who can break shared randomness is likely to also be able to break the entire consensus. And the consensus is a high-value target, whereas shared randomness isn't (yet). Therefore, I think we could treat any conflicts as bugs or misconfigurations, report them via IRC an

Re: [tor-dev] Update of prop#250: Random Number Generation During Tor Voting

ared random signing keys partway through a round? Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F ___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev

Re: [tor-dev] [FWD: Re: Apple developer account + codesigning]

ividual stages (as Xcode does automatically). Signing with --deep is for > emergency repairs and temporary adjustments only. > > Note that signing with the combination --deep --force will forcibly re-sign > all code in a bundle. > Mozilla have also had issues with signin

Re: [tor-dev] [FWD: Re: Apple developer account + codesigning]

ces us to the current state, where we distribute detached PGP signatures next to downloads. Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F signature.asc Descri

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal 257: Refactoring authorities and taking parts offline

#4483, prop #210) the authorities. Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F signature.asc Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail ___

Re: [tor-dev] Desired exit node diversity

o the network metadata db, and the > users can query it to make their own decisions, follow > other users prebuilt selection templates, or stick > with the provided defaults. > ___ > tor-dev mailing list > tor-dev@lists.torproject.org <mai

Re: [tor-dev] [FWD: Re: Apple developer account + codesigning]

. > > The executables have their own signature in the `LC_CODE_SIGNATURE` load > command in the Mach-O binary. Reproducible builds will be much easier if the executable signatures are also placed in a separate file, rather than modifying the executable. I'm guessing there's no optio

Re: [tor-dev] Load Balancing in 2.7 series - incompatible with OnionBalance ?

On 23 Oct 2015, at 03:30, Alec Muffett wrote: >> However, you mention that one DC going down could cause a bad experience for >> users. In most HA/DR setups I've seen there should be enough capacity if >> something fails, is that not the case for you? Can a single data center

Re: [tor-dev] Load Balancing in 2.7 series - incompatible with OnionBalance ?

On 23 Oct 2015, at 03:30, Alec Muffett wrote: >> However, if you were to use proposal #255 to split the introduction and >> rendezvous to separate tor instances, you would then be limited to: >> - 6*10*N tor introduction points, where there are 6 HSDirs, each receiving >> 10

[tor-dev] Proposal: Rendezvous Single Onion Services

Hi All,Please find below and attached a proposal: Rendezvous Single Onion Services.This is an updated and expanded version of "Direct Onion Services: Fast-but-not-hidden services”. It also borrows heavily from "Single Onion Services" (Proposal #252).The proposal is available in the branch

Re: [tor-dev] Load Balancing in 2.7 series - incompatible with OnionBalance ?

> On 21 Oct 2015, at 10:22, Alec Muffett wrote: > > typo: > >> alecm: and this persists for up to 24h, even though the outage was only 10 >> minutes > > Also, I neglected to observe that linear polling of A-E seeking a descriptor > suggests A will be hammered whilst J is

Re: [tor-dev] ResearchEthics

> On 20 Oct 2015, at 01:30, Aaron Johnson wrote: > > It seems the networking research community has already formed an ethics > review board: . Nick Feamster > and Philipp Winter are on the board. > > Maybe Tor can

Re: [tor-dev] Hello, I can't use Google Search Engine Service through Tor proxy.

CHA also affects sites using CloudFlare, but doesn’t affect Tor’s own Trac site. Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F signature.asc Description: Me

Re: [tor-dev] Trac priorities and severities

IW, it seems that the current default Priority for new tickets is > "Immediate" and the default Severity is "Blocker". This might cause > people who don't know how trac works, submitting stressfull trac tickets. And every time I edit an existing ticket, it gets severity “Blocker”,

Re: [tor-dev] ResearchEthics

s increase the risk of discovering the site? For example, if a site’s threat mitigation involves it being accessed a certain (small) number of times, and then changing address, crawlers could represent an unacceptable burden on the site’s operator and legitimate users. Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teo

Re: [tor-dev] Concerns regarding a multilingual version of TBB,

anonymity. Your thoughts? Tor is currently available in multiple languages, just not in the same download. We could use the solutions we currently use for this issue: * for the HTTP headers, send “accept-language: en-US,en;q=0.5” and in other places, either send en-US, or send no language. Tim

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal: HTTP header distinguish TBB users

ions to (2)? If not, I > will write the proposal. I think this kind of tagging has security implications, but I’m not sure what the tradeoffs are. Are we still trying to hide TBB users in the Mozilla browser crowd? Are we making it even easier to identify and block TBB users? Tim Tim Wilson-Brow

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal: Load-balancing hidden services by splitting introduction from rendezvous

n places slightly more load on the tor instance that receives the INTRODUCE2 cell. Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F signature.asc Description: Me

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal: Load-balancing hidden services by splitting introduction from rendezvous

> On 2 Oct 2015, at 14:43, Tom van der Woerdt <i...@tvdw.eu> wrote: > > Hi Tim, > > Thanks for your great comments, very much appreciated! > > Comments inline. > > > > Op 30/09/15 om 19:40 schreef Tim Wilson-Brown - teor: >> >>> On 3

[tor-dev] Faster Bootstrap - Prop #210 (Revised)

Hi All, I have revised proposal #210 - Faster Headless Consensus Bootstrapping today, after a number of discussions with Peter Palfrader Nick Mathewson, Mike Perry, and others. This proposal aims to improve tor’s consensus download behaviour when the authorities (or directory mirrors) are

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal: Load-balancing hidden services by splitting introduction from rendezvous

at we need to think through the implementation of this proposal more carefully, because it will help us decide whether it’s compatible with: * Current Hidden Services * Next-Generation Hidden Services And perhaps make changes to any of these proposals to make them work together. I’d also note that i

Re: [tor-dev] Anycast Exits (related : Special-use-TLD support)

gured IPv4 and IPv6 address * reject relay’s interfaces’ IPv4 and IPv6 addresses * Then add the default exit policy Regards Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F signature.asc Description: Messa

Re: [tor-dev] Draft proposal -- no number yet: How to safely drop support for old clients.

nnection from such a version, we could throttle the bytes we give > it, drop its circuits, or stop reading. > > [TODO: which?] Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F signature.asc Descriptio

[tor-dev] Onion Services and NAT Punching

cases that: * need NAT punching, * don’t need service location anonymity, and * would benefit from lower latency? Thanks Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F signature.asc Description

Re: [tor-dev] Special-use-TLD support

his exposure happening? Via traffic correlation? As far as I understand, your guard only sees your encrypted traffic, and not your exit(s) or your DNS queries. Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5

Re: [tor-dev] Special-use-TLD support

h can have search domains appended by the browser or OS. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fully_qualified_domain_name <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fully_qualified_domain_name> Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at bla

Re: [tor-dev] Desired exit node diversity

account" and then Roster can store the URL to this tweet to > maintain an independent proof that alias controls which relay, similar > to how Keybase does it. It would be great to do this in a way that’s independent of social media platform. Many social media platforms have been invent

Re: [tor-dev] Simplifying load balancing by removing Guard+Exit?

we also want to disable the DirPort on Exits? Or is that a small amount of extra load? Similarly, what about the HSDir flag? Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F signature.asc Description: Messa

Re: [tor-dev] Looking for resources

permail/tor-dev/> Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F signature.asc Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail ___ tor-dev mailing lis

Re: [tor-dev] . tor-roster's geo diversity badge and self-ref relays

t out? > > I bet that would be an easy minor feature for somebody to add, and it > would avoid creating this confusion in the future. > > —Roger https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17065 <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17065> Tim Wilson-Brown (

Re: [tor-dev] . tor-roster's geo diversity badge and self-ref relays

t; both fine with removing it. > Can this be downgraded to an informational message? (or eliminated entirely?) Penalties can be quite discouraging, particularly for minor configuration variants. Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/te

Re: [tor-dev] Bridge Guards (prop#188) & Bridge ORPort Reachability Tests

Or even “dual onion”? It’s shorter, and means the same thing. I’ll stop bikeshedding now. Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP: 968F094B (ABFED1AC & A39A9058 expire 15 Sep 2015) teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F (From 1 Sep 2015)

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal 247 (Hidden Service Vanguards) Overhaul and Proposal: Padding Negotiation

parameters intended to be always set, or just set when there is an issue with padding? (I can see arguments both ways, but having them always set could be useful as a precaution against a quick attack.) Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP: 968F094B (ABFED1AC & A39A

Re: [tor-dev] Bridge Guards (prop#188) & Bridge ORPort Reachability Tests

> On 12 Sep 2015, at 17:26, isis <i...@torproject.org> wrote: > > Tim Wilson-Brown - teor transcribed 23K bytes: >> >>> On 10 Sep 2015, at 17:01, isis <i...@torproject.org> wrote: >>> >>>> 4.4.1. Bridge Reachability Self-Te

Re: [tor-dev] Bridge Guards (prop#188) & Bridge ORPort Reachability Tests

osals/188-bridge-guards.txt > [1]: https://bugs.torproject.org/7144 > [2]: https://bugs.torproject.org/7349 > > Best Regards, > -- > ♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft > _ > OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A

Re: [tor-dev] Draft Proposal: Random Number Generation During Tor Voting

er? Time order involves the question of which commitment was received first, which isn’t necessarily consistent between authorities. (Does it need to be? If there’s no SR doc, I guess not.) Tim (teor) Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP: 968F094B (ABFED1AC & A39A9058 e

Re: [tor-dev] Should cloud-hosted relays be rejected?

lt;https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorChutneyGuide> Of course, if researchers or developers or others really need a machine, they can move to a smaller cloud provider. This has benefits for diversity, and reduces what Google, Amazon, and Microsoft can know about Tor. Tim (teor) ___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev

Re: [tor-dev] Should cloud-hosted relays be rejected?

s://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2015-August/007655.html> If the blocked IP ranges are going to become numerous, and change frequently, why not create a tool that volunteer relay operators can use to check an IP address? Tim (teor) ___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev

Re: [tor-dev] patch to improve consensus download decompress performance

On 28 Aug 2015, at 00:50, starlight.201...@binnacle.cx wrote: tor-0.2.6.10-gz4x_guess.patch Thanks for this patch, I have logged it into the Tor Trac system as #16914 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16914 The full details are on Trac, but I’ll summarise my analysis of the

Re: [tor-dev] [PATCH] Log malformed hostnames in socks5 request respecting SafeLogging

, Thank you for submitting this patch - is there a corresponding Trac ticket? (Patches without Trac tickets can get lost easily.) If there isn't a Trac ticket, feel free to log one, or I can log one for you if you'd like. Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC

Re: [tor-dev] [PATCH] Log malformed hostnames in socks5 request respecting SafeLogging

On 25 Aug 2015, at 21:25, Andreas Stieger astie...@suse.com wrote: Hello, On 08/25/2015 08:16 AM, teor wrote: On 24 Aug 2015, at 09:12, Andreas Stieger astie...@suse.com mailto:astie...@suse.com wrote: I found a warning-level message in socks5 code relating to malformed hostnames

Re: [tor-dev] Feature freeze plans for Tor 0.2.7: Please read if you hack Tor!

to. (Again, it seems to be a major build change, and we're trying not to merge those right before the freeze. Another one for 0.2.8?) Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2

Re: [tor-dev] [RFC] On new guard algorithms and data structures

Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https

Re: [tor-dev] Hash Visualizations to Protect Against Onion Phishing

.) Tim (teor) ___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal: Merging Hidden Service Directories and Introduction Points

further in advance. Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7___ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev

Re: [tor-dev] tor's definition of 'median'

easier to patch the documentation to specify low-median. (And I see no significant gain in changing from low-median to mean-median.) I'd rather see bandwidth measurements become more accurate, for more relays, more of the time, than change how their median is defined. Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor

Re: [tor-dev] Draft Proposal: Random Number Generation During Tor Voting

mirrors, this will make different relay versions distinguishable, but I don't think we worry too much about that, as relays report their versions.) Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp ABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR

Re: [tor-dev] Draft Proposal: Random Number Generation During Tor Voting

On 10 Aug 2015, at 23:07 , George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net wrote: teor teor2...@gmail.com writes: On 4 Aug 2015, at 22:00 , George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net wrote: Hello, snip 3.7. Shared Randomness Disaster Recovery [SRDISASTER] If the consensus at 12:00UTC fails

Re: [tor-dev] Draft Proposal: Random Number Generation During Tor Voting

On 12 Aug 2015, at 04:35 , George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net wrote: teor teor2...@gmail.com writes: Another implementation note on directory caching of the SR doc: I just noticed the following code in update_consensus_networkstatus_downloads(): for (i=0; i N_CONSENSUS_FLAVORS

Re: [tor-dev] Invitation to participate in a survey about Tor's future

address is susanpgardner(at)gmail.com, and her public key is here ​https://keybase.io/spg/ Regards Tim (teor) Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp ABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265

Re: [tor-dev] Relay Dashboard Code Review

, although links to raw source code like https://vim.googlecode.com/hg/README.txt will not. But again, Google Code will continue to work as normal until at least January 2016. https://code.google.com/p/support/wiki/ReadOnlyTransition Tim (teor) Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp

Re: [tor-dev] Draft Proposal: Random Number Generation During Tor Voting

, as there can be agreement on the number of participants, but disagreement on their identities. Can someone confirm my analysis? Can we modify the protocol to make sure that multiple colluding authorities can't split the shared random value? Regards Tim (teor) Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345

Re: [tor-dev] Draft Proposal: Random Number Generation During Tor Voting

the values, using both the date and the previous random value should prevent replay-like attacks. Regards Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp ABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7

Re: [tor-dev] Draft Proposal: Random Number Generation During Tor Voting

, wouldn't have revealed their votes yet. I don't think there's a need for reducing the predictability from 12 hours to 1-2 hours, but we could keep it in mind if a future version needs to reduce the amount of time the shared random value is predictable. … Tim (teor) Tim Wilson-Brown (teor

Re: [tor-dev] Unreachable hidden service by some clients

(teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp ABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7 signature.asc Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail ___ tor-dev

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal 248: Remove all RSA identity keys

it. Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp ABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7 signature.asc Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail

Re: [tor-dev] 4th status report for OnioNS

not be any need to address these issues before the beta release. You could do the release, and hope any issues like this are discovered by your beta testers. (It's a common strategy, and useful if you're short of testing time or test platforms.) Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot

Re: [tor-dev] BOINC-based Tor wrapper

/bitcoinutopia/ Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp ABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7 signature.asc Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal 248: Remove all RSA identity keys

Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp ABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7 signature.asc Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail

Re: [tor-dev] Proposal: Merging Hidden Service Directories and Introduction Points

services, and is a consensus parameter, so can be updated if needed. Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp ABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7 signature.asc Description: Message

Re: [tor-dev] Performance testing using chutney

On 10 Jul 2015, at 11:35 , teor teor2...@gmail.com wrote: On 10 Jul 2015, at 09:47 , Cory Pruce corypr...@gmail.com wrote: Signed PGP part Well, you could test my latest branches for #14175: Hey Tim, I got the branch of chutney and tor and made sure that the commands you run

Re: [tor-dev] tor#16518: Read-Only Filesystem Error opening tor lockfile in 0.2.6.9 but not 0.2.5.12

where your datadirectory is? B) Maybe it is some fancy selinux thing or the like? Which of those does Wheezy have? Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp ABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930

Re: [tor-dev] Performance testing using chutney

/environmental variables are in the ticket, and I've modified the chutney README to include performance testing. Let me know if anything isn't clear. Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp ABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR

Re: [tor-dev] Performance testing using chutney (was Re: Env variables for chutney)

On 6 Jul 2015, at 03:20 , Cory Pruce corypr...@gmail.com wrote: On 07/04/2015 06:19 PM, teor wrote: You could also modify tor to use single-hop connections, then measure single-hop bandwidth, by making a 1-hop connection and pushing data through it. There won't be as much client

Re: [tor-dev] Performance testing using chutney

on the same box / VM should still give you some idea, as long as CPU usage on all CPUs isn't ~100%. Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp ABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7

Re: [tor-dev] Env variables for chutney

chutney listed in that directory, along with the other chutney distribution files. The test-network.sh script is complaining that the chutney script is missing. Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp ABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor

[tor-dev] Performance testing using chutney (was Re: Env variables for chutney)

and get it into a usable state. Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp ABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7 signature.asc Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail

Re: [tor-dev] Discussions

Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7 signature.asc Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail

[tor-dev] Testing Tor (was Re: Discussions)

email to tor-dev the kind of advice you were expecting? https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-June/008988.html Tim Tim Wilson-Brown (teor) teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585

Re: [tor-dev] Multithreaded crypto on Tor

network. I've made some recent changes to the chutney test tool which allow throughput to be measured. These changes work on Linux and OS X, but they're still under review, and the git branch isn't as organised as I would like. teor teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https

Re: [tor-dev] The future of GetTor

frontend) teor teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7 signature.asc Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail

Re: [tor-dev] The future of GetTor

or the Tor network In most cases, the user experience would be one-click: 1. Open the app 2. See a recommended option highlighted out of a list of working options 3. click download 4. see a progress bar 5. Get a verified Tor Browser teor teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https://gist.github.com

[tor-dev] OS X OpenSSL/Tor Build Instructions

be really helpful for some users. teor teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7 signature.asc Description: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail

Re: [tor-dev] onionoo: bug in family set detection?

Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2015 16:52:00 + From: nusenu nus...@openmailbox.org teor: MyFamily requires bidirectional declarations to be effective. I'm aware of that fact ;) In this case: OnionOO appears to correctly implement the bidirectional MyFamily logic Apparently it doesn't

Re: [tor-dev] Quick logjam/Tor analysis.

… OpenSSL 0.9.7l 28 Sep 2006 … (As an aside, please avoid running strings on any untrusted binaries.) While it's possible to build or install OpenSSL 1.0 or 1.1 on OS X, it's not the default. How does this affect Tor and/or Tor Browser on OS X? teor teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https

Re: [tor-dev] Adding a NotDir router status flag

is still useful in with AccountingMax, we should reconsider the plan to drop NotDir in a few releases' time. teor teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor at blah dot im OTR D5BE4EC2 255D7585 F3874930 DB130265 7C9EBBC7 signature.asc

Re: [tor-dev] onionoo: bug in family set detection?

appears to believe each relay's MyFamily claims, without checking the other relay. This appears to be a fairly harmless bug in Compass, as Compass itself is not used for path selection. teor teor2345 at gmail dot com pgp 0xABFED1AC https://gist.github.com/teor2345/d033b8ce0a99adbc89c5 teor

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