I'm not sure I agree with that.

I think we want something that is better than the PSTN. I just don't think it's 
the
right question to ask.

And specifically, I don't think "identity" for PSTN numbers should be our 
mandate. 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Paul Kyzivat [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2008 11:25
> To: Audet, Francois (SC100:3055)
> Cc: Jonathan Rosenberg; IETF SIP List
> Subject: Re: [Sip] New I-D on RFC4474 and phone numbers
> 
> I think we don't need something *better* than the PSTN, 
> though that would be nice. What I think we need is something 
> that is *not worse* than the PSTN. The problem is defining 
> what that means.
> 
> I think that means at least:
> 
> - when you connect via sip you get a callerid for at least those
>    pstn callers where you would have gotten one if you had a 
> pstn phone
>    *and* that callerid was "correct".
> 
> - callerid is available to callees from sip callers with E.164 AORs
>    when it hasn't been intentionally blocked and the caller is the
>    legitimate "owner" of the number.
> 
> - the frequency with which "incorrect" (spoofed) callerid is delivered
>    to callees is no worse, on average, than with pure pstn calls.
> 
> I realize this are a bit vague and hard to measure. But I 
> think this is subjectively what will be required for sip to 
> be widely accepted as a substitute for pstn phone service.
> 
>       Paul
> 
> Francois Audet wrote:
> > Another "solution" is to not do it.
> > 
> > By that I mean, use RFC 4474 for domain-based security, and if you 
> > insist on using phone numbers, then it's not "secured that way".
> > 
> > Before the flaming start: by definition, if something is 
> addressed by 
> > a phone number,  it is something that is likely to be 
> reacheable through the PSTN.
> > 
> > The way security works in the PSTN is completely different. 
> The media 
> > is almost never encrypted for one. So in the context of 
> SIP, it means 
> > there is a gateway somewhere destroying the end-to-end 
> nature of the encryption.
> > 
> > Even for the Identity, it's different. For one thing, the Identity 
> > assertion is not end-to-end à-la-RFC 4474.
> > 
> > So, I'm proposing that if you are using phone numbers as your 
> > identity, then it is not a design requirement of this group to 
> > re-invent a "better" identity security system for the PSTN.
> > 
> > It's not because something is a problem that it necessarily 
> needs to be solved.
> > 
> > My 2 cents.
> > 
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> On Behalf Of 
> >> Jonathan Rosenberg
> >> Sent: Monday, February 18, 2008 11:36
> >> To: Paul Kyzivat
> >> Cc: IETF SIP List
> >> Subject: Re: [Sip] New I-D on RFC4474 and phone numbers
> >>
> >> I agree that something along the lines of enum could solve this 
> >> problem, and I believe there was a draft that proposed 
> such a thing. 
> >> This has been discussed since the start of rfc4474.
> >>
> >> However, I fear that saying, 'use enum' is kind of like 
> saying, we'll 
> >> just use an All-Knowing Oracle, so lets figure out the interface 
> >> protocol to the Oracle. The easy part is the interface (the enum 
> >> mechanism). The actual hard problem is how to get those entries 
> >> populated. The deployment of public enum has been - shall we say - 
> >> less than spectacular.
> >> I'd hate for that to be our only solution. Not that its 
> obvious what 
> >> else to do; though I do suggest in my draft how domain based 
> >> authentication, when combined with whitelists and blacklists, can 
> >> help.
> >>
> >> -Jonathan R.
> >>
> >> Paul Kyzivat wrote:
> >>> Jonathan,
> >>>
> >>> I guess the time has come for this discussion, since John 
> Ewell has 
> >>> also submitted a draft on this subject.
> >>>
> >>> I thought the problem was already well known, but perhaps
> >> not. IMO the
> >>> main thing now is to figure out the *solution* to the problem!
> >>> IMO a solution is to use a 4474-style approach, but where the 
> >>> certificate is tied to just the phone number, not to some 
> arbitrary 
> >>> domain name. That of course would depend on a model where
> >> the "owner" 
> >>> of the phone number is the one who may obtain the
> >> certificate for that number.
> >>> My thought is that we already have an algorithmic mapping from an
> >>> E.164 phone number to a domain name, defined by enum. If 
> the sender 
> >>> puts an
> >>> E.164 number in From, and can sign it with a cert for the
> >> enum mapped
> >>> domain name corresponding to that number, then that ought
> >> to be valid
> >>> proof of the validity of the sender.
> >>>
> >>> In those places where public enum is in operation, I 
> think there is 
> >>> already a legal mechanism in place to give the owner of 
> record of a 
> >>> particular phone number control over the contents of the
> >> corresponding
> >>> DNS entry. That should also be sufficient to allow a certificate 
> >>> authority to assign a cert to that same owner.
> >>>
> >>> Combine all that and you have a complete e2e identity model
> >> for phone
> >>> numbers, based on public enum. And that can be true even 
> if public 
> >>> enum isn't used to *route* the calls to that number. So 
> it could be 
> >>> used for "unlisted" numbers.
> >>>
> >>> To use this approach the From header should contain either
> >> a TEL URI,
> >>> or a sip/sips URI containing the enum-mapped domain name
> >> corresponding
> >>> to the phone number. (I would rather see the TEL used for
> >> this - it is
> >>> more user friendly.)
> >>>
> >>>     Thanks,
> >>>     Paul
> >>>
> >>> Jonathan Rosenberg wrote:
> >>>> I just submitted:
> >>>>
> >> 
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-rosenberg-sip-rfc4474-conce
> >>>> rns-00.txt
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> This is basically a discussion on the security properties
> >> of rfc4474
> >>>> with phone numbers, and a comparison to rfc3325 in this
> >> case. Also a
> >>>> discussion on what happens to dtls-srtp.
> >>>>
> >>>> Comments welcome.
> >>>>
> >>>> -Jonathan R.
> >> -- 
> >> Jonathan D. Rosenberg, Ph.D.                   499 Thornall St.
> >> Cisco Fellow                                   Edison, NJ 08837
> >> Cisco, Voice Technology Group
> >> [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> >> http://www.jdrosen.net                         PHONE: 
> (408) 902-3084
> >> http://www.cisco.com
> >> _______________________________________________
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> >> [EMAIL PROTECTED] for questions on current sip Use 
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> >>
> > 
> 
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