Hi
On Mon, 13 Mar 2000, Jeff Ricker wrote:
> As I see it, we run into the levels-of-analysis problem here.
> (Again, I am not a philosopher, but I do have some half-formed
> thoughts on the matter.) Reductionism has been a goal of many
> scientists for decades. But the problem is that higher levels
> of analysis don't necessarily (or often, or ever) translate
> well into the terms of lower levels. For example, genes as
> defined
I wonder how generally true this is in science? I remember a
lovely article in Scientific American many years ago in which
macro properties (e.g., boiling point, specific gravity) were
very strongly predicted by the molecular structure of the
substances (something like degree of connectedness of components
although as a non-chemist I could easily be off-base with this
recollection).
> other more fine-grained molecular events). My guess is that we
> will always speak of mental events in ways that will not be
> completely translatable into neural activity. Whether or not my
> guess will prove to be correct, I still submit that you do not,
> at this time, use the term "mental events" as short-hand for
> "physical events in the body." Instead, you use the term in the
> same way as everybody else: as a label for something that
> occurs in something we call the "mind." Whether or not we ever
> are able to translate this completely into lower-level physical
> events is a question for the future. At the present time, many
> psychologists are studying NONphysical entities such as
> schemas, personality traits, and motivations. They are not
> using these terms as shorthand for physiological events. They
> use them as psychological terms.
It probably depends on the area in which you work, but a
cognitive psychologist, for example, would have little difficulty
thinking of physical models corresponding to schemas and the
like. Nor do these models have to be at the lowest molecular
level. Models evolve from quite crude characterizations to more
precise and detailed forms, but they are all still "physical."
Moreover, even if many practicing psychologists did not think in
this way, that would not mean that their practices are ideal. My
own feeling is that psychology would be bettter off if we did
think far more mechanistically and reductionistically about our
phenomena and theories. Current modelling allows this in
increasingly broad areas of psychology. Physical models might
also help produce clearer thinking about issues that can get
muddled otherwise. For example, people do not inherit
"intelligence;" rather they inherit some biochemical process that
plays a role in what we call intelligence.
Best wishes
Jim
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James M. Clark (204) 786-9757
Department of Psychology (204) 774-4134 Fax
University of Winnipeg 4L05D
Winnipeg, Manitoba R3B 2E9 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
CANADA http://www.uwinnipeg.ca/~clark
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