Hi

On Tue, 14 Mar 2000, Paul C. Smith wrote:
> Jim Clark wrote:
> > There is often a confusion between the in-principle explanation
> > of macro phenomena by reductionist mechanisms and the
> > implications for actual prediction.  A leaf falling from a tree
> > is a prime example.  The physicist would have a terrible time
> > predicting the path of the leaf with any accuracy, but that does
> > not mean that we need anything more than the physical processes
> > to explain its path.

>       This is discussed in some depth by Jerry Fodor in the
> forward to "The Language of Thought" (a piece previously
> published as "the special sciences paper"). However, I believe
> that the confusion is actually between the in-principle
> ontological "reduction" of phenomena to physics (on the one
> hand) and implications for both prediction AND explanation.
> Fodor uses as his example a particular law of economics
> ("Gresham's Law", if I remember correctly), which makes
> statements about phenomena described as "monetary exchanges".
> Surely each example of a "monetary exchange" is a physical
> event. Just as surely, it is not possible to specify in advance
> which physical events constitute "monetary exchanges" and which
> do not. The phenomena covered in that economic law are physical
> phenomena, but cannot be predicted OR explained by reference to
> their purely physical descriptions. 

Notice that this counter-example returns once again to the human
sciences.  Even so, I would disagree with Paul's final "OR
explained by reference to their purely physical descriptions" if
we admitted into the physical such things as the physical events
that underly schema, motivations, and the like.  My biasses are
probably showing once again, but I also wonder to what extent
most economic "laws" actually fit the fuzzy criteria for
scientific laws.  In my very limited experience, they often seem
more analogous to religous or political pronouncements that lack
any sort of mechanistic underpinning.  Perhaps requiring more
physicalist modelling would rectify this alleged (by me)
shortcoming.

Best wishes
Jim

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James M. Clark                          (204) 786-9757
Department of Psychology                (204) 774-4134 Fax
University of Winnipeg                  4L05D
Winnipeg, Manitoba  R3B 2E9             [EMAIL PROTECTED]
CANADA                                  http://www.uwinnipeg.ca/~clark
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