On Mon, 13 Mar 2000, Jeff Ricker wrote:
> Bob Keefer responded:
>
> > I don't follow your argument here; whenever -I- speak of 'mental events'
> > I'm speaking either (1) as a shorthand for neural and chemical events in
> > the body-mostly-brain, or (2) metaphorically, referring to as-yet
> > sketchily understood physical events in the body-mostly-brain.
>
> My guess is that we will always speak of mental events in
> ways that will not be completely translatable into neural activity.
> Whether or not my guess will prove to be correct, I still submit
> that you do not, at this time, use the term "mental events" as
> short-hand for "physical events in the body." Instead, you use the
> term in the same way as everybody else: as a label for something
> that occurs in something we call the "mind."
Well, I submit to -you- that I -do- use 'mental events' just as I say I
do, in the full knowledge that my metaphor is not entirely congruent
with the underlying physical events. I also use the term 'mind' as a
shorthand for a whole complex of underlying physical events that are not
fully understood. I do so realizing that not everyone uses these terms
this way, but as a psychologist who also considers himself to be a
scientist, that is how -I- use these terms.
> Whether or not we ever
> are able to translate this completely into lower-level physical
> events is a question for the future. At the present time, many
> psychologists are studying NONphysical entities such as schemas,
> personality traits, and motivations. They are not using these terms
> as shorthand for physiological events. They use them as
> psychological terms.
This is an empirical question; how do you -know- that most psychologists
don't feel exactly as I do? Sure, they use them as 'psychological
terms,' but with the full understanding that they are shorthand (or
metaphors) for underlying physical processes.
> None of this means that we must fall back on a dualist philosophy. I
> still believe (with you, Bob) that ultimately everything is the
> result of physical processes even if I am not certain that we will
> be able to reduce mental processes completely to physical processes.
Now I am confused; if you agree with me that it's all ultimately due to
physical processes (and I'm willing to concede that full understanding
of those processes may recede almost endlessly into the future), what is
our disagreement?
> With regard to this issue, Dupré (to whom I referred in another
> post) stated: "The serious alternative to reductionism is not
> Cartesian dualism, or a belief in ghosts, but a pluralism that
> recognizes the equal ontological robustness of small simple things
> and large complex things" (p. 44).
"equal ontological robustness?" I have no idea what this means.
"Ontology" is the branch of metaphysics (!) that deals with the "nature
of being." How is this 'pluralism' different from/superior to dualism?
bob k.
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Robert Keefer Associate Professor
Psychology Department Office Phone:
Mt. St. Mary's College (301) 447-5394, Ext. 4251
Emmitsburg, MD 21727 e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[Speaking for myself.] fax: 301-447-5021
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