Dr. Kim is the ultimate in acidemic and profectional eithics. He worked with DGT for a long time and put his name on their decoveries. I neleive Dr. Kim.
The following is my view of what happened and why, The current LENR development scene is becoming an increasingly complex one and difficult to understand. I have written a number of recent posts that attempt to grapple with this Gordian knot even as this complex issue was percolating through the grounds of my subconscious. In this post, I attempt to bring this issue into sharper focus in my minds eye to apply the analysis that it deserves. Here in this post, let us attempt to make sense of these things. The fundamental issue is successful product development. Rossi set this stage when he declared in 2011 to prove LENR by bringing a successful LENR based product to the marketplace. Only by doing this would Rossi prove the viability of LENR as an important engineering and scientific topic. But conceiving and building a successful commercial product is most difficult. Take Microsoft as an example. That elite industry dominating company has been trying to get into the mobile marketplace with a competitive product to compete with Apple's IPhone for a decade or more, but has yet to be successful. Even at this juncture, billions of dollars dedicated to new product R&D and acquisitions budget does not guaranteed success. Far from it, this most admired of companies, has endured nothing but well publicized embarrassment, and repeated failures. Drawing insight from recent LENR history, let us remember that in order to offload the product development task from his long and encyclopedic list of product development concerns, Rossi farmed product development out to DGT. >From the very beginning, DGT had a very confident yet fatally flawed approach to product development because of the nature of LENR at that very early stage. Because they had always fiercely protected their independence and management prerogatives, DGT never deviated from this ill fated commercialization strategy. This strategy involved the development of dozens of dissimilar products that were to be based on a prototype that was configured by the engineers as a home heating unit. DGT was to license this basic LENR technology and reactor design to ship engine builders, and aircraft and car engine manufactures just to name a few of scores of applications, but where was the LENR product design engineers to come from to develop these very dissimilar products. Only Rossi had any expertise and he was secretive and paranoid. Rossi was not disposed to train the DGT personnel or DGT customer design engineers necessary to do this wide ranging product development. In those early times, Rossi's reactors self destructed far to often to allow the development of any commercially viable product, so Rossi and DGT parted ways. After this breakup, DGT looked to duplicate Rossi's technology and Rossi looked for a new product development partner. In the due course of time, both these now bitter rivals were successful, with Rossi teaming with Industrial Heat (IH) and DGT out on their own with a home grown LENR technology that was both controllable and responsive. IH had a commercial product concept in mind, a concept that they had warm feelings about, and Rossi was perceptive enough to change his reactor design sufficient to eventually meet most requirements of that concept save control as demonstrated by an acceptance test, and the one megawatt industrial LENR power plant was born. As IH shaped this product, the IH product concept became highly specialized to satisfy the functional requirements of their very limited American customer base. Being exclusively an industrial steam heat plant, IH reactor approach is ill suited as a generalized solution to any other segment of the energy market. Lack of any educated LENR workforce seriously limits LENR commercialization. DGT suffered great disadvantage because of an ill fated product plan from their very beginning. They were doomed to eventually fail. There were no legend of trained LENR engineers to build all the LENR products that were needed to satisfy the needs of their varied customer base. Having said that, their R5 reactor did function as a LENR product demonstration tool. DGT was far more forthcoming both publicly and privately in revealing engineering and R&D details than Rossi ever was so there was sufficient data to base a judgment that the LENR R5 reactor in fact worked. Failure of DGT as a business does not mean that their prototype reactor was not functional. That reactor served well the LENR marketing function that it was designed to serve. The world energy market is varied and requires an eclectic and vast ensemble of custom solutions. The key question that we as LENR product acceptance strategists must determine is what particular energy product is most likely to introduce LENR in the best light to the world. I have made my decision even if it was an unconscious one. As reflected in one of my recent posts, I believe that the self charging lithium ion fuel cell would be most impactful to convince the world that LENR is useful as a power source for transportation including cars, planes, trains, and ships. Each LENR company and LENR developer, has made their decision also. Black light power is developing a small scaled electric grid compatible generator. Brillouin is doing the same but on a larger scale. The Nanor of MIT is a designed to be a small electronic device power source. The Pd/D or the Ni/H open source community does not have a product plan. This fact is incompatible with Rossi's wise strategy to produce a wizbang product to introduce LENR to the world. Like DGT, even if an open source reactor works, the open source community must educate people to make a sucessful product lunch possible and sustainable. Walter Cronkite: "And that's the way it is." On Wed, Apr 22, 2015 at 4:20 PM, Jed Rothwell <[email protected]> wrote: > Daniel Rocha <[email protected]> wrote: > > Gabarelle and others relied on the childish hatred of Jed of his imaginary >> debt with DGT and the naivete of Mats Lewan, also his faith in Rossi, to >> spread the made up data. . . . >> > > Let me see if I understand the scenario you are describing. > > First, Gamberale and others established a new company (Defkalion Europe) > with a new lab. They spend millions of dollars and many months doing this. > > They lined up many potential customers and prepared to sign contracts with > them. > > They demonstrated at the ICCF conference. > > THEN they found out that Defkalion owed me $2000, and based on my > "childish hatred" they decided to take the following drastic steps: > > They cancelled all contracts with customers, and told them the device does > not work. > > They closed down their company, writing off millions of dollars. > > They published a false report describing fake reasons for doing all this. > > They filed suit against Defkalion -- a suit they cannot possibly win > because the only reason they did it was the $2000 Defkalion owes me. > > Do you *really believe* this is what happened? > > > You should also note that Hadjichristos publicly agreed they owed me the > money, and promised to pay it. Hundreds of people saw his messages about > this. So the debt was not imaginary. Defkalion's claims probably were > imaginary. > > - Jed > >
