I guess the question returns to one's criteria for assuming decoupling between 
the very [small|fast] and the very [large|slow]. Or in this case, the inner vs. 
the outer:

Susie Alegre on how digital technology undermines free thought
https://freethinker.co.uk/2024/03/interview-susie-alegre/

It would be reasonable for Frank to argue that we can generate the space of 
possible context definitions, inductively, from the set of token definitions, 
much like an LLM might. Ideally, you could then measure the expressiveness of 
those inferred contexts/languages and choose the largest (most complete; by 
induction, each context/language *should* be self-consistent so we shouldn't 
have to worry about that).

And if that's how things work (I'm not saying it is), then those "attractors" 
with the finest granularity (very slow to emerge, very resistant to dissolution) would be 
the least novel. Novelty (uniqueness) might then be defined in terms of fragility, short 
half-life, missable opportunity. But that would also argue that novelty is either less 
*real* or that the universe/context/language is very *open* and the path from fragile to 
robust obtains like some kind of Hebbian reinforcement, use it or lose it, win the hearts 
and minds or dissipate to nothing.

I.e. there is no such thing as free thought. Thought can't decouple from social 
manipulation.

On 3/21/24 13:38, Marcus Daniels wrote:
In the LLM example, completions from some starting state or none, have specific 
probabilities.   An incomplete yet-unseen (unique) utterance would be completed 
based on prior probabilities of individual tokens.

I agree that raw materialist uniqueness won't necessarily or often override 
constraints of a situation.  For example, if an employer instructs an employee 
how to put a small, lightweight product in a box, label it, and send it to a 
customer by UPS, the individual differences metabolism of the employees aren't 
likely to matter much when shipping more small, lightweight objects to other 
customers.   It could be the case for a professor and student too.   The 
attractors come from the instruction or the curriculum.  One choice constrains 
the next.

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> On Behalf Of glen
Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2024 11:50 AM
To: friam@redfish.com
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] the inequities of uniquity

I was arguing with that same friend yesterday at the pub. I was trying to describe how 
some of us have more cognitive power than others (he's one of them). Part of it is 
"free" power, freed up by his upper middle class white good diet privilege. But 
if we allow that some of it might be genetic, then that's a starting point for deciding 
when novelty matters to the ephemerides of two otherwise analogical individuals (or 
projects if projects have an analog to genetics). Such things are well-described in twin 
studies. One twin suffers some PTSD the other doesn't and ... boom ... their otherwise 
lack of uniqueness blossoms into uniqueness.

His objection was that even identical twins are not identical. They were 
already unique ... like the Pauli Exclusion Principle or somesuch nonsense. 
Even though it's a bit of a ridiculous argument, I could apply it to your sense 
of avoiding non-novel attractors. No 2 attractors will be identical. And no 1 
attractor will be unique. So those are moot issues. Distinctions without 
differences, maybe. Woit's rants are legendary. But some of us find happiness 
in wasteful sophistry.

What matters is *how* things are the same and how they differ. Their qualities 
and values (nearly) orthogonal to novelty.


On 3/21/24 11:29, Marcus Daniels wrote:
If GPT systems capture some sense of "usual" context based on trillions of internet tokens, and 
that corpus is regarded approximately "global context", then it seems not so objectionable to call 
"unusual", new training items that contribute to fine-tuning loss.

It seems reasonable to worry that ubiquitous GPT systems reduce social entropy by 
encouraging copying instead of new thinking, but it could also have the reverse effect:  
If I am immediately aware that an idea is not novel, I may avoid attractors that agents 
that wrongly believe they are "independent" will gravitate toward.

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam <friam-boun...@redfish.com> On Behalf Of glen
Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2024 7:49 AM
To: friam@redfish.com
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] the inequities of uniquity

A friend of mine constantly reminds me that language is dynamic, not fixed in 
stone from a billion years ago. So, if you find others consistently using a 
term in a way that you think is wrong, then *you* are wrong in what you think. 
The older I get, the more difficult it gets.

But specifically, the technical sense of "unique" is vanishingly rare ... so rare as to be merely 
an ideal, unverifiable, nowhere, non-existent. So if the "unique" is imaginary, unreal, and doesn't 
exist, why not co-opt it for a more useful, banal purpose? Nothing is actually unique. So we'll use the token 
"unique" to mean (relatively) rare.

And "unusual" is even worse. Both tokens require one to describe the context, domain, or universe within which the 
discussion is happening. If you don't define your context, then the "definitions" you provide for the components of 
that context are not even wrong; they're nonsense. "Unusual" implies a usual. And a usual implies a perspective ... a 
mechanism of action for your sampling technique. So "unusual" presents even more of a linguistic *burden* than 
"unique".

On 3/20/24 13:14, Frank Wimberly wrote:
What's wrong with "unusual"?  It avoids the problem.


On Wed, Mar 20, 2024, 1:55 PM Steve Smith <sasm...@swcp.com 
<mailto:sasm...@swcp.com>> wrote:

      I'm hung up on the usage of qualified  "uniqueness"  as well, but in 
perhaps the opposite sense.

      I agree with the premise that "unique" in it's purest, simplest form does 
seem to be inherently singular.  On the other hand, this mal(icious) propensity of 
qualifying uniqueness (uniqueish?) is so common, that I have to believe there is a 
concept there which people who use those terms are reaching for.  They are not wrong to 
reach for it, just annoying in the label they choose?

      I had a round with GPT4 trying to discuss this, not because I think LLMs are the 
authority on *anything* but rather because the discussions I have with them can help me 
brainstorm my way around ideas with the LLM nominally representing "what a lot of 
people say" (if not think).   Careful prompting seems to be able to help narrow down 
 *all people* (in the training data) to different/interesting subsets of *lots of people* 
with certain characteristics.

      GPT4 definitely wanted to allow for a wide range of gradated, speciated, spectral uses of 
"unique" and gave me plenty of commonly used examples which validates my position that 
"for something so obviously/technically incorrect, it sure is used a lot!"

      We discussed uniqueness in the context of evolutionary biology and 
cladistics and homology and homoplasy.  We discussed it in terms of cluster 
analysis.  We discussed the distinction between objective and subjective, 
absolute and relative.

      The closest thing to a conclusion I have at the moment is:

       1. Most people do and will continue to treat "uniqueness" as a 
relative/spectral/subjective qualifier.
       2. Many people like Frank and myself (half the time) will have an 
allergic reaction to this usage.
       3. The common (mis)usage might be attributable to conflating "unique" with 
"distinct"?



--
ꙮ Mɥǝu ǝlǝdɥɐuʇs ɟᴉƃɥʇ' ʇɥǝ ƃɹɐss snɟɟǝɹs˙ ꙮ

-. --- - / ...- .- .-.. .. -.. / -- --- .-. ... . / -.-. --- -.. .
FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe   /   Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom 
https://bit.ly/virtualfriam
to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/
archives:  5/2017 thru present https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/
 1/2003 thru 6/2021  http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/

Reply via email to