date:20170623

< Your comparison of "closure" to Nick's idea of "surplus" 
(intentional or not) meaning.  I accept that in programming a computer, 
"closure" is a useful tool, to avoid unintended "side effects".>

If one thinks of the mind of two people as two circles in a Venn diagram and 
the intersection as their communication, meaning is still in reference to each 
complete circle; it is subjective.  This may often lead to ambiguity and 
contradiction, but doesn't mean that language itself should be inherently 
ambiguous.   Specifically, a closure would imply that while each agent was 
bringing to bear their experience on the interpretation of the communication,  
to the extent their mind is in flux from that communication, in a functional 
programming approach it would be modeled as transactions within each agent.   
It's simply a question of being precise about what is going on.

Marcus


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Re: [FRIAM] the role of metaphor in scientific thought

2017-06-23 Thread Stephen Guerin

For catholics, a confirmed unmarried man might be different than a
confirmed bachelor .

___
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On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 7:52 AM, Frank Wimberly  wrote:

> Has anybody mentioned that there are lot of unmarried men that you usually
> wouldn't call bachelors?  There are widowers, priests, and nineteen
> year-olds, for example.  I learned the word because my father's brother was
> a thirty-five year old Major in the Air Force with no wife. He eventually
> got married and had children. Late bloomer?
>
> Frank
>
> Frank Wimberly
> Phone (505) 670-9918
>
> On Jun 22, 2017 11:34 PM, "gepr ⛧"  wrote:
>
>> But the difference isn't merely rhetorical. If we take the setup
>> seriously, that the unmarried patient really doesn't know the other names
>> by which his condition is known, then there are all sorts of different side
>> effects that might obtain. E.g. if the doctor tells him he's a bachelor, he
>> might google that and discover bachelor parties. But if the doctor tells
>> him he is "single", he might discover single's night at the local pub.
>>
>> My point was not only the evocation of various ideas, but also the side
>> effects of various (computational) paths.
>>
>>
>> On June 22, 2017 7:00:55 PM PDT, Eric Charles <
>> eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >Glen said: "So, the loop of unmarried <=> bachelor has information in
>> >it,
>> >even if the only information is (as in your example), the guy learns
>> >that
>> >because the condition has another name, perhaps there are other ways of
>> >thinking about it ... other _circles_ to use."
>> >
>> >This reminds me that, in another context, Nick complained to me quite a
>> >bit
>> >about Peirce's asserting that that any concept was simply a collection
>> >of
>> >conceived "practical" consequences. He felt that the term "practical"
>> >was
>> >unnecessary, and lead to confusions. I think this is a good example of
>> >why
>> >Peirce used that term, and felt it necessary.
>> >
>> >Perice would point out that the practical consequences of being
>> >"unmarried"
>> >are identical to the practical consequences of being "a bachelor."
>> >Thus,
>> >though the spellings be different, there is only one idea at play there
>> >(in
>> >Peirce-land... if we are thinking clearly). This is the tautology that
>> >Nick
>> >is pointing at, and he isn't wrong.
>> >
>> >And yet, Glen is still clearly correct that using one term or the other
>> >may
>> >more readily invoke certain ideas in a listener. Those aren't practical
>> >differences in Peirce's sense- they are not differences in practice
>> >that
>> >would achieve if one tested the unique implications of one label or the
>> >other (as there are no contrasting unique implications). The value of
>> >having the multiple terms is rhetorical, not logical.
>> >
>> >What to do with such differences..
>>
>> --
>> ⛧glen⛧
>>
>> 
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>> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>
>
> 
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Re: [FRIAM] the role of metaphor in scientific thought

2017-06-23 Thread Vladimyr

Glen said a lot,

That sort of pestered my thoughts. I thought some rebuttal was call for at the 
time

he crossed into my personal fiefdom. But I was preoccupied and let it slip.

>From my peculiar POV the circular component so often discussed seems to suit 
>certain minds

as a useful Swiss Army Knife. Or demonstrates the inability to achieve anything 
more complex.

I use surfaces very often, many containing some intricate circular components 
often quite many in 3D and higher order.

The results bear little resemblance to donuts or bagels but nevertheless the 
trig functions and circles were employed

for ease and simplicity. Now each circular bit  exists in a plane embedded into 
some higher dimension and should be addressable to that dimension 

making it simple to track as in the case of a torus , helix or even a Hopf 
Fibration S3/ Admittedly I do not talk to others when I putz about

and can work for years without using a proper term for some creation, thingy. 
So I use metaphors since that is the most troublesome part when 

speaking to a child or wife. Who then argue that they still do not comprehend 
my shoddy description. So then I might make up some performance description.

you know like the thing that keeps high voltage lines from grounding out on 
transmission lines. That may solve the need for a name when insulator is 
unavailable.

These metaphors are useful when we don’t take time for  proper nomenclature 
from a glossary.

If I use a metaphor improperly, then I try another and if that fails maybe a 
large axe will convince the customer to pay for

custom work. Generally I need only point at the axe since most know what that 
symbolic gesture implies.

I have only once gone to court to persuade a reluctant recreational boater to  
pay up for a radar tower.

The circle seems a favorite symbol around the group , but any good circle 
requires a perfectly fixed perimeter and should be viewed from points normal

to the centre or it loses its appeal. Circuitous thinking serves to reinforce a 
fixed path. Tautologies appear related but give only a false impression that 
anything was

accomplished. I use closed Loops to prove continuity at various points on the 
way to a solution, When I used to run transect lines to make detailed maps I 
did not fixate on a point 

but multiple points to avoid curvature.

So this discussion may bend a few noses out of joint but seems destined to 
settle down when you examine how recklessly

we mangle words when we feel compelled

to shine as bright lights.

Complexity is in No hurry to yield to   mere mortals. 

In regards to beating a dead horse eventually the stench will drive us 
elsewhere.

So lets wrap this up before anyone utters “… moving forward…”

>From the old days,”…put a stake through its heart before we leave or it will 
>rise again…”

Nail this devil to something firm.

vladimyr

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Eric Charles
Sent: June-22-17 9:01 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] the role of metaphor in scientific thought

Glen said: "So, the loop of unmarried <=> bachelor has information in it, even 
if the only information is (as in your example), the guy learns that because 
the condition has another name, perhaps there are other ways of thinking about 
it ... other _circles_ to use."

This reminds me that, in another context, Nick complained to me quite a bit 
about Peirce's asserting that that any concept was simply a collection of 
conceived "practical" consequences. He felt that the term "practical" was 
unnecessary, and lead to confusions. I think this is a good example of why 
Peirce used that term, and felt it necessary. 

Perice would point out that the practical consequences of being "unmarried" are 
identical to the practical consequences of being "a bachelor." Thus, though the 
spellings be different, there is only one idea at play there (in Peirce-land... 
if we are thinking clearly). This is the tautology that Nick is pointing at, 
and he isn't wrong. 

And yet, Glen is still clearly correct that using one term or the other may 
more readily invoke certain ideas in a listener. Those aren't practical 
differences in Peirce's sense- they are not differences in practice that would 
achieve if one tested the unique implications of one label or the other (as 
there are no contrasting unique implications). The value of having the multiple 
terms is rhetorical, not logical. 

What to do with such differences..

---
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Supervisory Survey Statistician

U.S. Marine Corps

On Wed, Jun 21, 2017 at 3:16 PM, glen ☣  wrote:

Given your extraordinary spam handling methods, I thought I'd notify you here, 
Nick, that I sent the rest of my notes on the rest of your introduction 
off-list.  For what it's worth, I think you've got a GREAT gist if you could 
find a

Re: [FRIAM] the role of metaphor in scientific thought

< I'm going to skip ahead a bit and state that my entire line of rhetoric about 
circularity goes back to the complexity jargon discussion we were having and 
whether or not, as Nick put it, a system has a say in its own boundary.  It's 
all about _closure_.  This particular tangent targets closure from the 
functional programming perspective (or maybe from the procedural one, depending 
on how you look at it).  When you execute a loop in a "systems" language like 
C, you have a good chance that whatever you do in there could have side 
effects.  But when you do something like that in a purely functional language, 
you're very unlikely (never) going to leave side effects laying around. >

Incidentally, in GNU C one can have dirty closures.  Note how foo is assigned 
the value 2.  It changes the operation of the closure f .  While GNU C has 
function attributes for purity, they aren't enforced, they are only exploited 
for code generation.  Fortran has purity for more than just compiler guidance; 
a conforming compiler can enforce it.  And of course languages like Haskell 
tolerate none of this nonsense.   In languages like C and Fortran they aren't 
real closures, the lexical scope is only good for duration of the caller (here, 
main).   In functional languages, the context will remain entangled.  
Characteristically, C++ gives the user the option to blow their head off and 
decide whether a closure (lambda) will copy its arguments.  

$ ./a.out 
 11 22 32 42 52
foo: 2

#include 
#include 

int *map (int len, const int *a, int (*f)(int c))
{
   int i;

   int *ret = malloc (sizeof(a));

   for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
 ret[i] = f(a[i]);
   }  
   return ret;
}


int
main()
{
   const int len = 5;
   const int a[] = { 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 };
   int foo = 1;

   int f(int c) {
 int val = c + foo;
 foo = 2;
 return val;
   }

   int *ret = map(len, a, f);
   int i;

   for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
 printf(" %d", ret[i]);
   }
   printf("\n");
   printf ("foo: %d\n", foo);

  return 0;
}



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Re: [FRIAM] the role of metaphor in scientific thought

Glen -

Thanks for the thoughtful analysis and return to(ward) the point at
hand. Your comparison of "closure" to Nick's idea of "surplus"
(intentional or not) meaning. I accept that in programming a computer,
"closure" is a useful tool, to avoid unintended "side effects". In
natural language, I think a certain amount of ambiguity is
*necessary*. Perhaps not in the most dry and literal of technical
manuals or even journal papers. But there are many other modes of
communication where I believe that ambiguity and multiple meanings and
even "side effects" or "un/intentional surplus" is not only a good thing
but perhaps critical to the goal of that communication.

I would say that exploratory brainstorming is a key example. I would
suggest that the value of this list (to me) is precisely that mode.
There is nothing expressed literally on this list that I couldn't have
looked up for myself. It is the collective curatorial value of this
group that makes it useful and interesting to me. It is the eclectic
*context* of the members of this group which makes it (much) more than
Wikipedia. After many years of reading others on this list, I
appreciate the wide perspectives offered by the computational/simulants
(e.g. Glen/Marcus), the social scientists (e.g. Nick et al), the
Educators (e.g. Angel, Sherwood, Chabon, now fled?), the non-US-born
(e.g. Vlad, Jochen, Mohammed), the exPatriot (Gary Schulz), the women
(e.g. Jenny, Merle, Dede, Patricia, et. al), the youth (Cody, Gil, ???),
the TechnoMystics (Rich Murray), the Mathematicians (Wimberly, et al),
the Generalists, the Complexitists, the Lightweights, the Heavy Hitters,
etc.

The *many* reserved lexicons and alternative uses of similar words adds
to the rich fecundity of the discussions *when* they blossom here.

I DO find it useful to niggle out of others, where there is
*intentional* vs *unintentional* surplus, and perhaps more to the point
*misintentional* or worse *malintentional* surplus. Nick jumped me
about using "inform" a dozen threads ago, I think assuming that my
choice of that word was sloppy parroting of a certain "style" of talk
(perhaps a subdialect of PostModernism?). I defended it as best I
could (and had to think carefully about why I chose "inform" instead of
the alternative(s) he offered which admittedly WERE more "plainspoken".
I was not offended by Nick's questioning my use of this specific word,
because it forced me to think more carefully about my use and to provide
the context to the rest of you who might actually be reading the
otherwise TL;DR material for the nuanced meaning I was trying to offer.

Ramble,

- Steve

On 6/23/17 9:13 AM, ┣glen┫ wrote:

Ha! I struggled to come up with "single" as an alternative name and you had 4
waiting in the wings.

I'm going to skip ahead a bit and state that my entire line of rhetoric about circularity
goes back to the complexity jargon discussion we were having and whether or not, as Nick
put it, a system has a say in its own boundary. It's all about _closure_. This
particular tangent targets closure from the functional programming perspective (or maybe
from the procedural one, depending on how you look at it). When you execute a loop in a
"systems" language like C, you have a good chance that whatever you do in there
could have side effects. But when you do something like that in a purely functional
language, you're very unlikely (never) going to leave side effects laying around.

If the unmarried person in the just-so story were somehow "closed", then there would be no side effects left
lying around as a result of walking _any_ path from the name "unmarried" to/from any other name like
"widow". But people aren't ever "closed" in any vernacular sense (never mind Rosen's or Kauffman's
parsing of agency for a while). That's why I asserted that the existence of _any_ other name (bachelor, single, widow,
whatever) opens up an entirely new world of side effects (including what Peirce should call practical) to the unmarried
patient. The fact that the condition even has _names_ opens it up to nomothetic generality. An entirely unique
condition, showing up nowhere else in space or time will not have a name and is not generalizable, by definition.

FWIW, in his introduction, Nick does distinguish 3 types of implication important to analogical reasoning:
"basic", "surplus-intentional", and "surplus-unintentional". And the latter 2
types are, I think, directly related to computational side effects, where type 3 would be a bug, type 2 might
be considered sloppy, and type 1 is the ideal. This is a fantastic way to talk about this sort of thing.
But it would be easier to discuss if we either avoided discussion of circularity _or_ gave it the full
analytic context it needs (starting from a relatively complete definition of closure).

You may be asking: If Nick's talking about analogs and implications, how does
that

Re: [FRIAM] the role of metaphor in scientific thought

2017-06-23 Thread ┣glen┫

Ha!  I struggled to come up with "single" as an alternative name and you had 4 
waiting in the wings.

I'm going to skip ahead a bit and state that my entire line of rhetoric about 
circularity goes back to the complexity jargon discussion we were having and 
whether or not, as Nick put it, a system has a say in its own boundary.  It's 
all about _closure_.  This particular tangent targets closure from the 
functional programming perspective (or maybe from the procedural one, depending 
on how you look at it).  When you execute a loop in a "systems" language like 
C, you have a good chance that whatever you do in there could have side 
effects.  But when you do something like that in a purely functional language, 
you're very unlikely (never) going to leave side effects laying around.

If the unmarried person in the just-so story were somehow "closed", then there 
would be no side effects left lying around as a result of walking _any_ path 
from the name "unmarried" to/from any other name like "widow".  But people 
aren't ever "closed" in any vernacular sense (never mind Rosen's or Kauffman's 
parsing of agency for a while).  That's why I asserted that the existence of 
_any_ other name (bachelor, single, widow, whatever) opens up an entirely new 
world of side effects (including what Peirce should call practical) to the 
unmarried patient.  The fact that the condition even has _names_ opens it up to 
nomothetic generality.  An entirely unique condition, showing up nowhere else 
in space or time will not have a name and is not generalizable, by definition.

FWIW, in his introduction, Nick does distinguish 3 types of implication 
important to analogical reasoning: "basic", "surplus-intentional", and 
"surplus-unintentional".  And the latter 2 types are, I think, directly related 
to computational side effects, where type 3 would be a bug, type 2 might be 
considered sloppy, and type 1 is the ideal.  This is a fantastic way to talk 
about this sort of thing.  But it would be easier to discuss if we either 
avoided discussion of circularity _or_ gave it the full analytic context it 
needs (starting from a relatively complete definition of closure).

You may be asking: If Nick's talking about analogs and implications, how does 
that relate to a computational procedure?  Well, simulation has several 
meanings, the 2 main ones being: mimicry vs. implementation.  I'd say 90% of 
simulation is about implementation.  E.g. an ODE solver numerically implements 
(simulates) an ideal/platonic mathematical declaration.  So, when you write a 
program, the computer that executes it (only during the execution) is an analog 
to whatever other (physical or platonic) construct might also be described by 
such a mathematical declaration.  Either of these two analogs can leave 
(surplus) side effects lying about as they reify their analogous (basic) 
behaviors.

I hope that's not tl;dr. 8^)

On 06/23/2017 06:52 AM, Frank Wimberly wrote:
> Has anybody mentioned that there are lot of unmarried men that you usually
> wouldn't call bachelors?  There are widowers, priests, and nineteen
> year-olds, for example.  I learned the word because my father's brother was
> a thirty-five year old Major in the Air Force with no wife. He eventually
> got married and had children. Late bloomer?

-- 
␦glen?

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Re: [FRIAM] the role of metaphor in scientific thought


Nick sez:


We have a word for tingo, don’t we?  Its “to ”borrow””.

In my experience 'to "borrow" ', in our culture usually means to "take 
without permission" or more bluntly "to steal".   That extends to 
"borrowing without returning" and anecdotally we are familiar with those 
who seem to do this chronically, though I don't know of it ever driving 
anyone to pauperhood.   I suppose, in the right extended context, one 
could claim that "tingo" and " 'borrow' " (with quotes) are roughly 
sememes...  but that is a LOT of context!


 There are other words in Rapanui for "to steal" which seem to all have 
an implication of "stealing things of little value", "to pilfer".   I'm 
not sure that "tingo" is a euphamism for simply borrowing without 
returning, it might very well be a real cultural experience that doesn't 
occur (often?) in our culture?


I wonder if there is an analog in "borrow words" between languages... 
can one language "borrow" so many word from another that the target of 
the borrowing becomes impoverished?   Within small circles I suppose 
that one could make that claim for Pidgens/Creoles where the resulting 
language is so much richer than the word-donor language that it might be 
true in some figurative sense...  or where the borrow words' meaning 
becomes more closely associated with the borrowing language than the 
mother tongue?


Curiouser and curiouser,
 - Steve






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Re: [FRIAM] the role of metaphor in scientific thought


Marcus-



I was thinking of the ER=EPR example.

My intuition is that after we elaborate enough examples like this, as 
well as Feynman's observation that since all (heretofore observed) 
electrons appear identical, perhaps they are a *single* electron which 
is everywhere/everywhen, we might come up with a "dual theory" in the 
same sense that when you replace the edges of a graph with vertices and 
vice-versa, you get a *dual* which is sometimes more tractable to 
operate on (or think about) than the other.


Seems like basic questions of interpretation just get kicked down the 
road indefinitely because there is math that is serviceable.   One 
could say its serviceability is what leads to improved interpretations 
(in the fullness of time), or maybe it just delays asking the hard 
questions?


“There was a time when the newspapers said that only twelve men 
understood the theory of relativity.  I do not believe that there ever 
was such a time.  On the other hand, I think it is safe to say that no 
one understand quantum mechanics.   Do not keep saying to yourself, if 
you can possibly avoid it, `But how can it be like that?’ because you 
will get `down the drain’ into a blind alley from which nobody has yet 
escaped.  Nobody knows how it can be like that.”  [Richard Feynman, 
The Character of Physical Law]


Good stuff...   in Monday's Salon, we invoked the von Neumann quote: "In 
mathematics you don't understand things. You just get used to them." and 
also discussed Lakoff/Nunez' "Where Mathematics Comes From" but did not 
resolve the implied contradiction (my observation in this moment, not 
discussed there/then).




- Steve

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Re: [FRIAM] the role of metaphor in scientific thought

Stephen -
For catholics, a confirmed unmarried man might be different than a 
confirmed bachelor .
being an unmarried man but not a Catholic, Confirmed or otherwise, I am 
not a bachelor, though my current lifestyle mimics many of the qualities 
of the canonical (but not Canonized) confirmed bachelor. I did, however, 
attend Catholic Mass for over 15 years, and raised two daughters under 
the Catholic Catechism up to (but not quite including) their 
Confirmation.   I am still drawn (for reasons unknown) to women raised 
Catholic... perhaps I was overly influenced by Billy Joel's apprehension 
of Catholic Girls in "Only the Good Die Young".

   In my specific case, the Catholic Church declared my only
   legal/religious marriage null and void just about the time my
   daughters, the issue of that (non)Marriage, were about to accept
   Confirmation into the Catholic Church somehow the Church's
   retroactive declaration that no Marriage had existed between their
   parents, now officially Bastards, gave my impressionable daughters
   the perfect excuse to decline Confirmation.  I do believe neither of
   them have attended Mass even once in the intervening 25 years.   I
   myself, despite not being a Confirmed Catholic did attend Mass (and
   listened thoughtfully) for 15 years and have in fact returned for
   special occasions (weddings, funerals, baptisms, confirmations).  In
   the spirit of hair-splitting terminology, I tend to ask those who
   were raised (and usually Confirmed) Catholic but no longer
   practicing if they are "Escaped", "Reformed", or "Recovering"
   Catholics.  I doubt those three terms cover the space fully, but
   seem to provide some pretty good sampling.   Most have used the term
   "Recovering" but many are taken aback by the alternatives and the
   nuances implied.

This is why I split hairs about terminology... or maybe my hairsplitting 
of such terms is why I think the way I do?

A woman once asked me "do you love me because I am beautiful or am I 
beautiful because you love me?"   I answered the only way possible: 
"Yes!"  It should also be noted that we have neither married nor 
divorced, and I still think she is beautiful.

- Sleeve

___
stephen.gue...@simtable.com 
CEO, Simtable http://www.simtable.com 
1600 Lena St #D1, Santa Fe, NM 87505
office: (505)995-0206 mobile: (505)577-5828
twitter: @simtable

On Fri, Jun 23, 2017 at 7:52 AM, Frank Wimberly > wrote:

Has anybody mentioned that there are lot of unmarried men that you
usually wouldn't call bachelors? There are widowers, priests, and
nineteen year-olds, for example.  I learned the word because my
father's brother was a thirty-five year old Major in the Air Force
with no wife. He eventually got married and had children. Late
bloomer?

Frank

Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918 

On Jun 22, 2017 11:34 PM, "gepr ⛧" > wrote:

But the difference isn't merely rhetorical. If we take the
setup seriously, that the unmarried patient really doesn't
know the other names by which his condition is known, then
there are all sorts of different side effects that might
obtain. E.g. if the doctor tells him he's a bachelor, he might
google that and discover bachelor parties. But if the doctor
tells him he is "single", he might discover single's night at
the local pub.

My point was not only the evocation of various ideas, but also
the side effects of various (computational) paths.

On June 22, 2017 7:00:55 PM PDT, Eric Charles
> wrote:
>Glen said: "So, the loop of unmarried <=> bachelor has
information in
>it,
>even if the only information is (as in your example), the guy
learns
>that
>because the condition has another name, perhaps there are
other ways of
>thinking about it ... other _circles_ to use."
>
>This reminds me that, in another context, Nick complained to
me quite a
>bit
>about Peirce's asserting that that any concept was simply a
collection
>of
>conceived "practical" consequences. He felt that the term
"practical"
>was
>unnecessary, and lead to confusions. I think this is a good
example of
>why
>Peirce used that term, and felt it necessary.
>
>Perice would point out that the practical consequences of being
>"unmarried"
>are identical to the practical consequences of being "a
bachelor."
>Thus,
>though the

Re: [FRIAM] the role of metaphor in scientific thought

Glen writes:

"How about, instead of interpretations, we think of applications, e.g. 
commonalities between domain-specific languages?"

I'd make a distinction between embedded DSLs (built on general-purpose 
programming languages) and DSLs which are not.   I don't want to get stuck 
thinking about only those things where the language is established and works 
well.   I want to be able to step away from it and change it when it doesn't 
work.   If language L' does something useful L doesn't, then I want to use its 
utility to drag the community along to my way of thinking.  DSLs lead to rule 
by committee and stagnation.

Marcus



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Re: [FRIAM] the role of metaphor in scientific thought

"John Zingale referenced something in last Monday's Salon about how idioms frm 
early string theory investigations was almost deprecated when it found new 
utility in quantum loop gravity?"

I was thinking of the ER=EPR example.

Seems like basic questions of interpretation just get kicked down the road 
indefinitely because there is math that is serviceable.   One could say its 
serviceability is what leads to improved interpretations (in the fullness of 
time), or maybe it just delays asking the hard questions?

"There was a time when the newspapers said that only twelve men understood the 
theory of relativity.  I do not believe that there ever was such a time.  On 
the other hand, I think it is safe to say that no one understand quantum 
mechanics.   Do not keep saying to yourself, if you can possibly avoid it, `But 
how can it be like that?' because you will get `down the drain' into a blind 
alley from which nobody has yet escaped.  Nobody knows how it can be like 
that."   [Richard Feynman, The Character of Physical Law]

Marcus

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Re: [FRIAM] the role of metaphor in scientific thought

What would you call people like me, who were reared Catholic, including 
confirmation and duties as an "altar boy", but who never believed a single word 
uttered in Mass, by parents, or in the official books?  In fact, the only 
concepts I took, believed in, from Catholicism are 1) catholicism (little "c") 
and 2) mystery, both of which I could have more readily learned from other 
traditions had my parents been more worldy.  Thank Yog for open-minded priests, 
who took the time to explore their own mental gymnastics with a child like me, 
in lieu of the stupidity that is Confession.

I kinda like "aborted acolyte".  8^)

On 06/23/2017 11:39 AM, Steven A Smith wrote:
>I tend to ask those who
>were raised (and usually Confirmed) Catholic but no longer
>practicing if they are "Escaped", "Reformed", or "Recovering"
>Catholics.  I doubt those three terms cover the space fully, but
>seem to provide some pretty good sampling.   Most have used the term
>"Recovering" but many are taken aback by the alternatives and the
>nuances implied.

-- 
☣ glen

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Re: [FRIAM] the role of metaphor in scientific thought

On 06/23/2017 12:08 PM, Steven A Smith wrote:
> Works for me, I was thinking "crypto athiest"...

Naa.  I don't qualify as any sort of atheist.  I have gods, they're just unique 
gods.

> Interesting that you didn't believe "a word uttered in Mass" while I, as a 
> young adult came to believe (or at least a appreciate) a great deal of what 
> was uttered in Mass. […] I "believed" a great deal of what he offered in 
> those Homilies.

Hm.  I suppose we could parse "believe".  But I've had way too many arguments 
about the difference (or lack thereof) between belief and knowledge.  I don't 
enjoy them much anymore.

> I lost what little "faith" in Christian Dogma I might have had when during a 
> summer Bible School teaching (9 years old?).  I got really excited by the 
> many "miracles" (manna from heaven, red sea parting, burning bushes, virgin 
> birth, rising from the dead, etc.) and when I expressed my enthusiasm, taking 
> these to be literal and true and verifiable stories, my Bible School teacher 
> became very stern with me, but did not attempt to explain allegory or parable 
> to me, leaving me to believe that SHE didn't believe those stories either. 
> Kinda undermined the magic of it all!  I got a little back years later when I 
> came to understand allegory and parable.

Heh, I kinda wish I'd had more "people in positions of power" like that.  Maybe 
I did and just ignored any power they had.  My CCD teacher taught us to 
meditate and chant.  I knew Jesus as Buddha before I learned anything about 
Buddha.

-- 
☣ glen

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Re: [FRIAM] the role of metaphor in scientific thought


Marcus -


The _/From Other Tongues/_ sketch is good.  Both what is heard and 
what is said could be modeled as a closure over some subjective 
representation.



...


The squiggles suggest that the types are not yet shared amongst the 
agents.


I agree with this, but the theme of the "From Other Tongues" collection 
is that one culture (and in this case associated language) has atomic 
concepts built into it (as a single common word) which do not have an 
atomic word in the other language and in fact may not lend themselves to 
a succinct description.  In fact, I believe entire books, multivolume 
sets, maybe even libraries have been written on and dedicated to a 
concept native to one culture but not to another?


My favorite: "Tingo" from Pascucense (Easter Islanders) is succinctly 
described as "to gradually steal all of one's neighbor's possessions by 
borrowing them one at a time and not returning them". The fact of a 
single word for this suggests that in that culture it is a much more 
common occurrence than in our own, or that the number of possessions 
involved is a tiny fraction of what we are familiar with, or the 
attachment to them by the original owner is so minimal that it is 
*possible* for Alice to borrow all of Bob's possessions before he might 
notice "what she did there".


Sobremesa is Spanish (and Frank and a few others may have their own 
input) for "the sociable time after a meal when you have food-induced 
conversations with the people you have had a meal with.


WedTech has an element of Sobremesa, but also has some of the overtones 
that Stephen once observed at the Complex:  "When you get together with 
a group of autistics, they might all appear to be listening intently to 
your every word, when in fact they are just waiting intently for you to 
pause so THEY can talk about what THEY are interested in!"


 I’m not sure I agree in the value of the interpolations and 
extrapolations of ontologies.  It sounds too much like “agree to 
disagree”.


I think that it does begin as "agree to disagree", my main formal 
experience with Ontologies is the Gene Ontology and that is perhaps 10 
years stale now, but at the time, it was apparently considered to be the 
most elaborated single technical ontology with a huge amount of work put 
forth to bring it to it's current state.  I think the number of concepts 
was roughly 5,000 at the time.


 Progress I think requires aggressively creating and destroying types 
and constant by negotiation and empirical validation.


I do believe a great deal of this was done in order to come to the level 
of "agreement" in place, but it was anecdotally understood that this was 
more of a "Rosetta Stone" linking the more accurate and apt Ontologies 
from the many subfields...   it was more useful for translation than for 
understanding, and that real understanding required learning the 
language/ontology of the subfields.   I don't think these are 
"disagreements" but rather an awareness that there is a fuller richness 
behind the formalisms agreed upon for convenience of discussion.


Many “interpretations” just put off getting to the bottom of things.   
Keep the interpretations around long enough to get parallax on a 
better interpretation, then press Delete.


I do agree with this in a mild form.   Many of us here are very 
interested in Etymology because often there is some deeper understanding 
residing in a word's original use, just as the calling up of deprecated 
terms can turn out to be useful for many reasons.


John Zingale referenced something in last Monday's Salon about how 
idioms frm early string theory investigations was almost deprecated when 
it found new utility in quantum loop gravity?I am winging this if 
John wants to correct me.


I think that a great deal of the "Ontology" developed by Alchemists 
before the Age of Enlightenment was still useful long after the 
Enlightenment brought a new way of thinking about Natural Sciences and 
in fact remains useful in the form of the Periodic Table. Similarly 
Newtonian vs Relativistic Mechanics, not to mention Quantum Theory?   
Each has a domain of utility which may last past a formal resolution of 
the differences and an agreement on a shared view (e.g. GUT)?


Closer to shared/reserved lexicons, I don't know if Newton's and 
Leibnitz' differing notations for Calculus also differences in how 
facile one using one or the other might be with the same concepts?


- Steve






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Re: [FRIAM] the role of metaphor in scientific thought

OK.  I mostly agree.  But at some point, there might be an unresolveable 
ambiguity in the kernel, at which point I would be forced to allow pluralism.  
That's why I allow pluaralism from the start... to avoid having to change my 
mind later. 8^)  I think it's easier to go from many to one than it is from one 
to many.

On 06/23/2017 12:25 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> I'd make a distinction between embedded DSLs (built on general-purpose 
> programming languages) and DSLs which are not.   I don't want to get stuck 
> thinking about only those things where the language is established and works 
> well.   I want to be able to step away from it and change it when it doesn't 
> work.   If language L' does something useful L doesn't, then I want to use 
> its utility to drag the community along to my way of thinking.  DSLs lead to 
> rule by committee and stagnation.

-- 
☣ glen

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Re: [FRIAM] the role of metaphor in scientific thought

Marcus -

This is about the time when I expect Dave West to jump in with his rant
about how broken the metaphor of "mind as computer" (or perhaps venn
diagram) is. Though he may not be cross-subscribed here.

Ignoring those arguments for a moment and giving over to the metaphor,
let me offer this observation:

To the extent that the only and precise goal is to efficiently,
unambiguously, and accurately serialize the contents of one's mind and
transmit it to another mind which de-serializes with the goal of
syncronizing the internal states of Bob's mind to that of Alice's,
perhaps what you say is spot on. A technical manual, a scientific
paper, those might very well call for that level of precision.

Jackson_Mary_Strong_WEBSQUARE

From Other Tongues

- Mary Strong Jackson

It just so happens, I am reading this poetry collection just now...

I think this all "begs the question" that Owen brought up about
shared ontologies.If Bob and Alice have a *precisely* shared
ontology (and therefore lexicon?) then this is quite tractable. If
they do NOT share an ontology (much less lexicon) then there is likely
(surely?) to be a mis-registration (if I'm using Glen's term correctly)
in any such serialization/deserialization.One might suggest that
developing/obtaining a perfectly shared ontology is the primary goal of
communication (coming to a common understanding?) and I think that is a
significant part of the reason we commun(icat)e... but I would claim
there is also a *creative* aspect of communication which is to explore
the differences between our ontolologies and look for interpolations
between and extrapolations *beyond* them which *might* yield a larger,
richer, more expressive and apprehensive ontology for *understanding the
world as it is*. Science is a very elaborated and formal system for
pursuing the more observable phenomena of the world and I don't argue
that in the phase of science where we might be buttoning down a well
explored concept/phenomena that precision and accuracy and lack of
ambiguity are crucial. Thus the reserved lexicons of every scientific
(sub)discipline. But what explains the Tower of Babel that is Science
as it is practiced? Is it merely sloppy thinking and language that
causes each subfield to (mis?)use terms from other (sub)fields? Or is
there something more afoot?

I would contend that this is one of the things that divides Science from
Engineering. Engineering is generally interested in highly
reproduceable results, while in a paradoxical sense, Science is often
more interested in the anomalous results?

That aside, my good friend and colleague Tom Caudell (UNM) has been
working on a book with Mike Healey (UW) for what seems like decades now,
building up a theory (and surrounding arguements) for a Neuronal Model
of Mind which is ultimately grounded in category theory and informed by
neural net theory. I am likely mis-describing this effort, but I think
I've captured the gist.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/241246640_Ontologies_and_Worlds_in_Category_Theory_Implications_for_Neural_Systems

In any case, I think that their level of formality is useful, but may
miss the true nature of consciousness and importantly creativity.

Just SAyin,

- Steve

On 6/23/17 10:39 AM, Marcus Daniels wrote:

< Your comparison of "closure" to Nick's idea of "surplus"
(intentional or not) meaning. I accept that in programming a computer,
"closure" is a useful tool, to avoid unintended "side effects".>

If one thinks of the mind of two people as two circles in a Venn diagram and
the intersection as their communication, meaning is still in reference to each
complete circle; it is subjective. This may often lead to ambiguity and
contradiction, but doesn't mean that language itself should be inherently
ambiguous. Specifically, a closure would imply that while each agent was
bringing to bear their experience on the interpretation of the communication,
to the extent their mind is in flux from that communication, in a functional
programming approach it would be modeled as transactions within each agent.
It's simply a question of being precise about what is going on.

Marcus

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Re: [FRIAM] the role of metaphor in scientific thought

Steve writes:

"To the extent that the only and precise goal is to efficiently, unambiguously, 
and accurately serialize the contents of one's mind and transmit it to another 
mind which de-serializes with the goal of syncronizing the internal states of 
Bob's mind to that of Alice's, perhaps what you say is spot on."

The _From Other Tongues_ sketch is good.  Both what is heard and what is said 
could be modeled as a closure over some subjective representation.   Most 
computer programs have one representation (one or separable module 
architectures, not many competing points of view), and, closures, if used, are 
over some (often small) subset of it.  Agent based models, in contrast, usually 
have many representations, and so there is the possibility of a well-defined 
types (and closures that use those types) for clauses in the blue and orange 
captions.  The squiggles suggest that the types are not yet shared amongst the 
agents.  I'm not sure I agree in the value of the interpolations and 
extrapolations of ontologies.  It sounds too much like "agree to disagree".  
Progress I think requires aggressively creating and destroying types and 
constant by negotiation and empirical validation.   Many "interpretations" just 
put off getting to the bottom of things.   Keep the interpretations around long 
enough to get parallax on a better interpretation, then press Delete.

Marcus


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Re: [FRIAM] the role of metaphor in scientific thought

Glen -

Works for me, I was thinking "crypto athiest"...

Naa. I don't qualify as any sort of atheist. I have gods, they're just unique
gods.
Understood... "crypto-animist" perhaps? I didn't think much of the
term (animist) until I encountered it in Abram's "Spell of the Sensuous"
which I am now recognizing anew in the "Pan Consciousness" movement.
You may also enjoy, if you haven't read it, Neal Gaiman's "American
Gods"...

Interesting that you didn't believe "a word uttered in Mass" while I, as a young adult
came to believe (or at least a appreciate) a great deal of what was uttered in Mass. […] I
"believed" a great deal of what he offered in those Homilies.

Hm. I suppose we could parse "believe". But I've had way too many arguments
about the difference (or lack thereof) between belief and knowledge. I don't enjoy them
much anymore.
I guess more important to me was that I *liked* and *tended to agree
with* a great deal of what he had to say. His Homilies illuminated my
understanding of the mystery of being human in this world in a new and
larger way than I had before. None of that was, by the way, couched in
the specific dogma of Catholicism or even Christianity.His
conception of "Grace" for example, did not require a literal belief in a
Paternalistic God, or a Forgiving Son, though maybe something like a
mysterious "Holy Spirit", nor a literal Garden of Eden or a Snake or an
Apple, or Satan or It might be noted that he had a lot of tussle
with the congregation at-large, partly over his "secular" style.
Selfishly, it "worked for me"!

I lost what little "faith" in Christian Dogma I might have had when during a summer Bible
School teaching (9 years old?). I got really excited by the many "miracles" (manna from
heaven, red sea parting, burning bushes, virgin birth, rising from the dead, etc.) and when I
expressed my enthusiasm, taking these to be literal and true and verifiable stories, my Bible
School teacher became very stern with me, but did not attempt to explain allegory or parable to me,
leaving me to believe that SHE didn't believe those stories either. Kinda undermined the magic of
it all! I got a little back years later when I came to understand allegory and parable.

Heh, I kinda wish I'd had more "people in positions of power" like that. Maybe
I did and just ignored any power they had. My CCD teacher taught us to meditate and
chant. I knew Jesus as Buddha before I learned anything about Buddha.
I wish I had not been so quick to ignore/dismiss those "people in
positions of power" myself. It *did* allow/require me to do a lot more
thinking for myself than if I'd swallowed their hooks, lines and
sinkers, but I think there might have been a finer line to have
appreciated than I did. For example, if I'd recognized those
miraculous stories for what they were, I might have returned for more of
that good 'ole Bible- thumpery-for-children and developed a more astute
understanding/appreciation of Christianity earlier... I feel quite
lucky to have been immersed in Catholicism as much as I was, and only
wish I had had more opportunity to get the same up-close-and-personal
taste of other "foreign" cultures.

I've a very good friend born/raised Muslim but extremely Westernized who
I wish would take me into her family for a year... she lives in
Australia... otherwise I think she would. Her father (now deceased)
was known for his scholarly nature and his affection for "Whiteys" (her
term, not mine) and the class of discourse they offered that was
different from his own peers in Islamic culture... she was raised at his
knee watching John Ford Westerns, many set in our local scenery... She
is a very powerful hybrid of three cultures. I have numerous Native
American friends but they are mostly if not all too "Americanized" to
give me yet more cultural/spiritual parallax, not to mention the clutter
we have loaded on them with ideas like "noble Savage". Even those born
and raised in the relative isolation of a "the Rez"... or more likely,
I'm not listening carefully enough.

- Steve

Re: [FRIAM] the role of metaphor in scientific thought

Glen -

What would you call people like me, who were reared Catholic, including confirmation and duties as
an "altar boy", but who never believed a single word uttered in Mass, by parents, or in
the official books? In fact, the only concepts I took, believed in, from Catholicism are 1)
catholicism (little "c") and 2) mystery, both of which I could have more readily learned
from other traditions had my parents been more worldy. Thank Yog for open-minded priests, who took
the time to explore their own mental gymnastics with a child like me, in lieu of the stupidity that
is Confession.

I kinda like "aborted acolyte". 8^)
Works for me, I was thinking "crypto athiest"... and while it is not
accurate to the original usage, I like the sound of "Refusenik Catholic".

I was not raised with much overt religion, though my mother attended
(and included her children) a local Presbyterian church now and again...
my father got drug in for occasional Easter or Christmas services where
he insisted on singing louder than anyone else and when the collection
plate was passed, he would just wave it off and say "thanks, but I've
got plenty already".

Interesting that you didn't believe "a word uttered in Mass" while I, as
a young adult came to believe (or at least a appreciate) a great deal of
what was uttered in Mass. Of course, I had unique priests.. the first
being Father Abiwyckrema, whose first language was probably Hindi...
although Mass was held in English by that time, his singsong accent made
most of what he said entirely unintelligible, but at least as lyrical as
if it had been in Latin. The second being Father Charlie Brown (yup,
that was his given name!) who dropped out of seminary after a year,
realizing that he couldn't minister to a "flock" if he was isolated and
sequestered from the common person. He studied psychotherapy instead
and practiced well into his 40's before realizing that without a more
spiritual grounding he felt he was less effective in his ministrations
and returned to Seminary.The bottom line for me was that his
Homilies were actually quite well considered and relevant to the real
world. I "believed" a great deal of what he offered in those Homilies.

I lost what little "faith" in Christian Dogma I might have had when
during a summer Bible School teaching (9 years old?). I got really
excited by the many "miracles" (manna from heaven, red sea parting,
burning bushes, virgin birth, rising from the dead, etc.) and when I
expressed my enthusiasm, taking these to be literal and true and
verifiable stories, my Bible School teacher became very stern with me,
but did not attempt to explain allegory or parable to me, leaving me to
believe that SHE didn't believe those stories either. Kinda undermined
the magic of it all! I got a little back years later when I came to
understand allegory and parable.

And THAT kindof undermined the phrase in the Pledge of Allegiance
referencing "under God"...

Carry on!
- Steve

On 06/23/2017 11:39 AM, Steven A Smith wrote:

I tend to ask those who
were raised (and usually Confirmed) Catholic but no longer
practicing if they are "Escaped", "Reformed", or "Recovering"
Catholics. I doubt those three terms cover the space fully, but
seem to provide some pretty good sampling. Most have used the term
"Recovering" but many are taken aback by the alternatives and the
nuances implied.

Re: [FRIAM] the role of metaphor in scientific thought