Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruno Marchal]

On 04 Jun 2017, at 13:31, David Nyman wrote:


On 4 June 2017 at 11:47, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 02 Jun 2017, at 00:29, David Nyman wrote:


On 1 June 2017 at 18:00, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 01 Jun 2017, at 16:42, David Nyman wrote:




On 1 Jun 2017 15:20, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 01 Jun 2017, at 15:59, David Nyman wrote:




On 1 Jun 2017 14:01, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 01 Jun 2017, at 12:44, David Nyman wrote:






Yes, but doesn't the comp theory itself assume the relation as if  
true, in order for mechanism to make sense (which was my caveat)?



The point here is very subtle. We cannot assume Mechanism is true,  
we can only assume Mechanism. We can assume it as a sort of meta- 
level hypothesis. It is indeed the reason why I insist on an act of  
faith, and why it is a theology.


Now, you might ask me what is the difference between assuming X,  
and assuming X is true. The difference is that when we assume X,  
but don't invoke the full semantic of X, and we can preserve our  
consistency. By saying "mechanism is true", even in an hypothesis,  
you refer to the God of mechanism at a place that is impossible.


We have something similar, but slightly simpler, for the notion of  
self-consistency. Take PA. It has 6 axioms + the infinity of  
induction axioms


1) Ax (0 ≠ s(x))
2) AxAy (s(x) = s(y) -> x = y)
3) Ax (x+0 = x)
4) AxAy (x+s(y) = s(x+y))
5) Ax (x*0=0)
6) AxAy (x*s(y)=(x*y)+x)
7) the infinity) (F(0) & Ax(F(x) -> F(s(x -> AxF(x)

PA is consistent (I hope you are OK with this, as all  
mathematicians are, except nelson)


Imagine I add to PA the axiom 8) PA is consistent. That is

8) consistent(1+2+3+4+5+6+7)

In that case there is no problem that new theory, PA+con(PA)  is  
consistent, and even much more powerful than PA. It proves new  
theorems and it shorten many proofs.


But imagine we add the following to PA

8') consistent(1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8')

That is self-referential, but using the diagonal lemma (the D'X' =  
'X'X'' trick), we can build that formula in arithmetic and add it  
to PA as axiom.


In that case, we get a theory which can prove, indeed in one line  
proof, its own consistency, and so, by Gödel II, that theory is  
inconsistent.


The case above is more complex to describe, because it refers to  
"arithmetical truth", which cannot even be defined in arithmetic.  
It is almost the nuance between (Bp & p), and (Bp & V(p)). For each  
partuclar p, you can write Bp & p, but you cannot define knowledge  
by a general (Bx & x).  It is the nuance between assuming that x +  
0 = x, and using only that, and assuming True('x + 0 = x'), which  
cannot be express in the arithmetical language.
Mechanism is awkward on this. Yet, this ​sustains your intuition  
that the ultimate 3p, the outer God view, is a 0p pov.


"Out of sight, out of mind" as the proverb has it.


"Loin des yeux, loin du coeur", we say in french (which has not  
exactly the same intent).






It works well with Plotinus idea that God does not exist, as it is  
the ultimate reason why everything exists without mentioning ever  
itself in the creation (making the idea that God can talk with us  
in a direct public way nonsensical). Only the first person has  
access to this, but can only stay mute.



Another example is that even if someone survives the classical  
teleportation experience, he/she cannot claim that he/she knows  
that mechanism is true.


​OK
​
 Still another example, even closer to what is alluded above is the  
case of the notion of sigma_1 truth, or simply sigma-truth. The  
notion of sigma-truth *is* definable in arithmetic, and the self- 
referential sentences saying that she is sigma-true appears to be a  
sigma proposition, yet it can be shown to be ... false! This is  
very unlike the sigma proposition saying "I am provable", which is  
always true! All this despite G* proves (sigma-true <-> sigma  
provable), but again, only G* says this, the machine has to be mute.


​The machine would appear to take Wittgenstein's dictum to heart.  
But its guardian angel is able nonetheless to intuit a truth in  
what it cannot say.


I would not use "intuit" for the guardian angel. he is not a  
subject. just a machinery who knows everything about the machine(s).  
At the propositional level, he knows/proves the whole truth about  
the self-referential sentence. We know it is true, only because we  
limit ourselves to true machine, by decision.


​So the angel is not conceived as self-referential, hence cannot be  
said to possess intuition. Is that it?


Yes. Only G is self-referential, and only the provability predicate  
that G models can be said self-referential. The soul can be said to  
refer to itself implicitly, given that it has no name. G* is entirely  
devolved in talking about G, or the machine. That makes it being both  
consistent and having a sort of omniscience-about-the-machine, but he  
never 

Re: Answers to David 4

[David Nyman]

On 4 June 2017 at 11:47, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 02 Jun 2017, at 00:29, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 1 June 2017 at 18:00, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 01 Jun 2017, at 16:42, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 1 Jun 2017 15:20, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 01 Jun 2017, at 15:59, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 1 Jun 2017 14:01, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 01 Jun 2017, at 12:44, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> 
>>
>>
>> Yes, but doesn't the comp theory itself assume the relation as if true,
>> in order for mechanism to make sense (which was my caveat)?
>>
>>
>>
>> The point here is very subtle. We cannot assume Mechanism is true, we can
>> only assume Mechanism. We can assume it as a sort of meta-level hypothesis.
>> It is indeed the reason why I insist on an act of faith, and why it is a
>> theology.
>>
>> Now, you might ask me what is the difference between assuming X, and
>> assuming X is true. The difference is that when we assume X, but don't
>> invoke the full semantic of X, and we can preserve our consistency. By
>> saying "mechanism is true", even in an hypothesis, you refer to the God of
>> mechanism at a place that is impossible.
>>
>> We have something similar, but slightly simpler, for the notion of
>> self-consistency. Take PA. It has 6 axioms + the infinity of induction
>> axioms
>>
>> 1) Ax (0 ≠ s(x))
>> 2) AxAy (s(x) = s(y) -> x = y)
>> 3) Ax (x+0 = x)
>> 4) AxAy (x+s(y) = s(x+y))
>> 5) Ax (x*0=0)
>> 6) AxAy (x*s(y)=(x*y)+x)
>> 7) the infinity) (F(0) & Ax(F(x) -> F(s(x -> AxF(x)
>>
>> PA is consistent (I hope you are OK with this, as all mathematicians are,
>> except nelson)
>>
>> Imagine I add to PA the axiom 8) PA is consistent. That is
>>
>> 8) consistent(1+2+3+4+5+6+7)
>>
>> In that case there is no problem that new theory, PA+con(PA)  is
>> consistent, and even much more powerful than PA. It proves new theorems and
>> it shorten many proofs.
>>
>> But imagine we add the following to PA
>>
>> 8') consistent(1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8')
>>
>> That is self-referential, but using the diagonal lemma (the D'X' = 'X'X''
>> trick), we can build that formula in arithmetic and add it to PA as axiom.
>>
>> In that case, we get a theory which can prove, indeed in one line proof,
>> its own consistency, and so, by Gödel II, that theory is inconsistent.
>>
>> The case above is more complex to describe, because it refers to
>> "arithmetical truth", which cannot even be defined in arithmetic. It is
>> almost the nuance between (Bp & p), and (Bp & V(p)). For each partuclar p,
>> you can write Bp & p, but you cannot define knowledge by a general (Bx &
>> x).  It is the nuance between assuming that x + 0 = x, and using only that,
>> and assuming True('x + 0 = x'), which cannot be express in the arithmetical
>> language.
>> Mechanism is awkward on this. Yet, this
>> ​
>> sustains your intuition that the ultimate 3p, the outer God view, is a 0p
>> pov.
>>
>
> "Out of sight, out of mind" as the proverb has it.
>
>
> "Loin des yeux, loin du coeur", we say in french (which has not exactly
> the same intent).
>
>
>
>
>
>> It works well with Plotinus idea that God does not exist, as it is the
>> ultimate reason why everything exists without mentioning ever itself in the
>> creation (making the idea that God can talk with us in a direct public way
>> nonsensical). Only the first person has access to this, but can only stay
>> mute.
>>
>
>
> Another example is that even if someone survives the classical
>> teleportation experience, he/she cannot claim that he/she knows that
>> mechanism is true.
>>
>
> ​OK
> ​
>
>>  Still another example, even closer to what is alluded above is the case
>> of the notion of sigma_1 truth, or simply sigma-truth. The notion of
>> sigma-truth *is* definable in arithmetic, and the self-referential
>> sentences saying that she is sigma-true appears to be a sigma proposition,
>> yet it can be shown to be ... false! This is very unlike the sigma
>> proposition saying "I am provable", which is always true! All this despite
>> G* proves (sigma-true <-> sigma provable), but again, only G* says this,
>> the machine has to be mute.
>>
>
> ​The machine would appear to take Wittgenstein's dictum to heart. But its
> guardian angel is able nonetheless to intuit a truth in what it cannot say.
>
>
> I would not use "intuit" for the guardian angel. he is not a subject. just
> a machinery who knows everything about the machine(s). At the propositional
> level, he knows/proves the whole truth about the self-referential sentence.
> We know it is true, only because we limit ourselves to true machine, by
> decision.
>

​So the angel is not conceived as self-referential, hence cannot be said to
possess intuition. Is that it?


>> I cannot say "if mechanism is true then the truth of mechanism go without
>> saying", but I can say at the meta-level "If mechanism then the truth of
>> mechanism go without saying". I think.
>>

Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruno Marchal]

On 02 Jun 2017, at 00:29, David Nyman wrote:


On 1 June 2017 at 18:00, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 01 Jun 2017, at 16:42, David Nyman wrote:




On 1 Jun 2017 15:20, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 01 Jun 2017, at 15:59, David Nyman wrote:




On 1 Jun 2017 14:01, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 01 Jun 2017, at 12:44, David Nyman wrote:






Yes, but doesn't the comp theory itself assume the relation as if  
true, in order for mechanism to make sense (which was my caveat)?



The point here is very subtle. We cannot assume Mechanism is true,  
we can only assume Mechanism. We can assume it as a sort of meta- 
level hypothesis. It is indeed the reason why I insist on an act of  
faith, and why it is a theology.


Now, you might ask me what is the difference between assuming X, and  
assuming X is true. The difference is that when we assume X, but  
don't invoke the full semantic of X, and we can preserve our  
consistency. By saying "mechanism is true", even in an hypothesis,  
you refer to the God of mechanism at a place that is impossible.


We have something similar, but slightly simpler, for the notion of  
self-consistency. Take PA. It has 6 axioms + the infinity of  
induction axioms


1) Ax (0 ≠ s(x))
2) AxAy (s(x) = s(y) -> x = y)
3) Ax (x+0 = x)
4) AxAy (x+s(y) = s(x+y))
5) Ax (x*0=0)
6) AxAy (x*s(y)=(x*y)+x)
7) the infinity) (F(0) & Ax(F(x) -> F(s(x -> AxF(x)

PA is consistent (I hope you are OK with this, as all mathematicians  
are, except nelson)


Imagine I add to PA the axiom 8) PA is consistent. That is

8) consistent(1+2+3+4+5+6+7)

In that case there is no problem that new theory, PA+con(PA)  is  
consistent, and even much more powerful than PA. It proves new  
theorems and it shorten many proofs.


But imagine we add the following to PA

8') consistent(1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8')

That is self-referential, but using the diagonal lemma (the D'X' =  
'X'X'' trick), we can build that formula in arithmetic and add it to  
PA as axiom.


In that case, we get a theory which can prove, indeed in one line  
proof, its own consistency, and so, by Gödel II, that theory is  
inconsistent.


The case above is more complex to describe, because it refers to  
"arithmetical truth", which cannot even be defined in arithmetic. It  
is almost the nuance between (Bp & p), and (Bp & V(p)). For each  
partuclar p, you can write Bp & p, but you cannot define knowledge  
by a general (Bx & x).  It is the nuance between assuming that x + 0  
= x, and using only that, and assuming True('x + 0 = x'), which  
cannot be express in the arithmetical language.
Mechanism is awkward on this. Yet, this ​sustains your intuition  
that the ultimate 3p, the outer God view, is a 0p pov.


"Out of sight, out of mind" as the proverb has it.


"Loin des yeux, loin du coeur", we say in french (which has not  
exactly the same intent).






It works well with Plotinus idea that God does not exist, as it is  
the ultimate reason why everything exists without mentioning ever  
itself in the creation (making the idea that God can talk with us in  
a direct public way nonsensical). Only the first person has access  
to this, but can only stay mute.



Another example is that even if someone survives the classical  
teleportation experience, he/she cannot claim that he/she knows that  
mechanism is true.


​OK
​
 Still another example, even closer to what is alluded above is the  
case of the notion of sigma_1 truth, or simply sigma-truth. The  
notion of sigma-truth *is* definable in arithmetic, and the self- 
referential sentences saying that she is sigma-true appears to be a  
sigma proposition, yet it can be shown to be ... false! This is very  
unlike the sigma proposition saying "I am provable", which is always  
true! All this despite G* proves (sigma-true <-> sigma provable),  
but again, only G* says this, the machine has to be mute.


​The machine would appear to take Wittgenstein's dictum to heart.  
But its guardian angel is able nonetheless to intuit a truth in what  
it cannot say.


I would not use "intuit" for the guardian angel. he is not a subject.  
just a machinery who knows everything about the machine(s). At the  
propositional level, he knows/proves the whole truth about the self- 
referential sentence. We know it is true, only because we limit  
ourselves to true machine, by decision.






​

I cannot say "if mechanism is true then the truth of mechanism go  
without saying", but I can say at the meta-level "If mechanism then  
the truth of mechanism go without saying". I think.


​Perhaps ​"if mechanism is true" is close to what Brent calls a  
reification.


Hmm... Brent does not use "reification" correctly. He accused me of  
reifying arithmetic, when I said that he reified primary matter. but  
arithmetic is assumes, not reified in anyway. Primary matter is  
reifed, as it is an appearance only, and its assumption is uded to  
avoid solving a question. It is 

Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruno Marchal]

On 01 Jun 2017, at 16:42, David Nyman wrote:




On 1 Jun 2017 15:20, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 01 Jun 2017, at 15:59, David Nyman wrote:




On 1 Jun 2017 14:01, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 01 Jun 2017, at 12:44, David Nyman wrote:




On 1 Jun 2017 10:02 a.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 31 May 2017, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote:


On 31 May 2017 at 17:00, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 30 May 2017, at 16:44, David Nyman wrote:


On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: 




On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker   
wrote:


​Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "​we are to  
extract" over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or  
in short, subject precedes object in the explanation. That's  
the reversal.


Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a  
little bit, or not in case you mean "physical object" for  
"object".


​Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little  
too short. But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an  
attempt to avoid ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long- 
winded :(

​
I would say that subjects precedes physical objects​, as  
physics becomes a first person plural notion.


​Exactly

But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we  
have to admit that the number objects still precedes (in some  
logical sense) the subject, which arises from the infinitely  
many computations which supports its self-referential modes.


​Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or  
ontological component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a  
certain objective sense, but their 'observable' or  
epistemological component can only be realised (i.e. made true)  
in terms of a point-of-view.



OK. Yet, having bet on a theory making us (or the correct part of  
us) aware that the first point of view is local, and so see only  
a part of a bigger truth, which is the "ultimate" 0p, which  
mechanism, and our sanity/soundness, which we cannot even  
express, still less justify, but we can "meta-prove" for the  
correct machine, that such an 0p can be reduced to first the  
arithmetical truth, and secondly (blaspheming for two seconds)  
the sigma arithmetical truth (the UD, The UM, the sigma_1  
complete set.


That is why we can take RA for the ontology. The PA induction  
axioms are put in the number epistemology already. RA can prove  
the existence of PA, but "for RA" PA is already dreaming.


It is an open problem (to me at least) if this is mandatory or  
not. Nelson believes (but seems unique in believing this) that  
the induction axioms are "viciously" circular,


​Is this in any way related to Popper's point about induction in  
fact always being deduction on the basis of some theory (even if  
only implicitly)? IIRC his rationale was that even the selection  
of 'data' on which to base the purported inductive generalisation  
was itself theory-dependent. Hence the claim should really be  
something more like "on the basis of a certain theory, let us  
select these features as data, which then might lead us to the  
following conclusion...etc.".


I agree that most (but not all) "induction" (in the sense of  
inductive inference) requires explicit "induction" axioms, in the  
Peano sense. But Peano induction axiom will not usually been seen  
as inductive inference. I agree that inductive inference is theory  
dependent, and it requires not just PA-like induction, but also  
the general assumption, usually at the metalevel that there is  
something to be observed (the <>t meta-assumption).




​
making PA inconsistent. I doubt this a lot, but with mechanism I  
think we can argue that we can't really prove the consistency of  
PA, despite most mathematicians believe in the consistency of  
much more (in the sense of proving abilities) powerful theory  
than PA, like ZF, Category, theory, group theory, etc.).




We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject,  
but that would be a bit ad hoc,


​Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the  
mind of the inner God-subject.


How? in Bp & p, the Bp part restricts  the truth. The "Bp" is  
like a finite window through which God/Truth, "p", look at  
itself. The inner god is the outer God looking at itself through  
the Bp window.


​Yes, that's what I meant. Perhaps it's just vocabulary. I  
assumed (wrongly?) that by natural object you meant physical or  
perceptual object.​


I guess that I meant "natural *number* object.





I think that what makes you adding the whole truth in the  
provable is due to the fact that the "Divine Intellect"'s view  
coincides with the view of the soul-instantiated: that is: the  
fact that S4Grz = S4Grz*. The soul does not split along G/G*. But  
that is the "natural", "unavoidable" solipsism of the first  
person 

Re: Answers to David 4

[David Nyman]

On 1 Jun 2017 15:20, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:


On 01 Jun 2017, at 15:59, David Nyman wrote:



On 1 Jun 2017 14:01, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:


On 01 Jun 2017, at 12:44, David Nyman wrote:



On 1 Jun 2017 10:02 a.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:


On 31 May 2017, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote:

On 31 May 2017 at 17:00, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 30 May 2017, at 16:44, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>> ​Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "​we are to extract"
>> over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or in short, subject
>> precedes object in the explanation. That's the reversal.
>>
>>
>> Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a little bit,
>> or not in case you mean "physical object" for "object".
>>
>
> ​Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little too short.
> But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an attempt to avoid
> ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long-winded :(
> ​
>
>> I would say that subjects precedes physical objects
>> ​,
>> as physics becomes a first person plural notion.
>>
>
> ​Exactly
>
>
>> But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we have to
>> admit that the number objects still precedes (in some logical sense) the
>> subject, which arises from the infinitely many computations which supports
>> its self-referential modes.
>>
>
> ​Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or ontological
> component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a certain objective sense,
> but their 'observable' or epistemological component can only be realised
> (i.e. made true) in terms of a point-of-view.
>
>
>
> OK. Yet, having bet on a theory making us (or the correct part of us)
> aware that the first point of view is local, and so see only a part of a
> bigger truth, which is the "ultimate" 0p, which mechanism, and our
> sanity/soundness, which we cannot even express, still less justify, but we
> can "meta-prove" for the correct machine, that such an 0p can be reduced to
> first the arithmetical truth, and secondly (blaspheming for two seconds)
> the sigma arithmetical truth (the UD, The UM, the sigma_1 complete set.
>
> That is why we can take RA for the ontology. The PA induction axioms are
> put in the number epistemology already. RA can prove the existence of PA,
> but "for RA" PA is already dreaming.
>
> It is an open problem (to me at least) if this is mandatory or not. Nelson
> believes (but seems unique in believing this) that the induction axioms are
> "viciously" circular,
>

​Is this in any way related to Popper's point about induction in fact
always being deduction on the basis of some theory (even if only
implicitly)? IIRC his rationale was that even the selection of 'data' on
which to base the purported inductive generalisation was itself
theory-dependent. Hence the claim should really be something more like "on
the basis of a certain theory, let us select these features as data, which
then might lead us to the following conclusion...etc.".


I agree that most (but not all) "induction" (in the sense of inductive
inference) requires explicit "induction" axioms, in the Peano sense. But
Peano induction axiom will not usually been seen as inductive inference. I
agree that inductive inference is theory dependent, and it requires not
just PA-like induction, but also the general assumption, usually at the
metalevel that there is something to be observed (the <>t meta-assumption).


​

> making PA inconsistent. I doubt this a lot, but with mechanism I think we
> can argue that we can't really prove the consistency of PA, despite most
> mathematicians believe in the consistency of much more (in the sense of
> proving abilities) powerful theory than PA, like ZF, Category, theory,
> group theory, etc.).
>
>
>> We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject, but that
>> would be a bit ad hoc,
>>
>
> ​Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the mind of the
> inner God-subject.
>
>
> How? in Bp & p, the Bp part restricts  the truth. The "Bp" is like a
> finite window through which God/Truth, "p", look at itself. The inner god
> is the outer God looking at itself through the Bp window.
>

​Yes, that's what I meant. Perhaps it's just vocabulary. I assumed
(wrongly?) that by natural object you meant physical or perceptual object.​


I guess that I meant "natural *number* object.




> I think that what makes you adding the whole truth in the provable is due
> to the fact that the "Divine Intellect"'s view coincides with the view of
> the soul-instantiated: that is: the fact that S4Grz = S4Grz*. The soul does
> not split along G/G*. But that is the "natural", "unavoidable" solipsism of
> the first person subject.

Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruno Marchal]

On 01 Jun 2017, at 15:59, David Nyman wrote:




On 1 Jun 2017 14:01, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 01 Jun 2017, at 12:44, David Nyman wrote:




On 1 Jun 2017 10:02 a.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 31 May 2017, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote:


On 31 May 2017 at 17:00, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 30 May 2017, at 16:44, David Nyman wrote:


On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: 




On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker   
wrote:


​Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "​we are to  
extract" over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or in  
short, subject precedes object in the explanation. That's the  
reversal.


Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a  
little bit, or not in case you mean "physical object" for "object".


​Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little  
too short. But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an  
attempt to avoid ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long- 
winded :(

​
I would say that subjects precedes physical objects​, as physics  
becomes a first person plural notion.


​Exactly

But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we  
have to admit that the number objects still precedes (in some  
logical sense) the subject, which arises from the infinitely many  
computations which supports its self-referential modes.


​Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or  
ontological component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a  
certain objective sense, but their 'observable' or  
epistemological component can only be realised (i.e. made true)  
in terms of a point-of-view.



OK. Yet, having bet on a theory making us (or the correct part of  
us) aware that the first point of view is local, and so see only a  
part of a bigger truth, which is the "ultimate" 0p, which  
mechanism, and our sanity/soundness, which we cannot even express,  
still less justify, but we can "meta-prove" for the correct  
machine, that such an 0p can be reduced to first the arithmetical  
truth, and secondly (blaspheming for two seconds) the sigma  
arithmetical truth (the UD, The UM, the sigma_1 complete set.


That is why we can take RA for the ontology. The PA induction  
axioms are put in the number epistemology already. RA can prove  
the existence of PA, but "for RA" PA is already dreaming.


It is an open problem (to me at least) if this is mandatory or  
not. Nelson believes (but seems unique in believing this) that the  
induction axioms are "viciously" circular,


​Is this in any way related to Popper's point about induction in  
fact always being deduction on the basis of some theory (even if  
only implicitly)? IIRC his rationale was that even the selection  
of 'data' on which to base the purported inductive generalisation  
was itself theory-dependent. Hence the claim should really be  
something more like "on the basis of a certain theory, let us  
select these features as data, which then might lead us to the  
following conclusion...etc.".


I agree that most (but not all) "induction" (in the sense of  
inductive inference) requires explicit "induction" axioms, in the  
Peano sense. But Peano induction axiom will not usually been seen  
as inductive inference. I agree that inductive inference is theory  
dependent, and it requires not just PA-like induction, but also the  
general assumption, usually at the metalevel that there is  
something to be observed (the <>t meta-assumption).




​
making PA inconsistent. I doubt this a lot, but with mechanism I  
think we can argue that we can't really prove the consistency of  
PA, despite most mathematicians believe in the consistency of much  
more (in the sense of proving abilities) powerful theory than PA,  
like ZF, Category, theory, group theory, etc.).




We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject,  
but that would be a bit ad hoc,


​Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the mind  
of the inner God-subject.


How? in Bp & p, the Bp part restricts  the truth. The "Bp" is like  
a finite window through which God/Truth, "p", look at itself. The  
inner god is the outer God looking at itself through the Bp window.


​Yes, that's what I meant. Perhaps it's just vocabulary. I  
assumed (wrongly?) that by natural object you meant physical or  
perceptual object.​


I guess that I meant "natural *number* object.





I think that what makes you adding the whole truth in the provable  
is due to the fact that the "Divine Intellect"'s view coincides  
with the view of the soul-instantiated: that is: the fact that  
S4Grz = S4Grz*. The soul does not split along G/G*. But that is  
the "natural", "unavoidable" solipsism of the first person subject.


​Yes indeed. That's what makes it compatible (at least  
heuristically) with monopsychism.


OK. God's solipism. To 

Re: Answers to David 4

[David Nyman]

On 1 Jun 2017 14:01, "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:


On 01 Jun 2017, at 12:44, David Nyman wrote:



On 1 Jun 2017 10:02 a.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:


On 31 May 2017, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote:

On 31 May 2017 at 17:00, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 30 May 2017, at 16:44, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>> ​Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "​we are to extract"
>> over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or in short, subject
>> precedes object in the explanation. That's the reversal.
>>
>>
>> Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a little bit,
>> or not in case you mean "physical object" for "object".
>>
>
> ​Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little too short.
> But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an attempt to avoid
> ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long-winded :(
> ​
>
>> I would say that subjects precedes physical objects
>> ​,
>> as physics becomes a first person plural notion.
>>
>
> ​Exactly
>
>
>> But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we have to
>> admit that the number objects still precedes (in some logical sense) the
>> subject, which arises from the infinitely many computations which supports
>> its self-referential modes.
>>
>
> ​Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or ontological
> component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a certain objective sense,
> but their 'observable' or epistemological component can only be realised
> (i.e. made true) in terms of a point-of-view.
>
>
>
> OK. Yet, having bet on a theory making us (or the correct part of us)
> aware that the first point of view is local, and so see only a part of a
> bigger truth, which is the "ultimate" 0p, which mechanism, and our
> sanity/soundness, which we cannot even express, still less justify, but we
> can "meta-prove" for the correct machine, that such an 0p can be reduced to
> first the arithmetical truth, and secondly (blaspheming for two seconds)
> the sigma arithmetical truth (the UD, The UM, the sigma_1 complete set.
>
> That is why we can take RA for the ontology. The PA induction axioms are
> put in the number epistemology already. RA can prove the existence of PA,
> but "for RA" PA is already dreaming.
>
> It is an open problem (to me at least) if this is mandatory or not. Nelson
> believes (but seems unique in believing this) that the induction axioms are
> "viciously" circular,
>

​Is this in any way related to Popper's point about induction in fact
always being deduction on the basis of some theory (even if only
implicitly)? IIRC his rationale was that even the selection of 'data' on
which to base the purported inductive generalisation was itself
theory-dependent. Hence the claim should really be something more like "on
the basis of a certain theory, let us select these features as data, which
then might lead us to the following conclusion...etc.".


I agree that most (but not all) "induction" (in the sense of inductive
inference) requires explicit "induction" axioms, in the Peano sense. But
Peano induction axiom will not usually been seen as inductive inference. I
agree that inductive inference is theory dependent, and it requires not
just PA-like induction, but also the general assumption, usually at the
metalevel that there is something to be observed (the <>t meta-assumption).


​

> making PA inconsistent. I doubt this a lot, but with mechanism I think we
> can argue that we can't really prove the consistency of PA, despite most
> mathematicians believe in the consistency of much more (in the sense of
> proving abilities) powerful theory than PA, like ZF, Category, theory,
> group theory, etc.).
>
>
>> We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject, but that
>> would be a bit ad hoc,
>>
>
> ​Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the mind of the
> inner God-subject.
>
>
> How? in Bp & p, the Bp part restricts  the truth. The "Bp" is like a
> finite window through which God/Truth, "p", look at itself. The inner god
> is the outer God looking at itself through the Bp window.
>

​Yes, that's what I meant. Perhaps it's just vocabulary. I assumed
(wrongly?) that by natural object you meant physical or perceptual object.​


I guess that I meant "natural *number* object.




> I think that what makes you adding the whole truth in the provable is due
> to the fact that the "Divine Intellect"'s view coincides with the view of
> the soul-instantiated: that is: the fact that S4Grz = S4Grz*. The soul does
> not split along G/G*. But that is the "natural", "unavoidable" solipsism of
> the first person subject.
>

​Yes indeed. That's what makes it compatible (at least heuristically) with
monopsychism.


OK. God's solipism. 

Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruno Marchal]

On 01 Jun 2017, at 12:44, David Nyman wrote:




On 1 Jun 2017 10:02 a.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:

On 31 May 2017, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote:


On 31 May 2017 at 17:00, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 30 May 2017, at 16:44, David Nyman wrote:


On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: 




On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker  wrote:

​Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "​we are to  
extract" over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or in  
short, subject precedes object in the explanation. That's the  
reversal.


Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a  
little bit, or not in case you mean "physical object" for "object".


​Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little too  
short. But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an  
attempt to avoid ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long-winded :(

​
I would say that subjects precedes physical objects​, as physics  
becomes a first person plural notion.


​Exactly

But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we  
have to admit that the number objects still precedes (in some  
logical sense) the subject, which arises from the infinitely many  
computations which supports its self-referential modes.


​Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or  
ontological component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a  
certain objective sense, but their 'observable' or epistemological  
component can only be realised (i.e. made true) in terms of a  
point-of-view.



OK. Yet, having bet on a theory making us (or the correct part of  
us) aware that the first point of view is local, and so see only a  
part of a bigger truth, which is the "ultimate" 0p, which  
mechanism, and our sanity/soundness, which we cannot even express,  
still less justify, but we can "meta-prove" for the correct  
machine, that such an 0p can be reduced to first the arithmetical  
truth, and secondly (blaspheming for two seconds) the sigma  
arithmetical truth (the UD, The UM, the sigma_1 complete set.


That is why we can take RA for the ontology. The PA induction  
axioms are put in the number epistemology already. RA can prove the  
existence of PA, but "for RA" PA is already dreaming.


It is an open problem (to me at least) if this is mandatory or not.  
Nelson believes (but seems unique in believing this) that the  
induction axioms are "viciously" circular,


​Is this in any way related to Popper's point about induction in  
fact always being deduction on the basis of some theory (even if  
only implicitly)? IIRC his rationale was that even the selection of  
'data' on which to base the purported inductive generalisation was  
itself theory-dependent. Hence the claim should really be something  
more like "on the basis of a certain theory, let us select these  
features as data, which then might lead us to the following  
conclusion...etc.".


I agree that most (but not all) "induction" (in the sense of  
inductive inference) requires explicit "induction" axioms, in the  
Peano sense. But Peano induction axiom will not usually been seen as  
inductive inference. I agree that inductive inference is theory  
dependent, and it requires not just PA-like induction, but also the  
general assumption, usually at the metalevel that there is something  
to be observed (the <>t meta-assumption).




​
making PA inconsistent. I doubt this a lot, but with mechanism I  
think we can argue that we can't really prove the consistency of  
PA, despite most mathematicians believe in the consistency of much  
more (in the sense of proving abilities) powerful theory than PA,  
like ZF, Category, theory, group theory, etc.).




We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject,  
but that would be a bit ad hoc,


​Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the mind  
of the inner God-subject.


How? in Bp & p, the Bp part restricts  the truth. The "Bp" is like  
a finite window through which God/Truth, "p", look at itself. The  
inner god is the outer God looking at itself through the Bp window.


​Yes, that's what I meant. Perhaps it's just vocabulary. I assumed  
(wrongly?) that by natural object you meant physical or perceptual  
object.​


I guess that I meant "natural *number* object.





I think that what makes you adding the whole truth in the provable  
is due to the fact that the "Divine Intellect"'s view coincides  
with the view of the soul-instantiated: that is: the fact that  
S4Grz = S4Grz*. The soul does not split along G/G*. But that is the  
"natural", "unavoidable" solipsism of the first person subject.


​Yes indeed. That's what makes it compatible (at least  
heuristically) with monopsychism.


OK. God's solipism. To be sure, the "(outer) God" of mechanism, V,  
is not the biggest "God".  Like in Plotinus, and perhaps arguably  

Re: Answers to David 4

[David Nyman]

On 1 Jun 2017 10:02 a.m., "Bruno Marchal"  wrote:


On 31 May 2017, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote:

On 31 May 2017 at 17:00, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 30 May 2017, at 16:44, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>> ​Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "​we are to extract"
>> over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or in short, subject
>> precedes object in the explanation. That's the reversal.
>>
>>
>> Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a little bit,
>> or not in case you mean "physical object" for "object".
>>
>
> ​Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little too short.
> But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an attempt to avoid
> ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long-winded :(
> ​
>
>> I would say that subjects precedes physical objects
>> ​,
>> as physics becomes a first person plural notion.
>>
>
> ​Exactly
>
>
>> But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we have to
>> admit that the number objects still precedes (in some logical sense) the
>> subject, which arises from the infinitely many computations which supports
>> its self-referential modes.
>>
>
> ​Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or ontological
> component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a certain objective sense,
> but their 'observable' or epistemological component can only be realised
> (i.e. made true) in terms of a point-of-view.
>
>
>
> OK. Yet, having bet on a theory making us (or the correct part of us)
> aware that the first point of view is local, and so see only a part of a
> bigger truth, which is the "ultimate" 0p, which mechanism, and our
> sanity/soundness, which we cannot even express, still less justify, but we
> can "meta-prove" for the correct machine, that such an 0p can be reduced to
> first the arithmetical truth, and secondly (blaspheming for two seconds)
> the sigma arithmetical truth (the UD, The UM, the sigma_1 complete set.
>
> That is why we can take RA for the ontology. The PA induction axioms are
> put in the number epistemology already. RA can prove the existence of PA,
> but "for RA" PA is already dreaming.
>
> It is an open problem (to me at least) if this is mandatory or not. Nelson
> believes (but seems unique in believing this) that the induction axioms are
> "viciously" circular,
>

​Is this in any way related to Popper's point about induction in fact
always being deduction on the basis of some theory (even if only
implicitly)? IIRC his rationale was that even the selection of 'data' on
which to base the purported inductive generalisation was itself
theory-dependent. Hence the claim should really be something more like "on
the basis of a certain theory, let us select these features as data, which
then might lead us to the following conclusion...etc.".


I agree that most (but not all) "induction" (in the sense of inductive
inference) requires explicit "induction" axioms, in the Peano sense. But
Peano induction axiom will not usually been seen as inductive inference. I
agree that inductive inference is theory dependent, and it requires not
just PA-like induction, but also the general assumption, usually at the
metalevel that there is something to be observed (the <>t meta-assumption).


​

> making PA inconsistent. I doubt this a lot, but with mechanism I think we
> can argue that we can't really prove the consistency of PA, despite most
> mathematicians believe in the consistency of much more (in the sense of
> proving abilities) powerful theory than PA, like ZF, Category, theory,
> group theory, etc.).
>
>
>> We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject, but that
>> would be a bit ad hoc,
>>
>
> ​Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the mind of the
> inner God-subject.
>
>
> How? in Bp & p, the Bp part restricts  the truth. The "Bp" is like a
> finite window through which God/Truth, "p", look at itself. The inner god
> is the outer God looking at itself through the Bp window.
>

​Yes, that's what I meant. Perhaps it's just vocabulary. I assumed
(wrongly?) that by natural object you meant physical or perceptual object.​


I guess that I meant "natural *number* object.




> I think that what makes you adding the whole truth in the provable is due
> to the fact that the "Divine Intellect"'s view coincides with the view of
> the soul-instantiated: that is: the fact that S4Grz = S4Grz*. The soul does
> not split along G/G*. But that is the "natural", "unavoidable" solipsism of
> the first person subject.
>

​Yes indeed. That's what makes it compatible (at least heuristically) with
monopsychism.


OK. God's solipism. To be sure, the "(outer) God" of mechanism, V, is not
the biggest "God".  Like in Plotinus, and perhaps arguably 

Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruno Marchal]

On 31 May 2017, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote:


On 31 May 2017 at 17:00, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 30 May 2017, at 16:44, David Nyman wrote:


On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: 




On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker  wrote:

​Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "​we are to  
extract" over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or in  
short, subject precedes object in the explanation. That's the  
reversal.


Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a little  
bit, or not in case you mean "physical object" for "object".


​Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little too  
short. But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an  
attempt to avoid ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long-winded :(

​
I would say that subjects precedes physical objects​, as physics  
becomes a first person plural notion.


​Exactly

But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we  
have to admit that the number objects still precedes (in some  
logical sense) the subject, which arises from the infinitely many  
computations which supports its self-referential modes.


​Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or  
ontological component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a  
certain objective sense, but their 'observable' or epistemological  
component can only be realised (i.e. made true) in terms of a point- 
of-view.



OK. Yet, having bet on a theory making us (or the correct part of  
us) aware that the first point of view is local, and so see only a  
part of a bigger truth, which is the "ultimate" 0p, which mechanism,  
and our sanity/soundness, which we cannot even express, still less  
justify, but we can "meta-prove" for the correct machine, that such  
an 0p can be reduced to first the arithmetical truth, and secondly  
(blaspheming for two seconds) the sigma arithmetical truth (the UD,  
The UM, the sigma_1 complete set.


That is why we can take RA for the ontology. The PA induction axioms  
are put in the number epistemology already. RA can prove the  
existence of PA, but "for RA" PA is already dreaming.


It is an open problem (to me at least) if this is mandatory or not.  
Nelson believes (but seems unique in believing this) that the  
induction axioms are "viciously" circular,


​Is this in any way related to Popper's point about induction in  
fact always being deduction on the basis of some theory (even if  
only implicitly)? IIRC his rationale was that even the selection of  
'data' on which to base the purported inductive generalisation was  
itself theory-dependent. Hence the claim should really be something  
more like "on the basis of a certain theory, let us select these  
features as data, which then might lead us to the following  
conclusion...etc.".


I agree that most (but not all) "induction" (in the sense of inductive  
inference) requires explicit "induction" axioms, in the Peano sense.  
But Peano induction axiom will not usually been seen as inductive  
inference. I agree that inductive inference is theory dependent, and  
it requires not just PA-like induction, but also the general  
assumption, usually at the metalevel that there is something to be  
observed (the <>t meta-assumption).




​
making PA inconsistent. I doubt this a lot, but with mechanism I  
think we can argue that we can't really prove the consistency of PA,  
despite most mathematicians believe in the consistency of much more  
(in the sense of proving abilities) powerful theory than PA, like  
ZF, Category, theory, group theory, etc.).




We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject, but  
that would be a bit ad hoc,


​Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the mind  
of the inner God-subject.


How? in Bp & p, the Bp part restricts  the truth. The "Bp" is like a  
finite window through which God/Truth, "p", look at itself. The  
inner god is the outer God looking at itself through the Bp window.


​Yes, that's what I meant. Perhaps it's just vocabulary. I assumed  
(wrongly?) that by natural object you meant physical or perceptual  
object.​


I guess that I meant "natural *number* object.





I think that what makes you adding the whole truth in the provable  
is due to the fact that the "Divine Intellect"'s view coincides with  
the view of the soul-instantiated: that is: the fact that S4Grz =  
S4Grz*. The soul does not split along G/G*. But that is the  
"natural", "unavoidable" solipsism of the first person subject.


​Yes indeed. That's what makes it compatible (at least  
heuristically) with monopsychism.


OK. God's solipism. To be sure, the "(outer) God" of mechanism, V, is  
not the biggest "God".  Like in Plotinus, and perhaps arguably already  
in Plato's Parmenides, God is overwhelmed by the "Noùs". Quantified  
G*, qG*, is PI-complete in the V oracle. So, 

Re: Answers to David 4

[David Nyman]

On 31 May 2017 at 17:00, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 30 May 2017, at 16:44, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>> ​Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "​we are to extract"
>> over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or in short, subject
>> precedes object in the explanation. That's the reversal.
>>
>>
>> Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a little bit,
>> or not in case you mean "physical object" for "object".
>>
>
> ​Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little too short.
> But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an attempt to avoid
> ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long-winded :(
> ​
>
>> I would say that subjects precedes physical objects
>> ​,
>> as physics becomes a first person plural notion.
>>
>
> ​Exactly
>
>
>> But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we have to
>> admit that the number objects still precedes (in some logical sense) the
>> subject, which arises from the infinitely many computations which supports
>> its self-referential modes.
>>
>
> ​Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or ontological
> component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a certain objective sense,
> but their 'observable' or epistemological component can only be realised
> (i.e. made true) in terms of a point-of-view.
>
>
>
> OK. Yet, having bet on a theory making us (or the correct part of us)
> aware that the first point of view is local, and so see only a part of a
> bigger truth, which is the "ultimate" 0p, which mechanism, and our
> sanity/soundness, which we cannot even express, still less justify, but we
> can "meta-prove" for the correct machine, that such an 0p can be reduced to
> first the arithmetical truth, and secondly (blaspheming for two seconds)
> the sigma arithmetical truth (the UD, The UM, the sigma_1 complete set.
>
> That is why we can take RA for the ontology. The PA induction axioms are
> put in the number epistemology already. RA can prove the existence of PA,
> but "for RA" PA is already dreaming.
>
> It is an open problem (to me at least) if this is mandatory or not. Nelson
> believes (but seems unique in believing this) that the induction axioms are
> "viciously" circular,
>

​Is this in any way related to Popper's point about induction in fact
always being deduction on the basis of some theory (even if only
implicitly)? IIRC his rationale was that even the selection of 'data' on
which to base the purported inductive generalisation was itself
theory-dependent. Hence the claim should really be something more like "on
the basis of a certain theory, let us select these features as data, which
then might lead us to the following conclusion...etc.".
​

> making PA inconsistent. I doubt this a lot, but with mechanism I think we
> can argue that we can't really prove the consistency of PA, despite most
> mathematicians believe in the consistency of much more (in the sense of
> proving abilities) powerful theory than PA, like ZF, Category, theory,
> group theory, etc.).
>
>
>> We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject, but that
>> would be a bit ad hoc,
>>
>
> ​Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the mind of the
> inner God-subject.
>
>
> How? in Bp & p, the Bp part restricts  the truth. The "Bp" is like a
> finite window through which God/Truth, "p", look at itself. The inner god
> is the outer God looking at itself through the Bp window.
>

​Yes, that's what I meant. Perhaps it's just vocabulary. I assumed
(wrongly?) that by natural object you meant physical or perceptual object.​


> I think that what makes you adding the whole truth in the provable is due
> to the fact that the "Divine Intellect"'s view coincides with the view of
> the soul-instantiated: that is: the fact that S4Grz = S4Grz*. The soul does
> not split along G/G*. But that is the "natural", "unavoidable" solipsism of
> the first person subject.
>

​Yes indeed. That's what makes it compatible (at least heuristically) with
monopsychism.
​

>
> So, I would say that they are in the mind of the outer God
>

​In what sense is
 the outer-God conceptualised as possessing a 'mind'?
​ Do you simply mean perception in some generic sense before symmetry is
broken?​



> , and the inner God is the outer God becoming amnesic, and "lost" in the
> belief that he is PA, or that number on the hard disk of the doctor.
>

​Yes, as above.
​

> On this, the math are difficult, and I assume fully the "galois
> connection", with consciousness side with the semantic, that is the G, <>t,
> by the completeness theorem. Eventually, and to be short, consciousness
> sides with p, making Bp, the brain/machine/theory/formula restricting
> consciousness.
> The problem with this is that it makes a 

Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruno Marchal]

On 30 May 2017, at 16:44, David Nyman wrote:


On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: 




On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker  wrote:

​Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "​we are to  
extract" over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or in  
short, subject precedes object in the explanation. That's the  
reversal.


Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a little  
bit, or not in case you mean "physical object" for "object".


​Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little too  
short. But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an attempt  
to avoid ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long-winded :(

​
I would say that subjects precedes physical objects​, as physics  
becomes a first person plural notion.


​Exactly

But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we have  
to admit that the number objects still precedes (in some logical  
sense) the subject, which arises from the infinitely many  
computations which supports its self-referential modes.


​Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or  
ontological component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a certain  
objective sense, but their 'observable' or epistemological component  
can only be realised (i.e. made true) in terms of a point-of-view.



OK. Yet, having bet on a theory making us (or the correct part of us)  
aware that the first point of view is local, and so see only a part of  
a bigger truth, which is the "ultimate" 0p, which mechanism, and our  
sanity/soundness, which we cannot even express, still less justify,  
but we can "meta-prove" for the correct machine, that such an 0p can  
be reduced to first the arithmetical truth, and secondly (blaspheming  
for two seconds) the sigma arithmetical truth (the UD, The UM, the  
sigma_1 complete set.


That is why we can take RA for the ontology. The PA induction axioms  
are put in the number epistemology already. RA can prove the existence  
of PA, but "for RA" PA is already dreaming.


It is an open problem (to me at least) if this is mandatory or not.  
Nelson believes (but seems unique in believing this) that the  
induction axioms are "viciously" circular, making PA inconsistent. I  
doubt this a lot, but with mechanism I think we can argue that we  
can't really prove the consistency of PA, despite most mathematicians  
believe in the consistency of much more (in the sense of proving  
abilities) powerful theory than PA, like ZF, Category, theory, group  
theory, etc.).




We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject, but  
that would be a bit ad hoc,


​Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the mind of  
the inner God-subject.


How? in Bp & p, the Bp part restricts  the truth. The "Bp" is like a  
finite window through which God/Truth, "p", look at itself. The inner  
god is the outer God looking at itself through the Bp window.


I think that what makes you adding the whole truth in the provable is  
due to the fact that the "Divine Intellect"'s view coincides with the  
view of the soul-isntanciated: that is: the fact that S4Grz = S4Grz*.  
The soul does not split along G/G*. But that is the "natural",  
"unavoidable" solipsism of the first person subject.


So, I would say that they are in the mind of the outer God, and the  
inner God is the outer God becoming amnesic, and "lost" in the belief  
that he is PA, or that number on the hard disk of the doctor.


On this, the math are difficult, and I assume fully the "galois  
connection", with consciousness side with the semantic, that is the G,  
<>t, by the completeness theorem. Eventually, and to be short,  
consciousness sides with p, making Bp, the brain/machine/theory/ 
formula restricting consciousness.
The problem with this is that it makes a butterfly more conscious than  
a human. Little mind have more possibilities, and a far bigger set of  
consistent extensions, and consciousness reflects that spectrum  
ignorance. I don't know, I find that weird.


That's one of the reasons I find that particular heuristic  
intuitively helpful. I guess it's my version of the Wittgenstein  
ladder. But don't worry, I can always let go of it. I hope.

​
even if for the numbers+addition+multiplication, we can only  
explains them by "God made them", in the sense that we cannot  
recover them by assuming less than anything Turing equivalent with  
them.


​I can't think of anything less, offhand.
​
Sorry for splitting the airs, I guess,

​Split away! It's hairs, by the way :)​



Now, *you* are splitting the hairs.

Let me really split one hair. What could that give? I tell you that it  
gives h and airs. h is the indivisible horse! I was just using Occam :)


Bruno




David

Bruno





such that in a sense one can think of the entirety of experience  
in terms of that of a single type of psychological 

Re: Answers to David 4

[David Nyman]

On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
>
> On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 5/28/2017 3:40 AM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 28 May 2017 5:52 a.m., "Brent Meeker"  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/27/2017 3:20 PM, David Nyman wrote:
>>
>> I think what is meant by the reversal is clear enough. The forward
>>> hypothesis, mechanism, is that the realization of some information
>>> processing in the brain, or other physical system, instantiates
>>> consciousness. The reverse, platonism, is that all computations exist and
>>> hence among them will be computations that instantiate all possible
>>> conscious thoughts.
>>> ​ ​
>>> And among all those thoughts there will be some that instantiate exactly
>>> those thoughts we have, including those thoughts of perceiving and
>>> inferring a physical world and other people.  Thoughts are related by
>>> threads of computation and consequently they can be classified into some
>>> that can be proven and some that are true but can't be proven.  One might
>>> hypothesize that this division corresponds to what is thought and is
>>> communicable versus what is thought but can't be communicated, i.e. the
>>> internal thoughts of consciousness.
>>>
>>
>> ​ Yes, although I think you could be more explicit ​that "those thoughts
>> of perceiving and inferring a physical world and other people" must
>> encompass the entire spectrum of observable physical phenomena. The
>> relevant computation must also precisely mirror the transformational
>> schemas of physics.
>>
>>
>> But that's the rub.  If the physics is instantiated by the UD
>> computation, is it really a "reversal"
>>
>>
>> Yes. You keep missing the point that the reversal is already with the
>> 'psychology' of machinery at a fundamental explanatory level,
>>
>>
>> No, the fundamental explanatory level is the set of all possible
>> computations - as might be executed in the abstract by a UD. From this
>> plethora we are to extract in some sense experiences AND the physics of
>> which they are experiences.
>>
>
> ​Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "​we are to extract" over
> "the physics of which they are experiences". Or in short, subject precedes
> object in the explanation. That's the reversal.
>
>
> Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a little bit,
> or not in case you mean "physical object" for "object".
>

​Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little too short.
But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an attempt to avoid
ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long-winded :(
​

> I would say that subjects precedes physical objects
> ​,
> as physics becomes a first person plural notion.
>

​Exactly


> But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we have to
> admit that the number objects still precedes (in some logical sense) the
> subject, which arises from the infinitely many computations which supports
> its self-referential modes.
>

​Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or ontological
component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a certain objective sense,
but their 'observable' or epistemological component can only be realised
(i.e. made true) in terms of a point-of-view.

>
> We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject, but that
> would be a bit ad hoc,
>

​Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the mind of the
inner God-subject. That's one of the reasons I find that particular
heuristic intuitively helpful. I guess it's my version of the Wittgenstein
ladder. But don't worry, I can always let go of it. I hope.
​

> even if for the numbers+addition+multiplication, we can only explains
> them by "God made them", in the sense that we cannot recover them by
> assuming less than anything Turing equivalent with them.
>

​I can't think of anything less, offhand.
​

> Sorry for splitting the airs, I guess,
>

​Split away! It's hairs, by the way :)​

David

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>> such that in a sense one can think of the entirety of experience in terms
>> of that of a single type of psychological agent. This is then the
>> subjective filter that effectively constrains stable, pervasive and thereby
>> (crucially) *consistently memorable* experiences from the rest of the
>> computational Babel. And the consequence of that subjective filtration, in
>> conjunction with the transformational computation that effects that its
>> very stabilisation, then comprises the effective physics of the
>> experiencer, with the caveats already mentioned. So subject precedes object
>> in explaining the appearance of physics. That is the reversal. And it is
>> necessitated by the not inconsiderable problem that the alternative
>> explanatory order cannot help but *omit the explanation of the experiencer
>> and its experiences*.
>>
>> or is it just a Church-Turing 

Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruno Marchal]

On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote:




On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker  wrote:


On 5/28/2017 3:40 AM, David Nyman wrote:



On 28 May 2017 5:52 a.m., "Brent Meeker"   
wrote:



On 5/27/2017 3:20 PM, David Nyman wrote:
I think what is meant by the reversal is clear enough. The forward  
hypothesis, mechanism, is that the realization of some information  
processing in the brain, or other physical system, instantiates  
consciousness. The reverse, platonism, is that all computations  
exist and hence among them will be computations that instantiate  
all possible conscious thoughts. ​ ​ And among all those  
thoughts there will be some that instantiate exactly those  
thoughts we have, including those thoughts of perceiving and  
inferring a physical world and other people.  Thoughts are related  
by threads of computation and consequently they can be classified  
into some that can be proven and some that are true but can't be  
proven.  One might hypothesize that this division corresponds to  
what is thought and is communicable versus what is thought but  
can't be communicated, i.e. the internal thoughts of consciousness.


​ Yes, although I think you could be more explicit ​that "those  
thoughts of perceiving and inferring a physical world and other  
people" must encompass the entire spectrum of observable physical  
phenomena. The relevant computation must also precisely mirror the  
transformational schemas of physics.


But that's the rub.  If the physics is instantiated by the UD  
computation, is it really a "reversal"


Yes. You keep missing the point that the reversal is already with  
the 'psychology' of machinery at a fundamental explanatory level,


No, the fundamental explanatory level is the set of all possible  
computations - as might be executed in the abstract by a UD. From  
this plethora we are to extract in some sense experiences AND the  
physics of which they are experiences.


​Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "​we are to  
extract" over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or in  
short, subject precedes object in the explanation. That's the  
reversal.


Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a little  
bit, or not in case you mean "physical object" for "object". I would  
say that subjects precedes physical objects, as physics becomes a  
first person plural notion. But with computationalism, to just gives  
sense to that word, we have to admit that the number objects still  
precedes (in some logical sense) the subject, which arises from the  
infinitely many computations which supports its self-referential modes.


We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject, but  
that would be a bit ad hoc, even if for the numbers+addition 
+multiplication, we can only explains them by "God made them", in the  
sense that we cannot recover them by assuming less than anything  
Turing equivalent with them.


Sorry for splitting the airs, I guess,

Bruno





such that in a sense one can think of the entirety of experience in  
terms of that of a single type of psychological agent. This is then  
the subjective filter that  effectively constrains stable,  
pervasive and thereby (crucially) *consistently memorable*  
experiences from the rest of the computational Babel. And the  
consequence of that subjective filtration, in conjunction with the  
transformational computation that effects that its very  
stabilisation, then comprises the effective physics of the  
experiencer, with the caveats already mentioned. So subject  
precedes object in explaining the appearance of physics. That is  
the reversal. And it is necessitated by the not inconsiderable  
problem that the alternative explanatory order cannot help but  
*omit the explanation of the experiencer and its experiences*.


or is it just a Church-Turing version of Tegmark, i.e. replacing  
the equations of quantum field theory with some computational  
sequences that have the same effect at the level of our experience.


But why be so cavalier about "the level of our experience"? It's  
that very level that is omitted or merely taken for granted in the  
conventional explanatory order. Remember that the point of  
departure for all this is the computational theory of *mind*.  
Nonetheless, the price of the ticket turns out to be a  
computational theory of everything. Should this surprise us?


But it's not clear to me that it has *mind* as fundamental.  Mind is  
to be explained by relations of provability (which doesn't seem very  
plausible - but maybe).


​Well, mind here is explained in a sort of duality of provability  
and truth, or externality and internality​. The internal or  
'qualitative' aspect is captured both by its incommunicability (as  
seen from the 'outside') and its indubitability (as seen from the  
'inside).



The fundamental stuff is all possible computations, or arithmetic.

Re: Answers to David 4

[Russell Standish]

On Sun, May 28, 2017 at 03:54:03PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> That is a personal question of taste. Why to try to unify GR and QM?
> If they works well in their domain, we could just keep both. But

There are physical domains where both theories are required. For
example the nature of the event horizon of a black hole, which is
currently not well described theoretically (eg the firewall problem).

So its not just a question of personal taste, at least if you're an
astrophysicist. Six pack Joe could probably get by fine without either
Relativity or QM, of course :).

Cheers
-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruno Marchal]

On 28 May 2017, at 00:28, David Nyman wrote:



-- Forwarded message --
From: David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com>
Date: 27 May 2017 at 22:43
Subject: Re: Answers to David 4
To: meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>


On 27 May 2017 9:19 p.m., "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:


On 5/27/2017 5:36 AM, David Nyman wrote:
​It might. But ISTM that the entire project of explanation itself  
entails at least a hesitation before assigning anything to the  
category of 'brute fact'.​ Bruno sometimes likes to metaphorise  
whatever we accept without explanation as God, or at least as an  
aspect of a generalised notion of theology (as indeed did Einstein,  
leading to not dissimilar misunderstandings in his case). So on that  
basis you are suggesting that we accept a physical universe  
(assuming that this is what you mean by reality being what it is)  
exclusively in that role. Trouble is, computationalism as a theory  
of mind closes that option.


That's not true.  It hides a lot of assumptions about the  
reification of arithmetic and the UD and modal logic.


I did not got Brent's mail, but I saw he PM you.




Well, I have to say from my perspective this debate over reification  
is getting a mite tedious. I really don't understand why you think  
that the assumption of arithmetic as an explanatory ontology is any  
more a 'reification' than that of any other mathematical schema.  
They're all essentially inferences to an explanation of the  
observables. I'd hoped my recent posts might possibly take the  
conversation in a more interesting direction.


I don't know whay Brent comes back on this. We assume only RA. Then  
the UD, and the modal logics are entirely derived from RA, and the  
definition of observers (PA) which provably exists in RA.


There is no reification at all. But the MGA shows that in physics,  
matter is reifed when invoked to make some computations more "real"  
than other.


Bruno





  Part of the problem in these discussions is that they started with  
a definition of computationalism = "consciousness arises when some  
class of computations is implemented"


I think part of your difficulty is encapsulated by the vocabulary  
you adopt here. ISTM you have a tendency to talk about consciousness  
in implicitly ontological terms, for example as something that  
"arises". For me what's interesting is the relinquishing of such  
ineffectual notions in exchange for the analysis of the  
characteristic modes of a reflexive epistemology. It opens up a  
quite novel conceptual space for thinking about perception. Instead  
of worrying about what sort of thing or process it might be, we can  
think rather in terms of what is perceptible and what isn't, what is  
doubtable and what isn't, what is communicable and what isn't and so  
forth. Then we may begin to discern how such aspects might represent  
effective points of contact with the specifics of what we ordinarily  
call consciousness and consequently also what the natural limits of  
any such representation might be. By conceiving the thing in this  
way we also 'vaccinate' it against any reduction in ontological terms.


but then it starts to be used to encompass Bruno's whole theology as  
though we accept not only the premise but also his whole argument.


We're not required to accept it, only to adopt it provisionally. But  
seriously. In point of fact though, speculative though it may be, in  
the last analysis it's a theory of everything or else a theory of  
nothing (pace Dr Standish). Sometimes you have to push a thing to  
the limit to see what it's really about.


David



Brent



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Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 May 2017, at 04:30, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 27/05/2017 11:46 am, David Nyman wrote:
On 27 May 2017 at 01:44, Bruce Kellett   
wrote:


I think it is the interpretation of the data that is theory- 
dependent.


​Not at all. Data don't just sit there staring you in the face.  
What is data in terms of one theory is mere background noise in  
terms of another.


That is what it means for the *interpretation* to be theory-dependent.

This insight led Popper to reject the notion of induction. As he (I  
believe correctly) pointed out, the very notion of the data on  
which induction putatively relies is theory-dependent and hence  
primarily deductive. Conjecture and refutation is a better account  
of how science (or any consistent reasoning) actually proceeds.


I don't think that is an accurate account of Popper. It was the  
asymmetry between falsification and confirmation that lay at the  
heart of his rejection of induction. His account of scientific  
practice as "conjecture and refutation" was rather naive, and  
philosophy of science has long moved beyond this.



​
But then you have a hierarchy of theories -- what is a new cutting- 
edge theory today is tomorrow's instrument for data taking.


​

​ ​ And the reductive aspect of theory is itself an  
implicitly ontological commitment.


Not for the pragmatic instrumentalist. Even committed scientific  
realists would only claim that it is only for our best, well- 
established, theories that there is any suggestion that the  
suggested entities actually exist.


​But we're not interested in "reifying" the ontology. It merely  
represents the unexplained part of an explanatory hierarchy.


That is an unconventional definition of ontology. Perhaps one can  
say that ontology is theory-dependent in that any mature theory  
carries an implied ontology -- statistical mechanics implies an  
ontology in which atoms/molecules exist, the standard model of  
particle physics implies an ontology in which quarks and gluons  
exist -- but the theory itself does not rely on such an ontology.  
The elements of the theory may be nothing more than convenient  
fictions, as was for many years the status of quarks in the Gell- 
Mann quark model -- the predictive power of the theory would be in  
no way impaired.


That's the sense in which it exists. It's the part that's  
"independent of us" simply because, although the basis of any  
explanation that follows, it doesn't itself rely on our explaining  
it.


Quite. Atoms, quarks, and gluons, require no explanation in terms of  
the theory. They are just terms in the equations that the theory  
uses -- their existence or otherwise is not an issue for the success  
of the theory.


With the  some assumptions linking the mind of the physicists looking  
at his needle and his brain, which simplifies a lot the prediction,  
but remains to be explained. And it fails, unlike mechanism, which  
explain both the mlind and the apparent matter, even if it will take a  
million years to get something close to the "standard model" of physics.


That is OK for a pragmatic person who is not interested in the mind- 
body problem, afterlife, etc. But is not OK for those interested in  
theology.






So if a hierarchy of laws were to imply mutually inconsistent  
ontological commitments it would be to that extent incomplete and  
unsatisfactory. Indeed the holy grail of (Aristotelian?) science  
is a hierarchical "Theory of Everything" that is, in precisely  
this sense, ontologically consistent "bottom up all the way down",  
if you'll permit me a slogan of my own.


The search for such a TOE has a chequered record in the history of  
science. Some still hope that such a theory is possible, but the  
negative induction from the past record would not lead one to be  
optimistic that any such theory exists or is possible.


For these reasons I can't accept that your distinction between  
Platonic and Aristotelian modes of explanation has much real  
force. In practice, *any* effective mode of explanation must  
inexorably be constrained by its fundamental ontological  
commitments,


That is the case only on your account of "explanation". If  
explanation does not rely on an underlying ontology, then it is not  
constrained by any such assumed ontology. Not all explanations need  
be reducible to your model of explanation.


That's true of course Bruce, but I would think then that any such  
heterogeneous account of explanation is in serious danger of  
falling into inconsistency.


Why?

And so I can't agree that "my account" of a mutually-consistent  
reductive hierarchy of explanation is substantially different from  
what would generally be accepted, if only implicitly, as the  
ultimate aim of mechanistic explanation tout court. Whatever you  
say, it must ​be the case, in the final analysis, that the entire  
hierarchy of explanation must ultimately be reducible to a common  
set of 

Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruno Marchal]

On 27 May 2017, at 02:07, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 26/05/2017 6:53 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 May 2017, at 03:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 26/05/2017 9:11 am, David Nyman wrote:

On 25 May 2017 23:18, "Brent Meeker"  wrote:

I have told you my theory of virtuous circular explanations.   
"Invoke" is a pejorative attribution.  The physical universe is  
an inference to explain appearances (and a very successful one at  
that).


Vocabulary. The point is, assuming mechanism (and please do tell  
me if you're reasoning in a different theory), that the inference  
is to a particular *selection* of computations from the  
computational plenitude. And why is that? Because they 'explain'  
the appearances. But do they really? Are those computations - in  
and of themselves - really capable of 'explaining' why or how  
they, and no others, come to be uniquely selected for our  
delectation? Are they really capable of 'explaining' why or how  
those selfsame appearances come to be present to us?


I think you and Brent are using different notions of  
"explanation". As I understand your (David's) position, it is a  
notion of "explanation" originating with Plato: Plato's theory of  
Forms offered at the same time both a systematic explanation of  
things and also a connected epistemology of explanation.  
(Summaries from Jonathan Cohen in the Oxford Companion to  
Philosophy.) In other words, the Platonic ideal is that "Ontology  
precedes epistemology", to vary Brent's slogan. In the case of  
mechanism, the ontology is the natural numbers (plus arithmetic)  
and for an explanation to be acceptable, everything has to follow  
with the force of logical necessity from this ontology.


As I understand Brent's position (and that is essentially the same  
as my position), his concept of "explanation" follows the  
tradition of British empirical philosophy, stemming from Bacon,  
through Hume, to Russell and others. In this tradition, to explain  
an observed characteristic is to show its relationship to a law in  
accordance with which the characteristic occurs or can be made to  
occur, and there is a hierarchy of such laws -- the more  
comprehensive laws are deemed more probable. This leads to the  
dominant model for explanation in the natural sciences, which  
requires the citation of one or more laws which, when conjoined  
with the statement of relevant facts, entail the occurrence of the  
phenomenon or uniformity that is to be explained. This does not  
rely on any assumed ontology; hence, "Epistemology precedes  
ontology".


Wherever we want to derive a technology from scientific knowledge,  
we shall need to know what causes a desired effect. So we need to  
distinguish between different levels of explanation, in that  
while, for example, the disappearance of a patient's infection may  
be causally explained by his antibiotic injection, the operation  
of that causal process is in its turn to be explained by  
correlational laws of biochemistry. Hence, the understanding of  
consciousness in any effective way will be linked to the creation  
of effective AI.


This is the paradigm of current scientific practice. Sure, as  
Bruno says, this stems ultimately from an Aristotelian approach to  
science rather than the Platonic approach. But the history of  
Western thought has shown the scientific, or Aristotelian,  
approach to have been overwhelmingly more successful, both in  
developing technology and in reaching understanding of the nature  
of reality.


Aristotle's Matter was a good simplifying hypothesis. I agree that  
it has led to some success. But that does not make it true,


For the pragmatic instrumentalist, "truth" is not of primary concern.


I agree. Computationalism is an hypothesis in metaphysics. Metaphysics  
does not concern a pragmatic person, unless he postulate pragmatism as  
a metaphysics, but this is not serious after the failure of positivism  
(even Wittgenstein eventually defended this).






What is relevant is explanation in terms of predictive success.


But this is true for scientific metaphysics. That is why I insist that  
the point I make is not that comp is true, but that it is testable.





The scientific realist might reject instrumentalism, but suggestions  
about the underlying ontology have always been shown inadequate in  
the past -- this being the famous 'negative induction' against  
scientific realism.


Yes, but that might be, by itself, the sign that we have not yet got  
the right metaphysical theory. Now, with comp, we have a large choice  
of equivalent simple ontology, and I use arithmetic for it, as people  
learned it in high school.






and the price of it has been the burying of many interesting  
problem (given away to the clergy). Physicalism simply fail to  
explain the apparent existence of the physical reality,


Why should there be an explanation for this?


That is a personal question of taste. Why to try to 

Re: Answers to David 4

[David Nyman]

On 27 May 2017 at 01:07, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On 26/05/2017 6:53 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 26 May 2017, at 03:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On 26/05/2017 9:11 am, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 25 May 2017 23:18, "Brent Meeker" < 
> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>
> I have told you my theory of virtuous circular explanations.  "Invoke" is
> a pejorative attribution.  The physical universe is an *inference *to
> explain appearances (and a very successful one at that).
>
>
> Vocabulary. The point is, assuming mechanism (and please do tell me if
> you're reasoning in a different theory), that the inference is to a
> particular *selection* of computations from the computational plenitude.
> And why is that? Because they 'explain' the appearances. But do they
> really? Are those computations - in and of themselves - really capable of
> 'explaining' why or how they, and no others, come to be uniquely selected
> for our delectation? Are they really capable of 'explaining' why or how
> those selfsame appearances come to be present to us?
>
>
> I think you and Brent are using different notions of "explanation". As I
> understand your (David's) position, it is a notion of "explanation"
> originating with Plato: Plato's theory of Forms offered at the same time
> both a systematic explanation of things and also a connected epistemology
> of explanation. (Summaries from Jonathan Cohen in the Oxford Companion to
> Philosophy.) In other words, the Platonic ideal is that "Ontology precedes
> epistemology", to vary Brent's slogan. In the case of mechanism, the
> ontology is the natural numbers (plus arithmetic) and for an explanation to
> be acceptable, everything has to follow with the force of logical necessity
> from this ontology.
>
> As I understand Brent's position (and that is essentially the same as my
> position), his concept of "explanation" follows the tradition of British
> empirical philosophy, stemming from Bacon, through Hume, to Russell and
> others. In this tradition, to explain an observed characteristic is to show
> its relationship to a law in accordance with which the characteristic
> occurs or can be made to occur, and there is a hierarchy of such laws --
> the more comprehensive laws are deemed more probable. This leads to the
> dominant model for explanation in the natural sciences, which requires the
> citation of one or more laws which, when conjoined with the statement of
> relevant facts, entail the occurrence of the phenomenon or uniformity that
> is to be explained. This does not rely on any assumed ontology; hence,
> "Epistemology precedes ontology".
>
> Wherever we want to derive a technology from scientific knowledge, we
> shall need to know what causes a desired effect. So we need to distinguish
> between different levels of explanation, in that while, for example, the
> disappearance of a patient's infection may be causally explained by his
> antibiotic injection, the operation of that causal process is in its turn
> to be explained by correlational laws of biochemistry. Hence, the
> understanding of consciousness in any effective way will be linked to the
> creation of effective AI.
>
> This is the paradigm of current scientific practice. Sure, as Bruno says,
> this stems ultimately from an Aristotelian approach to science rather than
> the Platonic approach. But the history of Western thought has shown the
> scientific, or Aristotelian, approach to have been overwhelmingly more
> successful, both in developing technology and in reaching understanding of
> the nature of reality.
>
>
> Aristotle's Matter was a good simplifying hypothesis. I agree that it has
> led to some success. But that does not make it true,
>
>
> For the pragmatic instrumentalist, "truth" is not of primary concern. What
> is relevant is explanation in terms of predictive success. The scientific
> realist might reject instrumentalism, but suggestions about the underlying
> ontology have always been shown inadequate in the past -- this being the
> famous 'negative induction' against scientific realism.
>
> and the price of it has been the burying of many interesting problem
> (given away to the clergy). Physicalism simply fail to explain the apparent
> existence of the physical reality,
>
>
> Why should there be an explanation for this? It might, after all, be just
> a brute fact that reality is what it is, so the best we can do is explore
> and attempt to understand how it works.
>
> and why it hurts. Computationalism does, but with the price that a lot of
> work remains for all details. We are at the beginning of the "reversal"
> only.
>
>
> I think there is reason to think that the "reversal" cannot succeed.
>

​Forgive me for the flurry of posting today, but I feel it may again be
useful to rearticulate a view of the 'reversal' at this ​point, since it
seems to lead to endless miscommunication. I'm afraid it's going to lean on
an explanatory style deriving from 

Re: Answers to David 4

[David Nyman]

On 27 May 2017 at 01:07, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On 26/05/2017 6:53 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 26 May 2017, at 03:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On 26/05/2017 9:11 am, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 25 May 2017 23:18, "Brent Meeker" < 
> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>
> I have told you my theory of virtuous circular explanations.  "Invoke" is
> a pejorative attribution.  The physical universe is an *inference *to
> explain appearances (and a very successful one at that).
>
>
> Vocabulary. The point is, assuming mechanism (and please do tell me if
> you're reasoning in a different theory), that the inference is to a
> particular *selection* of computations from the computational plenitude.
> And why is that? Because they 'explain' the appearances. But do they
> really? Are those computations - in and of themselves - really capable of
> 'explaining' why or how they, and no others, come to be uniquely selected
> for our delectation? Are they really capable of 'explaining' why or how
> those selfsame appearances come to be present to us?
>
>
> I think you and Brent are using different notions of "explanation". As I
> understand your (David's) position, it is a notion of "explanation"
> originating with Plato: Plato's theory of Forms offered at the same time
> both a systematic explanation of things and also a connected epistemology
> of explanation. (Summaries from Jonathan Cohen in the Oxford Companion to
> Philosophy.) In other words, the Platonic ideal is that "Ontology precedes
> epistemology", to vary Brent's slogan. In the case of mechanism, the
> ontology is the natural numbers (plus arithmetic) and for an explanation to
> be acceptable, everything has to follow with the force of logical necessity
> from this ontology.
>
> As I understand Brent's position (and that is essentially the same as my
> position), his concept of "explanation" follows the tradition of British
> empirical philosophy, stemming from Bacon, through Hume, to Russell and
> others. In this tradition, to explain an observed characteristic is to show
> its relationship to a law in accordance with which the characteristic
> occurs or can be made to occur, and there is a hierarchy of such laws --
> the more comprehensive laws are deemed more probable. This leads to the
> dominant model for explanation in the natural sciences, which requires the
> citation of one or more laws which, when conjoined with the statement of
> relevant facts, entail the occurrence of the phenomenon or uniformity that
> is to be explained. This does not rely on any assumed ontology; hence,
> "Epistemology precedes ontology".
>
> Wherever we want to derive a technology from scientific knowledge, we
> shall need to know what causes a desired effect. So we need to distinguish
> between different levels of explanation, in that while, for example, the
> disappearance of a patient's infection may be causally explained by his
> antibiotic injection, the operation of that causal process is in its turn
> to be explained by correlational laws of biochemistry. Hence, the
> understanding of consciousness in any effective way will be linked to the
> creation of effective AI.
>
> This is the paradigm of current scientific practice. Sure, as Bruno says,
> this stems ultimately from an Aristotelian approach to science rather than
> the Platonic approach. But the history of Western thought has shown the
> scientific, or Aristotelian, approach to have been overwhelmingly more
> successful, both in developing technology and in reaching understanding of
> the nature of reality.
>
>
> Aristotle's Matter was a good simplifying hypothesis. I agree that it has
> led to some success. But that does not make it true,
>
>
> For the pragmatic instrumentalist, "truth" is not of primary concern.
>

​Assuming that you're describing your own stance in this way, it would
hardly be surprising that you can then find little sympathy for 'digging'
on fundamental issues, as Bruno likes to put it. Trouble is, that tends to
mire these conversations in procedural preliminaries rather than
substantial argument.

What is relevant is explanation in terms of predictive success. The
> scientific realist might reject instrumentalism, but suggestions about the
> underlying ontology have always been shown inadequate in the past -- this
> being the famous 'negative induction' against scientific realism.
>

​But it is quite unnecessary to interpret 'realism' in this way. ​Realism
need entail only taking a provisional (or assumptive) ontological
commitment sufficiently seriously to discover what can be inferred from it.
How else could any explanatory schema be refuted or corrected if
inadequate? And if that incorrectness is a function of the inadequacy of
the assumptive ontology, then that too would have to be corrected. As
indeed has occurred many times in the history of science. ISTM that the
supposed necessity of a dichotomy between instrumentalism and so-called

Re: Answers to David 4

[David Nyman]

On 27 May 2017 3:30 a.m., "Bruce Kellett"  wrote:

On 27/05/2017 11:46 am, David Nyman wrote:

On 27 May 2017 at 01:44, Bruce Kellett < 
bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:

>
> I think it is the interpretation of the data that is theory-dependent.
>

​Not at all. Data don't just sit there staring you in the face. What is
data in terms of one theory is mere background noise in terms of another.


That is what it means for the *interpretation* to be theory-dependent.


Sure, that too, but prior to that you wouldn't necessarily be looking in
that particular direction or with that particular interpretative mindset
without having at least an implicit theory in the background.



This insight led Popper to reject the notion of induction. As he (I believe
correctly) pointed out, the very notion of the data on which induction
putatively relies is theory-dependent and hence primarily deductive.
Conjecture and refutation is a better account of how science (or any
consistent reasoning) actually proceeds.


I don't think that is an accurate account of Popper. It was the asymmetry
between falsification and confirmation that lay at the heart of his
rejection of induction. His account of scientific practice as "conjecture
and refutation" was rather naive, and philosophy of science has long moved
beyond this.


In my view the dismissal of Popper is often based on a somewhat naive
misreading. The process he described is rarely explicit, especially in the
case of 'normal' science as distinct from attempts at a theoretical
breakthrough. The asymmetry between falsification and confirmation is
likewise frequently implicit rather than stated, but that doesn't mean that
theories are ever more than provisional, even if our confidence in them
grows the more they resist refutation. I need hardly quote you chapter and
verse from the history of science.



​

> But then you have a hierarchy of theories -- what is a new cutting-edge
> theory today is tomorrow's instrument for data taking.
>

​

>
> ​ ​
> And the reductive aspect of theory is itself an implicitly ontological
> commitment.
>

Not for the pragmatic instrumentalist. Even committed scientific realists
> would only claim that it is only for our best, well-established, theories
> that there is any suggestion that the suggested entities actually exist.
>

​But we're not interested in "reifying" the ontology. It merely represents
the unexplained part of an explanatory hierarchy.


That is an unconventional definition of ontology. Perhaps one can say that
ontology is theory-dependent in that any mature theory carries an implied
ontology -- statistical mechanics implies an ontology in which
atoms/molecules exist, the standard model of particle physics implies an
ontology in which quarks and gluons exist -- but the theory itself does not
rely on such an ontology. The elements of the theory may be nothing more
than convenient fictions, as was for many years the status of quarks in the
Gell-Mann quark model -- the predictive power of the theory would be in no
way impaired.


That's the sense in which it exists. It's the part that's "independent of
us" simply because, although the basis of any explanation that follows, it
doesn't itself rely on our explaining it.


Quite. Atoms, quarks, and gluons, require no explanation in terms of the
theory. They are just terms in the equations that the theory uses -- their
existence or otherwise is not an issue for the success of the theory.


So if a hierarchy of laws were to imply mutually inconsistent ontological
commitments it would be to that extent incomplete and unsatisfactory.
Indeed the holy grail of (Aristotelian?) science is a hierarchical "Theory
of Everything" that is, in precisely this sense, ontologically consistent
"bottom up all the way down", if you'll permit me a slogan of my own.


The search for such a TOE has a chequered record in the history of science.
Some still hope that such a theory is possible, but the negative induction
from the past record would not lead one to be optimistic that any such
theory exists or is possible.

For these reasons I can't accept that your distinction between Platonic and
Aristotelian modes of explanation has much real force. In practice, *any*
effective mode of explanation must inexorably be constrained by its
fundamental ontological commitments,


That is the case only on your account of "explanation". If explanation does
not rely on an underlying ontology, then it is not constrained by any such
assumed ontology. Not all explanations need be reducible to your model of
explanation.

That's true of course Bruce, but I would think then that any such
heterogeneous account of explanation is in serious danger of falling into
inconsistency.


Why?


Because their respective ontological commitments may turn out to be in
conflict. This crops up all the time in the attempt to unify knowledge over
time. So long as the respective fields 

Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruce Kellett]

On 27/05/2017 11:46 am, David Nyman wrote:
On 27 May 2017 at 01:44, Bruce Kellett > wrote:



I think it is the interpretation of the data that is theory-dependent.


​Not at all. Data don't just sit there staring you in the face. What 
is data in terms of one theory is mere background noise in terms of 
another.


That is what it means for the *interpretation* to be theory-dependent.

This insight led Popper to reject the notion of induction. As he (I 
believe correctly) pointed out, the very notion of the data on which 
induction putatively relies is theory-dependent and hence primarily 
deductive. Conjecture and refutation is a better account of how 
science (or any consistent reasoning) actually proceeds.


I don't think that is an accurate account of Popper. It was the 
asymmetry between falsification and confirmation that lay at the heart 
of his rejection of induction. His account of scientific practice as 
"conjecture and refutation" was rather naive, and philosophy of science 
has long moved beyond this.



​

But then you have a hierarchy of theories -- what is a new
cutting-edge theory today is tomorrow's instrument for data
taking.


​


​ ​
And the reductive aspect of theory is itself an implicitly
ontological commitment.


Not for the pragmatic instrumentalist. Even committed scientific
realists would only claim that it is only for our best,
well-established, theories that there is any suggestion that the
suggested entities actually exist.


​But we're not interested in "reifying" the ontology. It merely 
represents the unexplained part of an explanatory hierarchy.


That is an unconventional definition of ontology. Perhaps one can say 
that ontology is theory-dependent in that any mature theory carries an 
implied ontology -- statistical mechanics implies an ontology in which 
atoms/molecules exist, the standard model of particle physics implies an 
ontology in which quarks and gluons exist -- but the theory itself does 
not rely on such an ontology. The elements of the theory may be nothing 
more than convenient fictions, as was for many years the status of 
quarks in the Gell-Mann quark model -- the predictive power of the 
theory would be in no way impaired.


That's the sense in which it exists. It's the part that's "independent 
of us" simply because, although the basis of any explanation that 
follows, it doesn't itself rely on our explaining it.


Quite. Atoms, quarks, and gluons, require no explanation in terms of the 
theory. They are just terms in the equations that the theory uses -- 
their existence or otherwise is not an issue for the success of the theory.


So if a hierarchy of laws were to imply mutually inconsistent 
ontological commitments it would be to that extent incomplete and 
unsatisfactory. Indeed the holy grail of (Aristotelian?) science is a 
hierarchical "Theory of Everything" that is, in precisely this sense, 
ontologically consistent "bottom up all the way down", if you'll 
permit me a slogan of my own.


The search for such a TOE has a chequered record in the history of 
science. Some still hope that such a theory is possible, but the 
negative induction from the past record would not lead one to be 
optimistic that any such theory exists or is possible.


For these reasons I can't accept that your distinction between 
Platonic and Aristotelian modes of explanation has much real force. 
In practice, *any* effective mode of explanation must inexorably be 
constrained by its fundamental ontological commitments,


That is the case only on your account of "explanation". If explanation 
does not rely on an underlying ontology, then it is not constrained by 
any such assumed ontology. Not all explanations need be reducible to 
your model of explanation.


That's true of course Bruce, but I would think then that any such 
heterogeneous account of explanation is in serious danger of falling 
into inconsistency.


Why?

And so I can't agree that "my account" of a mutually-consistent 
reductive hierarchy of explanation is substantially different from 
what would generally be accepted, if only implicitly, as the ultimate 
aim of mechanistic explanation tout court. Whatever you say, it must ​ 
be the case, in the final analysis, that the entire hierarchy of 
explanation must ultimately be reducible to a common set of 
ontological commitments or else risk frank inconsistency between its 
constituent elements.


Not at all. There is no inconsistency between explaining a reduction in 
infection in terms of an antibiotic injection, and an explanation in 
terms of the fundamental biochemistry of bacteria.


I should re-emphasise here that by ontology I mean merely those 
explanatory entities and relations that are in themselves not further 
explicated within the theory, but rather serve as the explanatory 
point of departure. Of course, you are perfectly 

Re: Answers to David 4

[David Nyman]

On 27 May 2017 at 01:44, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On 26/05/2017 8:44 pm, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 26 May 2017 2:26 a.m., "Bruce Kellett" < 
> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>
> On 26/05/2017 9:11 am, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 25 May 2017 23:18, "Brent Meeker" < 
> meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>
> I have told you my theory of virtuous circular explanations.  "Invoke" is
> a pejorative attribution.  The physical universe is an *inference *to
> explain appearances (and a very successful one at that).
>
>
> Vocabulary. The point is, assuming mechanism (and please do tell me if
> you're reasoning in a different theory), that the inference is to a
> particular *selection* of computations from the computational plenitude.
> And why is that? Because they 'explain' the appearances. But do they
> really? Are those computations - in and of themselves - really capable of
> 'explaining' why or how they, and no others, come to be uniquely selected
> for our delectation? Are they really capable of 'explaining' why or how
> those selfsame appearances come to be present to us?
>
>
> I think you and Brent are using different notions of "explanation". As I
> understand your (David's) position, it is a notion of "explanation"
> originating with Plato: Plato's theory of Forms offered at the same time
> both a systematic explanation of things and also a connected epistemology
> of explanation. (Summaries from Jonathan Cohen in the Oxford Companion to
> Philosophy.) In other words, the Platonic ideal is that "Ontology precedes
> epistemology", to vary Brent's slogan. In the case of mechanism, the
> ontology is the natural numbers (plus arithmetic) and for an explanation to
> be acceptable, everything has to follow with the force of logical necessity
> from this ontology.
>
> As I understand Brent's position (and that is essentially the same as my
> position), his concept of "explanation" follows the tradition of British
> empirical philosophy, stemming from Bacon, through Hume, to Russell and
> others. In this tradition, to explain an observed characteristic is to show
> its relationship to a law in accordance with which the characteristic
> occurs or can be made to occur, and there is a hierarchy of such laws --
> the more comprehensive laws are deemed more probable. This leads to the
> dominant model for explanation in the natural sciences, which requires the
> citation of one or more laws which, when conjoined with the statement of
> relevant facts, entail the occurrence of the phenomenon or uniformity that
> is to be explained. This does not rely on any assumed ontology; hence,
> "Epistemology precedes ontology".
>
>
> Interesting analysis Bruce. However, I'm not sure if I can follow you on
> all points. I think you're right that in a strictly pragmatic sense
> epistemology does indeed precede ontology in that observation provides data
> on behalf of theory. But as Popper points out, what counts as data is
> already theory-dependent.
>
>
> I think it is the interpretation of the data that is theory-dependent.
>

​Not at all. Data don't just sit there staring you in the face. What is
data in terms of one theory is mere background noise in terms of another.
This insight led Popper to reject the notion of induction. As he (I believe
correctly) pointed out, the very notion of the data on which induction
putatively relies is theory-dependent and hence primarily deductive.
Conjecture and refutation is a better account of how science (or any
consistent reasoning) actually proceeds.
​

> But then you have a hierarchy of theories -- what is a new cutting-edge
> theory today is tomorrow's instrument for data taking.
>

​

>
> ​ ​
> And the reductive aspect of theory is itself an implicitly ontological
> commitment.
>

Not for the pragmatic instrumentalist. Even committed scientific realists
> would only claim that it is only for our best, well-established, theories
> that there is any suggestion that the suggested entities actually exist.
>

​But we're not interested in "reifying" the ontology. It merely represents
the unexplained part of an explanatory hierarchy. That's the sense in which
it exists. It's the part that's "independent of us" simply because,
although the basis of any explanation that follows, it doesn't itself rely
on our explaining it.
​

>
>
> So if a hierarchy of laws were to imply mutually inconsistent ontological
> commitments it would be to that extent incomplete and unsatisfactory.
> Indeed the holy grail of (Aristotelian?) science is a hierarchical "Theory
> of Everything" that is, in precisely this sense, ontologically consistent
> "bottom up all the way down", if you'll permit me a slogan of my own.
>
>
> The search for such a TOE has a chequered record in the history of
> science. Some still hope that such a theory is possible, but the negative
> induction from the past record would not lead one to be optimistic 

Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruce Kellett]

On 26/05/2017 8:44 pm, David Nyman wrote:
On 26 May 2017 2:26 a.m., "Bruce Kellett" > wrote:


On 26/05/2017 9:11 am, David Nyman wrote:

On 25 May 2017 23:18, "Brent Meeker" > wrote:


I have told you my theory of virtuous circular explanations. 
"Invoke" is a pejorative attribution.  The physical universe

is an */inference /*to explain appearances (and a very
successful one at that).


Vocabulary. The point is, assuming mechanism (and please do tell
me if you're reasoning in a different theory), that the inference
is to a particular *selection* of computations from the
computational plenitude. And why is that? Because they 'explain'
the appearances. But do they really? Are those computations - in
and of themselves - really capable of 'explaining' why or how
they, and no others, come to be uniquely selected for our
delectation? Are they really capable of 'explaining' why or how
those selfsame appearances come to be present to us?


I think you and Brent are using different notions of
"explanation". As I understand your (David's) position, it is a
notion of "explanation" originating with Plato: Plato's theory of
Forms offered at the same time both a systematic explanation of
things and also a connected epistemology of explanation.
(Summaries from Jonathan Cohen in the Oxford Companion to
Philosophy.) In other words, the Platonic ideal is that "Ontology
precedes epistemology", to vary Brent's slogan. In the case of
mechanism, the ontology is the natural numbers (plus arithmetic)
and for an explanation to be acceptable, everything has to follow
with the force of logical necessity from this ontology.

As I understand Brent's position (and that is essentially the same
as my position), his concept of "explanation" follows the
tradition of British empirical philosophy, stemming from Bacon,
through Hume, to Russell and others. In this tradition, to explain
an observed characteristic is to show its relationship to a law in
accordance with which the characteristic occurs or can be made to
occur, and there is a hierarchy of such laws -- the more
comprehensive laws are deemed more probable. This leads to the
dominant model for explanation in the natural sciences, which
requires the citation of one or more laws which, when conjoined
with the statement of relevant facts, entail the occurrence of the
phenomenon or uniformity that is to be explained. This does not
rely on any assumed ontology; hence, "Epistemology precedes ontology".


Interesting analysis Bruce. However, I'm not sure if I can follow you 
on all points. I think you're right that in a strictly pragmatic sense 
epistemology does indeed precede ontology in that observation provides 
data on behalf of theory. But as Popper points out, what counts as 
data is already theory-dependent.


I think it is the interpretation of the data that is theory-dependent. 
But then you have a hierarchy of theories -- what is a new cutting-edge 
theory today is tomorrow's instrument for data taking.


And the reductive aspect of theory is itself an implicitly ontological 
commitment.


Not for the pragmatic instrumentalist. Even committed scientific 
realists would only claim that it is only for our best, 
well-established, theories that there is any suggestion that the 
suggested entities actually exist.


So if a hierarchy of laws were to imply mutually inconsistent 
ontological commitments it would be to that extent incomplete and 
unsatisfactory. Indeed the holy grail of (Aristotelian?) science is a 
hierarchical "Theory of Everything" that is, in precisely this sense, 
ontologically consistent "bottom up all the way down", if you'll 
permit me a slogan of my own.


The search for such a TOE has a chequered record in the history of 
science. Some still hope that such a theory is possible, but the 
negative induction from the past record would not lead one to be 
optimistic that any such theory exists or is possible.


For these reasons I can't accept that your distinction between 
Platonic and Aristotelian modes of explanation has much real force. In 
practice, *any* effective mode of explanation must inexorably be 
constrained by its fundamental ontological commitments,


That is the case only on your account of "explanation". If explanation 
does not rely on an underlying ontology, then it is not constrained by 
any such assumed ontology. Not all explanations need be reducible to 
your model of explanation.


Bruce

on pain of inconsistency. If these are unclear, then part of the 
explanation is to make them explicit, on pain of obscurantism. And 
finally of course to count as an explanation it must be susceptible of 
constraint by evidence, on pain of pusillanimity.


David


   

Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruce Kellett]

On 26/05/2017 6:53 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 May 2017, at 03:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 26/05/2017 9:11 am, David Nyman wrote:

On 25 May 2017 23:18, "Brent Meeker"  wrote:


I have told you my theory of virtuous circular explanations. 
"Invoke" is a pejorative attribution.  The physical universe is

an */inference /*to explain appearances (and a very successful
one at that).


Vocabulary. The point is, assuming mechanism (and please do tell me 
if you're reasoning in a different theory), that the inference is to 
a particular *selection* of computations from the computational 
plenitude. And why is that? Because they 'explain' the appearances. 
But do they really? Are those computations - in and of themselves - 
really capable of 'explaining' why or how they, and no others, come 
to be uniquely selected for our delectation? Are they really capable 
of 'explaining' why or how those selfsame appearances come to be 
present to us?


I think you and Brent are using different notions of "explanation". 
As I understand your (David's) position, it is a notion of 
"explanation" originating with Plato: Plato's theory of Forms offered 
at the same time both a systematic explanation of things and also a 
connected epistemology of explanation. (Summaries from Jonathan Cohen 
in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy.) In other words, the Platonic 
ideal is that "Ontology precedes epistemology", to vary Brent's 
slogan. In the case of mechanism, the ontology is the natural numbers 
(plus arithmetic) and for an explanation to be acceptable, everything 
has to follow with the force of logical necessity from this ontology.


As I understand Brent's position (and that is essentially the same as 
my position), his concept of "explanation" follows the tradition of 
British empirical philosophy, stemming from Bacon, through Hume, to 
Russell and others. In this tradition, to explain an observed 
characteristic is to show its relationship to a law in accordance 
with which the characteristic occurs or can be made to occur, and 
there is a hierarchy of such laws -- the more comprehensive laws are 
deemed more probable. This leads to the dominant model for 
explanation in the natural sciences, which requires the citation of 
one or more laws which, when conjoined with the statement of relevant 
facts, entail the occurrence of the phenomenon or uniformity that is 
to be explained. This does not rely on any assumed ontology; hence, 
"Epistemology precedes ontology".


Wherever we want to derive a technology from scientific knowledge, we 
shall need to know what causes a desired effect. So we need to 
distinguish between different levels of explanation, in that while, 
for example, the disappearance of a patient's infection may be 
causally explained by his antibiotic injection, the operation of that 
causal process is in its turn to be explained by correlational laws 
of biochemistry. Hence, the understanding of consciousness in any 
effective way will be linked to the creation of effective AI.


This is the paradigm of current scientific practice. Sure, as Bruno 
says, this stems ultimately from an Aristotelian approach to science 
rather than the Platonic approach. But the history of Western thought 
has shown the scientific, or Aristotelian, approach to have been 
overwhelmingly more successful, both in developing technology and in 
reaching understanding of the nature of reality.


Aristotle's Matter was a good simplifying hypothesis. I agree that it 
has led to some success. But that does not make it true,


For the pragmatic instrumentalist, "truth" is not of primary concern. 
What is relevant is explanation in terms of predictive success. The 
scientific realist might reject instrumentalism, but suggestions about 
the underlying ontology have always been shown inadequate in the past -- 
this being the famous 'negative induction' against scientific realism.


and the price of it has been the burying of many interesting problem 
(given away to the clergy). Physicalism simply fail to explain the 
apparent existence of the physical reality,


Why should there be an explanation for this? It might, after all, be 
just a brute fact that reality is what it is, so the best we can do is 
explore and attempt to understand how it works.


and why it hurts. Computationalism does, but with the price that a lot 
of work remains for all details. We are at the beginning of the 
"reversal" only.


I think there is reason to think that the "reversal" cannot succeed. You 
have to get a lot more than you currently have for computationalism to 
rival conventional science.


Bruce

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Re: Answers to David 4

[David Nyman]

On 26 May 2017 2:26 a.m., "Bruce Kellett"  wrote:

On 26/05/2017 9:11 am, David Nyman wrote:

On 25 May 2017 23:18, "Brent Meeker" < 
meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:


I have told you my theory of virtuous circular explanations.  "Invoke" is a
pejorative attribution.  The physical universe is an *inference *to explain
appearances (and a very successful one at that).


Vocabulary. The point is, assuming mechanism (and please do tell me if
you're reasoning in a different theory), that the inference is to a
particular *selection* of computations from the computational plenitude.
And why is that? Because they 'explain' the appearances. But do they
really? Are those computations - in and of themselves - really capable of
'explaining' why or how they, and no others, come to be uniquely selected
for our delectation? Are they really capable of 'explaining' why or how
those selfsame appearances come to be present to us?


I think you and Brent are using different notions of "explanation". As I
understand your (David's) position, it is a notion of "explanation"
originating with Plato: Plato's theory of Forms offered at the same time
both a systematic explanation of things and also a connected epistemology
of explanation. (Summaries from Jonathan Cohen in the Oxford Companion to
Philosophy.) In other words, the Platonic ideal is that "Ontology precedes
epistemology", to vary Brent's slogan. In the case of mechanism, the
ontology is the natural numbers (plus arithmetic) and for an explanation to
be acceptable, everything has to follow with the force of logical necessity
from this ontology.

As I understand Brent's position (and that is essentially the same as my
position), his concept of "explanation" follows the tradition of British
empirical philosophy, stemming from Bacon, through Hume, to Russell and
others. In this tradition, to explain an observed characteristic is to show
its relationship to a law in accordance with which the characteristic
occurs or can be made to occur, and there is a hierarchy of such laws --
the more comprehensive laws are deemed more probable. This leads to the
dominant model for explanation in the natural sciences, which requires the
citation of one or more laws which, when conjoined with the statement of
relevant facts, entail the occurrence of the phenomenon or uniformity that
is to be explained. This does not rely on any assumed ontology; hence,
"Epistemology precedes ontology".


Interesting analysis Bruce. However, I'm not sure if I can follow you on
all points. I think you're right that in a strictly pragmatic sense
epistemology does indeed precede ontology in that observation provides data
on behalf of theory. But as Popper points out, what counts as data is
already theory-dependent. And the reductive aspect of theory is itself an
implicitly ontological commitment. So if a hierarchy of laws were to imply
mutually inconsistent ontological commitments it would be to that extent
incomplete and unsatisfactory. Indeed the holy grail of (Aristotelian?)
science is a hierarchical "Theory of Everything" that is, in precisely this
sense, ontologically consistent "bottom up all the way down", if you'll
permit me a slogan of my own.

For these reasons I can't accept that your distinction between Platonic and
Aristotelian modes of explanation has much real force. In practice, *any*
effective mode of explanation must inexorably be constrained by its
fundamental ontological commitments, on pain of inconsistency. If these are
unclear, then part of the explanation is to make them explicit, on pain of
obscurantism. And finally of course to count as an explanation it must be
susceptible of constraint by evidence, on pain of pusillanimity.

David


Wherever we want to derive a technology from scientific knowledge, we shall
need to know what causes a desired effect. So we need to distinguish
between different levels of explanation, in that while, for example, the
disappearance of a patient's infection may be causally explained by his
antibiotic injection, the operation of that causal process is in its turn
to be explained by correlational laws of biochemistry. Hence, the
understanding of consciousness in any effective way will be linked to the
creation of effective AI.

This is the paradigm of current scientific practice. Sure, as Bruno says,
this stems ultimately from an Aristotelian approach to science rather than
the Platonic approach. But the history of Western thought has shown the
scientific, or Aristotelian, approach to have been overwhelmingly more
successful, both in developing technology and in reaching understanding of
the nature of reality.

Bruce





Or is this really just the latest case of "If I can't see it, it doesn't
exist?" Perhaps you will be content to say that whatever those computations
are capable of explaining sets the absolute limit of what we can ask in
explanation. But if that's the way it is, I can't help being put in mind of

Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 May 2017, at 03:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 26/05/2017 9:11 am, David Nyman wrote:

On 25 May 2017 23:18, "Brent Meeker"  wrote:

I have told you my theory of virtuous circular explanations.   
"Invoke" is a pejorative attribution.  The physical universe is an  
inference to explain appearances (and a very successful one at that).


Vocabulary. The point is, assuming mechanism (and please do tell me  
if you're reasoning in a different theory), that the inference is  
to a particular *selection* of computations from the computational  
plenitude. And why is that? Because they 'explain' the appearances.  
But do they really? Are those computations - in and of themselves -  
really capable of 'explaining' why or how they, and no others, come  
to be uniquely selected for our delectation? Are they really  
capable of 'explaining' why or how those selfsame appearances come  
to be present to us?


I think you and Brent are using different notions of "explanation".  
As I understand your (David's) position, it is a notion of  
"explanation" originating with Plato: Plato's theory of Forms  
offered at the same time both a systematic explanation of things and  
also a connected epistemology of explanation. (Summaries from 
Jonathan Cohen in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy.) In other  
words, the Platonic ideal is that "Ontology precedes epistemology",  
to vary Brent's slogan. In the case of mechanism, the ontology is  
the natural numbers (plus arithmetic) and for an explanation to be  
acceptable, everything has to follow with the force of logical  
necessity from this ontology.


As I understand Brent's position (and that is essentially the same  
as my position), his concept of "explanation" follows the tradition  
of British empirical philosophy, stemming from Bacon, through Hume,  
to Russell and others. In this tradition, to explain an observed  
characteristic is to show its relationship to a law in accordance  
with which the characteristic occurs or can be made to occur, and  
there is a hierarchy of such laws -- the more comprehensive laws are  
deemed more probable. This leads to the dominant model for  
explanation in the natural sciences, which requires the citation of  
one or more laws which, when conjoined with the statement of  
relevant facts, entail the occurrence of the phenomenon or  
uniformity that is to be explained. This does not rely on any  
assumed ontology; hence, "Epistemology precedes ontology".


Wherever we want to derive a technology from scientific knowledge,  
we shall need to know what causes a desired effect. So we need to  
distinguish between different levels of explanation, in that while,  
for example, the disappearance of a patient's infection may be  
causally explained by his antibiotic injection, the operation of  
that causal process is in its turn to be explained by correlational  
laws of biochemistry. Hence, the understanding of consciousness in  
any effective way will be linked to the creation of effective AI.


This is the paradigm of current scientific practice. Sure, as Bruno  
says, this stems ultimately from an Aristotelian approach to science  
rather than the Platonic approach. But the history of Western  
thought has shown the scientific, or Aristotelian, approach to have  
been overwhelmingly more successful, both in developing technology  
and in reaching understanding of the nature of reality.


Aristotle's Matter was a good simplifying hypothesis. I agree that it  
has led to some success. But that does not make it true, and the price  
of it has been the burying of many interesting problem (given away to  
the clergy). Physicalism simply fail to explain the apparent existence  
of the physical reality, and why it hurts. Computationalism does, but  
with the price that a lot of work remains for all details. We are at  
the beginning of the "reversal" only.


Bruno






Bruce





Or is this really just the latest case of "If I can't see it, it  
doesn't exist?" Perhaps you will be content to say that whatever  
those computations are capable of explaining sets the absolute  
limit of what we can ask in explanation. But if that's the way it  
is, I can't help being put in mind of that old huntsman John Peel,  
who would assert, with a remarkable satisfaction in the virtue of  
invincible ignorance, "What I don't know ain't knowledge."


David



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Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 May 2017, at 03:16, David Nyman wrote:



-- Forwarded message --
From: David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com>
Date: 26 May 2017 at 01:53
Subject: Re: Answers to David 4
To: Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net>


On 26 May 2017 at 01:24, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:


On 5/25/2017 4:11 PM, David Nyman wrote:



On 25 May 2017 23:18, "Brent Meeker" <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:


On 5/25/2017 8:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Also, "my" theory is believed by almost all scientists. Diderot  
call it simply "rationalism". If Brent does not believe in  
mechanism, he should tell us what is his explanation for  
consciousness. But here, he clearly dismiss the problem when  
saying that once machine will be intelligent, the "hard" problem  
will dissolve. But he never explained why and how.


Because it will be recognized that consciousness is not one thing,  
but something that can be implemented in different ways having  
different relations to memory and emotions.


Sure, but you betray your implicit conclusion. Consciousness is  
just a 'thing' in this view - a neurological thing supervening on a  
physical thing. Parse it how you will, the 'explanation' will  
always be in terms one thing or another.


Exactly my point - leading to a virtuous circle of explanation.

​That's your point? Well I guess that works if things are your  
(only) thing. That, in case you missed it, was *my* point. By the  
way, you're still PM-ing me.


Which explain why I did not get the message.

Brent, an explanation can be circular only if you can embed the circle  
in some clean ontology. Adding "virtuous" will not help. I can  
appreciate you virtous circles, but this is because arithmetic  
implements many (virtuous) circles.


Bruno





I think Brent just do not see the problem raised by mechanism,  
which is that we cannot invoke the physical universe to explain  
the appearance of the physical universe.


I have told you my theory of virtuous circular explanations.   
"Invoke" is a pejorative attribution.  The physical universe is an  
inference to explain appearances (and a very successful one at that).


Vocabulary.


??  Your point is that you should be allowed a pejorative  
characterization of what Newton, Einstein, et al have done?


Hardly. Of course I meant only *your* quibble about vocabulary​. I  
don't see ​anything pejorative in invoke. Invoke and infer are  
doing the same work here, AFAICS.


Would it have been better to invoke arithmetic?  What would that  
explain?




The point is, assuming mechanism (and please do tell me if you're  
reasoning in a different theory), that the inference is to a  
particular *selection* of computations from the computational  
plenitude. And why is that? Because they 'explain' the appearances.  
But do they really? Are those computations - in and of themselves -  
really capable of 'explaining' why or how they, and no others, come  
to be uniquely selected for our delectation? Are they really  
capable of 'explaining' why or how those selfsame appearances come  
to be present to us?


Good questions.

​Thanks.
​
Or is this really just the latest case of "If I can't see it, it  
doesn't exist?" Perhaps you will be content to say that whatever  
those computations are capable of explaining sets the absolute limit  
of what we can ask in explanation.​


Well, you didn't answer this. But to be fair, it was somewhat of a  
rhetorical question, since you've told me time and again that this  
is indeed what you think.


​But if that's the way it is, I can't help being put in mind of  
that old huntsman John Peel, who would assert, with a remarkable  
satisfaction in the virtue of invincible ignorance, "What I don't  
know ain't knowledge."​



It ain't so much what you don't know that gets you into trouble, as  
what you know that ain't so.

  --- Josh Billings

​A double-edge sword, if ever I felt one.

David​


Brent



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Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruno Marchal]

On 26 May 2017, at 00:18, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 5/25/2017 8:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Also, "my" theory is believed by almost all scientists. Diderot  
call it simply "rationalism". If Brent does not believe in  
mechanism, he should tell us what is his explanation for  
consciousness. But here, he clearly dismiss the problem when saying  
that once machine will be intelligent, the "hard" problem will  
dissolve. But he never explained why and how.


Because it will be recognized that consciousness is not one thing,  
but something that can be implemented in different ways having  
different relations to memory and emotions.


OK with this. But that does not solve the mind-body problem.








I think Brent just do not see the problem raised by mechanism,  
which is that we cannot invoke the physical universe to explain the  
appearance of the physical universe.


I have told you my theory of virtuous circular explanations.   
"Invoke" is a pejorative attribution.  The physical universe is an  
inference to explain appearances (and a very successful one at that).



I was alluding to the use of the metaphysical assumption of a primary  
physical universe, which does not work when we assume mechanism.


Bruno

PS very busy days. I might not been able to answer all comments before  
sunday. I let you know. I might answer during pause.






Brent

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Re: Answers to David 4

[Bruce Kellett]

On 26/05/2017 9:11 am, David Nyman wrote:
On 25 May 2017 23:18, "Brent Meeker" > wrote:



I have told you my theory of virtuous circular explanations. 
"Invoke" is a pejorative attribution. The physical universe is an

*/inference /*to explain appearances (and a very successful one at
that).


Vocabulary. The point is, assuming mechanism (and please do tell me if 
you're reasoning in a different theory), that the inference is to a 
particular *selection* of computations from the computational 
plenitude. And why is that? Because they 'explain' the appearances. 
But do they really? Are those computations - in and of themselves - 
really capable of 'explaining' why or how they, and no others, come to 
be uniquely selected for our delectation? Are they really capable of 
'explaining' why or how those selfsame appearances come to be present 
to us?


I think you and Brent are using different notions of "explanation". As I 
understand your (David's) position, it is a notion of "explanation" 
originating with Plato: Plato's theory of Forms offered at the same time 
both a systematic explanation of things and also a connected 
epistemology of explanation. (Summaries from Jonathan Cohen in the 
Oxford Companion to Philosophy.) In other words, the Platonic ideal is 
that "Ontology precedes epistemology", to vary Brent's slogan. In the 
case of mechanism, the ontology is the natural numbers (plus arithmetic) 
and for an explanation to be acceptable, everything has to follow with 
the force of logical necessity from this ontology.


As I understand Brent's position (and that is essentially the same as my 
position), his concept of "explanation" follows the tradition of British 
empirical philosophy, stemming from Bacon, through Hume, to Russell and 
others. In this tradition, to explain an observed characteristic is to 
show its relationship to a law in accordance with which the 
characteristic occurs or can be made to occur, and there is a hierarchy 
of such laws -- the more comprehensive laws are deemed more probable. 
This leads to the dominant model for explanation in the natural 
sciences, which requires the citation of one or more laws which, when 
conjoined with the statement of relevant facts, entail the occurrence of 
the phenomenon or uniformity that is to be explained. This does not rely 
on any assumed ontology; hence, "Epistemology precedes ontology".


Wherever we want to derive a technology from scientific knowledge, we 
shall need to know what causes a desired effect. So we need to 
distinguish between different levels of explanation, in that while, for 
example, the disappearance of a patient's infection may be causally 
explained by his antibiotic injection, the operation of that causal 
process is in its turn to be explained by correlational laws of 
biochemistry. Hence, the understanding of consciousness in any effective 
way will be linked to the creation of effective AI.


This is the paradigm of current scientific practice. Sure, as Bruno 
says, this stems ultimately from an Aristotelian approach to science 
rather than the Platonic approach. But the history of Western thought 
has shown the scientific, or Aristotelian, approach to have been 
overwhelmingly more successful, both in developing technology and in 
reaching understanding of the nature of reality.


Bruce





Or is this really just the latest case of "If I can't see it, it 
doesn't exist?" Perhaps you will be content to say that whatever those 
computations are capable of explaining sets the absolute limit of what 
we can ask in explanation. But if that's the way it is, I can't help 
being put in mind of that old huntsman John Peel, who would assert, 
with a remarkable satisfaction in the virtue of invincible ignorance, 
"What I don't know ain't knowledge."


David


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Re: Answers to David 4

[David Nyman]

On 25 May 2017 23:18, "Brent Meeker"  wrote:



On 5/25/2017 8:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Also, "my" theory is believed by almost all scientists. Diderot call it
simply "rationalism". If Brent does not believe in mechanism, he should
tell us what is his explanation for consciousness. But here, he clearly
dismiss the problem when saying that once machine will be intelligent, the
"hard" problem will dissolve. But he never explained why and how.


Because it will be recognized that consciousness is not one thing, but
something that can be implemented in different ways having different
relations to memory and emotions.


Sure, but you betray your implicit conclusion. Consciousness is just a
'thing' in this view - a neurological thing supervening on a physical
thing. Parse it how you will, the 'explanation' will always be in terms one
thing or another.





I think Brent just do not see the problem raised by mechanism, which is
that we cannot invoke the physical universe to explain the appearance of
the physical universe.


I have told you my theory of virtuous circular explanations.  "Invoke" is a
pejorative attribution.  The physical universe is an *inference *to explain
appearances (and a very successful one at that).


Vocabulary. The point is, assuming mechanism (and please do tell me if
you're reasoning in a different theory), that the inference is to a
particular *selection* of computations from the computational plenitude.
And why is that? Because they 'explain' the appearances. But do they
really? Are those computations - in and of themselves - really capable of
'explaining' why or how they, and no others, come to be uniquely selected
for our delectation? Are they really capable of 'explaining' why or how
those selfsame appearances come to be present to us?

Or is this really just the latest case of "If I can't see it, it doesn't
exist?" Perhaps you will be content to say that whatever those computations
are capable of explaining sets the absolute limit of what we can ask in
explanation. But if that's the way it is, I can't help being put in mind of
that old huntsman John Peel, who would assert, with a remarkable
satisfaction in the virtue of invincible ignorance, "What I don't know
ain't knowledge."

David



Brent

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Re: Answers to David 4

[Brent Meeker]

On 5/25/2017 8:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Also, "my" theory is believed by almost all scientists. Diderot call 
it simply "rationalism". If Brent does not believe in mechanism, he 
should tell us what is his explanation for consciousness. But here, he 
clearly dismiss the problem when saying that once machine will be 
intelligent, the "hard" problem will dissolve. But he never explained 
why and how.


Because it will be recognized that consciousness is not one thing, but 
something that can be implemented in different ways having different 
relations to memory and emotions.




I think Brent just do not see the problem raised by mechanism, which 
is that we cannot invoke the physical universe to explain the 
appearance of the physical universe.


I have told you my theory of virtuous circular explanations. "Invoke" is 
a pejorative attribution.  The physical universe is an */inference /*to 
explain appearances (and a very successful one at that).


Brent

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