On 7/31/08, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Categorization depends upon context. This was pretty much decided by the
late 1980s (look up Fuzzy Concepts).
This is an important point so I don't want to miss it. But I can't think of
a very good example of context-dependence of concepts.
Jeez, there is NO concept that is not dependent on context. There is NO concept
that is not infinitely fuzzy and open-ended in itself, period - which is the
principal reason why language is and has to be grounded (although that needs
demonstration).
1. My response to your post is that you are
On 8/5/08, Mike Tintner [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Jeez, there is NO concept that is not dependent on context. There is NO
concept that is not infinitely fuzzy and open-ended in itself, period -
which is the principal reason why language is and has to be grounded
(although that needs
On 8/5/2008 6:53 AM, YKY (Yan King Yin) wrote:
On 8/5/08, Mike Tintner [EMAIL PROTECTED]
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Jeez, there is NO concept that is not dependent on context. There is
NO concept that is not infinitely fuzzy and open-ended in itself,
period - which is the principal
Can you define that difference in an abstract, general way? I
mean, what is the *qualitative* difference that makes:
cybersex is a kind of sex
different from:
penguin is a kind of bird?
I believe that cybersex and phone sex are called sex in a metaphoric way.
The keyboard or
We only know that:
P(sex | cybersex) = high
P(STD | sex) = high
If we're also given that
P(STD | cybersex) = 0
I think you just need a few more bits of knowledge:
P(sex | cybersex) = high
P(STD | sex) = high
P(STD | !contact) = 0
P(contact | cybersex) = 0
The 0-values (0 strength,
.
___
James Ratcliff - http://falazar.com
Looking for something...
--- On Tue, 7/29/08, YKY (Yan King Yin) [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: YKY (Yan King Yin) [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [agi] a fuzzy reasoning problem
To: agi@v2.listbox.com
Date: Tuesday, July 29, 2008
Categorization depends upon context. This was pretty much decided by the late
1980s (look up Fuzzy Concepts).
- Original Message -
From: James Ratcliff
To: agi@v2.listbox.com
Sent: Wednesday, July 30, 2008 4:05 PM
Subject: Re: [agi] a fuzzy reasoning problem
One
On 7/29/08, Benjamin Johnston [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I see the failure in this argument at step 2. Cybersex is a kind of erotic
interaction. Erotic interactions are often called sex in general
conversation, even though there are many kinds of erotic interactions that
don't result in the
Saying that
cybersex is a kind of sex
is similar to saying
phone sex is a kind of sex
oral sex is a kind of sex
anal sex is a kind of sex
group sex is a kind of sex
or
penguin is a kind of bird
It seems pretty uncontroversial...
It's true that cybersex is a
Here is an example of a problematic inference:
1. Mary has cybersex with many different partners
2. Cybersex is a kind of sex
3. Therefore, Mary has many sex partners
4. Having many sex partners - high chance of getting STDs
5. Therefore, Mary has a high chance of STDs
What's wrong with
On Mon, Jul 28, 2008 at 10:04 AM, YKY (Yan King Yin)
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Here is an example of a problematic inference:
1. Mary has cybersex with many different partners
2. Cybersex is a kind of sex
3. Therefore, Mary has many sex partners
4. Having many sex partners - high chance
The eternal flaw in all this, it seems to me, is that you are still doing
logic which assumes that agents know what the premises refer to, and those
premises can be taken for granted.
Real world thinking, which is vastly more important and extensive than the
logical variety, is interested in
I didn't emphasize the first flaw in logic, (which is more relevant to your
question, and why such questions will keep recurring and can never be
*methodologically* sorted out) - the assumption that we know what the terms
*refer to*. Example:
Mary says Clinton had sex with her.
Clinton says
On 7/28/08, Pei Wang [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Every rule is general to a degree, which means it ignores
exception. It is simply impossible to list all exceptions for any
given rule. This issue has been discussed by many people in the
non-monotonic logic community.
The solution is not to
Your inference trajectory assumes that cybersex and STD are
probabilistically independent within sex but this is not the case.
PLN would make this error using the independence-assumption-based term logic
deduction rule; but in practice this rule is supposed to be overridden in
cases of known
On 7/28/08, Mike Tintner [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Mary says Clinton had sex with her.
Clinton says he wouldn't call that sex.
LOL...
But your examples are still symbolic in nature. I don't see why they
can't be reasoned via logic.
In the above example the concept sex may be a fuzzy concept.
Mike said:
I didn't emphasize the first flaw in logic, (which is more relevant to
your question, and why such questions will keep recurring and can
never be *methodologically* sorted out) - the assumption that we know
what the terms *refer to*. Example:
Mary says Clinton had sex with her.
Clinton
It is an application of the rule error. One of my main arguments is
that while weighted reasoning systems (such as fuzzy logic) could be
shaped to accommodate this kind of rule error (by finding the
additional information that is needed to resolve it), I believe it is
more insightful to recognize
Exclusively searching KB for all possible derivations on a given
statement will lead to combinatorial explosion. What NARS does is to
resolve conflicts whenever they are encountered by the system. That
is, the system looks for better (more confident) conclusions until
spent all the time allocated
On Mon, Jul 28, 2008 at 10:58 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Your inference trajectory assumes that cybersex and STD are
probabilistically independent within sex but this is not the case.
PLN would make this error using the independence-assumption-based term logic
deduction rule;
On 7/28/08, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Your inference trajectory assumes that cybersex and STD are
probabilistically independent within sex but this is not the case.
We only know that:
P(sex | cybersex) = high
P(STD | sex) = high
If we're also given that
P(STD | cybersex)
On Mon, Jul 28, 2008 at 11:10 AM, YKY (Yan King Yin)
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 7/28/08, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Your inference trajectory assumes that cybersex and STD are
probabilistically independent within sex but this is not the case.
We only know that:
P(sex |
On 7/28/08, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
PLN uses confidence values within its truth values, with a different
underlying semantics and math than NARS; but that doesn't help much with the
above problem...
There is a confidence-penalty used in PLN whenever an independence assumption
On Monday 28 July 2008 07:04:01 am YKY (Yan King Yin) wrote:
Here is an example of a problematic inference:
1. Mary has cybersex with many different partners
2. Cybersex is a kind of sex
3. Therefore, Mary has many sex partners
4. Having many sex partners - high chance of getting STDs
On Mon, Jul 28, 2008 at 12:14 PM, YKY (Yan King Yin)
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 7/28/08, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
PLN uses confidence values within its truth values, with a different
underlying semantics and math than NARS; but that doesn't help much with the
above
YKY/MT
Mary says Clinton had sex with her.
Clinton says he wouldn't call that sex.
LOL...
But your examples are still symbolic in nature. I don't see why they
can't be reasoned via logic.
In the above example the concept sex may be a fuzzy concept. So
certain forms of sex may be construed
On 7/29/08, Charles Hixson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
There's nothing wrong with the logical argument. What's wrong is that you
are presuming a purely declarative logic approach can work...which it can in
extremely simple situations, where you can specify all necessary facts.
My belief about
On 7/29/08, Mike Tintner [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Why isn't science done via logic? Why don't physicists, chemists,
biologists, psychologists and sociologists just use logic to find out about
the world? Do you see why?And bear in mind that scientists are only formal
representatives of every
On Monday 28 July 2008 09:30:08 am YKY (Yan King Yin) wrote:
On 7/29/08, Charles Hixson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
There's nothing wrong with the logical argument. What's wrong is that
you are presuming a purely declarative logic approach can work...which it
can in extremely simple
On Monday 28 July 2008 07:04:01 am YKY (Yan King Yin) wrote:
Here is an example of a problematic inference:
1. Mary has cybersex with many different partners
2. Cybersex is a kind of sex
3. Therefore, Mary has many sex partners
4. Having many sex partners - high chance of getting STDs
Pei:
Charles Hixson wrote:
There's nothing wrong with the logical argument. What's wrong is that
you
are presuming a purely declarative logic approach can work...which it can
in
extremely simple situations, where you can specify all necessary facts.
My belief about this is that the proper
On 7/29/08, Charles Hixson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
This is true, but the logic statements of the model are rather different
than simple assertions, much more like complex statements specifying
proportional relationships and causal links. I envision the causal links
as being at statements
YKY,
There's nothing wrong with the logical argument. What's wrong is that
you
are presuming a purely declarative logic approach can work...which it can
in
extremely simple situations, where you can specify all necessary facts.
My belief about this is that the proper solution is to
On 7/29/08, Mike Tintner [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
YKY: The key word here is model. If you can reason with mental models,
then of course you can resolve a lot of paradoxes in logic. This
boils down to: how can you represent mental models? And they seem to
boil down further to logical
Charles:Sensory data would be more
significant, but there's considerable evidence that even sensory data has a
hard time in overruling a strong model belief.
That's a really good point. Both individuals' and social groups' willingness
to change their models in the light of the evidence, has a
: [agi] a fuzzy reasoning problem
Here is an example of a problematic inference:
1. Mary has cybersex with many different partners
2. Cybersex is a kind of sex
3. Therefore, Mary has many sex partners
4. Having many sex partners - high chance of getting STDs
5. Therefore, Mary has a high chance
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