On 22 Jan 2009, at 13:21, Kim Jones wrote:
Bruno,
I found this an incredibly moving reply. I also see clearly your
points. I am glad to have given you an opportunity to state so
clearly some profoundly important ideas. Thank you, and let's
continue the voyage.
OK, thanks. ASAP (I am
Bruno,
thanks for 4z1, I find it an exciting (although not in all details for me
followable text) in beautiful French (your language!) which I have to
pronounce (silently) to understand (mostly) and did not study all along so
far. Also the supporting lit is remarkable - it was decades ago when I
On 24/01/2009, at 4:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Have you find the time to take a look on UN-16 UN-24 in
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume1CC/4z1_1sansp.pdf
After all, you know some french, isn't it? Take it easy, I will
explain all this to you, beginning from zero.
On 21 Jan 2009, at 05:46, Kim Jones wrote:
OK. But keep in mind that consciousness is unique in the sense of
knowing that it cannot know its Turing emulability level (yet can
bet).
Footnote - (parenthetical digression): I know the above thought is
native to your schema, and up
On 21 Jan 2009, at 22:15, Kim Jones wrote:
On 22/01/2009, at 3:50 AM, Günther Greindl wrote:
Kim,
the uncomputability of this issue. Why should the mind be limited
to the
computable? Clearly it is not.
So you deny Step 1 again? You say no to the doctor?
In fact I have 'multiple
Bruno,
I found this an incredibly moving reply. I also see clearly your
points. I am glad to have given you an opportunity to state so clearly
some profoundly important ideas. Thank you, and let's continue the
voyage.
I am glad that Penrose was wrong. But then, without somebody as
Kim,
the uncomputability of this issue. Why should the mind be limited to the
computable? Clearly it is not.
So you deny Step 1 again? You say no to the doctor?
Could an AI conceive of Platonia?
Why not?
Cheers,
Günther
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You
On 22/01/2009, at 3:50 AM, Günther Greindl wrote:
Kim,
the uncomputability of this issue. Why should the mind be limited
to the
computable? Clearly it is not.
So you deny Step 1 again? You say no to the doctor?
In fact I have 'multiple personality disorder' - from Thursday to
On 19 Jan 2009, at 13:56, Kim Jones wrote:
But Brent was momentarily speaking of materialism - materialism
doesn't acknowledge any form of comp immateriality except
according to the (probably) false mind/body dualism, where the mind
is allowed to be an ethereal emanation of the
On 21/01/2009, at 6:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Jan 2009, at 13:56, Kim Jones wrote:
But Brent was momentarily speaking of materialism - materialism
doesn't acknowledge any form of comp immateriality except
according to the (probably) false mind/body dualism, where the mind
On 19/01/2009, at 9:58 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 18-janv.-09, à 11:32, Kim Jones a écrit :
On 18/01/2009, at 4:38 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
I have no doubt that digital mechanism and materialism are
incompatible,
though.
Is that because, under materialism, consciousness depends on
2009/1/18 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Jan 2009, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
I should add that in the case of the digital version, as I said earlier, the
causal link is in no way the physical computer, but the program and its
state.
2009/1/18 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com
2009/1/18 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Jan 2009,
On 18/01/2009, at 4:38 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
I have no doubt that digital mechanism and materialism are
incompatible,
though.
Is that because, under materialism, consciousness depends on causal
links?
Brent
supernatural causal links
enter the hand wavers
Kim
On 18 Jan 2009, at 06:38, Brent Meeker wrote:
Are you stopping at UDA step 1?
No. There's a difference between your idea of running a world and
making a copy
of me within this world. I think the latter will necessarily incur
a gap in my
consciousness because of the need to gather
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Jan 2009, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
snip
in a computer program. But a
Le 15-janv.-09, à 20:55, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Stathis is not wrong but seems unclear on what a computation
mathematically is perhaps.
Many miss Church thesis. The fact that there is a purely mathematical
notion of computation at all.
I thought the Church's thesis was that all
2009/1/16 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
But both the electronic and the mechanical computer are implementing a process
that is distributed in spacetime and has causal connections.
Yes, and my claim is that the causal connections are important only
because they give rise to the
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/16 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
But both the electronic and the mechanical computer are implementing a
process
that is distributed in spacetime and has causal connections.
Yes, and my claim is that the causal connections are important
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 15 Jan 2009, at 22:50, Brent Meeker wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
snip
in a computer program. But a
2009/1/16 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/16 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
But both the electronic and the mechanical computer are implementing a
process
that is distributed in spacetime and has causal connections.
Yes, and my
2009/1/17 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
On 16 Jan 2009, at 14:10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/16 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
But both the electronic and the mechanical computer are
implementing a process
that is distributed in spacetime and has causal connections.
2009/1/17 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
But I think you are assuming something about states that is false - i.e.
that they are discrete non-overlapping things. According to our current
understanding of physics this is not the case for brain states or
computer states. Because they
2009/1/15 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
In an actual physical computer the transition rules are represented by
the causal links between the states, so that a particular input will
reliably give rise to a particular output. But I return to my question
about what would happen if
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/15 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
In an actual physical computer the transition rules are represented by
the causal links between the states, so that a particular input will
reliably give rise to a particular output. But I return to my question
On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also
requires a
set of transition rules. So in the same abstract way that the
integers
are
On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:52, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also
requires a
set of transition rules.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:52, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Jan 2009, at 18:40, Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also
requires a
set of transition rules. So in the same abstract way that the
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also requires a
set of transition rules. So in the same abstract way that the integers
are ordered by succession the computational states of a Turing machine
are ordered. Whether
2009/1/14 John Mikes jami...@gmail.com:
Stathis,
common sense, not always applicable to math-related topics
is startled before a task on a REGULAR contraption-type Turing machine
(binary, electrically driven finite hardware etc.) can emulate ALL the
potentials of 11+billion neurons in
Stathis: (from reply to Brent):
I return to my question about what would happen if there were a
discontinuity in a sequence of states,...
There IS discontinuity if the state transits'(?) from s1 to s2.
Do you have any idea how one can observe a changed state by only continuous
transitions? Where
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also requires a
set of transition rules. So in the same abstract way that the integers
are ordered by succession the computational states of a Turing
Hi,
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
However a Turing machine is not just a set of states, it also requires a
set of transition rules. So in the same abstract way that the integers
are
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
However a Turing machine is not just a
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi,
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com
mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
2009/1/13 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
In human consciousness, as instantiated by brains, there is a process in which
signal/information is not local, it is distributed in spacetime and is
connected
causally which means, per relativity, that you cannot make any unique
spacelike
2009/1/13 Günther Greindl guenther.grei...@gmail.com:
Stathis,
thinking about this way (which I did when reading Egan's Permutation
City) is indeed problematic - because then you would also have to let
consciousness supervene on Lucky Alice (the one from MGA), right down to
Super Lucky
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/13 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
In human consciousness, as instantiated by brains, there is a process in
which
signal/information is not local, it is distributed in spacetime and is
connected
causally which means, per relativity, that you
Stathis,
common sense, not always applicable to math-related topics
is startled before a task on a REGULAR contraption-type Turing machine
(binary, electrically driven finite hardware etc.) can emulate ALL the
potentials of 11+billion neurons in unrestricted groupings and unlimited
connectivities
On 13 Jan 2009, at 18:44, Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/13 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
In human consciousness, as instantiated by brains, there is a
process in which
signal/information is not local, it is distributed in spacetime
and is connected
Le 11-janv.-09, à 17:55, Brent Meeker a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I'm suggesting that running a state is incoherent.
A machine running a program goes through a sequence of states.
Consider 20 consecutive states, s1 to s20, which
2009/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
A machine running a program goes through a sequence of states.
Consider 20 consecutive states, s1 to s20, which give rise to several
moments of consciousness. Would you say that running the sequence s1
to s20 on a single machine m1 will give a
Stathis,
thinking about this way (which I did when reading Egan's Permutation
City) is indeed problematic - because then you would also have to let
consciousness supervene on Lucky Alice (the one from MGA), right down to
Super Lucky Alice (Alice which is made anew for every state through
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
A machine running a program goes through a sequence of states.
Consider 20 consecutive states, s1 to s20, which give rise to several
moments of consciousness. Would you say that running the sequence s1
to s20 on a
2009/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I'm suggesting that running a state is incoherent.
A machine running a program goes through a sequence of states.
Consider 20 consecutive states, s1 to s20, which give rise to several
moments of consciousness. Would you say that running the
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
I'm suggesting that running a state is incoherent.
A machine running a program goes through a sequence of states.
Consider 20 consecutive states, s1 to s20, which give rise to several
moments of
On 10/01/2009, at 6:37 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
The question is how is the simulated observer made conscious of the
passage of
(simulated) time. If you just look a momentary machine states,
ignoring their
causal/temporal relations, how will they create the consciousness of
time in
Kim Jones wrote:
On 10/01/2009, at 6:37 PM, Brent Meeker wrote:
The question is how is the simulated observer made conscious of the
passage of
(simulated) time. If you just look a momentary machine states,
ignoring their
causal/temporal relations, how will they create the
2009/1/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
The question is how is the simulated observer made conscious of the passage of
(simulated) time. If you just look a momentary machine states, ignoring their
causal/temporal relations, how will they create the consciousness of time in
the
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
The question is how is the simulated observer made conscious of the passage
of
(simulated) time. If you just look a momentary machine states, ignoring
their
causal/temporal relations, how will they create the
Thomas,
(Apropos Günther Greindl's remark: space as the self moving in
relation to everything else, time as everything outside the self moving in
relation to oneself.
it's funny that already in 1895, in his novel The Time Machine, H.G.
Wells wrote, There is no difference between time and
2009/1/9 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
But in a block universe, where each frame contains all of the
information for a particular time, the order is implicit.
What makes it implicit?... increasing entropy? ...conformance to dynamical
laws?
These are things outside the frames.
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/9 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
But in a block universe, where each frame contains all of the
information for a particular time, the order is implicit.
What makes it implicit?... increasing entropy? ...conformance to dynamical
laws?
These are
2009/1/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Consider a simulation of an observer watching a falling stone, running
on a digital computer. Does the observer have any way of knowing
whether the simulation is being run serially, in parallel, on how many
and what kinds of physical machines,
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Consider a simulation of an observer watching a falling stone, running
on a digital computer. Does the observer have any way of knowing
whether the simulation is being run serially, in parallel, on how many
and what
2009/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/7 Abram Demski abramdem...@gmail.com wrote:
I would not deny causality in such a universe so long as the logical
structure enforces the Life rules (meaning, the next level in the
stack is *always* the next
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/7 Abram Demski abramdem...@gmail.com wrote:
I would not deny causality in such a universe so long as the logical
structure enforces the Life rules (meaning, the next level in the
2009/1/7 Abram Demski abramdem...@gmail.com wrote:
I would not deny causality in such a universe so long as the logical
structure enforces the Life rules (meaning, the next level in the
stack is *always* the next life-tick, it couldn't be something else...
which is true by supposition in the
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/7 Abram Demski abramdem...@gmail.com wrote:
I would not deny causality in such a universe so long as the logical
structure enforces the Life rules (meaning, the next level in the
stack is *always* the next life-tick, it couldn't be something else...
which
On 06 Jan 2009, at 20:18, Brent Meeker wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/6 Abram Demski abramdem...@gmail.com:
Thomas,
If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we
experience
moving in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember
the past and not the
OK, and thanks Bruno. I thought MW more or less presumed a block
universe without time, but apparently this is yet uncertain.
Abram,
If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience
moving in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember
the past and not the
PS. If the two-dimensional cartoon man has something to say about
mathematics or logic, I would certainly listen, but his intuition,
common sense and and experienses I would rather smile at :)
Maybe somebody is smiling at me right now? or laughing? I hope not ;-)
Abram,
I agree with Brent. In relativity theory space and time are
intermingled in a geometrical way to give the Minkowski structure.
Actually you can make it into an Euclidian space by introducing an
imaginary time t' = sqr(-1)*t = it. The metrics becomes dx^2 + dy^2 +
dz^2 + dt'^2.
In
2009/1/6 Abram Demski abramdem...@gmail.com:
Thomas,
If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience
moving in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember
the past and not the future? Could a being move in some spatial
dimension in the same way we move
On 06 Jan 2009, at 14:07, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/6 Abram Demski abramdem...@gmail.com:
Thomas,
If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience
moving in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember
the past and not the future? Could a being
Abram,
With General Relativity, time is so geometrical that you can make it
circular.
(Cf the Gödel's solutions to Einstein's GR Equation, which gives hope
to some to build a time machine, and even infinite computers!).
Give me just a sufficiently massive cylinder ...
Bruno
On 06 Jan
Stathis,
I would not deny causality in such a universe so long as the logical
structure enforces the Life rules (meaning, the next level in the
stack is *always* the next life-tick, it couldn't be something else...
which is true by supposition in the block world).
Perhaps that still counts as a
Bruno,
This I know... yet I want to say that it doesn't necessarily make time
*spatial*. But, I can't say exactly what that would mean. It seems to
me that the word spatial becomes less meaningful if time is said to
be spatial...
--Abram
On Tue, Jan 6, 2009 at 1:57 PM, Bruno Marchal
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
2009/1/6 Abram Demski abramdem...@gmail.com:
Thomas,
If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience
moving in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember
the past and not the future? Could a being move in some spatial
dimension
Abram,
an intuition I have come to concerning time is the following (it is only
qualitative and may or may not be helpful in thinking about time):
From relativity theory we know that there is no universal now, and that
the invariant between two points in the physical universe is spacetime
Lewis Carroll Epstein says the reason we can't go faster than light is that we
can't go slower than light, c is our speed along the time axis.
Brent
Günther Greindl wrote:
Abram,
an intuition I have come to concerning time is the following (it is only
qualitative and may or may not be
PS. Of course space and time exist, even if only in consciousness, but
I guess you know what I mean :)
On Jan 5, 1:10 am, Thomas Laursen krimma...@gmail.com wrote:
I admit that consciousness is a bit special but what about time as
(nothing but) a space dimension? Do you agree on this? (put
Thomas,
If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience
moving in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember
the past and not the future? Could a being move in some spatial
dimension in the same way we move through time, and in doing so treat
time more like we
On 05 Jan 2009, at 01:10, Thomas Laursen wrote:
I admit that consciousness is a bit special but what about time as
(nothing but) a space dimension? Do you agree on this?
The physicist in me don't know. But he likes the universal equation of
the multiverse E = 0, in which physical time
Abram Demski wrote:
Thomas,
If time is merely an additional space dimension, why do we experience
moving in it always and only in one direction? Why do we remember
the past and not the future? Could a being move in some spatial
dimension in the same way we move through time, and in doing
I admit that consciousness is a bit special but what about time as
(nothing but) a space dimension? Do you agree on this? (put aside
whether time/space is only in the mind, as you think, or really exist)
On Jan 3, 10:39 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I disagree, and your remark
I disagree, and your remark singles out the problem with the bird's
eye/frog view of Tegmark. Those two views remains third person point
of views. Consciousness is intrinsically a first person view. You
cannot describe it in any third person point of view. This explains
why the
If I understand the standard MWI right (with my layman brain) Abram
Demski's view of time is very much in accordance with it, except that
time should be looked at simply as a fourth space dimension. A bird's
eye view on the whole universe (= all it's actualized worlds) would
be like a static
Hi Kim,
On 25 Dec 2008, at 06:21, Kim Jones wrote:
A bit of an end-of-year ramble. For the multi-lingual, illogically-
minded, lateral thinkers:
My last post was a bit self-destructive ramble as I am able to do once
a time. But that's ok. (I hope I am not shocking).
It is rather kind of
Hi Kim and all,
On 23 Dec 2008, at 11:50, Kim Jones wrote:
Bruno,
things are starting to hang together in my new digital brain (bright
yellow)
Good.
you wrote the plan:
---
A) UDA (Universal Dovetailer Argument)
1) I explain that if you are a machine, you
Abram,
On 23 Dec 2008, at 00:23, Abram Demski wrote:
I think you are right in calling this view eliminative materialism. I
am saying that the I is a convenient fiction.
All right. It is a normal tendency for scientist. It is like wanting
to see Platonia from outside. It is like deciding
Bruno,
things are starting to hang together in my new digital brain (bright
yellow)
you wrote the plan:
---
A) UDA (Universal Dovetailer Argument)
1) I explain that if you are a machine, you are already immaterial.
---
Fine. This thought is merely
I wrote:
Abram wrote
--When I tell you my bet about which movie I will see, I am not
minimizing the chance of being condemned to hell, I am minimizing the
number of my copies that will be so carried.
?
OK. I was distracted. To do this by altruism? And *you* (in your
sense) you
Bruno,
I think you are right in calling this view eliminative materialism. I
am saying that the I is a convenient fiction.
Hmmm... If you were correct, it seems to me you should say he when
you talk about yourself in the future. I love coffee so he will drink
coffee.
Maybe We love coffee,
Bruno,
Interesting thought experiment. My initial reaction (from my time
skeptic position):
--Since my consciousness is relative to a single moment, I can't talk
about that same consciousness being carried over to the next moment:
the consciousness in the next moment is a different
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