ownership
syndicates and grants co-owners free use and enjoyment of [the] private
portion and of the common portions of the condo, provided he observes the
by-laws of the immovable and does not impair the rights of the other
co-owners
Paul Horwitz
Visiting Assistant Professor
University of San
be
surprised if there were not other and clearer examples.
Paul Horwitz
From: Brad M Pardee [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: Re: Dover Intelligent-Design
argument on kirpans presented by Prof. Hamilton in
her valuable book God vs. the Gavel, and respectfully sides with the Court's
view.
Paul Horwitz
Southwestern University School of Law
Los Angeles, CA
___
To post, send message to Religionlaw
displays, although one set of arguments need not follow from the other. But
it seems to me that this resolution is unsure what it wants to say, or
unwilling to say it clearly. This strikes me as a remarkably irresolute
resolution!
Paul Horwitz
Southwestern University School of Law
Los Angeles, CA
I honestly can't recall, although I didn't think he had, so this is not too
much of a loaded question -- but where in Smith does Justice Scalia
expressly carve out the ministerial exception?
Best,
Paul Horwitz
Visiting Associate Professor
Notre Dame Law School
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply
As a first-time teacher of law and religion, I would be exceedingly grateful
if any list members have any past exams they'd be kind enough to share with
me offlist. Needless to say, I'm interested in models, and will craft my
own questions.
Thanks much in advance,
Paul Horwitz
Visiting
: Falwell -- good or bad?
Paul Horwitz
Visiting Associate Professor
Notre Dame Law School
From: Susan Freiman [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: Re: Falwell
Just as interesting, and more disquieting, than the blog post itself are the
comments on it.
Date: Mon, 14 Jul 2008 15:30:30 -0700
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: Mezuzah Suit Sparks Ruckus, Impassioned 7th Cir. Dissent
EMAIL THIS Email
of these areas, he deserves
serious consideration. If you know of any schools that might be looking in
these areas, or if you want to reach him directly or have questions, do feel
free to email me any time. Thanks and back to your regularly scheduled
programming.
Yours,
Paul Horwitz
Do you mean that Smith as symbol has been important to child and disabled adult
victims of church sexual abuse? I guess I have two questions about this. 1)
Those movements were becoming increasingly popular in the 1990s. Do you think
there's a causal relationship, or merely a correlative
I've read this long thread with interest. Marci's post evokes some questions
from me, as do some of the broader questions raised by the thread.
With respect to Marci's post, I confess I am uncertain why this case is
presented as an example of men imposing their religious views on the freedom
-- although they haven't changed my mind.
Paul Horwitz
From: lederman.ma...@gmail.com
Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2011 09:53:06 -0400
Subject: Hosanna-Tabor and the Ministerial Exception
To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Now that all the briefs are in except Doug's reply -- see
http://www.americanbar.org
.
On Mon, Aug 15, 2011 at 10:25 AM, Paul Horwitz phorw...@hotmail.com wrote:
I have a brief and basically non-substantive post up on Prawfsblawg today about
the Law and Religion Professors brief. Also, the Northwestern University Law
Review Colloquy will be running several pieces
sufficient to do all the necessary work.)
But even so, that claim is far more modest than the claim that there is a very
different and nearly unanimous consensus about this case . . .
On Mon, Aug 15, 2011 at 11:59 AM, Paul Horwitz phorw...@hotmail.com wrote:
I'm certainly happy to plead guilty
I think Marci has raised many valuable practical and theoretical questions
about church autonomy, both at the level of doctrine and at the level of
theory. I'm not trying to address all that here. Nonetheless, I think the
argument that the Court has repeatedly followed the principle of
I appreciate Marty and Rick's conversation. As Rick knows, I tend to share his
broad viewpoint and I've published on this issue before. Let me suggest that
there's a kind of disjuncture in the conversation, one that might be roughly
captured by the difference between thinking locally and
On the second point only, I can imagine two responses. The first you may find
too abstract: that some people may believe that whatever rights Dale secures
for churches, they should not have to rely on freedom of association to get
there. Maybe they just feel that way for abstract or
leader. At least in some cases, it seems quite
relevant to me.
Regards,
Paul Horwitz
University of Alabama School of Law
From: dc...@law.usc.edu
To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu; conlawp...@lists.ucla.edu
Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2012 08:56:31 -0800
Subject: Re: Hosanna-Tabor
It seems to me
This has been an absolutely fascinating conversation--heated, yes, but terribly
educational. I'm grateful to the many people who have weighed in. Given that I
was otherwise occupied during the meat of this discussion I have hesitated to
contribute, but I did want to pull together a couple of
implicitly or explicitly, for
ignoring, avoiding, disobeying, or violating rules resembles madness more
closely than it does common sense.
Best to all,
Paul Horwitz
University of Alabama School of Law
On Mar 3, 2012, at 5:41 PM, Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
The trouble
I agree that the word liberty may be problematic here. Of course it depends
on the circumstances: some set of facts, or some particular state law regime,
might involve a public sports league, or some set of religious rights of
non-discrimination in a place of public accommodation. (Although,
be in saying so) – and I would certainly hope that he wouldn’t reward my
hospitality with a lawsuit. Eugene Paul Horwitz writes: In this
case, it seems to me that the road to a reasonable resolution of the problem
lies in the fact that TAPPS opened itself to a situation in which
I'm sorry there haven't been more responses to this thread. May I point out
that Mirror of Justice has, unsurprisingly, had some very interesting
discussions of the statement in the last few days. I don't agree with all of
them but have found the discussion excellent.
For myself, I find the
This has been a very interesting discussion. I confess that at this point, I am
quite confused about the meaning of best interests of the child. I understand
it is a complex, context-driven, and multivalent test. But it would certainly
help to understand the foundational values and defaults
I am also curious about roughly the same point Howard raises. I always value
the doctrine- and act-specific discussions I get on this list--I learn a great
deal from them, and the theory I can more or less do on my own. But these
discussions often seem to me to be just one step away from
they must
be treated as sectarian, if that is even constitutionally relevant, just
because the outcome they suggest is consistent with a prominent sectarian view.
Paul Horwitz
Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 29, 2013, at 2:18 PM, Marci Hamilton hamilto...@aol.com wrote:
Of course history (people) can
On the first point only, the reservation is just that--a reservation. For EC
purposes, doctrine aside, I'm not sure whether I believe the religiosity of a
statement or display can be fixed only by contemporary understanding. I suspect
my conclusion would be that both historical and contemporary
Nelson, just on the third-party harm point, do you therefore think that
Hosanna-Tabor was wrongly decided? Or do you think that it is something of a
misnomer to treat a ministerial employee as a total third party?
On Nov 27, 2013, at 9:12 AM, Nelson Tebbe nelson.te...@brooklaw.edu wrote:
a litigation claim. But those
harms can't be used to displace an absolute Establishment Clause prohibition.
On Wed, Nov 27, 2013 at 10:44 AM, Paul Horwitz phorw...@hotmail.com wrote:
Nelson, just on the third-party harm point, do you therefore think that
Hosanna-Tabor was wrongly decided? Or do you
I'm curious about how this response relates to your response to Chris Lund, in
which you cited the Madisonian assumption that every group will seek the
maximum amount of power. It reminded me of this profile of Valerie Jarrett:
University
@Marci_Hamilton
On Dec 2, 2013, at 2:10 PM, Paul Horwitz phorw...@hotmail.com wrote:
I'm curious about how this response relates to your response to Chris Lund,
in which you cited the Madisonian assumption that every group will seek the
maximum amount of power. It reminded me
involving a clear and present danger or proximate cause
or reasonable person inquiry).
Regards,
Paul Horwitz
On Dec 3, 2013, at 10:13 AM, Marci Hamilton hamilto...@aol.com wrote:
I find it interesting that Doug concedes in this thread that results in RFRA
cases turn on the judge's predilections
Is that accurate? It may vary, but I thought the privilege could be claimed for
any confidential communication made to a clergy member in his/her professional
capacity as a spiritual advisor. The person seeking that counsel need not
necessarily be a co-communicant. I don't think this is just
they share. Secular people do not. Eugene From:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
On Behalf Of Paul Horwitz
Sent: Thursday, December 05, 2013 9:33 AM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: The clergy-penitent privilege
I don't think it becomes the equivalent of the Ninth Amendment, or a shell,
without heightened scrutiny as a freestanding principle. And I say that as a
fan of the pre-Smith regime. Rather, it becomes an equality/speech provision,
like the rest of the modern First Amendment. I am by no means a
Subject: Re: courts and lawmaking
From: phorw...@hotmail.com
Date: Sat, 28 Dec 2013 23:17:10 -0500
To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
CC: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Although I don't share this orientation, this is certainly an interesting
discussion. I'm wondering how New York Times v. Sullivan
In a liberal and tolerant society, I would also suggest that, absent some
particularly compelling circumstances, the government should not burden either
law professor by making them take the action they believe would render them
morally culpable for someone else's wrongdoing.
Which again makes
The literature on this question, as a legal question. Is of course growing like
Topsy. But I am not sure that you are asking the same question. Because this
country does not tend to privilege conscience qua conscience to the same degree
as religion, the question usually asked is why religion is
of academic freedom. Or do you think
that, sometimes, it just might?
For what it's worth, I agree with you that this story deserves attention. But
perhaps not for the same reasons that you do.
Respectfully,
Paul Horwitz
Sent from my iPad
On May 25, 2014, at 5:42 PM, jim green ugala
Just to add one small detail: I have no particular problem with questions or
skepticism and agree that they can be put into a legally relevant framework
(although in the post-decision commentary, not every such doubt or criticism
was so framed). But just as the ACA and its implementation have
It seems to me the broader debate suggests that *lots* of people these days,
and not just the religious, have no sympathy for post-modernist
anti-foundationalism--and/or that most of us are capable of moving between
legal realism and formalism and back again in a split second, often without
Of course, it is also possible that these legislators believe that it *is*
unconstitutional to heavily regulate homeschooling, either because it's the
best reading of Yoder and Pierce going forward (and given the premise that
those decisions leave the point unresolved), or because they are
I have no complaint about the way Hillel puts things below. I had no complaint,
as such, about the way he put things the first time. And I could think of much
worse things to be accused of than naiveté. But I should like to defend myself
to a certain extent. Of course I understand that
Ruthann Robson of CUNY has, on the con law listserv, offered a post linking to
the issuance of a judgment by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of
Mouvement laique quebcois v. Saguenay (City). [I apologize for not properly
accenting it; I am reminded of page 104 of Rick Atkinson's
I'm sorry not to see reference in the discussion to preexisting scholarly
discussions of the question of the extraterritorial reach of the EC or other
clauses of the First Amendment. No offense to the worthy statements of those
who have posted, or written elsewhere, although I do think
the state to empower various entities to have
police forces, is it constitutional because respectful of equal access to
governmental benefits or privileges?
Paul Horwitz
University of Alabama School of Law
MONTGOMERY, Ala. (AP) – The Alabama Senate has voted to allow a church to form
its
ervenor
...
On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 11:04 AM, Paul Horwitz
<phorw...@hotmail.com<mailto:phorw...@hotmail.com>> wrote:
Here's a story from the AP. What do you (or, to use the proper and incredibly
useful grammar of my adopted state, "y'all") think? Is it a quasi-Grend
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