Frances to imago Asthetik and others... The thorn in pragmatist categorics and semiotics is that its theorists want to accommodate the broadest sense of evolution into the mix. The introduction of the terms "representation" and "representamen" and "representant" is an attempt to satisfy this need. Having this orientation, it may then be possible to venture an explanation of the terms in application of matter and mind that evolves, which stuff would range from subtronic preparticulate neutrinos to intelligent scientific thinkers. In the original evolution of primal phenomena, no representation need necessarily occur, but until some auto representation occurs then no representation occurs. If a phenomenal thing however should sportingly represent itself to itself as its self for its self, perhaps the way particles in atoms might do to form a whole group, then the phenomenon is a representamen but one that is not a sign, because the self represents itself yet not as some other self and not even itself as another self to itself. Such phenomenal representation is contained only within a closed triune whose inner parts are nonetheless related, such as an atom or a molecule or plant or perhaps even a newborn baby brain. This kind of phenomena and representamen are called continuing continuent continua. If the phenomenon or thing should evolve to represent its self as some other self but only to itself in a sort of mirror reflection, then the continuent thing becomes an existent synechastic object, but remains a representamen that is not yet a sign. If it evolves to represent its self as some other self to its self or to some other self in a sort of external referention, then the existent synechastic object becomes a semiosic object and thus a representamen that is an existent sign. The representative and existening synechastic object determines the very being of a sign, while the subsequent representative and existing semiosic object determines the main kind a sign will be as an icon or index or symbol in acts of semiosis. The continuing things are attributed essences of phenomena given uncontrolled to feeling, while the existing objects are manifested substances of phenomena given uncontrolled to sense, and the existing signs are exemplified presences of phenomena given uncontrolled to the quasi mind and effete mind of matter or to the proto mind and mind of life. The difference between a representation or representamen that is not a sign or not yet a sign, and a representation or representamen that is a sign, is whether the referred object determines the representative sign; or whether the object or thing is represented internally by a kind of auto referention to the object or thing itself as its own representamen and referent, and not to any other object or thing external to it. My feeble attempt to explain and define this metaphysical haze of phenomenal stuff like representamen that was posited by early pragmatists is an ongoing struggle requiring great scholarly effort, but it will continue. At this stage in the discussion, some kind of graphic model depicting the visible layout of the phenomenal universe would likely be preferable, but the limits of these email messages without safe attachments makes this to me risky and virtually impossible. The model however could even have separate overlaying layers showing the terms and links applicable to different fields of study, such as metaphysics and categorics and physics and psychics and semiotics. It would all turn on the universe of phenomena. My apologies if my reply failed to address your concerns, therefore keep in touch online for further attempts. Perhaps other listers might wish to enter the fray and help to untangle this snarl of twine.
imago Asthetik writes... What is the difference, Ms Kelly, between a sign and a representation? One might think that saying >> Any ordinary object is a sign if it represents some other >> object for its self or for some other object as a signer to some >> effect. All objects are fated by representation to be signs and >> to determine signs, and further to be assigned or reassigned as >> iconic or indexic or symbolic signs of other objects, all by the >> evolutionary process of telic design. is tantamount to saying "a representation represents something represented". This strikes me as uninformative. Could you please clarify? On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 11:07 PM, Frances wrote: > Frances to imago Asthetik and others... > Any ordinary object is a sign if it represents some other > object for its self or for some other object as a signer to some > effect. All objects are fated by representation to be signs and > to determine signs, and further to be assigned or reassigned as > iconic or indexic or symbolic signs of other objects, all by the > evolutionary process of telic design. The agent of design however > is not some mystical entity like a god, but is a dispositional > tendency for evolving objects to act innately or habitually in > certain ways that sign situations demand of them. > Any ordinary object found or held to be a sign of art is an > extraordinary work that has the "power" in its form to reflect > worthy aesthetic values and to evoke intense aesthetic responses > of an emotional or practical or intellectual kind that are > worthwhile both individually and communally. If the substantive > form of the work is empowered in this reflective and evocative > way, then the work "has" an aesthetic form and "is" an aesthetic > object. The agent of design driving an object to be a sign of art > and a work of art is therefore some formal enforced empowerment. > > imago Asthetik partly writes... > I was under the impression that a reasonable definition stated > the necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of a term > (For example, "X is a sign if and only if conditions a, b, c, etc > are met" where 'a,' 'b,' and 'c' identify necessary properties of > the definiendum). She fails to provide a definition. Further, if > she has a specific notion in mind, it should not be difficult to > provide a definition, rather refer us to an unspecified set of > texts (angoamerican realist pragmatism). In fact, it would be far > more helpful to have a list of texts to consult, or a > philosopher's name (other than Peirce, who was not strictly > speaking a pragmatist).
