I was under the impression that a reasonable definition stated the necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of a term (For example, "X is a sign if and only if conditions a, b, c, etc are met" where 'a,' 'b,' and 'c' identify necessary properties of the definiendum). When Ms Kelley Writes,
The term "sign" should be held to stand for an "objective > relative" object that representatively stands for or signs some > other object in some signing way as related to a signer for some > signed purpose. The signers can be of matter or life, because > even matter is held to be quasi effete mind that feels in its > attempt to merely exist. For those who wish a good deep > definition of sign at its broadest, sources in the philosophy of > angloamerican realist pragmatism with its categorics and > semiotics is highly recommended. > She fails to provide a definition. Further, if she has a specific notion in mind, it should not be difficult t provide a definition, rather refer us to an unspecified set of texts (angoamerican realist pragmatism). IN fact, it would be far more helpful to have a list of texts to consult, or a philosopher's name (other than Peirce, who was not strictly speaking a pragmatist) On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 4:32 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > In a message dated 3/15/10 1:19:03 PM, [email protected] writes: > > > > The term "sign" should be held to stand for an "objective > > relative" object that representatively stands for or signs some > > other object in some signing way as related to a signer for some > > signed purpose. > > > I strongly recommend that to become comprehensible Frances provide examples > of the various entities she has in mind with 'sign', 'symbol', etc, and > that she describe her notion of "representatively" and of "stands for". > Evidently Frances believes in an action called "signing" that also needs to > be > elucidated. > > I also recommend that none of us listers assume that just because a notion > comes to mind when we read one of these arcane words it must be > sufficiently > like the notion in Frances's mind. I have many times over the years seen > listers wrestle uselessly because they didn't realize they unawaredly have > different notions in mind for the same term. > > Frances: Did you mean 'objective CORRelative' in T.S. Eliot's sense?
