What is the difference, Ms Kelly, between a sign and a representation?  One
might think that saying,

Any ordinary object is a sign if it represents some other
>> object for its self or for some other object as a signer to some
>> effect. All objects are fated by representation to be signs and
>> to determine signs, and further to be assigned or reassigned as
>> iconic or indexic or symbolic signs of other objects, all by the
>> evolutionary process of telic design.
>>
>
is tantamount to saying, "a representation represents something
represented".  This strikes me as uninformative.  Could you please clarify?


On Mon, Mar 15, 2010 at 11:07 PM, Frances Kelly
<[email protected]>wrote:

> Frances to imago Asthetik and others...
>   Any ordinary object is a sign if it represents some other
> object for its self or for some other object as a signer to some
> effect. All objects are fated by representation to be signs and
> to determine signs, and further to be assigned or reassigned as
> iconic or indexic or symbolic signs of other objects, all by the
> evolutionary process of telic design. The agent of design however
> is not some mystical entity like a god, but is a dispositional
> tendency for evolving objects to act innately or habitually in
> certain ways that sign situations demand of them.
>   Any ordinary object found or held to be a sign of art is an
> extraordinary work that has the "power" in its form to reflect
> worthy aesthetic values and to evoke intense aesthetic responses
> of an emotional or practical or intellectual kind that are
> worthwhile both individually and communally. If the substantive
> form of the work is empowered in this reflective and evocative
> way, then the work "has" an aesthetic form and "is" an aesthetic
> object. The agent of design driving an object to be a sign of art
> and a work of art is therefore some formal enforced empowerment.
>
> imago Asthetik partly writes...
>    I was under the impression that a reasonable definition stated
> the necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of a term
> (For example, "X is a sign if and only if conditions a, b, c, etc
> are met" where 'a,' 'b,' and 'c' identify necessary properties of
> the definiendum). She fails to provide a definition. Further, if
> she has a specific notion in mind, it should not be difficult to
> provide a definition, rather refer us to an unspecified set of
> texts (angoamerican realist pragmatism). In fact, it would be far
> more helpful to have a list of texts to consult, or a
> philosopher's name (other than Peirce, who was not strictly
> speaking a
> pragmatist).

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